The New Middle East

Are we headed for a war with Iran?

2012-01-29T17:37:00.005-05:00

The following Op-Ed article was published in the Newark, NJ, Star-Ledger and the Newhouse Papers on January 29, 2012. It can be found at: http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/01/are_we_headed_for_war_with_ira.html

As Iran defies the world and works toward building nuclear arms, Washington is turning up the heat in an effort to get the Iranians to back off. President Obama last week convinced Europe to impose economic sanctions on Iran — which some have called an act of war.

The United States doesn’t buy oil from Iran, but Europe is its No. 2 market. Europe’s embargo, with a push from America, could be crippling. And Obama is trying to convince Iran’s customers in Asia — China, India, Japan, South Korea — to join in.

The attack on Iran’s already wounded economy could push its leaders to retaliate: Iran is threatening to use military force to close the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and cut off the flow of oil to the United States and its allies.

Obama has moved more U.S. warships into the gulf — just in case — while he tries to find a diplomatic solution.

Tensions with Tehran are getting worse: Did Israel assassinate an Iranian nuclear scientist? Did the United States know about it? Will Japan and South Korea join the oil embargo? Will Iran execute a U.S. spy?

In the background, meanwhile, Obama’s Republican challengers are talking tough and pushing for a show of U.S. force.

Where’s it all heading? Star-Ledger editorial writer Jim Namiotka last week spoke with Eric Davis, a political science professor at Rutgers University and an expert on Middle Eastern affairs.

Q: Let’s start here: What are the odds of a U.S. war with Iran in 2012? 2013?

A: I would say that the odds are relatively small because neither side would benefit.
Iran would find itself isolated even more internationally. A war would increase support for Iran’s isolation by increasing the number of countries willing to impose sanctions.

For the U.S., war would have a very damaging impact on foreign relations in the Middle East, where it already has a poor image and is viewed as a bully and imperialist power.

Domestically, a war would lead to a drastic increase in gas prices. There are warnings that oil prices would go up to $300 or $400 a barrel or even higher. It would undermine the already tepid economic recovery we’re seeing here now in the U.S.

Q: Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Is that a real possibility?

A: Closing the Strait of Hormuz would be a violation of international law, which might justify action by the United Nations — paralleling the kind of action that was taken against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War over violations of international law. The Iranian regime couldn’t predict what the outcome of closing the strait would be, but it certainly knows that the U.S. wouldn’t allow that to happen.

Q: Europe has now said it will boycott Iranian oil if Iran’s leaders don’t halt their nuclear production. How can we expect Iran to react?

A: International sanctions have already wreaked havoc on Iran’s currency and forced the government to dramatically increase interest rates. The more significant effect is that the deteriorating economic situation is going to affect the parliamentary elections this coming March. It was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who has rejected calls to raise interest rates, which is necessary to protect the value of the Iranian rial.

As a result, his parliamentary candidates could suffer in the March elections.
So the sanctions are having both an economic impact and a political impact, as well.

One of the few options available to the Iranians is to try and increase their rhetoric on closing the Strait of Hormuz to force an increase in oil prices. This would have the effect of at least temporarily increasing the price of oil.

Even if Iran sold less oil, what it did sell would bring a higher price.

Iran can saber-rattle and it can threaten certain actions. But the Iranians can only go so far — they’re not about to start attacking tankers and laying mines because that would be considered an international act of war.

Q: What if other countries, such as Japan and South Korea, join in?

A: You might see perhaps — not a collapse of the Iran economy; that would be too extreme a prediction — but severe economic problems.

Q: Will sanctions convince Iran to stop developing nukes?

A: The Iranian regime might get serious about allowing international inspections, and then start playing games with the inspections while they keep working on their uranium enrichment program at underground facilities. But the regime can’t have it both ways and Iran’s leadership is going to have some real decisions to make in the very near future.

If Iran backs down in the face of U.S. and international pressure, that would constitute a real loss of status and prestige for Ahmadinejad and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

If Iran doesn’t respond to international demands for inspections of what it says is only a nuclear energy program, it’s going to continue to suffer economically.

Q: Is Iran a worrisome power? Compared with, for instance, Saddam’s Iraq?

A: No, Iran is not a major military power. But, as we saw in the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian forces have units ... such as their Revolutionary Guards that can inflict great harm if there was a land war as a result of an invasion by an international coalition, such as occurred in Kuwait in January 1991. Iran doesn’t have a powerful air force or navy. While Iran does have missiles that could reach parts of Europe, these aren’t serious military threats because Iran would not dare attack Europe.

Iran’s military power would only manifest itself if there were a land invasion of Iran, which I don’t see happening.

Iran’s greatest threat is using its rockets to attack Israel, which would result in an overwhelming Israeli response. Iran realizes such an attack would have serious consequences for the regime.

Q: Republican presidential candidates are talking tough about Iran. What are the practical results of such rhetoric?

A: Certainly, they are providing Iran’s regime tremendous grist for their propaganda mill. I don’t think any of the candidates are doing the U.S. any favors by threatening to attack Iran.

Q: Is Iran’s nuclear program a real threat?

A: I think they really want to develop nuclear weapons as part of their vision of becoming one of the main powers of the Middle East, primarily to compete with Israel and Turkey, even though they have a good relationship with Turkey. The Turks and the Persians have, historically, been enemies.

Q: What are the worldwide impacts of U.S.-Iran tensions?

A: The Saudis are threatening to start development of a nuclear program, perhaps to preclude Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

Q: Describe the changing face of the Middle East with a nuclear Iran.

A: It would be incredibly unstable. There would always be the threat of a pre-emptive attack by Israel.

Turkey sees itself as the emerging model — it’s an Islamist government, but it’s democratic and politically moderate. ... I think the Turks would have to think twice about becoming a nuclear power if Iran became a nuclear power.

It would not be very easy for Turkey to try to do that. Turkey is part of NATO, and a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. But treaties can be broken.

Q: Is there any way for the U.S. to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power?

A: There are only two ways: Either to make the cost of sanctions so high that Iran decides to allow for meaningful international inspections, which will prevent them from doing anything apart from what they say they want to do, namely use nuclear materials for power and civilian purposes … or to attack Iran and destroy its nuclear program. That would involve a ground war because a lot of their facilities are underground. You’d run into a lot of casualties by any invading army.

You could not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program simply through the use of air power.

Q: What don’t we know about Iran that we should?

A: The impression that readers will take away from this article is that Iran is kind of a radical country on the model of North Korea. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Iranian public is very much in support of democratization. For evidence of that, see the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, when thousands of Iranians demonstrated against his stealing of the presidential election. Public opinion polls and the opinions of scholars are that Iranians are very supportive of democracy. They also see a nuclear program as part of their sovereignty as a nation, but there’s no support for starting a nuclear war by attacking Israel.

One thing that doesn’t come across in the press is that there’s a lot of competition within the political elite: between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — the secular wing — and their spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who represents the clerical wing. The rhetoric we see is part of each far wing’s attempt to mobilize its base — much like the current political process we’re seeing in the U.S.

So there’s an intense political struggle going on inside Iran, which is why no one can really predict what the outcome will be in the effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

The Many Moving Parts of Iraq's Current Political Crisis

2012-01-27T19:24:00.017-05:00

What are the key components of the current Iraqi political crisis and what does it tell us about the future of Iraqi politics?

The most important dynamic is Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's effort to marginalize his political opponents and centralize power in his own hands. This effort was discussed in an earlier post (Dec. 23, 2011) and is described in great detail in a recent report by Human Rights Watch that has received a high profile in the Arab Press (see al-Hayat, Jan.23).

Maliki’s efforts to impose a new form of authoritarian rule has been incorrectly analyzed in purely sectarian terms. The processes in motion are much more complex and go well beyond sectarian politics. Maliki’s arch enemy, Ayad Allawi, is a fellow Shi’i as is his other nemesis, Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sadri).

Maliki is trying to eliminate Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition (which received many Shi’i and Kurdish votes in the March 2010 parliamentary elections) through a campaign of arrests in which those detained are accused of having engaged in terrorist attacks. Many of those arrested are former members of the Ba’th Party as well as members of the al-Iraqiya Coalition.

The core dynamic is the ongoing struggle over Iraq’s political identity. Will Iraq become a state dominated by Shi’i Islamists such as those in Maliki’s Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiya) which controls the broader State of Law Coalition (I’tilaf Dawlat al-Qanun)? Or will Iraq return to the legacy of the Iraqi nationalist movement which was dominated by secular politics?

Secular politics was the norm from Iraq's independence in 1921 and through at least the first decade of Ba’th Party rule between 1968 and Saddam Husayn’s seizure of power in 1979. Fearing the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 might spread to Iraq, Saddam began to promote sectarianism after invading Iran in September 1980.

While all Iraqi regimes (except that of Abd al-Karim Qasim between 1958 and 1963) favored Sunni Arabs for cabinet positions and positions in the state bureaucracy, Maliki seeks to impose the obverse of that system which now privileges Iraq's Shi’a. The difference with former regimes is that Maliki’s model is Islamist and anti-secular and thus precludes the type of cross-ethnic coalitions - such as represented by al-Iraqiya - that rose to prominence in the Arab Provincial Legislature elections of 2009 and the March 2010 parliamentary elections.

The most high profile case of those accused of terrorism is Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi who currently remains under the protection of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Most Iraqis feel that Maliki’s attempt to arrest al-Hashimi is political since the charges against him have been known since 2006. The KRG government is loathe to turn over al-Hashimi because that would both increase Maliki’s power and implicitly recognize Baghdad’s judicial authority within the KRG.

An important complicating factor is Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani’s declining health since he is al-Hashimi’s most important patron in the KRG. Talabani is increasingly worried about the sectarian policies that Maliki is pursuing. If Maliki is able to eliminate the secularists’ power, both Sunni and Shi’i Arab, Talabani and the KRG leadership realize that the Kurds will be the next target on Maliki’s list of political opponents.

Second, the struggle with his political opponents is not limited to Maliki’s dispute with secularists and al-Iraqiya. The Iraqi prime minister has been under constant attack by the Sadrists who have castigated him for his unwillingness to bring government corruption under control and to improve the quality of government services. Since the Sadrists represent poor Shi’a in Sadr (Revolution) City in Baghdad and throughout Iraq’s southern provinces, social services are the core factor in attracting support for their movement.

Maliki is also trying to undermine the power of the Sadrists by giving support to its arch-enemy, the League of the Righteous (‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq). Now that US forces have left Iraq, the Iraqi government is negotiating to have the League put down its arms and enter the political process. This was a brilliant move by Maliki because it increases the League's power and visibility and power and has forced the Sadrists to shift their attention from attacking his government to fending off the League’s new found strength.

The League of the Righteous developed within the ranks of the now disbanded Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi) beginning in 2004. That year the JAM challenged US forces by mounting an assault in the holiest Shi’i shrine city, al-Najaf. The Najaf uprising led to its defeat but created resentment among fighters that the JAM failed to mount further major offensives against American forces.

JAM units in a number of provinces and cities were gradually transformed into units loyal to the newly created League. These units included the "Abu-l-Fadl al-'Abbas" brigade in Amara Priovince, the "Musa al-Kadhim" brigade in Baghdad, the "Imam al-'Askari" brigade in Samarra, and the "Imam Ali" brigade in al-Najaf. The League has also received assistance from Iran where its fighters have received training (al-Hayat, Jan 4)

Under the leadership of Shaykh Qays al-Khaz’ali, the League grew to the position of influence it now holds. al-Khaz'ali studied under Sadr's father, Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq alp-Sadr (assassinated by Saddam's regime in 1999) which enhances his legitimacy among poor Shi'a. With Iranian help, and given added legitimacy by the Maliki government, the ranks of what we may call “populist Shiism” are divided between those who support the Sadrists and those who support the League (or a number of smaller militias that have formed in the south).

Over the past few months, Muqtada al-Sadr’s attacks on the League have escalated. The underlying theme of al-Sadr’s attacks have been that the League is a criminal organization which has nothing to do with religion (qutla la din la hum). Sadr has called for making the organization illegal. In a recent interview, Qays al-Khaz’ali indicated that he does not see the League reconciling with the Sadrist Trend. He also rejected assertions that his return from Iran indicates that he seeks to become the “Nasrallah of Iraq.”

The struggle between the Sadrists and the League of the Righteous not only enhances Maliki’s power but also that of Iran, which has given training and military support to both organizations. As their conflict intensifies, Iran always maintains the option of serving as an important mediator between these organizations as well as among competing Shi’i factions in Baghdad and throughout southern Iraq.

A third level of struggle reflects the impact of “neighborhood effects” on Iraq's domestic politics. Recently a scandal ensued in response to remarks supposedly made the Ali Solimani, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, before a large gathering of youth in Tehran, including those from several Arab countries. According to those at the gathering, Solimani indicated the Iran maintains decisive influence over the politics of Iraq and southern Lebanon (al-Hayat, Jan. 22).

The response in Iraq to Solimani's remarks was immediate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad for an explanation. Iraqi politicians were quick to attack Iran for interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs and for its failure to respect Iraq’s sovereignty.
At the same time, Turkey has criticized the Maliki regime for its sectarian policies and the possibility that they could lead to new instability. These remarks infuriated Maliki leading him to to protest to the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded by saying that nations which are friends are allowed to comment on theri respective politics and that Turkey’s criticism of Maliki’s policies were entirely appropriate (al-Hayat, Jan 21).

A fourth “moving part” is Maliki’s efforts to circumscribe the power of the Hawza, particularly that of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiism's most prominent religious figure. Maliki despises al-Sistani for his continued criticism of the rampant corruption in the state bureaucracy and the prime mister’s unwillingness to prosecute corrupt elements in his government. Maliki is also angry that al-Sistani has consistently refused to meet with him or any of his representatives (al-Sharq al-Awsat, Nov. 26, 2011)

It is no surprise that Maliki welcomed the Iranian government's decision to send Iraqi born Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi to al-Najaf to become Guardian of the Jurists (Wali al-Faqih) for Iraq, ostensibly to oversee the thousands of Iranian pilgrims who visit Shiite shrines in south central Iraq, especially in al-Najaf and Karbala’.

By appointing Shahroudi, a prominent cleric who once headed Iran’s judiciary, Wali al-Faqih for Iraq, the Iranian regime has mounted a direct challenge to the Najafi Hawza and its efforts to keep Shiism out of Iraq's daily politics. It also indicates that there will be intense competition over the successor to al-Sistani, who is in poor health.

The struggle for control of Iraqi Shiism pits the "quietist" clerics, who seek to keep power politics out of religion, and those who adhere to Iran's politicized form of Shiism, evident in the concept of State of the Jurisprudent (Wilayat al-Faqih). Maliki hopes that the Najafi Hawza will be forced to spend more time trying to contain Iranian influence being spread through Shahroudi’s office and thus have less time to criticize his government.

Maliki’s political decision-making is “penny wise, and pound foolish,” to use an old adage. He has put his opponents on the defensive and ingratiated himself with Iran. His political calculation is that he can ignore Turkish and American protests against his recent actions. Turkey will not go beyond criticism of his government because the Erdogan government does not want to jeopardize the Nabucco Pipeline project which will carry Iraqi natural gas through Turkey to Europe. For its part, the US does not want to loose lucrative arms contracts as Iraq rebuilds its air force and navy.

The longer term scenario is not as promising for Maliki. Marginalizing al-Iraqiya and continuing arrests of Sunni Arabs could easily lead to a renewal of violence, especially as the Sunni community sees Maliki working to create a sectarian based army in which Sunni Arabs (and Kurds) have little influence. A renewed insurgence in the so-called Sunni Arab triangle of north-central Iraq would have severe consequences for Iraq’s political stability.

The attempt to reduce the power of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Najafi Hawza is likewise poorly conceived. Certainly, it will alienate many pious Shi’a who consider al-Sistani much more than just their spiritual leader. al-Sistani’s efforts to promote social justice and democracy has made his beloved among large segments of Iraq’s Shi’i population (and Shi'a outside Iraq as well).

The Turks may decide to place more of their political eggs in the KRG basket and back off from investments in the Arab south, especially if political unrest and violence increase. If the Kurds feel Turkey is a solid ally, they may be encouraged to declare independence, especially if they see no change in Maliki’s unwillingness to make more concessions to the KRG. The current Iraqi budget, for example, has come under criticism from the Kurds (and local provincial legislatures) for not devolving government revenues to the KRG (al-Hayat, Jan. 23)

As Maliki attempts to consolidate power, he is becoming ever more dependent on the Iranian regime. The sensitivity of this issue is evident from Iraqi responses to Ali Solimani’s comments mentioned above. If attacks from the Sunni Arab community, the Sadrists and the Kurds increase, Maliki may find himself isolated and even more dependent on Iran. If he does become largely an Iranian puppet, his regime will face constant instability.

Democratic politics is not just a normative desideratum. It is ultimately the most stable and effective form of governance. If Maliki had decided after the March 2010 parliamentary elections to share power with al-Iraqiya, and to negotiate seriously with the KRG, he could have retained the prime ministership and put Iraq on the road to meaningful political and economic development. Maliki certainly has not learned the lesson that has led to the ouster of multiple autocrats in the Middle East. The processes he has set in motion can only lead to disastrous outcomes, both or Maliki and for Iraq.

Pakistan’s Current Crisis: Institutional Maturation or Manipulation?

2012-01-20T08:41:00.002-05:00

Guest author - Farah Jan

Over the past few weeks, Pakistan’s army has been faced with the quandary of whether to take over through a coup or not, while the rest of us are left wondering if this fragile democracy will survive, or once again be defeated by its formidable challenger – the army.

Since the start of the year, civil-military relations have taken a nosedive, with no recovery in sight, and with each side threatening serious consequences. The initiation of this cat and mouse chase between the military establishment and the democratically elected government began back in May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed by the American forces in Abbotabad. The government’s initial response was to condemn the blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but the rupture between the army and the civilian government was already set in place.

The recent "Memogate" scandal/affair is a testament to the army’s mistrust of the civilian regime, along with the Supreme Court’s order of reopening the corruption cases that were suspended in the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Hussain Haqqani, seems to be the first victim of the memogate scandal, who is accused of being the author of the so-called memorandum. This scandal is based on a confidential memorandum addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen after the bin Laden raid seeking American help to avert a military coup in return for nuclear transparency. The memorandum was delivered to Admiral Mullen by a Pakistani-American businessman, Mansoor Ijaz, on behest of Hussain Haqqani.

The analysis here is based on two issues; first, a post-U.S. scenario in the region, and, secondly, on the rising influence of the red dragon, China. Both are crucial for the Pakistan army and its future choices and options. In a post-U.S. region, along with the decline in American supremacy globally, the patron client relationship that Pakistan has maintained with the U.S. is also dwindling. Thus any party, person or group connected with it is also out of the game. The army from the very beginning has perceived the Zardari-Gillani enterprise as an American client regime, albeit the army would like to play that role itself and traditionally it had done so. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is conventionally associated with the West (particularly the U.S.) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif’s (PML-N) link seems to be more with the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia). Yet both have maintained and respected Pakistan’s ties with China.

The emerging player in Pakistani politics is cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan Threek-i-Insaaf (PTI), who has maintained an anti-American stand, in addition to an anti-foreign aid stance. Nevertheless, Khan has been astute enough not to air anti-China sentiment, and instead he insists on strengthening the already strong Sino-Pak ties. In recent months, Imran Khan also received an unprecedented invitation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to visit Beijing. Up until now, only elected prime ministers have been granted such honors, and this shows Beijing’s commitment to Pakistan’s future, as well as affirming its own regional position vis-à-vis India. Hence, for the army establishment it would be bearable to accept someone like Imran Khan, to keep the public content and the army in the barracks and not on the streets. The question is, would Imran Khan be able to keep his promises and contain this army-cum-leviathan that is immersed in every aspect of the Pakistani society.

Pakistan is clearly linking itself exclusively with China, and Sino-Pakistan relations have remained strong since 1962. Both sides claim that this all-weather friendship has endured political and economic shifts, but their partnership has remained strong. This brings us back to our earlier question: would the army once again enter the political arena or not? Historically, the army allows democracy to come into play only to please its Western clients, and with the power balance shifting towards the Chinese side, the army is not concerned with Western appeasement.

At this point, it is pivotal to keep in mind that the current political institutions in Pakistan are very different from the previous times when martial law was declared. The rules of the game have changed, with the judiciary and the media both playing a robust role in the political system. Albeit, the army might not care to placate the West, but to play it safe and not face a threat of mass revolt, it would not commit a coup for two reasons. Firstly, it is not prepared for a repeat of anything similar to the Long March of 2008-09. More importantly, if it can easily get its way by exploiting institutions like the judiciary and the media, why bother with instating martial law. In addition, General Kayani seems to be comfortable in being only the Chief of Army Staff, and not interested in being the president or the chief executive.

Pakistan has grappled with three and half (Yahya khan’s regime being the half) military regimes lasting for almost four decades. The military has exploited the India security threat for most of Pakistan’s existence in order to gain full access to all institutions. Thus, over the years it has strengthened its reach, and is used to getting rid of any civilian leader by conveniently declaring martial law. But with the recent events in the Middle East, it will play it safe and would not like to start a new wave, or the South Asian version of winter revolution/uprising.

Thus the army this time is more calculated, by playing one branch of the government against another. The judiciary seems to be in a head on collision with the executive branch with the army establishment in the control position. The reopening of NRO cases (corruption cases) is an attempt to purge the society of the old guard and pursuing the memogate scandal has already left the government weak and discredited.

Predictions are often embarrassing, yet as political scientists, we attempt to make enlightened guesses, and the present situation in Islamabad is filled with ambiguity and uncertainty. The aim here is not to predict, but to contend that the army has always claimed to be the defenders of Pakistan’s borders and the protectors of their motherland, yet their record shows that they have not been the guardians of Pakistan’s constitution or the preservers of democratic institutions. As it was famously joked about, ‘every country has an army, and in Pakistan’s case the army has a country.’ If the army establishment is interested in the future of Pakistan as an economic success story, it needs to back off and let the political process take place. The army needs to heed from Henry Kissinger advice, ‘that Pakistan needs to think long term and needs to find a national identity that is not based on the fear of India.’

fjan@polisci.rutgers.edu

Farah Jan is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Rutgers University – New Brunswick, NJ.

Making Sense of the Arab Spring - Part 3: Egypt's Stalled Democracy

2011-12-30T21:32:00.021-05:00

Will Egypt's democracy activists be able to tame the military? As I mentioned in a earlier post on Egypt's Arab Spring, the main threat to Egypt's democratic transition is neither its Islamist-secular divide, nor intra-Islamist conflict between moderates and Salafis. The key impediment is the military (or what should more accurately be called the military-industrial complex) . Will the military cede power to civilian leadership? Thus far, the answer is not at all encouraging.

Two recent events underscore the power and central role of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) in post-Mubarak politics: on December 28th, SCAF announced that it was lending $1 billion to the central bank to prop up Egypt's deteriorating currency. Egypt's foreign currency reserves have been cut in half from $36 billion since political demonstrations a year ago to $18 billion at the end of this past November, threatening a balance of payments crisis. As reserves approach dangerous levels, the developing crisis threatens to devalue Egypt's currency still further and add to inflation, leading to a spike in local commodity prices that Egyptians can ill afford.

SCAF's other move was the sacking the following day of the offices of 17 civil society organizations, 3 of which are American, on the grounds of accepting foreign donations and "operating outside Egyptian law" (never mind that the military itself accepts $1.3 billion in US foreign aid each year).

Both of these developments suggest that we should not expect any meaningful democracy to develop in Egypt anytime soon. As Freedom House, one of the organizations whose computers and files were seized, noted, the attacks “come in the context of an intensive campaign by the Egyptian government to dismantle civil society through a politically-motivated legal campaign.”

SCAF's ability to lend the Egyptian government funds and suppress legitimate civil society organizations tells us two things: first, the military is really a state within a state that answers to no one but its leadership; and second, it is not serious about allowing anything more than the trappings of democracy to emerge in Egypt.

In their obsessive focus on the Islamist movement in Egypt, Western analysts continue to overlook the main roadblock to positive change, namely the SCAF. The Egyptian military has huge economic holdings that are estimated to constitute anywhere from 8% to 30% of total Egyptian GDP. Whatever the correct percentage, the question becomes whether the state controls the military or the whether the state is merely an appendage of the military.

The military is thoroughly enmeshed in Egypt's economy. It manages bakeries and gas stations, owns industrial factories that produce everything from bottled waters to tanks, and even controls toll roads inside Egypt. The military owns large amounts of land around Cairo where its members live in fashionable gated communities, complete with sod for golf courses flown in from the United States.

The Egyptian military differs from many of the armed forces in other states involved in the Arab Spring. It is not organized according to the professional model that characterizes the Tunisian military. It was never fragmented like the Libyan military which, for all intents and purposes, was thoroughly destroyed with the overthrow of Muammar al-Qaddafi. While certain cliques control the Egyptian officer corps, it is not organized along sectarian lines like the Syrian military which, if Bashar al-Asad's regime falls, will take down the Alawite dominated army with it.

The Egyptian military more closely resembles the former Kemalist military in Turkey. For decades, it too controlled a large state public sector, including banks, industry and trading companies. The Turkish military removed governments at will, especially when it thought they were infringing on its rights. It took a long time but the Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) that controls the Turkish government has finally been placed the military under civilian control. If the Turkish model provides any example, the effort to convert Egypt's military into an apolitical institution, designed to do what the armed forces are intended to do - defend the nation - will involve a long struggle indeed.

SCAF reflects more the Algerian model where, as one Arab colleague, Dr. Abdel Hamid al-Siyam, put it, the military owns a state, and that state is called Algeria. Indeed, SCAF owns a state as well and that state is Egypt.

That separating the military from its economic holdings will be extremely difficult was already evident this past November when SCAF proposed rules that would remove the military and its funding from constitutional oversight. The last thing SCAF wants to see is that its budget be made public. When nation-wide demonstrations were called to reject the military's refusal to place itself under civilian control, a brutal crackdown ensued in which 40 demonstrators were killed in a week of protests.

What then can one expect now that Egypt has held its first post-Mubarak elections? As the recent election results indicate, a new Islamist dominated government will undoubtedly be installed, but with little or no power of control over the military. While it might be allowed to implement some of its political agenda, ]such as reining in what are considered religiously inappropriate Western entertainment programming, the new government will not be allowed to infringe on the military's prerogatives.

While the SCAF might see this as an acceptable political equilibrium, the new Egyptian government will be unable to implement the economic reforms necessary to jump start the Egyptian economy or tackle the massive corruption that pervades the state apparatus unless it can gain control of military spending. As exit polls and numerous analyses of the elections have made clear, the vote for the Islamists was not a vote for a more religious society and constraints on individual freedoms, but for controlling corruption and expanding economic opportunity. If this doe not occur, the new government will lose its legitimacy.

Egypt needs to create at least 175,000 new jobs each year (some estimates put hte number at closer to 250,000) just to maintain the present high level of unemployment which hits Egyptian youth especially hard. If more jobs aren't forthcoming, more demonstrations can be expected. While many junior officers and conscripts find the military's attacks on demonstrators repugnant, the military has plenty of funds to continue to support the special security forces that it uses to suppress demonstrations.

After the first elections in Egypt since the fall of Mubarak (elections that have been compromised by irregular ballots and shifting candidate names on elections lists, just to name two problems that have surfaced), we can expect a political system that parallels those of some central American states where elected officials serve as front men for military rule, or the Pakistan model where the president and prime minister bow to the rule of the army and its security arm, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The United States, Europe and Turkey are wise to have begun a dialogue with the Muslim Brotherhood which will need all the support it can muster if it is to mount any type of challenge to the SCAF. While it might seem a radical step, withdrawing the US's annual $1.3 billion in foreign aid to the military and channeling it instead to local development organzaitions would send a strong message to those who control Egypt's military-industrial complex. The message is simple: either allow for substantive change, including civilian oversight of the military's budget, and tackling corruption in the state public sector, or lose US financial support.

Hopefully, the US learned by now that support for autocratic forces is no longer a viable long-term strategy in the Middle East. Only meaningful democratic change will bring stability to the region. Egyptians are a politically sophisticated people who not allow themselves to establish a radical and intolerant Islamic state. The US and its allies insult this political sophistication if they do not keep up the pressure on the SCAF to allow real democratic change

The Ripple Effects of the Political Crisis in Iraq

2011-12-25T22:15:00.029-05:00

What are the dangers posed by the spreading political crisis in Iraq, both domestically and in the larger region? Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's gambit of issuing an arrest warrant forVice-President Tariq al-Hashimi on charges of having been involved in the 2006 bombing of the Shiite al-Askari mosque in the city of Samarra and of being complicit in the assassination attempt of former deputy prime-minister Salam al-Zawbai'i in 2007 ring hollow.

First, these charges are not new. Coming immediately after the final withdrawal of US troops from Iraq, they smack of sectarianism and a power grab. The charges leveled against deputy prime minister Salih al-Mutlak, of administrative irregularities, which effectively prevents him from serving in his current post, also seem highly dubious, since corruption and malfeasance plagues much of Maliki's current administration. These charges were leveled a day after Multlak referred to Maliki as a "dictator."

First and foremost, al-Maliki's actions threaten to further undermine efforts at national reconciliation among Iraq's 3 main ethnoconfessional groups and, in the process, erode Iraqi federalism. That both al-Hashimi and al-Mutlak are Sunni Arabs strikes many Iraqis as sectarianism on the part of Maliki's Shiite dominated government. Already the Sunni Arab Provinces of north-central Iraq have voted to create their own semi-autonomous region on the model of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), although the Diyala Provincial Council subsequently rescinded its vote after widespread demonstrations against the province becoming a semi-autonomous region (see al-Hayat, Dec. 21).

Second, Maliki's efforts to consolidate power in his hands increases Iranian influence in Iraq since they are designed to reduce the influence of secular and anti-Iranian political forces. Maliki has not only alienated Iraq's Sunni Arabs but the Kurds as well. It was Kurdish deputies in parliament who allowed Maliki to create a ruling coalition after 9 months of wrangling following the March 2010 parliamentary elections.

The semi-autonomous KRG suffered attacks by Iranian forces earlier this year, ostensibly to root out PJAK guerrillas who fight Iran from Iraqi soil to improve conditions of Iran's Kurdish population. Certainly , the KRG is loath to see increased Iranian political clout in Baghdad. That the Kurds are sheltering al-Hashimi in the KRG is indicative of their displeasure with Maliki's actions.

Third, both the Kurds but especially the Sunni Arab population sees Maliki's actions as an attempt to marginalize them politically. This process further undermines trust between the central government in Baghdad and the provinces, threatening to stokes the flames of civil unrest. Now that American troops are gone, the prospect of a reemergence of the Sunni Arab insurgency and increased conflict between the KRG and Baghdad over the disputed oil-rich city of Kirkuk and other areas along the so-called "Green Line" separating the KRG and Arab Iraq have increased and could lead to renewed bloodshed.

Fourth, Maliki's moves have created apprehension in Saudi Arabia and among the Sunni Arab dominated Gulf states which are already nervous about Iran's efforts to become a regional hegemon as evidenced by its efforts to develop nuclear weapons. As the crisis in Bahrayn makes clear, there is great concern on the part of the Saudi and Arab Gulf monarchies that their own Shiite populations will demand more political rights. If the current crisis in Iraq continues, the result will be further efforts of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to interfere in Iraq's domestic politics on the side of the Sunni Arab population as they did when the insurgency led by al-Qai'da in the Mesopotamian Valley began after 2003.

Fifth, Maliki's actions at consolidating political power in an authoritarian manner have enhanced the cynicism of the populace at large and undermined their confidence in the democratization process. Just when many Iraqis thought that the March 2010 parliamentary elections heralded a turn towards real democratization, Maliki manipulated the political process to exclude al-Iraqiya, the winning coalition. Hence Maliki's ability to ignore the people's will by not ceding any meaningful cabinet posts and political power to al-Iraqiya has undermined Iraq's still fragile democracy.

Sixth, if the crisis continues, it will accelerate the "brain drain" that Iraq is suffering as educated Iraqis from the middle and upper middle classes seek to leave the country to fulfill their professional goals. The loss of the educated classes has many negative consequences. It hinders improving the quality of the services provided by the state bureaucracy which is populated by many employees who do not possess the necessary education or training for the positions that they hold. It also undermines efforts at economic development because the state lacks the competent officials required to facilitate foreign investment, not only in the dominant hydrocarbon sector but in the developing private sector as well.

Finally, while Maliki's short-sighted policies may enhance his political power, the resulting political discontent and instability that these policies engender could undermine foreign investment. Already the Maliki government is embroiled in a dispute with Exxon-Mobil which is owed $50 million for the energy giant's work at increasing oil production in the West Qurna field in southern Iraq.

What makes this conflict especially troubling is Exxon-Mobil's signing of a separate contract with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) which has infuriated the central government in Baghdad. Analysts have suggested that the Iraqi government is withholding payment over what it considers an illegitimate contract signed by Exxon-Mobil with the KRG.

If political instability increases, including attacks by insurgents on foreign companies engaged in exploration of Iraq's oil fields (and natural gas fields as well), the entire process of foreign investment in Iraq's energy sector could grind to a halt. Since the Iraqi government began awarding contracts to foreign oil companies in 2008, the profits derived from these contracts, known as Technical Service Agreements (TSA), have been very small.

While foreign companies must invest large sums of money upfront In Iraq in the hope of gaining more lucrative contracts in the future, there is no incentive for them to take such risks if these investments will not produce profits in the long term. The key phrase here is long-term. No foreign firm will invest in Iraq if it thinks that the country is politically unstable.

KRG president Masoud Barzani has called for a national conference of all political parties to confront the ongoing crisis. President Jalal Talabani has expressed doubts in the charges leveled against Tariq al-Hashimi (al-Hayat, Dec. 21), and Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist bloc, one of the mainstays of Maliki's parliamentary coalition, not only called Maliki a "traitor" for traveling to Washington, DC to meet with President Obama (al-Hayat, Dec 12), but now has called for new parliamentary elections to address the current crisis.

Maliki may have overplayed his hand. There are calls for a no-confidence vote in his government and al-Iraqiya has proposed replacing Maliki with either Ibrahim al-Ja'fari or Adil Abd al-Mahdi. While Maliki's attempt to dispense with the cumbersome 3 party structure that requires compromise with political forces he finds distasteful, such as the Kurdish bloc and al-Iraqiya, he should realize that national reconciliation is not only in his own personal interest - namely retaining his position as prime minister - but in finally beginning the healing process that Iraq so desperately needs.

While the Iraqi people look on with great dissatisfaction, if not disgust, Iraq's political elite has yet to learn the lesson that there can be no authoritarian regime such as that of the former dictator Saddam Husayn. Compromise and national reconciliation represent the only road forward in Iraq, Failure to do so will have serious negative consequences that will only serve those forces that want to see Iraq become a weak and fragmented nation-state.

The Crisis in Iraq

2011-12-22T09:13:00.011-05:00

Developments over the past few days represent the continuation of a disturbing political trend since the March 2010 parliamentary elections. Methodically, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has been maneuvering to gain complete control over Iraq's political system. Placing independent government agencies under his control, such as the Central Bank and the Independent High Election Commission, intimidating the judiciary to adjudicate decisions that favor his rule, and creating security services that report directly to him, Maliki is on his way to establishing an new authoritarian political system.

President Obama's comments that we leave behind a stable and democratic Iraq indicates one of the problems with US policy in Iraq. The US has not been forceful enough in criticizing Maliki's moves to undermine Iraq's nascent experiment with democratization. While respecting Iraq's sovereignty as an independent nation-state, the issue is not one of interfering in Iraq's internal affairs but one of keeping the pressure on authoritarian rulers and authoritarian wannabes throughout the world, including Iraq.

For those who argue that what is happening in Iraq - particularly the efforts to marginalize the Kurds and arrest Sunni political leaders such as Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi on charges of engaging in terrorist activities - reflects its "artificiality" as a nation-state, we need remember that the March 2010 parliamentary elections. These elections witnessed a large nation-wide turnout of well over 60%, were devoid of violence, were said to be fair and free according to international observers, and were won by a cross-national coalition based in secular politics. That coalition - al-Iraqiya - won the votes of Sunni Arabs , Shiites and not an insignificant number of Kurds. The new reformist Gorran (Change) Party. that won a large number of seats in the Kurdish Regfional Government parliament elections of July 2009, along with its coalition partner, the Services and Reform List, won 8 parliamentary seats in the March 2010 elections.

The point here is that the problem is not Iraq's artificiality as a nation-state, but the quality of its political leadership. And we need remember that the current leadership gained power with US help when it facilitated the return to Iraq of large number s of expatriate politicians, including Nuri al-Maliki. Beyond the need to criticize repressive regimes, the US bears considerable responsibility for the current political state of affairs in Iraq.

What should the US be doing given Maliki's high stakes actions that could lead Iraq back to sectarian violence and even the possibility of its splitting up as a country? The US still has many cards in its hand. First an foremost, it controls the flow of new weapons and military technology to Iraq. Second, it is involved in training of Iraqi troops, security personnel and police forces.

Third, the US continues to advocate on Iraq;'s behalf in international economic fora, such as helping Iraq conclude its debt obligations to Kuwait resulting from the 1990-91 occupation of that country. Fourth, the US plays an important role in mediating relations between Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states which view the Maliki government as a Trojan Horse for Iran. Finally, for all the talk of Iranian influence, Iraq's political elite still seeks to use US influence as a counterweight to Iran. In short, the US still wields considerable influence in Iraq.

In the short term, the US should maintain some patience since a political solution to the current impasse between Maliki, and the Sunni Arab and Kurdish leaders may still be worked out. However, in back channels, it needs to make known in the most vigorous manner, its alarm and dissatisfaction with Maliki's behavior. If such behavior intensifies, public criticism will be in order.

If Maliki continues to pursue his authoritarian policies, the US needs to ask itself whether it wants to be drawn in to another situation such as occurred in Egypt under the rule of Husni Mubarak. Is it worth maintaining a strong position for US military and police trainers and selling weapon systems to Iraq if the Maliki government comes to replicate the type of dictatorial rule that was overthrown in 2003? Is the US willing to once again support authoritarianism with the idea that the benefits gained by not criticizing Maliki are offset by its ability to use its position in Iraq to offset Iranian influence in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula?

The disastrous US policies in Iran that led to the revolution of 1978-79, the overthrow of Mubarak in Egypt with the resulting chaos and threat to stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the turmoil that resulted from supporting Muammar al-Qaddafi's rule in Libya demonstrate the self-defeating consequences of supporting authoritarian rule in the Middle East (and elsewhere).

The Obama administration needs to realize that democratization in Iraq is not just an abstract question of creating a desirable political system. Failure to push forward with democratization in Iraq means to effectively exclude the Sunni Arab population as well as the Kurds from political participation and power. The danger here is a return to violence and the possibility of Iraq breaking up into 3 mini-states. Already, the demands of the Sunni Arab provinces in north-central Iraq to create a regional government such as the KRG point to the centrifugal political forces at work.

A fragmented Iraq would not be in Iraq's interest, the interest of the broader Arab Mashriq, and certainly not in the interest of the United States. The Obama administration needs to carefully assess whether the short term gains of maintaining its position in Iraq are worth not calling Maliki to task for his destructive political policies.

Iraq is at a tipping point. Is the US ready to meet the challenge or will it hide its head in the sand and continue to foster the illusion that Iraq is on its way to becoming a "sovereign, reliant and democratic country"?

Democratization and the US Legacy in Iraq

2011-12-16T08:45:00.010-05:00

What is the US legacy in Iraq, especially its impact on democratization in the Middle East? By the standards that were originally set forth as the reasons for the 2003 invasion, we have a very mixed picture. Saddam Husayn and his repressive Ba'thist regime are gone for which many Iraqis are thankful. Yet Iraq faces many problems which threaten its efforts to achieve security, national reconciliation and economic growth. Perhaps worst of all, the cause of democratization in the Middle East has been undermined by many aspects of US policy in Iraq.

First, should the US have invaded Iraq? Let us begin by admitting that it is unconscionable that there was so little criticism of Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist regime prior to its overthrow in 2003. Whether the statistic is 2 or 3 million Iraqis, Saddam and his henchmen were responsible for genocide. That so few intellectuals, both Arab and Western, called this to the attention of the world is something of which no one can be proud. If we are to take human rights seriously, then Saddam and the Ba'th were among some of the most egregious violators of the late 20th century.

The US and the world community came to possess an enormous amount of documents after the 1991 Uprising (Intifada) that followed the 1991 Gulf War. An extraordinary trove of documents that called for mass killings, many signed by Saddam himself, made clear the extent to which the Ba'th was responsible for genocide. If the US and other countries - Western and non-Western - had been serious about removing Saddam from power, they would used these documents immediately after the 1991 Gulf War to indict Saddam and demand that he be remanded for trial in a special international tribunal as was done for Nazi leaders at Nuremberg, and with former Serbian dictator, Slobadon Milosevic.

To argue, as some critics of the US invasion have done, that Iraq is worse off today than under Saddam and the Ba'th is an untenable position. However, that does not mean that we need agree with the manner in which Saddam was removed from power. If we have learned one lesson from the Iraq experience, it is that unilateralism in international affairs is neither an effective nor acceptable component of a country's foreign policy.

Second, despite the sectarian infighting that continues to bedevil Iraqi politics, we need to keep in sight the impact that many of the early, ill advised decisions taken by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). The CPA's policies set the stage for the many of the problems Iraq faces as US troops complete their withdrawal from the country.

The most serious mistake was disbanding the 385,000 man Iraqi conscript army. That army had an ethnically integrated officer corps. Most of its members despised Saddam and his regime because elite units such as the Republican Guards, the Special Republican Guards and the Fedayeen Saddam (Those who would sacrifice for Saddam) received preferential treatment. Members of the conscript army remembered being left in Kuwait in January 1991 to suffer carpet bombing by US and UN coalition aircraft, receiving substandard weaponry and often not being paid. Many begged the US to give them back their positions after May 2003.

Had the conscript army not been disbanded, a force would have been in place that could have assured stability in Iraq after the ouster of Saddam and the Ba'th. Disbanding the national police and the ill conceived policy of de-Ba'thification (a policy strongly influenced by Iraqi expatriates who were more interested in their individual political agendas than Iraq's national interests) only added to the number of Iraqis who developed a hostility to the US occupation. Because of the dire economic situation, many Iraqis were forced to join the anti-American insurgency that developed in late 2003 and after.

The extensive looting that occurred in Baghdad in April 2003, including the destruction and theft of many priceless artifacts in the Iraq Museum, led many Iraqis to immediately lose trust in American intentions in Iraq. Subsequently, few Iraqis were willing to support the US' occupation and fewer still believed in the stated goal of the invasion that the US truly wanted to bring democracy to Iraq.

The formation of the Iraqi Governing Council shortly after the toppling of Saddam along sectarian lines - the first government to be constructed according to ethnoconfessional quotas - set a terrible tone for post-Ba'thist Iraqi politics. While sectarianism informed most Iraq governments in the 20th century (the regime of General Abd al-Karim Qasim between 1958 and 1963 being a notable exception), none had ever made ethnoconfessional quotas an explicit criterion for membership in government.

Worse still, and often ignored by analysts of Iraq, was the failure of the US government to confront the severe unemployment and material suffering of the populace caused by the UN sanctions regime of the 1990s and the Ba'th's policies of favoring certain regions of the country, e.g., providing electricity to Baghdad at the expense of the largely Shi'i inhabited south.

As the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) demonstrated, when funds were used to give Iraqis work, even at menial jobs such as cleaning up neighborhoods, or repairing sewer lines and schools, violence virtually disappeared. A more culturally informed policy - an understanding that Iraqis needed not only physical security but economic security - would have nipped the insurgency in the bud. It would have undermined the incentives for Iraqis to take up arms against US forces and against the nascent Iraqi army and newly formed police forces.

The CPA's elimination of agricultural subsidies in August 2003 made Iraqi farmers' crops less competitive with Iranian and Syrian exports of fruits and vegetables. One of the outcomes was the migration of large numbers of Iraqi farmers, especially younger ones, to urban areas where they became available for recruitment by sectarian militias and criminal organizations.

It was only in 2006 and after when the Bush administration did a major shift in its policy that the insurgency was finally crushed. A key factor was the development of the "Awakening" (al-Sahwa) or "Sons of Iraq" movement that ended the military power of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq - an arm of al-Qa'ida in the Mesopotamian Valley.

The key factor in turning the situation around in Iraq was cultural sensitivity - listening to and respecting Iraqis, and following their lead in trying to bring stability to the country. Had the US followed such a policy earlier on, and had Saddam been removed from power by an international coalition, and not just by unilateral US action, the tremendous human and material losses in Iraq could have been avoided.

We also need to remember that Iraqis voted at high turnout levels in parliamentary elections in 2005 and 2010, in Arab provincial legislative elections in 2009, and in the Kurdish Regional Government local parliamentary elections in 2009. The problems of Iraqi democracy are not those of its citizens but those of its elites, many of whom arrived on the political scene with the US invasion in 2003.

These political elites continue to pursue narrow political agendas, manipulating sectarian identities in the process. We need remember that Baghdad's and Arbil's sectarian entrepreneurs represent only a small (albeit powerful) percentage of the overall Iraqi populace, whether Arab, Kurdish, or Turkmen.

Many analysts still stress the sectarian dimension of Iraqi politics and, by extension, apply it to all the Arab world. This has led these analysts to trot out old, worn-out concepts such as the Arab "democracy deficit," and the lack of national identity. While still in its infancy, the Arab Spring belies many of these concepts. It is time for many Western analysts to look at themselves in the mirror and question their analytic frameworks. Which analysts, myself included, predicted the Arab Spring?

The US, the EU, and countries such as Turkey, India, Indonesia, and other countries committed to democracy need to continue to support forces in the Middle East, especially the region's youth, who are struggling for democratic change. The continud efforts of sectarian elites in Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East to impose authoritarian rule should not become an excuse for democracies outside the region to lose hope in its future.

While democratization movements face many challenges, achieving democratic change is the key to solving the problems of the Middle East. There can be no economic growth if social and political participation is limited to small rapacious elites or if women - 50% + of the population - are excluded from the public sphere by movements that purposely misinterpret Islam. Corruption - pervasive throughout the Middle East - can only be eliminated through representative, accountable and transparent governance.

Because the US made many flawed policy decisions in Iraq is no reason to compound these mistakes. Public opinion polls and many other indicators continue to show that Iraqis want democracy, but a democracy that offers them social justice in the form of needed social services. It would be a great tragedy if the US legacy in Iraq were to undermine US and Western support for democratization in Iraq and throughout the region.

Sectarianism in Iraq: a Review

2011-12-04T21:19:00.012-05:00

The following review of Sectarianism in Iraq: Antagonistic Visions of Unity by Fanar Haddad, published by Columbia University Press, will appear in the winter 2012 issue of The Middle East Journal (vol. 66, no. 1).

Iraqi officials often deny the existence of sectarianism in Iraq. Conversely, Western analysts often view Iraq as an artificial nation comprised of an amalgam of mutually conflictual ethnoconfessional groups. A binary that presents Iraq as either devoid of or consumed by sectarian identities is obviously conceptually flawed. In Sectarianism in Iraq, Fanar Haddad seeks to expand our understanding of this difficult and complex topic.

Drawing upon symbolic anthropology, cultural analysis and post-modernism, the author develops a sophisticated analytic framework that emphasizes the impact of the post-Gulf War Uprising (Intifada) of 1991, the 2003 American invasion, and what the author terms the “civil war” that developed in the wake of the invasion to frame his study.

Sectarianism in Iraq is particularly insightful when examining the changing nature of social and political identities. The negative legacy of Saddam Husayn’s political manipulation of ethnoconfessional identities, especially during the 1990s UN sanctions regime, was compounded after 2003 by a weak state that has consistently failed to exercise the leadership needed to promote social trust and national reconciliation.

The author deftly analyzes how Shi'i identities following 2003 have come to reflect the obverse of Sunni Arab identities prior to 2003. The once dominant Sunni Arab political community now expresses themes of marginalization and victimization similar to those formerly expressed by Shi'a.

Sectarianism in Iraq exhibits conceptual parallels with Kanan Makiya’s Republic of Fear. While offering a trenchant critique of Ba'thist rule, Makiya presented Saddam’s regime as so powerful as to create an aura of its invincibility. In the process, Makiya inadvertently provided Saddam’s regime with support since his analysis suggested that efforts to overthrow it were futile.

Likewise, Sectarianism in Iraq presents a picture of post-1991 (and especially post-2003) Iraq in which sectarian identities have paralyzed state and society. The volume leaves the reader with the feeling that Iraq suffers from a social disease that can never be cured.

In presenting a partial analysis, the author proffers a theory that is conceptually monochromatic, half of the dialectic as it were. On the one hand, he is extremely thorough in demonstrating state discrimination against the Shi'a since the modern state’s founding in 1921. However, the study says virtually nothing about the powerful nationalist movement that emerged after WW I which fought to promote a national sense of Iraqi identity and to unite Iraqis of all ethnic and confessional origins.

The historical memory of that movement still lives. As the author himself notes, a Rwandan style genocide could never occur in Iraq (p. 54). Yet he never explains what factors lead some Iraqi to construct what he aptly terms a “myth-symbol complex” based in sectarianism as opposed to one that is grounded in a sense of national Iraqi identity.

Consequently, Sectarianism in Iraq cannot explain why Iraqis celebrated en masse Iraq’s unexpected victory in the 2007 Asia Cup, or why Iraqi Shi'a and Sunnis (and even Arabs and Kurds) still intermarry. It offers little insight into why public opinion polls consistently show that Iraqis view unemployment and lack of social services as far more important problems than sectarianism. It cannot tell us why Rashid al-Khayyun’s Against Sectarianism (Didd al-Ta’ifiya) was one of the most popular books at this past summer’s Baghdad Book Fair.

The author cannot expalin why so many Iraqis still keep a photograph of Gen. Abd al-Karim Qasim in their home or work. Qasim, the only modern Iraqi leader to rule in a non-sectarian manner (1959-1963), is still beloved for his commitment to social justice for all Iraqis, regardless of ethnoconfessional background. Clearly, the Qasim's continued valorization provides insight on what Iraqis desire in a ruler today.

Nor does the author analyze the role of cross-cutting cleavages - based in social class, education, gender, generation, or ideology - in creating conflict within ethnoconfessional groups. For example, the mercantile middle classes, that form the social base for Nuri al-Maliki’s Da'wa Party/State of Law Coalition, fear their fellow Shi'a in the populist Sadrist Movement, which is rooted in the urban and rural poor, much more than any Sunni Arab political movement.

Despite being viewed as anti-Shi'i, the Ba'th Party’s first two leadership cadres were dominated by Shi'a, under Fu’ad al-Rikabi in the 1950s and Ali Salih al-Sa'di (a Fayli Kurd) in the 1960s. If sectarian identities were as pronounced as the author implies, it is difficult to explain why 50% of Saddam’s praetorian guard, the Fadayeen Saddam, were Shi'a.

What Sectarianism in Iraq fails to adequately clarify is the distinction between secular and religious Shi'a, as well as between middle and upper class and poor Shi'a . The author demonstrates that hostility to the Shi'a - under Ba'th Party rule and prior regimes - was based in the fear that the Najafi Hawza represented a “fifth column” intent on promoting Iranian influence in Iraq, especially after the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Historically, regime discrimination against the Shi'a seems to have been more directed against the clerical class than educated secular Shi'a, many of whom were Ba'th Party members.

This study fails to focus on the contestation between Iraqis who view sectarianism as socially destructive (evident in my research with Iraqi youth, in the activities of many civil society organizations, and in the arts, such as the film, Baghdad High), and sectarian entrepreneurs (elites) who promote sectarian identities to advance narrowly defined political and economic agendas. As such, it tells us little about the possibilities for change, whether leading towards national reconciliation or towards further social and political decay.

By ignoring the inner dynamics of Iraq’s main ethnoconfessional groups, we cannot understand how cross-ethnic political coalitions might develop in the future, such as the al-Iraqiya Coalition that won the March 2010 parliamentary elections with support from secular Sunni Arabs, Shiites and even a significant number of Kurds.

Finally, a more appropriate title for this study would be Sectarianism in Arab Iraq. While 20% of the population, the Kurds (and minority groups) are given no voice in this volume. As is well known, Saddam’s genocidal “Anfal” campaign against the Kurds (not mentioned at all) was couched in a sectarian discourse.

Fanar Haddad has tackled one of the most difficult aspects of Iraqi politics and society, providing numerous insights and a rich empirical data base. What this study underscores is both the complexity of the question of sectarian identities in Iraq and how much research is still needed on this critical topic.

My appearance on al-Jazeera today

2011-12-02T20:25:00.023-05:00

Earlier today, I had the pleasure of joining Dr. Azzam al-Tamimi, director of the Institute for Islamic Thought in London, Dr. Antoine Basbous, founder of the Paris based L'Observatoire des Pays Arabes, and Jon Alterman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies on al-Jazeera Arabic's nightly program, Hasid al-Yawm (The Day's Harvest), with presenter Layla al-Shayib. The topic of discussion was the future of relations between the newly powerful Islamist parties in the Arab World and the United States.
http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/77DA11FF-7556-457F-81BB-EC1B1A1B51F1.htm

Speaking in Arabic, I discussed the Arab Spring and the future of US-Arab relations. I argued that the US has little to fear from the victory of Islamist parties in recent elections in Tunisia, Egypt and Morocco (see my series of postings on Making Sense of the Arab Spring). My point was that the region has changed and with it, Arab Islamist parties. Rather than fear these parties, the US should engage those that are truly committed to democratic governance.

The assumption that Islamist parties are ipso facto hostile to US interests in the Middle East is faulty. As I pointed out, both the US and the newly victorious parties - al-Nahda in Tunisia, Justice and Development in Morocco, and the Freedom and Justice (Muslim Brotherhood) in Egypt - support democratic freedoms, social justice and economic development.

Compared to the authoritarian regimes that were overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya, new governments which are ruled by parties that enjoy legitimacy based on victories in free and fair elections promise much greater stability and potentially less political conflict. Such an outcome is obviously in the interest of all concerned.

If the new Islamist dominated governments can move beyond a narrow Islamist agenda to focus on social reconstruction, tackling corruption, energizing the economy to produce desperately needed jobs, and improving the education system, they will become extremely popular.

While Islamist governments will no doubt seek to implement policies that secularists, both in the Middle East and the West, find objectionable, such as promoting specific forms of dress and regulating entertainment programs, they may actually promote a transition to democracy much as the mildly Islamist AKP party has accomplished in Turkey.

If the participation of the 88 Muslim Brotherhood members who were elected to the Egyptian parliament in 2005 is any indicator, participation in deliberative bodies acts to moderate radical political agendas. Without negotiating with other parties, members of parliament accomplish very little and risk being turned out of office during the next elections cycle. In Iraq, for example, 66% of the members of parliament (Council of Representatives) lost their seats in the March 2010 elections because voters thought they had not done enough while in office, especially to provide needed social services and fight corruption.

My comments on Hasid al-Yawm today were a plea for a new policy on the part of the US - one that seeks to help countries like Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt meet their development needs. What I argued for was a new partnership between the US and the countries that comprise the Arab Spring. Especially in a period of serious economic downturn, when its ability to wield power has been curtailed, the US should welcome the positive change that is occurring in much of the Arab World.

The US should try and provide technical assistance, and help create an international development fund, that would help the Arab countries which are trying to democratize achieve the ends that will serve the mutual interests of all concerned, namely strengthening democracy, individual freedoms and social justice.

Iraqi Youth After the US Withdrawal

2011-11-28T21:52:00.004-05:00

Iraqi youth feel increasingly frustrated as the prospects for democracy and national reconciliation narrow. In the following article in the Washington Post, Dan Zak discusses the results of his conversations with Iraqi youth during a recent stay in Iraq, His article also summarizes some of the research that I have conducted with Iraqi youth over the past year.

This research is part of a larger project I am conducting on Iraqi youth and youth elsewhere in the Arab world who are struggling to bring about democratic change. Youth constitute a large demographic in the Arab world and have been at the center of the Arab Spring. The outcome of the current struggles taking place in the Middle East will help determine whether these youth become cynical and withdraw from politics or whether they continue the struggle for meaningful political change. Such change must result in their becoming true citizens who enjoy individual rights, social justice and a political culture based in tolerance, cultural pluralism and national reconciliation.

Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Part 2)

2011-11-22T22:52:00.015-05:00

(For a discussion of the overall goals and logic of these postings on the Arab Spring, see Part 1, Nov. 6, 2011)

Egypt is at the core of the Arab Spring. What happens there will be critical to the success or failure of the larger Arab democracy movement. As Egyptians go to the polls for what is the most free election since the 1952 military coup d'etat that overthrew the monarchy, what are the prospects for Egypt making a transition to democracy?

What many analysts have failed to mention is that Egypt has been under military rule since 1952. There were only been 3 presidents between 1952 and 2011 and the last two were vice presidents for their predecessors (Sadat for Nasser and Mubarak for Sadat). As Leonard Binder pointed out some time ago in his study, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt, the Egyptian military has been a highly cohesive organization given its social base in what he termed a "rural middle class." While the military (known officially as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces or SCAF) has evolved since Binder's 1978 study, it still demonstrates incredible cohesion at the upper echelons of the officer corps.

To speak about the military is to really speak about a military-industrial complex. Following the 1956 Tripartite invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel after Gamal Abd al-Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, all major foreign enterprises were nationalized. This policy was followed in the early 1960s by a similar wave of nationalizations as domestic industry and financial institutions were taken over by the public sector. From that time forward, the "commanding heights" of the economy have been under state control.

While Anwar al-Sadat's famous "liberalization" of the economy (al-infitah) in the early 1970s suggested a step away from the public sector dominated economy of the Nasser years, this was not to be the case. The public sector actually grew after 1973, only now in partnership with foreign investors. In the process, corruption spread as did the spectacular growth of the nouveaux riches who were the engineers of the new economic order.

Why are these considerations important for understanding Egypt's efforts to shed authoritarian rule and move towards democratic governance? The military is above all the most powerful institution in Egypt. But it is much more than that. It is more conceptually accurate to speak of it as a "military-industrial complex" because the military has developed a parallel economy over time. This parallel economy not only gives the military a monopoly over the instruments of coercion but control of the national economy as well.

From an institutional perspective, the choice to develop a state controlled public sector in the late 1950s and early 1960s created a "path dependency" which is difficult to reverse. This development of this massive institution - the public sector in alliance with foreign capital - has created a huge set of material interests among the military-industrial-commercial elite. This political-economic elite views the demands by democracy activists for open and accountable governance as threatening the very core of its power. Thus it is not surprising that the military has tried to create a post-Mubarak political universe that parallels its economic universe, namely one in which it beyond the reach of civilian control.

The conclusion one can draw from the structural conditions of Egypt's military-industrial complex and the SCAF's behavior since the toppling of Mubarak is that it will not concede any meaningful power to civilian rule. The key question is not just whether Islamists in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood will acquire power in the Egyptian parliamentary elections but whether the military will be forced to transform itself into a different and accountable institution.

What might be some of the incentives that would lead the military to change course in the face of continued tenacious demonstrations throughout the country? The military claims that its efforts to restrain demonstrations are intended to prevent the country from slipping into complete disorder. Using the very potent Arabic term "fitna," the SCAF has tried to frighten non-activist Egyptians that they have everything to lose if they support pro-democracy forces and the country slips into chaos.

This argument might be more powerful if the ongoing demonstrations were indeed limited to Cairo's Tahrir Square. Both the military and its civilian supporters have been fond of stating that "Egypt is not Tahrir Square." However, this argument is belied by the spread of demonstrations throughout the country. In many cities and towns in Egypt's provinces, local security forces have been totally overwhelmed by demonstrators who have taken over local security offices and police stations (see, al-Hayat, Nov. 23).

The anger of the demonstrators that the military has "stolen" the revolution continues to energize large numbers of Egyptians, and not just youth. That the military refuses to place its budget under civilian control in the new constitution that is to be written after elections take place tells many Egyptians that unless they keep up the pressure, the SCAF will continue to rule much as did Husni Mubarak.

What concerns the military is what we might call the "Iran factor." During the revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, troops refused orders to fire on demonstrators which hastened the Shah's downfall (as we have seen occur in Syria as well where troops have defected rather than kill civilian demonstrators). Continued demonstrations might undermine the willingness of the Egyptian army and security forces to suppress them. Were that to occur, the SCAF would lose its ability to control the street and hence its political power.

Where do the Islamists fit into this equation? The Islamist movement suffers from fragmentation and from not having demonstrated sufficient commitment to the pro-democracy revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood was very tentative about the anti-Mubarak demonstrations that developed last January and did not support renewed demonstrations this month against the military. The Brotherhood fears that demonstrations and the violence that invariably accompanies them will give the military the excuse to cancel elections. Because the Brotherhood is confident that it will do well in the elections, it does not want to alienate the military by pressuring it to make additional concessions.

The Brotherhood has alienated part of its base among youth who have come to view it as yet another Machiavellian political party whose real interest is to gain power rather than implement democratic governance and provide Egypt's citizenry with needed social services. To its right, as it were, the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party is being challenged by Salafists from the Party of Light (hizb al-nur), which is especially strong in Alexandria, and by more moderate Islamists and secularists to its left.

After 80 years of trying to win power, the Brotherhood may end up with limited political authority given the SCAF's unwillingness to cede any meaningful power. It may also engender hostility from Salafists, and Islamist and secular moderates, who see it as developing an accommodation with the SCAF and not challenging military authority given its desire to acquire political power.

Where does this leave Egypt's pro-democracy revolution? Demonstrations will continue and perhaps even become even more threatening in the provinces beyond Cairo's Tahrir Square. The military may decide that, from a cost-benefit analysis, it has more to lose by continued unrest, and the impact that such unrest will have on the Egyptian economy, than in trying to continue to suppress the demonstrations.

The SCAF's policy of trying to mobilize Egypt's so-called "silent majority" does not seem to have worked, although elections may temporarily take some of the wind out of the demonstrators' sails. However, what the SCAF does not realize is that many Egyptian, especially the young, have little hope in the future. There is every incentive for demonstrators to continue the struggle since there is little cost to them when compared to returning to a status quo ante which offers few possibilities for advancement.

Egypt's "stalled" transition to democracy could unfortunately continue for the indefinite future. In both Yemen and Syria, protests and conflict have not abated, despite the state's use of violence to suppress opposition forces. In Egypt, the negative economic (and political) consequences of this protracted conflict are now becoming clear.

The United States, the EU, and Turkey - to mention the external actors with the most influence among the SCAF - would do well to bring to its attention that democratic change is not all that is needed in Egypt. Changes in the privileges enjoyed by those who control Egypt's military-industrial complex are long overdue as well.

(The next post on Egypt will discuss the role of ideas in efforts to bring about democratic change and the uneasy alliance between Islamist and secular forces and between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military)

Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Part 1)

2011-11-06T22:51:00.080-05:00

This posting is the first in a series that examines the Arab Spring. Now that 3 autocrats have been deposed and free elections held in Tunisia, it makes sense to ask where the democracy movement in the Arab world is heading. Will the Arab Spring be successful? Does it represent a new "wave" of democratic change in a region that has not been known for democratic governance? What approaches best help us explain the origins and development of the movement?

The postings in this series take 3 forms. One focal point is to examine individual countries and try and ascertain whether they will be able to establish a stable democracy and, if so, when. The second focal point is to assess the extent to which existing theories of democratization, almost all of which have been developed by Western scholars, actually explain what is taking place in those Arab countries where citizens have opposed authoritarian rule. The final postings will tease out the implications for US foreign policy in what is shaping up to be a very different Arab world than the one many analysts have traditionally known.

It is appropriate to begin with Tunisia, where Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in the town of Sidi Bouzid became the catalyst for the Arab Spring. In less than a month between December 2010 and January 2011, and in a non-violent manner, demonstrators enraged by government corruption and Bouazizi's death, toppled the regime of long-time dictator, Zine al-Din Bin Ali.

If we begin with the assumption that the first phase of the Arab Spring involves the removal of autocratic rule and replacing it via free and fair elections, we now have the results of the recent Tunisian elections. These results are, in many respects, very promising.

First, the elections were held without significant disruption. There were protests prior to the elections that the main Islamist party, Ennahda (Harakat al-Nahda) had behaved unfairly and "rigged" the elections by receiving large amounts of funds from conservative Arab Gulf states that wanted the the party to win. After the vote, there was some minimal violence in one one town (Sidi Bouzid - the origins of the Arab Spring) where Ennahda was accused of manipulating the vote. Aside from this incident, the elections occurred without any serious problems.

Ennahda won 89 of 217 seats in the new parliament (41%) which constitutes an impressive showing. Before jumping to the conclusion that this vote was somehow an indicator that Tunisia might become an Islamic republic, we need realize that the party reflects much more to its supporters than its Islamist credentials.

Ennahda has attracted many members of the urban lower middle classes, similar to the social base of Islamist movements in many other Arab countries (see my "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" for earlier data on the Muslim Brotherhood's social base in Egypt). The reason for this social support extends beyond religion.

For many Tunisians, secularism is synonymous with the country's Francophone elite, many of whom reject Islamic culture. There is certainly a social class element in the secular-Islamist divide because secularists are often more well off than those who are drawn to Islamic culture. Islamism acquires its strength both due to Ennahda's valorization of traditional culture and because it offers a voice for the have-nots, especially the urban lower middle classes. A vote for Ennahda is less about voting for religion in the formal sense of the term. Social class is partially disguised as "religion," meaning that many Tunisians expressed their dissatisfaction in the elections with the more prosperous members of society who are frequently Francophone, secular and generally Western in orientation.

What many observers have missed is that, what is often perceived as a "secular-Islamist" divide, actually represents a struggle between the haves and the have-nots. As with Islamist parties in Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere, many less fortunate Tunisians, especially those with aspirations for upward mobility, associate secularism with that social class which benefited under the regimes of secular autocrats, such as former dictator, Zine al-Din Bin Ali.

I would also underline that we should not separate social class from Islamist ideology. For many supporters of Islamism, the issues of economic sustenance and maintaining an authentic (asil) heritage reflect two sides of the same coin: social justice, on the one hand, and Tunisia's identity as a nation-state and who will define that identity, on the other. In other words, we cannot separate religion (understood as much as traditional culture as formal religion), social class and identity politics.

So what are the prospects for Tunisian democracy? One important indicator of the direction of political change in Tunisia can be seen in the defensive position adopted by Ennahda and other Islamist parties regarding the issue of women's rights, individual freedoms and a commitment to abide by electoral results. While some would argue that Ennahda merely used "progressive rhetoric" to win more votes, many observers believe that it will not try to impose Islamic law on Tunisian society. The party seems to realize that to do so would provoke a serious negative response among secularly minded youth and the educated middle classes.

Moving beyond the parliamentary elections, we need to examine larger historical-structural variables when assessing Tunisia's prospects for democratic change. Tunisia is considered by many to be the most progressive Arab state, if by progressive we mean politically tolerant and endowed with well developed human resources. For all his faults, former president Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) promoted education – including education for women - literacy and universal health care, birth control and family planning, and a moderate form of Islam.

Gender equality is all too often ignored when analyzing democratic transitions. Unlike many Middle Eastern states, women were highly educated in Tunisia under Bourguiba’s rule. Prior to the 2011 Revolution, women held 23% of the seats in the Tunisian Parliament (a higher percentage than in the US). Tunisia has a strong civil society as evidenced by a robust trade union movement, women’s organizations and extensive use of social media. Over 3.5 million Tunisians are regular internet users, 1.6 million are Facebook users and there are hundreds of internet cafes, known as “publinet.”

Unlike Syria and Libya, where the "father leaders" destroyed all meaningful elements of civil society and repressed all efforts at autonomous political and social behavior, Tunisia under Bourguiba was more tolerant. As his rule demonstrates, not all autocrats are cut from the same political cloth. A certain amount of institution building occurred under authoritarian rule that can provide support for Tunisia's nascent democracy.

The prospects for a consolidation of democracy are strengthened by the fact that Tunisia does not suffer from significant social cleavages. It does not have ethnic differences (such as Iraq and Syria), confessional differences (such as Egypt and Iraq), or tribal cleavages (such as Yemen and Libya). It also benefits from a relatively large middle class. Indeed, per capita income in Tunisia is has been relatively high (currently at $4,070), despite its being a relatively resource poor country.

My prediction is that Tunisia will develop a government based on a stable parliamentary coalition. Tunisia will most likely approximate the Turkish model where there is an uneasy but stable coexistence between Islamist and secularists. Indeed, the October parliamentary elections in which neither the Islamists not secular forces were able to dominate suggests such as outcome. Because Ennahda did not win a majority of the votes in the elections, it will be forced to form a collation with a set of secular center-left parties. We can call this new form of governance, a contested coalitional democracy.

In a broader analytic sense, how do we assess Tunisia's so-called Jasmine Revolution? What factors facilitated the overthrow of authoritarian rule? Clearly, economic variables represent a key "tipping point" in the Arab Spring. Mohammed Bouazzizi engaged in self-immolation. Like many other politically conscious Tunisian youth, he experienced tremendous frustration working as a street pedlar and not being able to make a living and provide for his extended family.

After having been forced off the street by the police for many years because he didn't have the necessary money to bribe them, he was already highly frustrated and angry. The final straw came when he was forced to stop selling his vegetables yet again by a government inspector who took the scales from his cart when she discovered that he had no license. After being unable to retrieve them at the town's municipal offices, he poured gasoline on his body and set himself on fire.

Why wasn't the state able to suppress the demonstrations engendered by Bouazizi's death? One key factor was the refusal of the military to crush the demonstrators and its withdrawal from the political sphere after the flight of former president, Zine al-Din Bin Ali. Hence the coercive apparatus in Tunisia should be viewed as more professional than patrimonial. Unlike Egypt, the military is not involved in day to day politics which bodes well for Tunisia’s short term future.

Many theorists of democratization avoid comparative historical analysis. If we consider Turkey, we see that the nation-state spent many years under the rule of what was euphemistically referred to in the early post-colonial period of the late 1940s and 1950s as "guided democracy."

Despite periodic elections, Ataturk's Republican Peoples' Party controlled the Turkish polity until the elections of 2002 which brought the AKP to power. Prior to 2002, the army had removed any regime that it considered threatening to the secular principles of Kemalism and its own corporate interests. Neverthless, many of Ataturk's policies resulted in important institutional development that paved the way for the current consolidation of democracy.

In terms of institutions, during his years as president, Bourguiba promoted limited development of an incipient civil society. More importantly, he stressed the importance of education, including the education of women. In the 1960s, his regime pursued family planning. These policies created a strong presence for women in Tunisian society. Women even were able to form some civil society organizations which established a degree of semi-autonomy from state control.

In other words, the institutional legacy of quasi-authoritarian regimes can be an important factor in establishing the groundwork for the transition to democracy. In the recent Tunisian elections, 50% of the candidates were women. This is not only remarkable for the Middle East, where limited number of women occupy public office, but remarkable for advanced industrialized democracies where women do not constitute such a high percentage of candidates.

The economic development literature constitutes a popular approach to the study of democratic transitions. This literature traces its intellectual pedigree to the late Seymour Martin Lipset and his seminal 1959 essay, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," and to the 1966 study by Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Unlike the writing of many current theorists, such as Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limongi and their colleagues, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, and Christian Houle (who will be discussed in later posts), their models are, in certain respects, much less sophisticated than those of Lipset and Moore.

A political sociologist, Lipset was not burdened by the rational choice (rational actor) theory (RAT) that informs much of the current economic development and democracy literature. Rather than create the somewhat artificial binary of authoritarian elites and oppositional mass publics, Lipset cast a much broader conceptual net.

Instead of focusing on economic development in the narrow sense of per capital income/GDP, Lipset included such variables as literary and media access, urbanization, the size of the middle class in relation to other social classes, and the structure of income distribution. Lipset offers a multivariate approach contra the more unidimensional approach followed by many current theorists of economic development and democracy. Unlike Lipset, Moore's analysis opted for a comparative historical approach that was based on several countries whose development he studied over time. Above all, Moore emphasized the need for a strong (entrepreneurial) middle class and a resolution of what he called the "peasant problem," namely integrating the peasant population into the process of economic modernization.

Turning to Tunisia, we see that both Lipset and Moore offer many analytic insights that help explain its transition to democracy. Literacy rates and urbanization are high as is media consumption. Salaries are also relatively high. Tunisia's Gini Index is actually better than the US, having improved between 1995 and 2005. Tunisia has a large and politically sophisticated middle class and a diversified economy.

As Dankwart Rustow pointed out in a famous 1971 article, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," the conditions that bring about the fall of authoritarianism are not the same as those than sustain democratic governance. While the economic development literature may be able to help us understand why democracies are able to consolidate themselves, it cannot easily explain the dynamics of the key "tipping points" that have led to the coalescing of the popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian rule in the Arab world.

To situate Tunisia's transition to democracy in a still broader context, we need to return to the education policies of the Bourguiba regime and the demographics of Tunisian society. Even though it does not suffer the "youth bulge" that characterizes many other Middle Eastern nation-states, it still needs to provide employment for the large cohort of educated youth that are the product of the education system introduced by the Bourguiba regime.

The social requisites and historical institutional analysis that have been used to explain Tunisia's move towards democracy can also benefit from demographic analysis. The work of Stimson Center demographer Richard Cincotta is important here in that he points to the significance for political stability of the maturing of the Tunisian population, which now has a median age of 29. Cincotta demonstrates a correlation between authoritarian rule and a large youth demographic between the ages of 15 and 29. The decline of the youth bulge tends to support political stability and democratic governance.

Still, we need to better understand the dynamics of the processes suggested by demographic analysis. If rational choice or rational actor theory (RAT) has told us nothing else, it is the need to focus on individual preferences and choices. While Mohammed Bouazzi was not the selfish utility maximizer that characterizes human actors in RAT (he was known for giving some of his produce to poor families), he was interested in bettering his economic condition as well as that of his family, as seen by his support for his family and paying the university tuition for one of his sisters. Ultimately, it was his choice to burn himself to death that provided the spark for the much larger conflagration that became the Arab Spring.

Looking to the future, the Achilles heel of Tunisian political development is and will continue to be the political economy. The state has few resources at its disposal and tourism - a major source of external funds – has been severely compromised by the recent political instability. The return of many Tunisians who were working in Libya has reduced foreign remittances as has the slowing of the economies of southern Europe where many expatriate Tunisians live and work.

If the current unemployment rate of 15% persists, it may not bode well for continued support for democracy, especially among those Tunisian youth who do not have much hope in the future. A key variable will be exogenous in nature, i.e., whether the EU, US, Turkey and neighboring Libya provide investment capital for the Tunisian economy.

A stagnant economy will most likely place more strains on the political coalition that is currently in the process of formation. Ennahda supporters may call for greater efforts to regulate the economy and even for the appropriation of the wealth of the upper classes. Such actions would certainly undermine foreign investment and dampen European Union support for the Tunisian government.

If Tunisia's democracy is not to become a "spectator sport" for the US, EU, and Turkey - the main stakeholders in the success of its fledgeling democracy - they would all do well to move as quickly as possible to prop up its economy. Mobilizing an international coalition to achieve this end makes the most sense. While Tunisia is a small country in the larger Arab world, the demonstration effect of its becoming a successful democracy should not be underestimated.

(Elite driven) sectarianism is alive and well in Iraq

2011-10-31T23:28:00.020-04:00

Despite public opinion polls and my recent focus groups with Iraqi youth that show a rejection of sectarianism, the behavior of Iraq's political elite threatens to undermine the gains that have made in the effort to implement a democratic transition. Sectarianism continues to manifest itself at the highest level as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki refuses to budge on his unwillingness to come to terms with Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya Coalition which received the largest number of seats in the March 2010 parliamentary elections.
When the conflict between al-Iraqiya and Maliki's al-Da'wa Party first flared after the elections, the two Kurdish parties that dominate the KRG welcomed the split. Their reasoning was simple. If the Arabs fight it out in Baghdad, they'll have less time to devote to us. A power struggle in Baghdad would preclude a unified Arab front which would to try and block Kurdish interests.

Along the lines of the adage, "be careful of what you wish for," the Kurds have discovered that a dysfunctional government in Baghdad is actually not in their interest. Sectarian leaders often discover that, when you play with fire, you often get burned. The Kurds increasing unease with the stalemate in Baghad was evident in the Central Committee meeting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that was recently held in Sulaimaniya (ses al-Hayat, Oct. 21). PUK leader and Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, expressed serious concern with the "uncertainty" surrounding a solution to the crisis pitting al-Iraqiya against Maliki's political alliance which seems to have no end in sight.

Even the Kurds, who seek a weak central government in Baghdad, realize the danger that exists if the present stalemate between Nuri al-Maliki and Ayad Allawi persists. Iraq's ability to defend itself, to develop its hydrocarbon wealth - oil and natural gas- and to create the necessary feelings of trust that will allow all of Iraq's regional and ethnoconfessional groups to work together to get the country moving forward are increasingly jeopardized.

Clearly, the fault here is not the Iraqi people but their ineffectual and narrowly partisan leaders. Whether as a result of pressure from Iran, or fears of being outflanked by populist elements such as the Sadrist movement, Maliki refuses to come to terms with Allawi and the members of his al-Iraqiya Coalition. Because al-Iraqiya won the majority of votes, it needs to be given a say in the daily functioning of the Iraqi government. As a primarily Sunni Arab coaltion, Maliki's unwillingnessl to bring al-Iraqiya into his government smacks of sectarianism among much of Iraq's populace.

By refusing to ceded any power to Allawi and al-Iraqiya, Maliki is stoking the fires of sectarianism. If he were a true statesman, he would put the interests of Iraq and the Iraqi people above his own sectarian partisanship.

A second indicator of the seriousness of sectarianism is the "struggle of the flags." Since the downfall of Saddam Husayn's Ba'th Party, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has refused to fly the Iraqi flag. It is nowhere in sight when one crosses the border from Turkey into Iraq, nor does it fly elsewhere in the KRG. Because the flag still invokes memories of Ba'thist Pan-Arabism, and inscription "God is great" (Allahu akbar) was added by Saddam Husayn just before the Gulf War of 1991 to attract support from Muslim majority countries, the KRG has been loath to have the flag flying in its Kurdish majority provinces.

However, the Kurds have used the symbol of the flag for their sectarian purposes. When Iraq won a Cinderellaesque victory in the 2007 Asia Cup beating Saudi Arabia, many Kurds raised the Iraqi flag to celebrate the vicotry, especially since Iraqi Kurds play on the national team. Nevertheless, those Kurds who had raised the Iraqi flag were threatened with imprisonment if they did not immediately remove the flag from their homes.

In 1996, during the height of the Kurdish civil war that pitted the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) against its arch-rival, the PUK, Masoud Bazzani, the current KRG president, asked Saddam Husayn to send tanks into the Kurdish region to help him stave off a military defeat by PUK forces. As the tanks of the Iraqi army proceeded north into the KRG, Iraqi flags adorned the roads. This was the same Iraqi army that had been involved in the infamous ANFAL campaign between 1986 and 1989 in which Saddam's forces leveled 175 Kurdish villages, destroyed the Kurdish agrarian sector and killed thousands of Kurds in the process.

The most recent crisis is the order that the Kurdish flag be removed from government buildings in the city of Khanaqin, a Kurdish majority town in Diyala Province, not far from Iraq's northwest border with Iran. The town suffered under Saddam's Arabization policies as many Kurds were killed and their homes taken over by Arabs. However, during the the 1940s, and 1950s, Arabs and Kurds in the Khanaqin region enjoyed good relations and many shared membership in local labor unions, particularly oil unions since the area has important oil fields.

Whether Maliki ordered the KRG's flag removed, or the order came from an official in the Ministry of Interior, the issue has become intertwined with Maliki's introduction of a oil and natural gas bill into the parliament that apparently caught the Kurdish bloc in the Council of Deputies (national parliament) off guard (al-Hayat, Oc. 17). The order to remove the flag led to demonstrations in Khanaqin by its Kurdish community and the formation of a Kurdish delegation to go to Baghdad to demand that the order be rescinded.

The Kurdish suggestion for a new Iraqi flag that would resemble if not replicate the flag used under the rule of General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), which used the ancient Mesopotamian star of Isis, is not unreasonable and is supported by many Iraqis. However, the "struggle of the flags" is really not about symbols but rather part of a larger power struggle between the Maliki government and the KRG. The winner's prize will be Iraq's vast hydrocarbon wealth (oil and natural gas).

Yet another example of the corrosive effect of sectarianism in Iraq is the decision of the Maliki government to dismiss 145 Iraqi professors at Tikrit University in Salah al-Din province, a province comprised primarily of Sunni Arabs. After the fall of Tripoli, former Libyan National Transitional Council prime minister Mahmud Jibril flew unexpectedly to Baghdad to inform Maliki that the NRTC had discovered that the Qaddafi regime was involved a plot with former Ba'thists to overthrow the Iraqi government.

It is unclear how serious the plot was since no documents have been released. Nevertheless, Maliki quickly moved to arrest many former Ba'thists. Because the party recruited a disproportionate number of Sunni Arabs, the arrests have strong sectarian overtones. The firing of professors at Tikrit University was particularly egregious because it is difficult to imagine that such a large number of academics at one particular university could have all been involved in a plot against the government. University professors are not know for their skills in organizing coups d'etat against the state.

Since almost everyone under Saddam was forced to join the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi parliament passed a law in 2008 amending the de-Ba'thification process to include only those who occupied positions that harmed other Iraqis. Clearly, the faculty members who lost their positions at Tikrit University were not in this category. The firings of the professors only enhanced the idea that Maliki was using the news of a plot to marginalize Sunni Arabs.

Aside from Ayad Allawi, who deos seem to want to create a government with a broad social base were he to become prime minister, most members of Iraq' s political elite suffer from sectarianism tendencies and promote policies that undermine inter-ethnic and inter-c0nfessional trust. Their behavior is motivated by their desire to increase their polticial power and enhance their economic wealth. Although Maliki himself has not been associatedwith economic corruption, he has done little to try and eradicate it.

As for Maliki, "the fish rots from the head down," as the adage goes. Not only is he failing to provide strong, civic leadership that could promote national reconcilaition - a key component of building the necessary trust to enhance security, political cohesion and economic development - but he is promoting policies that further inflame sectarian tensions.

Under these conditions, the ability of Iraq's political institutions to develop is severely curtailed. Prospects for implementing a democratic transition require effective eladership and a political culture of tolerance and political pluralism. Such a political culture represent the prerequisite for rebuilding the necessary trust that Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist henchmen worked so hard to destroy in Iraq.

What can the US learn from Turkey in the Middle East?

2011-10-14T15:39:00.008-04:00

During the 1990s, Turkey was a relatively unstable country. The Islamist government of Necmitten Erbakan was removed by the military in 1997 following a longstanding pattern of Turkish generals removing any prime minister who threatened their prerogatives. Efforts to gain membership in the European Union were going nowhere and ethnic conflict between Turks and Kurds was growing as seen in the spread of support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

By the beginning of this century, Turkey was experiencing solid economic growth. EU membership was no longer a top priority, Turkish-Kurdish relations within Turkey were beginning to be addressed, and the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was behind bars. Gradually, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has won two parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 following its initial victory in 2002, has been able to eliminate the power of the army to intervene in the political process. While there have been attempts to manipulate the constitution and the judiciary, most Turks seem quite content with AKP rule.

Perhaps Turkey's most impressive achievement, beyond its economic growth, has been its ability to become one of the dominant powers in the Middle East. It has skillfully deployed "soft power" to inject itself into a number of volatile conflicts that threaten the region's stability.

By concluding important economic agreements with the Iranian government, particularly in the energy field, Turkey has pacified Iran, its historic enemy. In championing the Palestinian cause, and backing away from its traditional close ties to Israel, Turkey has ingratiated itself with the Arab countries of the region, the core provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. It has also situated itself as a possible intermediary given its ties to both Israel, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and the Arab states, on the other.

While its foray into Lebanese politics in early 2011, where it sought to bring together the country contentious ethnoconfessional groups, was unsuccessful, Turkey is now a major player in efforts to force the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad to cede to the demands of democracy activists who fill the streets of many Syrian cities demanding the end of authoritarian rule. Turkish army maneuvers along the border with Syria have sent a strong message to Syria's Ba'thist regime that the wanton killing of its citizenry who are calling for democratic reforms cannot continue indefinitely.

Turkey's rather spectacular rise in power is paralleled by a decline in US power in the region. With the Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats, Zine al-Din Bin Ali and Husni Mubarak, no longer in power, and authoritarian rulers such as Ali Abdallah Salih in Yemen and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, who formerly cooperated with US anti-terrorism initiatives, likewise gone from power, the US has now to deal with governments that lack the stability and coherence of the autocratic regimes which have been deposed.

In Iraq, the US faces the ironic outcome that its removal of Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist regime has led to much greater influence of its arch-enemy, Iran. The government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Malaki seems determined to demonstrate that it is not an American puppet as it seeks to placate Iran. Maliki's tilt toward Iran is most evident in his unwillingness to commit to allowing any significant number of US troops to remain in Iraq after the end of the Status of Forces Agreement on December 31 of this year (read my analysis, "US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq" by clicking here).

In the energy field, not only has Turkey signed energy contracts with Iran, but it is at the center of the 7.9 billion Euro Nabucco Pipeline Project that will channel natural gas from Central Asia, and Iraq through Turkey to an energy hungry Europe, allowing Europe to become less dependent on Russian energy supplies and those of Russia's surrogates.

What can the US learn from Turkey's almost meteoric rise to a regional power in the Middle East? How can it develop policies based on mutually beneficial interests that align US foreign policy in the Middle East with that of Turkey? How can the US work with Turkey to offset its declining options in the Middle East?

To answer these questions requires greater scrutiny of the Turkish success. First, Turkey is exercising its economic muscle in the Middle East based on impressive GDP growth rates over the past 5 years. While economic growth was minimal in 2008 and even dropped in 2009, in 2010, real GDP growth reached 8.2%. Turkey has used its investments in Syria but especially in Iraq to influence domestic policy in both countries. While this policy has not prevented Bashar al-Asad's regime from brutally suppressing pro-democracy demonstrators, it has weakened the Syrian economy. Many analysts argue that if the Syrian economy continues to decline, the business elites of Damascus and Aleppo, a core component of the regime's political base, will turn against the regime, possibly bringing it down in the process.

In Iraq, Turkey has invested heavily in the Iraqi economy to the tune of more than $6 billion. Its investments are still largely concentrated in Iraq's 3 majority Kurdish population provinces that comprise the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). While investments in the KRG have not led to an end of PKK attacks on Turkish forces that originate in Iraq's
mountainous Kurdish region, it has developed a greater inventive on the part of the KRG to reign in the PKK and prevent it from attacking Turkey.

Clearly, Turkish economic might has played and will continue to play a central role in its effort to become the regional hegemon. A key question here is whether the US is following Turkey's lead. Obviously it is not. On strategy might be for US firms to seek to form joint ventures with Turkish firms, such as the energy giants, Enerco Energy and BOTAS, to explore the region's undiscovered oil and natural gas resources

In Iraq, US-Turkish cooperation could not only benefit US firms and hence American overseas investment, but lighten its political footprint in a country that is still very sensitive to the charges by many political groups that the US' goal is to dominate Iraqi politics as a means to control its extensive hydrocarbon wealth (both oil and natural gas).

Turkey's foreign policy success is based on the fact that it treats other Middle Eastern states with respect and promotes a strong democratic agenda. Although it sent out ambiguous signals at first, evoking much anger among anti-Qaddafi forces, Turkey soon joined the chorus of states calling upon Muammar al-Qaddafi to step down from power. Its support for Mubarak's ouster in Egypt and its campaign against the Asad regime in Syria have strengthened its democratic credentials in the Arab world.

The US has not been as forceful as Turkey in supporting popular protest movements of the "Arab Spring." Continued public declarations of support for democratization in the Middle East would serve US interests, much as Turkey's support for democratic change has endeared it to Arab populations throughout the region. The mild Islamism of the AKP underscores the need to develop a model of democracy in the Middle East that reflects local cultural preferences. Here the US needs to recognize that a "one size fits all" definition of democracy can be counterproductive.

In comparing the foreign policies of the US and Turkey, we need realize that the government of President Recip Tayyip Erdogan faces few domestic constraints in exercising its foreign policy preferences. The US Congress has placed many roadblocks in the Obama administration's efforts to pursue American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. Efforts to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiating table have been labelled as "anti-Israeli" and "undermining our closest Middle East ally," as a number of Tea Party Republicans have declared. And Congress has yet to confirm the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, who has been using visits to areas where pro-democracy demonstrations have taken place as a means to put pressure on the Asad regime to end the killing of demonstrators.

What the US needs to learn from Turkey is that investment strategies which are multilateral in nature, such as the Nabucco Pipeline project, can not only have important economic multiplier effects, but can exercise enormous political influence. More active engagement of Turkey in bi-lateral meetings where the US seeks to forge ties around policies, both economic and political, that both countries are pursuing in the region, can become a "win-win" situation for both countries.

This is not to argue that the US should forgo its traditional foreign policy goals in the Middle East simply to placate Turkey. Nevertheless, both Turkey and the US seek to prevent Iran from undermining regional stability. Turkey is as horrified at the prospect of an Iranian-Israeli military conflict as is the US. Turkey, like the US, realizes that economic development and democratization are the keys to the region's stability, especially to meeting the aspirations of the region's large youth demographic, which is often referred to as the "youth bulge."

Turkey still faces a major problem in enacting national reconciliation with its own restive Kurdish population which is growing at a faster rate than the indigenous Turkish population. Here the US can create greater good will by trying to help the Turkish government develop policies that will promote such reconciliation. If the US can become more involved behind the scenes in helping Turkey tackle what is clearly its most significant domestic problem, then it will ingratiate itself with the Erdogan government. Helping Turkey's Kurds meet their demands for economic, cultural and political reforms will undermine support for the militant wing of the PKK which advocates the use of violence to achieve those goals, rather than through the use of peaceful means.

What Turkey demonstrates most clearly is that a bold, forceful and consistent foreign policy is, at the end of the day, one that is most effective in the Middle East. It has also shown that it can learn from its mistakes, as it did in Libya. Greater attention to the manner in which Turkey has been able to develop such an effective regional foreign policy policy could teach the US how to increase its own success in the Middle East as well.

جائزة نوبل للربيع العربي ممثلا في المرأة اليمنية

2011-10-14T14:41:00.006-04:00

The article below, "The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Arab Spring is represented by a Yemeni Woman: Tawwakul Karman," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, and appeared in the Jerusalem newspaper, al-Quds,

ثلاثة هم الفائزون بجائزة نوبل للسلام: المرأة اليمنية المناضلة المجسدة في شخص السيدة توكل عبد السلام كرمان وباقة النساء المناضلات من

حولها في صفوف الثورة اليمنية من أمثال أروى عبده عثمان وسامية وفاطمة الأغبري وبشرى المقطري ونادرة عبد القدوس وهدى العطاس وناديا الكوكباني وسارة جمال وهند وآمنة النصيري ونبيلة الزبير وأسوان عثمان ومنى لقمان وسعاد عطا وأروى أحمد عون ، وأمل الباشا ومها البريهي وأروى الخطابي ووفاء الأكحلي، والفائز الثاني هو الربيع العربي ممثلا في ثورة اليمن العظيمة التي حافظت على سلميتها رغم استفزازات النظام الدموي المتآكل، والفائز الثالث هو المرأة العربية المناضلة بشكل عام من جميلة بوحيرد إلى الشهيدة ليلي السرميني ابنة ال 45 ربيعا والتي سقطت يوم الرابع من هذا الشهر برصاص القتلة من أتباع النظام الدموي في سوريا في بلدة تلبيسة قرب حمص أمام عيون الكاميرا ومن بعدها أمام عيون العالم.

توكل عبد السلام كرمان إمرأة تجسد أمة ناهضة تتململ بعد غياب طويل صنعه أعداء الأمة ووكلاؤهم المحليون وهي على وشك أن تكسر الأغلال وتطيح بالطغاة واحدا بعد الآخر. أمة ستضع الآن تاجا من الغار على جبين توكل الطاهر الشريف ابنة اليمن السعيد الواعد بإنجاب المزيد من المناضلات. لقد شرفت توكل كل الرجال والنساء والشباب والشابات العرب من الغلابى والمضطهدين والعاطلين عن العمل والباحثين عن لقمة عيش وجرعة كرامة والذين قرروا أن يثوروا ضد العملاء والخانعين والقتلة والمجرمين والفاسدين وأجهزة البلطجة والبلاطجة والشبيحة ودوائر المخابرات والقناصة والمرتزقة.

تكريم توكل اليوم من السيد ألفرد نوبل اعتراف بدور المرأة العربية الجديدة التي تصنع فجرا ومستقبلا لأمتها وتشق طريقا وعرة بين أكوام الخراب التي خلفها هؤلاء الطغاة في شرق البلاد وغربها، شمالها وجنوبها. وجائزة نوبل هذه صفعة حامية على جبين النظام الكالح الجاف القبيح الذي يوجه رصاصه لصدور أبناء اليمن الغر الميامين ولم يكتف بأكثر من 33 سنة حكم، خرب فيها البلاد وأذل العباد ونهب الثروات وفرق الناس إلى تجمعات قبلية وعرقية ودينية كي يسهل مهمة القبض على خناق الوطن، ثم أدخل أطياف الشعب اليمني في حروب داخلية وساوم على سيادة البلد حيث أعطى صكا لدول خارجية لملاحقة أبناء اليمن وقتلهم على أرض اليمن.

هذه الجائزة تكريم لكل نساء اليمن اللواتي صرخن في وجه الطاغية الأمي: إرحل إرحل. هذه الجائزة هدية لفتيات ميدان التحرير من الشهيدة سالي زهران إلى إسراء عبد الفتاح، المرشحة العربية الأخرى لنفس الجائزة، وأسماء محفوظ وأمينة الطنطاوية وزميلهن وائل غنيم المرشح الآخر لنيل الجائزة والآلاف الذين حولوا ميدان التحرير إلى موقع لميلاد مصر الجديدة المناضلة العائدة إلى أمتها بعد سنين الاغتراب . هذه الجائزة أيضا لك يا راضية نصرواي ولك يا لينا بن مهنا ، المرشحتين التونسيتين لنفس الجائزة، ولزميلاتكما المناضلات في الثورة التونسية العظيمة ولابن سيدي بوزيد الشهيد محمد بو العزيزي ونساء ورجال تونس الذي تسلحوا بأطواق الياسمين وأسقطواعصابة بن علي و ليلى والطرابلسي.

وهذه الجائزة لمناضلات الثورة الليبية من إيمان العبيدي وإسراء بن محمود وهدى أبو زيد إلى عائشة قدور وفاطمة بريدان وأمل بشير، وكل الشباب والشابات الذين طاردوا الطاغية وأولاده من بيت لبيت ومن شارع لشارع ومن زنقة لزنقة فولى هاربا كالجرذ يفتش عن دهليز أو جحر يختبئ فيه مع أوهامه التي يبدو أنه ما زال متمسكا بها.

وهذه الجائزة باقة من الورد تقدم للفتيات السوريات اللواتي يتحدين الرصاص والتعذيب والموت ويناضلن، كل واحدة بطريقتها، لوقف تقدم الجيش والمخابرات والشبيحة والأمن السري والعلني من المناضلة مي كساب إلى الحقوقية رزان زيتون إلى الشهيدة ليلى السرميني. إنها جائزة للشباب الذين يتحدون الموت ويخرجون في الليل والنهار رافعين شعارا واحدا تلتف حوله كل فئات الشعب: سوريا بدها حرية.

وهذه الجائزة اعتراف بالمرأة العربية المناضلة من عهود الاستعمار إلى عهود الطغاة من صفية زغلول في مصر إلى سناء المحيدلي في لبنان ومن دلال المغربي وليلى خالد في فلسطين، إلى جميلة بوحيرد في الجزائر. إنها هدية للمناضلات اللواتي عبدن الطريق نحو الثورة المباركة. من هدى شعراوي ونوال السعداوي إلى توجان الفيصل ولويزة حنون وأسيرات الحرية في سجون الاحتلال: غفران زامل وسنا عامر ودعاء الجيوسي ومريم أبو دقة وجيهان دحادحة وفاطمة الزق وصونا الراعي وغيرهن.

هذه الجائزة إقرار بأن المرأة العربية لم يعد دورها مقصورا على المطبخ وغرفة الولادة. لقد ساهم الربيع العربي في إعادة تأهيل المرأة لأخذ دورها الحقيقي في التنمية والبناء والنهضة والتطور والتقدم، كما ساهمت المرأة أيضا في صقل الربيع العربي وإعلاء الجانب الإنساني والاجتماعي والحضاري منه. لقد خرجت إلى الشارع لتشارك الزوج والأب والإبن والأخ والمعلم والموظف والتاجر والعالم والمبرمج والسائق في نسج خيوط فجر يكاد أن ينبلج من بقايا ليل يكاد أن يمّحي.

نتمنى أن تحرك هذه الجائزة العروق في بقية الشعوب العربية التي ما زالت تقرفص على السياج بانتظار انقشاع غبار االثورات في اليمن وسوريا. ونريد لهذه الجائزة أن تضخ عزيمة مضاعفة في نساء هذا الوطن لينزعن الصورة النمطية التي تصور المرأة العربية خانعة ساكنة طائعة وطيّعة ومهيضة الجناح التي كرسها المجتمع الذكوري والفكر المتمترس في مجاهل التاريخ الذي فصّـلوه على مقاس كراسيهم.

نتمنى لجائزة توكل أن تخترق الحدود الموصدة على ملايين النساء في بلدان مجاورة، محرومات حتى من حق قيادة السيارة أو المشي أو السفر بدون محرم حيث اختصرت الأنظمة المتخلفة والمسلحة بالفتاوى دور النساء على أن يكن كومة لحم فقط مغطاة بالسواد دون وجه أو أنف أو عينين أو عقل.

تحية للسيدة المناضلة توكل وتحية مماثلة لزوجها الفاضل محمد إسماعيل الذي وقف مساندا ومشجعا ولولاهذه العقلية المنفتحة والمتفتحة لما كنا نحتفل هذا اليوم بفوز توكل بهذه الجائزة الكبرى. تحية للشعب اليمني العظيم وهو يكتب الفصول الأخيرة في نهاية حكم هذا الطاغية الأبله الذي يصر أن يبقى هو وأولاده في السلطة حتى ولو على جثث الآلاف.

دعونا نفرح هذا اليوم مع الشعب اليمني ومع مناضلاته الماجدات. دعونا نفرح ليوم واحد على الأقل لهذا الانجاز الكبير قبل أن نستأنف المسيرات السلمية وحمل الشهداء إلى موائلهم الأخيرة في صباح الغد في تعز وحمص وسرت وصنعاء ودير الزور وبلد الوليد، حيث يصر هؤلاء الطغاة أن "يأخذوا حصتهم من دمنا قبل أن ينصرفوا"، أما نحن فلنا ما ليس يرضيهم "لنا المستقبل، ولنا في أرضنا ما نعمل"

عبد الحميد صيام*

* أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

القانون الدولي والاعتراف بالدول.. خلفية من أجل فلسطين

2011-10-14T14:22:00.003-04:00

عبد الحميد صيام

This article, "International Law and its Acceptance by the International Community: the Case of Palestine," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, for the Jerusalem paper, al-Quds, September 22, 2011

تستعد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية للتقدم للأمم المتحدة بطلب الاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية مستقلة على حدود عام 1967 في شهر أيلول الحالي موعد انعقاد دورة الجمعية العامة السادسة والستين التي يرئسها الممثل الدائم لقطر السيد ناصر عبد العزيز النصر.

ورغم الضغوطات والتهديدات الأمريكية الإسرائيلية التي تمارس على القيادة الرسمية وخاصة التلويح بوقف المساعدات المالية إلا أن الأخيرة ما زالت مصرة على التقدم بمثل هذا الطلب لمجلس الأمن وفي حالة استخدام الولايات المتحدة لحق النقض سيتم تحويل الطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بعد تفعيل قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام" الذي يخول الجمعية العامة بمناقشة الموضوع بسبب فشل مجلس الأمن ويكون للقرار المعتمد بغالبية الثلثين سلطة القانون ويصبح شرعيا لا غبار عليه مثل سلسة القرارات التي اتخذتها الجمعية العامة في معالجة أزمة السويس عام 1956 بعد أن فشل مجلس الأمن في التعامل مع العدوان الثلاثي بسبب الفيتوين الفرنسي والبريطاني.

سيكون لهذا القرار في حالة نجاحه قوة قانونية ومعنوية وسياسية هائلة فتصبح دولة فلسطين كيانا معترفا به دوليا. صحيح أن أجزاء من أراضي هذه الدولة واقع تحت إحتلال بلد أجنبي (إسرائيل) لكن دولة فلسطين المستقلة والمعترف بها ستعمل ضمن القانون الدولي لإنهاء الاحتلال بالمفاوضات بين بلدين مستقلين متكافئين ومن حق كل طرف أن يدفع باتجاه تحقيق الحد الأقصى من طموحاته وإذا ما حدث وتم الاتفاق على كافة المسائل الخلافية فسيتم حينئذ إبرام معاهدة سلام شاملة بين دولتين بضمانة المجتمع الدولي الممثل في الأمم المتحدة وفي حالة تعنت إسرائيل في الرضوخ لمتطلبات الاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية تستطيع هذه الدولة جرجرة إسرائيل إلى محكمة العدل الدولية وتستطيع كذلك التقدم بشكوى رسمية إلى محكمة الجنايات الدولية بعد انضمامها لعضوية المحكمة لملاحقة محرمي الحرب الإسرائيليين. إستخدام الولايات المتحدة للفيتو في مجلس الأمن سيسبب إحراجا شديدا لإدارة أوباما التي ما فتئت تتحدث عن قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة وعندما جاءت اللحظة الحاسمة لترجمة ما وعدت به تلك الإدارة ها هي تقف وحيدة أمام العالم لوأد تلك الخطوة مما سيزيد من عزلتها أمام المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك حلفاؤها الأوروبيون وسيعلم العالم كله أن الولايات المتحدة فقط هي من يقف حجر عثرة في طريق إنشاء الدولة الفلسطينية. الخوف كل الخوف أن تكون السلطة الفلسطينية غير مستعدة للتعامل مع نتائج هذا القرار وتعود الأمور إلى سابقها وتعتبر القرار انتصارا معنويا "وكفي المؤمنين شر القتال" وتصبح تلك الدولة حبرا على ورق والقرار الجديد يضاف إلى عشرات بل مئات القرارات التي داست عليها إسرائيل أمام المجتمع الدولي دون رادع أو حساب أو حياء بسبب الدعم الأمريكي لتلك الدولة المارقة. وأريد أن أناقش هنا شروط قيام الدول والوضع القانوني الذي يحول كيانا ما إلى دولة رسمية على قدم المساواة أسوة بمائة وثلاث وتسعين دولة.

الدولة وشروط قيامها

استنادا إلى نتائج مؤتمر وستفاليا (ألمانيا اليوم) للسلام عام 1648 بين الدول والكيانات والإمارات الأوروبية المتنازعة، تم الاتفاق على أن هناك ثلاثة شروط لقيام الدولة ذات السيادة وهي: وجود شعب بشكل دائم ومستمر، في رقعة جغرافية محددة ، وحكومة تمارس سيادة على الأرض والشعب. وقد أضيف شرط رابع عام 1933 في معاهدة مونتفيديو بالأوروغواي وهو إعتراف دولي بتلك الدولة بحيث تستطيع الدخول في معاهدات واتفاقيات ثنائية أو متعددة الأطراف مع أية دولة تختار.

منذ تأسيس الأمم المتحدة عام 1945 تم الالتزام بالشروط الأربعة والعمل بها عند ضم أعضاء جدد للأمم المتحدة بشرط موافقة مجلس الأمن الذي يرفع توصية للجمعية العامة والتي بدورها تصوت على العضوية بأغلبية الثلثين. فمثلا تتوفر الشروط الثلاثة الأولى في "تايوان" لكنها ليست دولة معترفا بها بسبب وقوف الصين بالمرصاد لاستخدام الفيتو فيما لو تقدمت بطلب الإعتراف الدولي من مجلس الأمن. بورتو ريكو فيها حكومة منتخبة تمارس سيادة ناقصة على شعب في رقعة جغرافية محددة لأن السيادة العليا في يد الولايات المتحدة وهي لا تستطيع إقامة علاقات مستقلة دون رضى واشنطن ولذلك هي ليست دولة. حكومة كردستان العراق تمارس سيادة في رقعة جغرافية محددة وعلى شعب متجانس ومستقر لكنها ليست دولة لأن المعادلة الإقليمية قادرة على منع الاعتراف الدولي بها حتى لو أعلنت عن قيامها. وجمهورية قبرص التركية تتوافر فيها الشروط الثلاثة إلا الاعتراف الدولي حتى لو اعترفت بها تركيا. وإقليم كوسوفو يعاني من نفس المأزق حتى لو اعترفت به معظم دول أوروبا والولايات المتحدة إلا أن الإقليم ما زال لا يتمتع بالاعتراف الدولي القانوني رغم تمتعه بما يسمى في القانون "الاعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع" لأن الفيتو الروسي قادر على وأد المحاولة في المهد أو مقايضة الاعتراف بكوسوفو باعتراف دولي بجمهوريتي أبخازيا وأوسيتا الجنوبية في جمهورية جورجيا وهو أمر شبه مستحيل على الأقل الآن. أما أفغانستان تحت حكم حركة طالبان (1996-2001) فكانت دولة رغم أن هناك ثلاث دول فقط كانت تعترف بها هي السعودية والإمارات وباكستان. أما بقية دول المجموعة الدولية فكانت لا تعترف بحكومة أفغانستان لا بدولة أفغانستان. والعكس صحيح، فإن إعتراف عدد كبير بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية لا يعني إعترافا بدولة فلسطين لعدم توفر شرط قيام الدولة. فاعتراف الجامعة العربية ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي ومجموعة دول عدم الانحياز لا بفلسطين كدولة بل بكيانية منظمة التحرير كممثل لشعب فلسطين الذي يناضل من أجل قيام الدولة. وللتذكير فقط فإن رسالة الاعتراف التي بعثها إسحاق رابين، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل آنذاك، للمرحوم ياسر عرفات، رئيس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، في 9 أيلول عام 1993 تمهيدا لاتفاقية أوسلو المشؤومة نصت بالحرف الواحد على إعتراف إسرائيل بمنظمة التحرير "بصفتها الممثل الشرعي (فقط دون كلمة وحيد) للشعب الفلسطيني"، بينما نصت رسالة ياسر عرفات "بالاعتراف بحق دولة إسرائيل في العيش بسلام وأمن" وشتان بين الاعترافين، فالأول اعترف بسلطة شرعية والثاني بدولة. إذن من المهم أن نفرق بين الاعتراف بالدولة والاعتراف بالحكومة وكذلك بين الإعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع (تايوان) والدولة من الناحية القانونية (193 دولة من توفالو بآلافها العشرة إلى الصين الشعبية بملايينها الألف والثلاثمئة).

فالاعتراف الدولي بأية دولة شرط أساسي ويجب أن تقره الجمعية العامة بأغلبية الثلثين بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن كما حدث مؤخرا مع جمهورية جنوب السودان. إسرائيل مثلا، إعطيت شرعية ضمن قرار التقسيم 181 الصادر عن الجمعية العامة بتاريخ 29 تشرين الثاني 1947 الذي منح نفس الشرعية لقيام دولة عربية وأعلن ديفد بن غوريون قيام الدولة عشية الرابع عشر من أيار 1948 لكن الإعتراف بها لم يتم إلا بعد قيام مجلس الأمن بالتصويت على قرار الإعتراف رقم 69 بتاريخ 4 آذار1949 الذي أوصى الجمعية العامة بالإعتراف بإسرائيل. بتاريخ 11 أيار 1949 اعتمدت الجمعية العامة القرار 273 والذي شرعن وجود دولة ذات سيادة اسمها إسرائيل وصفها بأنها "دولة محبة للسلام تقبل التزاماتها المنصوص عليها في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وهي قادرة وراغبة في تنفيذ تلك الإلتزامات". وكم كانت رؤية الجمعية العامة ضالة ومنحازة عندما وصفت ذلك الكيان بانه دولة محبة للسلام وملتزمة بنصوص الميثاق.

أما سحب الإعتراف بحكومة دولة ما فهو أمر جائز في القانون الدولي ونود هنا أن نذكر بأن الجمعية العامة طردت من عضويتها حكومة الفصل العتصري بجنوب إفريقيا عام 1974 لكن ذلك لا يعني سحب الاعتراف بالدولة بل سحب الإعتراف بالحكومة العنصرية وعندما انهارت الحكومة العنصرية عادت الحكومة المنتخبة لتملأ المقعد الخالي في قاعة الجمعية العامة في 23 حزيران 1994 .

إذن آلية الإعتراف الطبيعية لا تصل إلى الجمعية العامة إلا بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن. ومن هنا نعود إلى المربع الأول ونقول إن الولايات المتحدة قادة على إجهاظ فكرة الاعتراف بدولة فلسطين قبل إكتمال شروط الولادة وتكون الجمعية العامة التي ستعقد جلسة طارئة خاصة تحت سلطة قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام"هي المخولة شرعيا بمناقشة هذا الطلب واعتماده بأغلبية الثلثين.

شروط قيام دولة فلسطين من الناحية القانونية

وعلى فرض أن الجمعية العامة إعتمدت القرار فالسؤال الآن هل شروط قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة ذات سيادة كاملة أسوة ببقية الدول متوفرة حاليا؟ هل هناك رقعة جغرافية محددة ذات حدود مرسمة يسكنها شعب واحد متجانس ذو ذاكرة جماعية واحدة وفيها حكومة قادرة على ممارسة السيادة على كافة أبناء الشعب في تلك الرقعة الجغرافية المحددة؟ الإجابة ليست صعبة على هذه الأسئلة فالرقعة الجغرافية غير واضحة المعالم وممزقة وغير متصلة ليس فقط بين جناحي الوطن في الضفة وغزة بل وفي كانتونات الضفة وخاصة في منطقة القدس. كما أن الشعب في تلك المناطق مقطع إلى أجزاء كل جزء تحكمه قوانين مناقضة ومخالفة للقوانين التي تخضع لها المناطق الأخرى، فليس سكان القدس الشرقية كسكان غزة ولا المجموعتان كثالثتهما في الضفة. بالإضافة إلى أن هناك استبعادا لغالبية الشعب الفلسطيني في المنفى والذي يشكل الغالبية من المجموع الكلي للشعب الفلسطيني. والأخطر من ذلك وجود مجموعات سكانية طارئة لا تنتمي للشعب الفلسطيني داخل نفس الرقعة الجغرافية وتخضع لمنظومة قوانين مناقضة تماما لقوانين الدولة الفلسطينية. وبالتالي سيكون هناك مجموعتان من السكان في رقعة جغرافية واحدة تحكم كل مجموعة منظومة قوانين مختلفة بل ومتناقضة، وهذا يخل بمبدأ سيادة السلطة المركزية التي ستجد نفسها غير قادرة على إنفاذ أي قانون في مناطق المستوطنين الصهاينة، ومن المؤكد أنهم سيشكلون تحديا لهيبتها وسلطتها مرتكزين على حائط الإسناد القوي المتمثل في دولة إسرائيل.

إذن فالشروط الثلاثة غير متوفرة لا الشعب ولا الأرض ولا السلطة القادرة على ممارسة السيادة على الإثنين. أما عن القدرة على عقد الاتفاقيات بعد توفر الاعتراف الدولي فليس لهذا البند إلا قيمة معنوية إذ إن الكيان المنبثق عن هذا الاعتراف غير قادر على استقبال ضيف يحل زائرا على السلطة نفسها التي لا تسيطر على حدود ومعابر تلك الدولة ولا مجالها الجوي ولا شريطها الساحلي ولا الحركة من وإلى الدولة.

ترجمة القرار إلى واقع على الأرض

نخلص إلى نتيجة أن التقدم بطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بالاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية حتى ولو نجح بغالبية الثلثين (129 دولة على الأقل) لا يعدو عن كونه انتصارا معنويا لا يمكن ترجمته على أرض الواقع حتى لو أعلن الفلسطينيون قيام دولتهم كما فعلوا في 15 تشرين الثاني عام 1988. لكن القرار يمكن أن يكون سندا قانونيا لشن حملة قانونية لطرد الاحتلال بالمقاومة السلمية المتواصلة وتوجه الشعب الفلسطيني بكامله لطرد المستوطنين وهدم الجدار العازل وإعادة السيطرة على كل شبر من الأراضي المحتلة وعدم إسقاط الحق التاريخي للاجئين الفلسطينيين في ديارهم الأصلية.

فعرض قضية الاعتراف أمام الجمعية العامة في شهر أيلول (سبتمبر) يجب أن يتزامن مع مظاهرات سلمية شاملة ومتواصلة لا تضعف ولا تكل ولا تمل ولا تنهزم ولا تتراخى ولاتتراجع ولا تتوقف تحت أي ظرف من الظروف. يجب إنطلاق المظاهرات العارمة يوم مناقشة الموضوع أمام الجمعية العامة من رام الله والقدس وكل مدن وقرى وبلدات الضفة والقطاع وعمان وبيروت والقاهرة والخرطوم وتونس والجزائر والرباط وإسطنبول وجاكرتا وإسلام أباد وباريس ولندن ومدريد وأثينا ونيويورك. عندها ستصبح الدولة الفلسطينة المستقلة أدنى إلى التحقيق من هذه المناورات التي نخشى أن يكون الهدف منها تسجيل انتصارات معنوية فقط. فالدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة تصنعها إرادة الجماهير المناضلة المصممة على تحقيق الانتصار لا المفاوضات العبثية ولا المناورات المكشوفة ولا المقذوفات البدائية التي تطلق من غزة لأغراض حزبية ونادرا ما تؤذي أحدا. وكما استطاعت الشعوب العربية أن تطيح برؤوس ثلاثة من كبار الطغاة والحبل على الجرار فحري بشعب الانتفاضتين والكفاح الطويل المرير وقوافل الشهداء ورائد العلم والإبداع أن يخرج إلى الشوراع في كافة أنحاء العالم بطريقة حضارية سلمية منظمة واعية ليفرض على العالم قيام دولته المستقلة في الواقع لا في العالم الافتراضي. دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة مترابطة تتحكم في حدودها ومواردها وتمارس سيادتها على كل شبر من أراضيها معافاة من سرطان الاستطيان وجدار الفصل العنصري. دولة تكون حاضنة وطنية للشعب الفلسطيني كله ومجسدة لآماله وحقه في العودة وتقرير المصير فعلا كما نص على ذلك قرار الجمعية العامة 3236 (1974). وأقترح على السلطة الفلسطينية ومفاوضيها أن يراجعوا هذا القرار المهم للتعرف على رزمة حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني التي أقرتها الأمم المتحدة إن كانوا نسوا أو تناسوا تلك الحقوق.

__________________________________________________________________

*أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq

2011-09-19T21:15:00.008-04:00

The end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the United States and Iraq signed in December 2008 calls for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still unclear whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant change. What will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic importance both in the Middle East, and to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts at democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of U.S. troops?

U.S. policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual interest to both countries, all of which are interrelated. Their focal points include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion, economic growth and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of tensions that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba'thist regime. An effective U.S. foreign policy will require treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.

The following article was published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It can be read in its entirety by clicking here.

Syria’s Arab Spring: Phase Two of the Crisis

2011-09-11T15:52:00.005-04:00

Guest writer Ghaidaa Hetou has conducted extensive research in Syria during the past year. She is currently writing her PhD dissertation on alliance behavior in Syrian foreign policy and the determinants of Syrian foreign policy making between 1970 and 2010.

It has been six months since protests erupted in Syria. The current political sluggishness in Syria, where calm has not been completely restored by the government, nor have the protests gained traction in major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, has ushered in the next phase in the ongoing crisis.

During the first six months, various opposition groups have insisted on the peaceful nature of the protests. However, violent clashes that have occurred in Jisr al-Shughur, Homs, Hama and other towns. In addition, the declarations of the armed Syrian opposition committee have marred the efforts of thousands of Syrians who have continued to peacefully brave the wrath of the totalitarian apparatus of Bashar al-Asad's Ba’thist regime.

The conflicting efforts of protesters and armed rebels mirror the ideological competition among the various opposition groups. From the secular left to the religious conservatives, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the contrasting political agendas of the Syrian opposition are impeding its ability to develop a united front. It has now become the norm for these various opposition groups to send their delegates to Washington, Europe and Moscow to meet separately with government representatives. A number of Syrian opposition conferences - in Turkey, Qatar, France and Germany - have tried to narrow the gap between the opposition group’s conflicting ideological agendas, but with little success.

On the domestic front, two minority groups in Syria, the Kurds and Christians, have adopted a position of neutrality towards the uprising. Their position has been reinforced, especially after recent chants of some demonstrators of “" عربية, عربية “"عمر, عمر” and “ المسيحي على بيروت أو للتابوت”, the first saying that this is solely an “Arab movement,” the second using the slogan of “Omar” in an effort to underscore the Sunni nature of the movement, and the last chant stating that the Christians have two choices, either to leave Syria for Beirut or in a casket. These chants prevail among groups that are calling for armed confrontation. In a demographically diverse society, social movements can easily, in an effort to garner popularity, alienate minority groups who might have otherwise tipped the scale in their favor.

What has ushered in the next phase in Syria’s crisis is precisely the country’s stagnant situation, with neither the government nor the opposition able to achieve their objectives. It is clearly a time of reassessment of means and ends by both sides in the conflict. Recent statements by opposition figures, like Ammar al-Qurabi in Moscow, indicate that they are ready for a “conditional dialogue with the regime.” From its part, the Syrian government has recently encouraged its allies, especially Moscow and Iran, to host these negotiations. Dr. Nabil al-Arabi, head of the Arab League, visited Damascus today to hand the Syrian president an Arab endorsed proposal containing 13 provisions to end the crises.

Due to lack of a unified opposition, any perceived attempt by one opposition group to negotiate with the government is sidetracked by another group, accusing it of treason and short selling Syrian sacrifices to date. Unfortunately, the stagnant situation, characterized by protests, bloody crackdowns and confrontations, will continue, until a number of opposition groups are able to consolidate their positions and form a majority in order to coordinate and legitimize their strategies.

The dust that has been stirred up by the sudden political awakening in Syria is settling. The euphoria that the protestors created by breaking the wall of fear and silence is being replaced, among many Syrians, by a frantic search for a political outlet, reflecting decades of frustration. The political upheaval that was silenced in 1962 has reawakened with the same political fury that prevailed in the 1950s in Syria, namely the struggle between conservatives and progressives, large urban areas and their suburbs, and between more prosperous cities and smaller towns that are outside the economic mainstream. This struggle manifests itself in a dispute over political identities and loyalties, which are all symptoms of a painful and ongoing process of state formation and the slow evolution of what it means to be a “citizen” in post-colonial Middle East.

Nevertheless, one thing is absolutely clear. Syria is on the road to transition and there is no possibility of a return to the status quo ante.

The Tea Party and the Middle East

2011-09-05T15:07:00.051-04:00

As President Barack Obama's approval ratings decline, pushed ever downward by a global and domestic recession that shows little sign of abating, the prospects of a Republican in the White House in 2012 loom ever larger. It is not at all out of the question that, if a Republican is elected, she or he will have strong ties to the Tea Party.

Thus far, little attention has been given to the implications of a Tea Party dominated White House for US foreign policy, especially in one of the world's most volatile regions, the Middle East. What would be the consequences of a Tea Party administration for US policy and interests in that region?

As others have already been noted, there are (at least) two trends in the Tea Party movement regarding US foreign policy. One, a neo-isolationism advocated by the supporters of Ron Paul (but perhaps by those of Rick Perry as well), reflects the isolationism that characterized much of US history prior to World War II.

The other, which argues for the decisive use of force against our enemies in the region, calls for strong support for Israel and relying on it to fight terrorism in the Middle East and to help restrain Iran. This policy is considered especially important for the US and the international community's efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At least two candidates with close ties to the Tea Party, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Santorum, fall into this camp.

The problem with the Tea Party is that it has no policy for reconciling declining American economic power - both in absolute and relative terms (especially in relation to China) - with sustaining US global influence. The US has faced severe constraints in fighting two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US were forced to militarily engage Iran, especially if it were to attack Israel, as well as simultaneously confront an outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula, an unlikely but possible scenario, the US would be hard pressed to mount the forces necessary to meet such as a challenge.

Tea Party advocates either call for US withdrawal from much of the world to improve the budget deficit or the use of military force to intimidate our enemies. Both of these perspectives fail to appreciate the implications of our economic crisis for US "hard power" (the use of military force). They also fail to comprehend the opportunities for enhancing US policy in the area of "soft power" (public diplomacy, technical and educational support, and direct engagement of our adversaries where appropriate).

Tea Party supporters make an important point when they argue that US government spending has outstripped its ability to pay for this spending. Clearly the US economy is experiencing serious economic difficulties caused largely by the mortgage lending debacle that came to a head in 2008.

But do the US' financial problems imply the need for an isolationist strategy? Likewise, is there an alternative to the second policy prescription, namely a reliance on force as the primary element of our foreign policy in the Middle East? Is there not a third way that could achieve our objectives in the Middle East but without "breaking the bank"?

As the "Arab Spring" has shown, there is considerable convergence between Arab and US political interests in the Middle East. The warmth of the Libyan people towards the US over the past 6 months, especially now that the Libyan dictator, Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi has been overthrown, is just one indicator of those interests. It suggests that, even in a country that has been under repressive authoritarian rule, citizens can both quickly embrace democracy and reject decades of anti-American and and anti-Western rhetoric and propaganda.

Rather than making an effort to better understand the political, cultural and economic dynamics that currently engulf the Middle East, Tea Party candidates have, to date, opted instead for a simplistic approach to US foreign policy. Either we need to withdraw into "fortress America" or hit our enemies hard when they challenge our interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. The problem is that neither of these approaches will work, Indeed, they both pose a serious threat to the US' national interests in the region.

What, then, are the dynamics that Tea Partiers have failed to grasp? First, the Middle East is ripe for serious and positive change. It has a "youth bulge" which means that a large percentage of the region's youth, 70%, is under the age of 30. As my current research with Iraqi and other youth in the region indicates, many of these youth admire American popular culture and values, especially our values of freedom of expression and creative freedom.

Although most youth in the Middle East have not had the benefit of a social science education, either in secondary schools or at the university level, many intuitively understand that there is a strong relationship between individual freedoms and personal success. They also realize that the countries where individual freedoms reign are precisely those countries that enjoy prosperity and political stability - key factors for these youth if they are to have any hope in the future.

Second, Tea Partiers fail to see the need to reach out to other cultures which they often assume are hostile to American values. Many Tea Partiers have wrapped themselves in a mythical American Golden Age during which the United States was supposedly close to being a perfect society.

While the US did make tremendous progress throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries to become the world's industrial and military superpower, such thinking forgets that such growth had its dark side - the political and economic marginalization of women and African Americans, labor strife, the Great Depression, two world wars and the struggle against communism. This is not to direct criticism at the US, but simply to point out that selective readings of history do not produce good domestic or foreign policy.

The US should be proud of its values and accomplishments. The desire of so much of the world's population to emigrate to the US is a striking reminder of that. However, we are now a global society in which "Golden Age" politics, in whatever form, no longer has a place. Inter-cultural understanding is not a matter of being "politically correct." Rather, it is absolutely necessary that our political leaders make a serious effort to understand the cultures of the Middle East and engage its peoples so that they can make the most effective decisions as they affect US interests in the region.

While Israel is a strong and trusted ally, the idea that we can rely on Israel alone to pursue American interests in the Middle East is naive. To link US support for Israel to Christian Biblical injunctions is no substitute for a rational foreign policy, nor is it in the interest of Israel, much less the peoples of the Middle East. As the most prominent Tea Party candidate to view the Middle East through the prism of the Bible, Michelle Bachman's advocacy of a foreign policy based on her interpretations of Biblical texts is a strong example of why our Founding Fathers sought to keep religion out of politics.

In the Christian world, the idea that God has bestowed His (Her?)grace on a particular group of people brought us the the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the 100 Years War, and many other examples of religious intolerance. Voltaire noted the absurdity of the notion of a "Chosen People" in Candide when he described the (Christian) Bulgars and the (Muslim) Ottoman Turks praying to God for victory over their enemy as the sun began to rise over the battlefield on which they would fight later that day.

The US has lost many allies in the Middle East in recent years. Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, and Libya (yes Qaddafi supplied the US with intelligence after agreeing to end his WMD program in 2006) are the most prominent examples. Likewise, Israel finds itself more isolated than ever in the Middle East.

With the election of an Islamist government in 2002, Israel no longer has a close ally in Turkey. Following Husni Mubarak's ouster in Egypt, ties with that country have deteriorated as well. Turkey's recent recall of its ambassador from Israel and the conflict with Egypt over containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip are only the most recent examples of Israel's deteriorating relations with its former allies.

If the Tea Partiers sincerely want to reduce the deficit, enhance our influence in the Middle East, and help strengthen Israel, our closest ally in the region, they need to eschew basing foreign policy on Biblical injunctions, and prescribing withdrawal, or an exclusive use of force as the main tools in the US' foreign policy arsenal. The NATO success in Libya is probably not going to be replicated elsewhere in the region anytime soon (although US and EU cooperation in squeezing Syria economically may end up ousting the Ba'thist regime of Bashar al-Asad as well).

Using American technical expertise in the Middle East, much as it has been done by developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, should become the model for encouraging economic growth and development, along with improvements in education, health care, housing and agriculture. Such assistance, especially if it is based on local needs (rather than prescribed by the West), can help to develop close ties with the countries of the Middle East. There is a reason why developed countries do not engage in wars or experience serious political instability - the citizens of these countries have very little incentive to engage in such activity, especially when they have hope in the future.

Offering US technical assistance (a great way to put unemployed American professionals to work overseas), offering Middle Easterners scholarships to study at American universities, and engaging the peoples of the Middle East, especially youth, whether thorough social media and/or exchange programs, would cost much less than military engagement and building new weapons systems that were appropriate for an earlier era of wars among nation-states, but now are much less effective in fighting terrorism and "asymmetric war."

Engaging the youth who have been the main force behind the Arab Spring will demonstrate that our rhetoric of supporting democracy has teeth. Many Middle Eastern youth realize that autocrats such as Qaddafi used anti-Zionism as a propaganda tool to distract attention from domestic repression and lack of government services. If the US can move forward the creation of Palestinian state, living side by side in peace with Israel, along with engaging the peoples of the region, much of the region's anti-American rhetoric and radicalism will dissipate.

As we approach the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001, all those who aspire to the US presidency owe it to the American people to offer them well thought through foreign policy alternatives. We need to develop a smart foreign policy in the Middle East which views the peoples of the region as potential allies, not as inherently hostile to our interests and way of life. With the stakes so high in the Middle East, and with the economic challenges facing the US, empty rhetoric is clearly unpatriotic.

Libya is not Iraq

2011-08-23T21:20:00.036-04:00

It is unfortunate that many Western commentators are making comparisons between Iraq after the US invasion of March 2003 and the overthrow of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya. What does tie Iraq and Libya together is the lessons that US foreign policy makers have learned from the mistakes of the Bush administration in Iraq. Eschewing a "top down" approach, the Obama administration has allowed the Libyan National Transitional Council(NTC)to take the lead in setting the agenda for the campaign to rid Libya of Qaddafi's rule and to map out the broad outlines of the post-Qaddafi era.

One of the main differences between the overthrew of Saddam in 2003 and the end of the Qaddafi regime was the manner in which the US approached the two countries. Both pre-invasion and post-Saddam policy in Iraq involved limited consultation with a small number of Iraqis. Even the main political actors that dominated Iraqi politics in 2003 and 2004 were handpicked by the Department of Defense and the White House.

In Libya, the main political actors have emerged from the struggle against the Qaddafi regime. Some may be suspect for once having once been part of that regime. But we do not hear any talk of the functional equivalent of "de-Ba'thification" in Libya, namely preventing anyone associated with the Qaddafi regime from participating in post-Qaddafi politics. Only those who were at the core of the ancien regime will have to face trials.

Another major difference between Iraq and Libya is that the Qaddafi regime has been overthrown by the Libyan people. True, NATO warplanes and logistical support have been crucial in that victory. Still, it has been the Libyan people, especially youth who make up 75% of the population under 30, who have made up the casualties in the struggle to rid Libya of its repressive dictator. Even if NATO had not been involved, it is highly likely that we would still have seen a protracted struggle such as that which is currently underway in Syria.

In Iraq, the US military that was completely responsible for ridding the country of the Ba'th. Iraqis had little or no sense of having contributed to the Ba'thist regime's downfall. The manner in which the Bush administration failed to control extensive looting in Baghdad in April 2003, including protecting the priceless artifacts of the Iraq Museum, created anger and distrust among Iraqis of US objectives in Iraq. It also undermined support for the Bush administration's professed goal of creating a democratic Iraq. Many Iraqis did not trust the Bush administration who they felt did not seem to have developed a well defined policy for post-Saddam Iraq.

In Libya, on the other hand, the US, NATO, the UN and the international community generally have used a light touch when dealing with rebel forces and their political arm, the NTC. Libyan rebels have been forced to make their own decisions and suffer the consequences when these decisions have not worked out, e.g., overstretching their supply lines when engaging Qaddafi's loyalist forces. They have not been able to blame anyone but themselves and in the process have undergone an important learning process.

As rebel forces have struggled to oust the Qaddafi regime, groups of fighters representing different regions, ideologies and tribes have had to cooperate and work together to develop joint military and political strategies. This is not to say that these differences have been overcome and won't reemerge in the new post-Qaddafi era. However, informal groups of rebel fighters have already been formed throughout the country and developed a certain level of trust as they have fought together against what were often better trained and equipped forces.

In Iraq, post-Saddam politics quickly fell under the control of exiles who had not lived in Iraq for many years, in some cases decades. These new leaders have been referred to by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael as "carpetbaggers." Indeed, many Iraqis were highly suspicious of these politicians who came to Iraq in March and April, 2003 with US forces and who had not suffered under Saddam as had the populace at large.

Unlike the political leadership that developed in Iraq after Saddam was toppled, the NTC and military leaders in Libya are much closer to the Libyan citizenry. Yes, some of them were part of Qaddafi's regime, and at least one, the NTC's military commander, Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, was assassinated for having served Qaddafi. Yet the majority of the new leadership has not only shown great courage, especially in the beginning of the struggle when it was not at all clear that Qaddafi would be defeated, and in their measured approach to the struggle. What has been particularly impressive in the NTC's focus on national reconciliation, and their mantra that Libyans not engage in revenge killings and treat their captives with respect.

In short, the old adage that democracy is not a gift that one nation can give to another but must be created by the people through a process of struggle, has played itself out in Libya, as it has in Egypt, Tunisia which are also engaged in the "Arab Spring." All the doubts that Western commentators have expressed about Libya being a "tribal society" in which all the institutions of civil society were destroyed by Qaddafi are arguments of those who doubt that Libya (or any of the countries of the Arab Middle East) can become truly democratic nation-states.

Iraq has made impressive strides towards democracy, even with the many mistakes made by the US occupation administration in 2003 and 2004. It held free and fair parliamentary and provincial legislative elections in 2005, 2009 and 2010. In the March 2010 elections, a secular nationalist coalition led by a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, won a majority of seats and garnered electoral support from all of Iraq's major ethnoconfessional groups. All observers agreed that the elections were fair and free.

Iraq boasts over 6000 registered civil society organizations. The press plays a vigorous role in criticizing the government for not providing needed social services, while the heads of the Shiite and Sunni communities, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samara'i respectively, constantly demand that the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki eliminate extensive corruption and nepotism within its ranks.

In many ways, it can be argued that Iraq has had faced an even more difficult road than Libya in its efforts to implement a democratic transition. Not only did it experience extensive sectarian based violence after 2003, but it has suffered from a fragmented and dysfunctional political elite that spends more time focusing on infighting than trying to work for the interests of the Iraqi people.

Unlike Iraq, Libya will most likely be able to avoid regional, tribal or sectarian based conflict, e.g., Arab against Berber. Libya's political elite seems much more cohesive than its Iraqi counterpart and more closely linked to the populace at large. The NTC and its successor government may use Libya's oil wealth for corrupt ends as have Iraq's Arab and Kurdish political elites. But there are many indications that the NTC benefits from a "civic core" within its ranks that will work to prevent widespread abuses of power such as we saw under the Qaddafi regime

Many would argue that Iraqis have a stronger sense of national identity than do Libyans. This may be true. However, the fact that Iraq, Libya and most of the countries of the Middle East are experiencing a "youth bulge," where a large percentage of the population refuses to adhere to the shibboleths of the past, loses sight of the fact that we are witnessing not just an Arab Spring but the birth of a new generation of political leadership throughout the Middle East.

In Libya, the new generation does not find that tribalism offers them much in the way of improving their lives. Tribalism was more effective for leaders like Saddam and Qaddafi who used it to create social and political cleavages that were intended to "divide and conquer" the populace. However, in the process, Saddam and Qaddafi atomized tribes, often killing their leaders if they refused to follow their dictates. The result was that the tribal system in both countries was undermined and has lost much of its social and political legitimacy.

Observers, Western Arab and others, have every right to be concerned about the form of the new political system that will emerge in Libya now that the Qaddafi regime has been toppled. But we need to avoid the temptation to trot out the old and tired stereotypes about "Islam," "tribalism" and l"lack of national identity" preventing a transition to democracy in the Arab world, so as to not encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Instead, the Obama administration, NATO, Turkey, Qatar and other friends of Libya's NTC should continue their policy of patient, wise and non-obtrusive counseling, supplemented by whatever technical expertise they can offer the new Libyan government. The Arab Spring will enjoy a much greater probability of success if it can count on consistent and long-term support from its allies, both inside and outside the Middle East.

This type of support - namely providing support for the new Libyan government's needs as it defines them - is the best way to avoid the mistakes of Iraq. For those who want to see Libya become a functioning democracy, it is also the most appropriate way to honor all the Libyans who have died so their their countrymen could be free.

Soap operas, elite politics and security in Iraq

2011-08-16T12:38:00.045-04:00

On August 13th, the Iraqi parliament voted to ban the showing of the soap opera, al-Hasan and al-Husayn on Iraqi television channels. In a video recording of the session, the parliament speaker declared that the film is causing sectarian conflict (al-fitna) in the Muslim world. The film is being shown throughout the Arab world during the holy month of Ramadan. al-Hasan and al-Husayn continues a recent tradition of showing films on topics important to Islam during Ramadan. Such films have drawn large audiences and al-Hasan and al-Husayn is no exception.

The banning of the soap opera shows not only the continued salience of sectarian identities in the Arab world but the lack of effort on the part of political elites to confront the problem of national reconciliation. The problems that led to the banning of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in Iraq are linked to the larger realm of Arab elite politics. This form of elite politics, which refuses to take national reconciliation seriously, threatens the security of Iraq (and that of other Middle Eastern countries where this type of politics is all too often replicated).

As we saw this week, Iraq experienced a devastating series of attacks throughout the country, all of which had sectarian overtones. The groups that organized these attacks need to find recruits to carry out their deadly attacks. Only when all sectors of society feel that they are part of the political process will the recruits for such attacks dry up.

In Iraq's banning the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn, what are the political dynamics of the relationship between culture, politics and national security? In other words, what do the dynamics of banning a soap opera tell us about the politics of national reconciliation in Iraq? And what impact does this form of politics have on Iraq's security situation?

The topic of the assassination of Hasan and Husayn is extremely sensitive since it encompasses the origins of the schism between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Even before it aired, the title of the program was changed from al-Hasan, al-Husayn and Mu'awiya, to al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The omission of Mua'wiya is indicative of the sensitivity of the film's topic. Not only did Mu'awiya organize the attack on Hasan and Husayn's father, the caliph Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was himself murdered in 661 CE, but he was seen as complicit in the deaths of Hasan and Husayn.

The film seeks to edify Muslims about an important event in the history of Islam. Ramadan has become a particularly appropriate time to air lengthy films about complex historical topics because television viewing increases substantially as Muslims fast and spend much of their daytime fast at home.

Taking 3 years to complete, and produced in several Arab countries, the film is comprised of 30 one hour segments. A large number of prominent clerics, religious scholars and historians served as consultants to the producer, Muhammad al-Anzi, of the Kuwaiti Al-Maha Productions company. As al-Anzi has pointed out in several interviews, he tried to present a balanced account of the lives of the two imams, Hasan and Husayn.

The film has elicited criticism throughout the Arab world, including from al-Azhar, the preeminent religious institution in Sunni Islam. The Azhar's calling for the film not be shown based on Sunni Islam's prohibition of showing human representations of Muslim religious figures was underscored by the opposition from the head of the Sunni Religious Endowments (al-Awqaf) in Iraq, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samarra'i and the his counterpart, the head of Shi'i religious endowments, Salih al-Haydari. Likewise, through a representative who delivered the Friday prayer in Karbala', Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani indicated his opposition as well, claiming that the film was filled with factual errors and constituted a deviation from Islam.

However, as a commentator to an article on the controversy noted, the film only became political in Iraq once the parliament voted to ban it from all Iraq's television channels. The problem then is the unwillingness of politicians to tackle head on the sectarian divide that still afflicts Iraq and other Arab countries. Rather than open the historical record to scrutiny, political elites instead prefer to repress efforts to examine the past.

While many viewers in the Arab world have been drawn to watch al-Hasan and al-Husayn given the controversy surrounding it, many others indicate their interest in it stems from their lack of knowledge of the historical events that are depicted in the film and their desire to know more about them. Once again, we see the divide between elite and mass politics. By not allowing a healthy discussion of what led to the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, Arab countries are prevented from moving forward with the process of national reconciliation.

The lack of national reconciliation is a key factor that allows sectarian identities to persist. And the persistence of sectarianism is good news for Sunni Arab organizations like al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and their Shi'i counterparts. As long as historical grievances are not confronted, such organizations can find recruits, especially when the government provides limited services and is characterized by extensive corruption.

For political elites, serious efforts at national reconciliation represent a threat to their power base. Indeed, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has dismissed calls for national reconciliation in the past, emphasizing instead that a focus on the rule of law and the constitution is more important (al-Nahar, May 25, 2009).

Once reconciliation becomes part of a meaningful political process, all parts of the political spectrum must be given access to political participation. Once the political process is opened up, the ability of elites to maintain vertical forms of social and political identity are undermined. The cohesion of their political base is threatened. To achieve their narrow personal goals, it is more effective to play the sectarian card rather than pursue a politics of national inclusion.

In Iraq, the al-Maliki government's sectarian based politics has led to the exclusion of important sectors of the population, such as the tribal groups of al-Anbar Province. Many Anbaris who participated in the Sons of Iraq movement (Sahwat al-'Iraq) are understandably resentful that al-Maliki has not kept his promise to integrate them into the army, security forces or state bureaucracy. al-Maliki would like to exclude the Kurds but needs them to offset challenges from the al-Iraqiya list that won the 2010 national parliament elections and is led by his nemesis, Ayad 'Allawi

The pursuit of a sectarian based politics is compounded by political discrimination based on social class. al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition shows very little concern or compassion for poor Shi'a in Iraq (much less the poor of other ethnoconfessional groups). The party is based largely in the prosperous Shi'i merchant and professional middle classes who see the Shi'a poor as aligned with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Trend and thus threatening to their interests. This neglect provides an opening for radical elements such as the Sadrists and other sectarian militias, such as the "League of the Righteous" (Asa'ib al-Haqq)to recruit among the Shi'a poor.

Further, the failure of the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi political elite to confront sectarianism through an emphasis on national reconciliation has had a negative effect on Iraq's security forces. It is well known that units in the army profess loyalty to individual political parties and leaders rather than to a unified army command.

The failure of members of Iraq's Arab political elite to come to terms with their Kurdish counterparts means that the Iraqi army and the Kurdish pesh merga remain separate military forces. If the two forces could cooperate on national rather than local security, Iraq would be better positioned to assert control over its national territory. While pesh merga units have helped repress terrorist cells in Baghdad in the past, little has been done to integrate these units into the larger Iraqi army.

What the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn indicates is the potential power of historical memory. The past can be used to bring Iraqis (and other peoples in the Middle East) together if done in an open and honest manner as the screen writer, director and producer have attempted to do in the film, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The fact that the most recent Iraqi school textbooks have avoided all controversial topics and fail to confront the legacy of Saddam Husayn's brutality is indicative of the weak and ostrich-like approach of the political leadership in Iraq.

If the Iraqi government and the Obama administration think that Iraq's security problems can be solved through continued training of the Iraqi army and security forces alone, they need to rethink their assumptions. As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down." Structural changes are needed among Iraq's political elite if the horrific attacks of this week are to become a thing of the past and meaningful security for the Iraqi people is to be achieved.

Will US Troops Remain in Iraq?

2011-07-14T22:43:00.008-04:00

As the deadline nears for the Iraqi government to decide if a contingent of American troops will be allowed to remain in Iraq after the end of this year, the Obama administration has expressed mounting frustration that a decision has yet to be made. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s blunt language during his recent visit to Baghdad, which criticized Prime Minister al-Maliki’s indecision, reflected that frustration. However, no amount of American criticism or behind the scenes pressure can, by itself, alter the basic political dynamics that constrain Iraqi decision-making regarding US troops remaining in Iraq. Rather the al-Maliki government is going to have to make some difficult choices and make them soon.

One constraint is the profound sense of nationalism that characterizes the Iraqi people. At one level, the US should welcome this expression of nationalism because it underlines a sense of national unity that is belied by the usual focus in the West on Iraq as a nation-state rent by sectarian and ethnic divisions.

While the Kurds are much more amenable to US troops remaining in Iraq, neither Iraqi president Jalal Talabani nor Kurdish Regional Government president Masoud Barzani has been making a public case for retaining American troops after December 31, 2011. If US troop are to remain in Iraq, there will need to be justification by the Iraqi government as to how those troops serve its national interests.

A second constraint is more problematic from the US perspective. This reflects the problem created by the pressure being exerted on al-Maliki by his erstwhile ally, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend and former Mahdi Army (now partially reincarnated as the Army of the Promised Day - Jaysh al-Yawn al-Maw’ud).

The Sadrist Trend, which is represented in the Iraqi parliament by the “Liberals” (al-ahrar) reflects a fundamental problem of Iraqi society, namely the continued deterioration of the quality of life for large segments of the country’s poor and marginal social strata. The agrarian sector’s decline means that agriculture cannot support the rural population, thus producing a steady stream of migrants to urban areas. These migrants tend to be young and uneducated and highly susceptible to recruitment to militias and criminal organizations.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government, both under al-Maliki and former prime ministers, has done little to curb extensive state corruption. The lack of any serious effort to bring corruption under control has created an even more pernicious dynamic. It sends a message to cabinet minsters that they need not make an effort to improve government services. Corruption not only wastes huge amounts of public funds but produces a political culture in which holding a government office is viewed as a source of patronage, rather than an as institution whose raison d’être is to provide a public service. Corruption is also linked to nepotism because relatives and friends are given choice positions within government ministries.

These conditions result in poor and inadequate services and widespread cynicism among the populace at large. They create the “perfect storm” for populist and proto-authoritarian organizations such as the Sadrists who argue that they are the true embodiment of the common will, because only they take the public interest seriously.

In this respect, the Sadrists parallel movements in other parts of the Middle East where the government has abdicated its responsibilities towards its citizenry. Hizballah in Lebanon demonstrates many similarities with the Sadrist movement given the Lebanese government’s historical neglect of the Shiite dominated southern region of the country. Likewise, the PKK in south eastern Turkey and Hamas in the Gaza Strip would not have acquired popular support had the Turkish government and the PLO respectively been more attentive to the local populace’s needs.

A third constraint on American forces remaining in Iraq is the influence of negative “neighborhood effects.” As I have mentioned in previous postings, none of Iraq’s neighbors with the exception of Turkey, wants to see a democratic, pluralistic and tolerant political system develop in Iraq.

June 2011 was the worst month for US troop casualties in 2 years and almost all the deaths can be attributed to Shiite militias in the south who have been supplied with sophisticated arms by the Iranians. Clearly, Iran continues to put pressure on the US so as to hamper its ability to achieve its goals in Iraq, particularly through strengthening Shiite militias and encouraging them to attack US forces. By increasing tensions between American forces and these militias, focus continues to be placed on the presence of US forces in Iraq and the December 31 deadline for them to leave. These developments place more constraints on al-Maliki’s behavior.

According to the al-Hayat (July 5), the Iranians have let the US know through back channels that they would be willing to agree to some US troops remaining in Iraq if the US agrees not to pressure Hizballah concerning the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, not to topple Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria, and to pull back in its efforts to punish Iran for continuing to develop its nuclear energy program which the US sees as intended to produce nuclear weapons.

The US will not accept such conditions and agree to strike such a bargain with Iran. Therefore, we can expect Iran to continue encouraging Shiite militias to attack US forces and to instruct the Sadrist movement to insist that all US forces withdraw from Iraq. The al-Maliki government’s failure to suppress these militias and to arrest their leaders has created great resentment among US forces in Iraq and can only serve to drive a wedge between the US and Iraq.

There is a solution to the problems just outlined but it would require al-Maliki to change course politically. Adopting a statesman-like approach in which he explained to the Iraqi public why some US forces must remain in Iraq after December 31, al-Maliki would detail the need for these forces to complete the training of the Iraqi army, assist Iraq in building an air force that can monitor and control the country’s borders, and help Iraq’s national police force acquire the skills it needs to insure control of terrorist and criminal elements.

In this process, al-Maliki can expect the withdrawal of Sadrist members of parliament from his government in protest of his decision to allow some US forces to remain in Iraq. The resulting political deficit could be filled by having al-Maliki reach out to his arch-rival Ayad Allawi. Al-Maliki would need to create what he has been calling for ever since the March 2010 elections, namely a “national unity government.”

With the support of the Kurds, and Allawi, al-Maliki’s government would not fall. However, the Iraqi Prime Minister would need to make concessions to Allawi. This would include allowing Allawi to have an important say in the selection of the ministers of defense and interior, positions which still have not been filled since the March 2010 elections.

It would also entail giving meaningful powers to the position of Director of the new National Council for Strategic Policies which the US proposed be created after the March 2010 elections to break the logjam over who would become prime minister. The idea was that Allawi, while unable to become prime minister, would still receive a meaningful political position in the new Iraqi government. By heading the new National Council for Strategic Policies, Allawi would be able to temper the prime minister’s power by having control over defense and national security issues.

Will al-Maliki see the necessity of forcing the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq with Muqtada al-Sadr, other Shiite militias and their patron Iran? Or will he give in to current political pressures and cede political influence to theses groups that pose a major threat to Iraq’s democratic development and its ability to maintain Iraq’s autonomy from Iran?

What Iraq requires is bold leadership. Prime Minister al-Maliki needs to face down the Sadrists and nascent Shiite militias, make clear to Iran that Iraq will no longer tolerate meddling in its internal affairs, clean up the political mess in Baghdad by coming to terms with Ayad Allawi and his al-‘Iraqiya List, and then use this political foundation to attack the pressing social problems facing Iraq which are security, job creation and economic development, and the provision of government services.

Such bold action would allow Iraq to more forward. It would place the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq in its proper context, namely helping Iraq achieve its national agenda.

What does Iraq's political crisis tell us about the Arab Spring?

2011-06-05T22:07:00.023-04:00

How is Iraq confronting its own Arab Spring? What does Iraq’s current political crisis tell us about the possibilities of success for the Arab Spring? Much of what happening in Iraq today has important ramifications for the best candidates for a transition to democracy, Egypt and Tunisia. While all 3 countries are very different, Iraq's experience points to one of the main problems that emerges after the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. That problem is the inability of competing factions within the political elite to develop cohesive policies and adopt a civic as opposed to personalistic approach to politics.

Iraq celebrated the holding of successful parliamentary elections in March 2010. Iraq’s Higher Elections Commission and foreign observers agreed that the elections were fair and violence was almost non-existent. Voter turnout was 62.5% nationwide and as high as 70% in Iraq’s 3 northern Kurdish provinces.

In a rejection of what voters perceived as the parliament’s inefficacy in fighting corruption, over 60% of the sitting members of the parliament elected in 2005 were turned out of office. Further, a national coalition, al-Iraqiya, which rejected sectarian politics won 91 seats, the largest number of any political grouping. The fact that al-Iraqiya was led by a Shiite, former prime minister Ayad Allawi, and received significant votes from all 3 of Iraq’s main ethnic groups created great optimism about the future direction of Iraqi politics.

However, these expectations did not materialize. Sitting prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki refused to cede any power to Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition and instead worked to marginalize it by reaching out to the Iraqi National Alliance, which included the Sadrists and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, and the Kurdish Alliance. This maneuvering angered Allawi and al-Iraqiyia, especially the Coalition’s rural Sunni Arab supporters who felt that Maliki was trying to exclude them along sectarian lines.

It took until November 2010, over 7 months, before al-Maliki was able to form a new government that largely excluded al-Iraqiya. The Kurds stepped as king makers by brokering a compromise that allocated the prime minister’s position to al-Maliki, the position of speaker of parliament to al-Iraqiya, and the president of the newly created National Strategic Council, that was supposedly intended to coordinate national defense and security policy to Allawi. But the actual powers of the newly formed council were never clearly defined and Allawi refused to accept the position.

At the same time, Maliki has had to fight out attacks by his erstwhile coalition partner Muqtada al-Sadr upon whose parliament members he depends. Sadr has pounded away at the need for all US forces to be out of Iraq by the agreed date of December 31, 2011 as agreed by upon Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded between Iraq and the US in 2008.

While no one expects Sadr to actually be able to act on his threat to reactivate the Mahdi Army if US forces aren’t withdrawn, he recently organized a march of thousands of his supporters in Sadr City who were dressed in a quasi uniform (Shirts emblazoned with the Iraqi flag), as he keeps up relentless pressure on al-Maliki’s government.

Although nominally al-Maliki’s ally, Sadr continues to attack the government for the lack of and jobs and services, and for failing to fight corruption. Thus the Sadrists are trying to assume the mantle not only as the political force that will protect Iraq against Western domination, but also bring transparent government and one that delivers the type of social services that the populace craves.

If the inter-elite cleavages were not destructive enough of effective governance, increased tensions have developed between al-Maliki and local government, both provincial governors and provincial councils. Not a day seems to go by that the Iraqi and Arab press fail to report some form of conflict between the central government and the provinces. Invariably these problems are caused by decisions by taken by Baghdad that rides roughshod over local rights. These decisions include appointing and removing local officials, failing to provide the provinces with funds to which they’re entitled or making investment decisions that concern local oil and natural gas resources without consulting local officials (in violation of the constitution).

What Iraq points to is the legacy of authoritarian rule for democratic transitions in the Middle East. Saddam Husayn destroyed all political institutions and civil society during 35 years of Ba’thist rule. He also killed any members of the political elite who he thought might at some point challenge his rule, even his former childhood friend who he appointed as defense minister during the Iran-Iraq War, Adnan Khayrallah.

Most of the players in Iraq’s unstable political game fled the country and hence were expatriates during Ba’thist rule. None enjoy any significant level trust among the populace at large. Constant infighting - often over what appear to the Iraqi electorate as petty matters - has further undermined the elite's popularity. That was certainly evident from research I recently completed among Iraqi youth who consistently used pejorative terms to refer to Iraq’s political class.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Iraq is making economic progress. It plans to invest $150 billion in infrastructural development over the next 3 years, especially to rehabilitate oil and natural gas pipelines. Inflation rates have dropped from a high of over 20% in 2007 to an expected level of 6.2% in 2012. Oil export revenue has increased with the global rise in energy prices (Iraq earned about $7 billion in revenues from oil sales this past March). GDP growth is up from 1.5% in 2007 to a projected 10.9% in 2012.

But investing in the hydrocarbon sector does not produce many jobs. The revenues derived from the sale of oil and natural gas has not been translated into job creation or improved services. Indeed, 1 out of 6 Iraqis still lives below the poverty line on $2 per day, a situation that infuriates large segments of the populace.

Most analysts blame the recent uptick in violence in Iraq on the inability of the political elite in Baghdad to reach a national solution to the country’s political crisis. The lack of a political solution has recently seen an increase in attacks on prominent Iraqi political figures. There were unsuccessful assassination attempts on Atheel al-Nujayfi, the governor of Ninewa Province and an important figure in the Mosul-based al-Hadba' Party, and on al-Iraqiya's candidate for Defense Minister, Major-General Khalid al-Ubaydi.

The core component of a national solution to solving Iraq;s current crisis must center on giving all sectors of the elite a place at the political table. As long as al-Maliki refuses to do this, as evident in his continued reluctance to appoint al-Iraqiya members to the vacant positions of Defense and Interior ministers, resentment by those who feel excluded will persist and violence will be one of the results. How might such a national political solution come about? This is a topic to be explored in future postings.

the Arab Spring: Markets, Wasatiya and Federalism

2011-05-26T21:48:00.046-04:00

The New York Times carried two articles this past Sunday, May 22nd, that point to the problematic way in which the Arab Spring is understood in the West. On the front page, headlines pronounced, "Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions." The article warns that the spirit of national unity that characterized the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere now threatens to devolve into social and political cleavages based in religion, tribe and ethnicity.

This doom and gloom tenor of this article stands in sharp contrast to an article in the magazine section, "The Hot Money Cowboys of Iraq," which describes the entrepreneurial spirit of Iraq's new business class. As these entrepreneurs press forward with numerous projects, they have little time to worry about social and political cleavages, or "religion, clan sect and ethnicity," to use the words of the front page story.

As Namir al-Akabi, one of the wealthiest men of the new business class, put it, "Iraq is a rich, virgin country!" While others view Iraq as an ethnically fragmented society, Iraq's new business class sees it as a great opportunity for economic reconstruction and profit.

The sense of individual initiative that characterizes the businessmen in "Hot Money Cowboys" recalls my interviews with Iraqi businessmen during the period when ethnic strife was still prevalent throughout Iraq. Interviewing one of Iraq's wealthiest Kurdish businessmen in Arbil in 2007, I asked him whether he had any problem working with his Arab partner who was sitting across the table from us. Both he and his partner looked at me quizzically. "We are trying to make a profit," they replied, "and if we can create some jobs in the process, so much the better." For them, they didn't have time to worry about ethnic differences.

Clearly, not all Arab countries possess the oil and natural gas resources of Iraq. However, the entrepreneurial spirit that I encountered in Iraq, even during the height of ethnic conflict, is not confined to that country. A new spirit of individual initiative, responsibility and openness to new ideas is spreading throughout the Arab world, especially among the young. This indeed was one of the findings of my recent research with focus groups of Iraqi youth.

The new spirit of individual initiative is reflected in the values of openness, toleration and moderation, not just among entrepreneurs, but in the interpretation and practice of Islam. One manifestation of this is the spread of al-wasatiya. Derived from the Arabic wasat, or middle, it connotes moderation in the interpretation and application of Islamic doctrine. This approach is often juxtaposed to more rigid and doctrinaire forms of Salafism.

For many Muslim clerics, the focus on wasatiya represents a return to the core values of Islam, which rejects extremism in all its forms (Qur'an 68:25). To be situated between extremes (al-awsat)leads the believer to a virtuous and fruitful life. Wasatiya does not represent a concession to modernity and a watering down of Islam as a religion, but rather the foregrounding of its true message for all humanity, namely an emphasis on the coming together of all peoples of good will, regardless of religion.

The threat with which authoritarian regimes have viewed wasatiya was evident in the refusal of the Husni Mubarak regime to approve a license for the "Middle Party" (hizb al-wasat). Founded in 1995 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, this party stressed tolerance and inter-religious reconciliation (even including a Christian as one of its founding members).

Husni Mubarak's regime prevented the Middle Party (excellently analyzed by A.R. Norton in his, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of the Hizb al-Wasat"*)from becoming an official political party because it wanted to restrict the the "official opposition" to the more radical Muslim Brotherhood. Any time Western countries pressed Mubarak to liberalize and democratize Egypt, he could point to the Brotherhood and ask: "If we hold the elections you suggest, do you want the Islamists to take power?" If a more moderate Islamic alternative had existed, such as the Middle Party, Mubarak's ploy would have lost its power of persuasion. Thankfully, the Transition Military Council gave the Middle Party a license after Mubarak was ousted.

If the spirit of individual thought and judgment rings true to many Arab businessmen and youth, the concept of federalism supports this frame of mind. Federalism offers a palliative to the centralized authoritarianism that characterizes most Arab states. Such authoritarianism is the logical outcome of the corporatist "group think" that military and single party regimes have forced on their unwilling citizenry.

In Iraq, federalism has devolved power to the provinces where governors and provincial legislatures not only often offer better services to the citizenry than the central government, but also provide a set of check and balances against the abuse of power at the center(see my posting "Local Control and Democratization in Iraq," Nov. 8, 2010). The effort to exercise local control within a federal political structure has infuriated Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who has sought to centralize all power in his hands. Nevertheless, the federal political system represents one of the best hopes for building democracy in Iraq.

Federalism does not just apply to Iraq. In Yemen, it could be used to decentralize power and ameliorate much of the tension between the northern and southern portions of the country. As Dr. John Duke Anthony noted to me in a recent conversation, the concept of federalism is not alien to Arab political culture, despite arguments to the contrary. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)has existed as a federal state for over 40 years and tribes embody notions of federalism in their alliances (think of the Muntafiq, Shamar and other tribal confederations in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula).

Correspondents, Western, Arab or otherwise, have a responsibility to report on political conflict and to call our attention to potential looming crises. However, there is no society or human community in which the direction of social change is only going in a negative direction without that society or community likewise experiencing positive change as well. As I found while conducting research in Iraq during the 1980s, even under Saddam Husayn's brutal regime, Iraqis still found ways to resist (as I documented in Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq).

Let's hope that the media - press, television and social media - offer more perspectives on positive change in the Arab world. The spread of open markets, ideas such as al-wasatiya, and the institutionalization of federalism can help promote a more democratic Arab world. These develometns call out for more reporting.

The process of democratization in the Arab world is not a "spectator sport." Whether the Arab Spring is successful will depend on the extent to which social, political and economic forces - both in the Arab world and beyond it - give it their support.

*Augustus Richard Norton, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of Hizb al-Wasat," in Robert Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, 2005, 133-160.

The Pakistani Taliban’s Formulation of lex talionis

2011-05-23T15:51:00.005-04:00

Guest author: Farah Jan

After the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the US navy seals on May 2nd, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) issued a statement in which they threatened to avenge Bin Laden by targeting Pakistan’s army, navy and air force, along with the US and NATO interests. The Latin word lex talionis, translates as, “the law of retaliation.” This principle finds its roots in Biblical times and refers to the precept of “an eye for an eye.” The TTP and other militant groups have affirmed the retaliation pledge, but with no end in sight.

As the ancient Greeks proclaimed prior to the start of Olympics, “let the games begin!,” so the TTP have issued a similar message in a sinister fashion for the Pakistani government and its armed forces. In the process, the TTP has unleashed its war machine using its most effective weapon, “the suicide bomber.”

During the last few weeks, we have seen numerous attacks, starting with the twin attacks on Frontier Constabulary headquarters on May 13th, that killed 98 paramilitary recruits and civilians, the assassination of Saudi consulate official on May 16th, the attack on U.S. officials on May 20th, killing a passerby, and now the most embarrassing attack on the Pakistani naval base in Karachi on May 22nd. The TTP has taken responsibility for these attacks, each time issuing a statement afterwards that, “this was revenge for martyrdom of Osama Bin Laden. It was the proof that we are still united and powerful.” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127)

The May 22nd attack on the PNS Mehran base demonstrates the coordination and strength of the TTP and other al-Qaeda influenced groups. The naval base attack raises serious concerns regarding the ability of militant groups to launch small-scale combat against the seventh largest army in the world.

Indeed, the militant groups are deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s major cities. Through their recent attacks, they threaten to weaken the security institutions of the state. Incapacitating the state, supposedly the sole institution that has the right to exercise the use of force within the boundaries of the territory over which it rules, threatens to render Pakistan a failed state. According to the Weberian definition, the state is a “human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Thus the state via its security apparatus and institutions successfully asserts this use of force within its territory, as well as defending this territory from external threats.

The state of Pakistan today is at a critical crossroad in determining its security and defense from internal and external perils. The ultimate end for non-state actors like the TTP, would be to reconfigure current state structures, and replace them with institutions that advance their extremist agenda. Their short-term objective is to cripple Pakistan’s security institutions, further leading it to collapse.

A failed or collapsed Pakistan would be a regional disaster for South Asia, particularly for the economic and political stability of both China and India. The effects of Pakistan’s failure are not limited to the region, but would have global repercussions. For the United States, Pakistan’s geo-strategic location is crucial. Policy makers in Washington are expecting a forceful response by the Pakistani army against the TTP’s attack on the Karachi naval base . At stake is the Pakistani state’s capacity to use legitimate force for its own self-defense.

Sectarian Identities and the Arab Spring

2011-05-10T23:45:00.039-04:00

Will sectarian identities derail the Arab Spring? Many observers fear that, were Bashar al-Asad to fall from power in Syria, the outcome would not be a transition to democracy but an outbreak of confessionally based violence, pitting the country's constituent religious groups against one another. The continued clashes between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt likewise has led to fears that Mubarak's removal may represent a pyrrhic victory if religious based violence spreads. In Tunisia, threats against women by radical Islamists for not wearing "appropriate" Islamic dress has raised the specter of intervention by the army if these forces appear to be gaining too much power.

The problem of sectarianism continues to raise its ugly head in Iraq as well. Ethnically based violence persists, albeit at much lower levels than during the height of such strife between 2004 and 2007. The efforts of the Baghdad city council to ban alcohol earlier this year was seen as the beginning salvo in an effort to place constraints on, if not eventually close, Baghdad's famed social clubs and artist ateliers which are known not only for serving alcohol but for their avowedly secular cultural and political orientation and as venues where Iraqis from all ethnic and religious groups gather.

In an effort to better understand sectarianism in Iraq, I organized a special issue of the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. The topic of the special issue is "the question of sectarian identities in Iraq." In addition to editing the issue and writing a theoretical introduction, I asked nine top scholars on Iraq to contribute to the issue.

The contributors include Adeed Dawisha, Peter Sluglett,Abbas Kadhim, Reider Visser, Orit Bashkin, Dina Khoury, Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael, and Bassam Yousif. The topics range from British efforts to manipulate sectarian tensions for purposes of colonial control, the impact of 1920 Revolution on sectarian identities, the position of Iraq's Jewish community in relation to sectarianism, Shi'a attitudes towards creation of a separate confessionally base state, the impact of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars on sectarian identities, the impact of expatriate politicians who returned to Iraq in the wake of the 2003 US invasion on sectarian identities, and the political economy of post-2003 sectarian identities in Iraq.

These historically and contemporary based essays emphasize that the dynamics of sectarian identities in Iraq are very complex. Nevertheless, the essays convincingly demonstrate that sectarian identities are a function of crises and the manipulation of these crises by political elites who seek to promote their narrow political and economic interests. Such elites have been historically referred to by Iraqis as the "merchants of politics" (tujjar al-siyasa). I prefer to call them "sectarian entrepreneurs."

At the same time, the journal essays underscore that sectarian identities cannot be seem as simply "socially and politically constructed." In Iraq, as in any nation-state, there are many histories, some of them tolerant and some of them politically divisive.

The Shi'a and Kurds, as well as other ethnoconfessional groups, have experienced social and political marginalization if not violence during the course of Iraqi history. That historical memory is always available in times of crisis for sectarian entrepreneurs to exploit needs to be recognized. While sectarian identities are rarely if ever "primordial" - so-called "ancient hatreds" - there is always a broad tableau of historical events that can be mobilized if the political and socioeconomic conditions are right.

What those who analyze sectarian identities often forget is the obverse, namely that ethnic groups can cooperate to achieve impressive political results. Indeed, the research by James Fearon and David Laitin shows that in ethnically divers societies, cooperation not conflict is the norm. The Iraqi nationalist movement, that began in the late 19th century but came into its own after the 1920 Revolution until it was viciously suppressed by the first Ba'thist regime that seized power in February 1963, was characterized by cross-ethnic cooperation. As I document in my Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, all of Iraq's ethnic groups - Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Kurds, Christians, Jews, Turkmen and other ethnic groups participated in the nationalist struggle.

If we look at Egypt, we see that it too developed a nationalist movement that, like Iraq, included Muslims, Christians and Jews. Tolerance and cross-ethnic cooperation have been the rule in Iraq's modern history. Only during the UN sanctions of the 1990s did sectarian identities begin to spread in Iraq and only during the immediate post-2003 period did Iraq experience persistent sectarian violence.

And we need to remember that, in Iraq, ethnically based violence was facilitated by the ill-advised US decision to dissolve the conscript army and the national police in May 2003. If that decision had not been taken, it is highly unlikely that the Ba'thist and al-Qa'ida sponsored insurgencies would have gotten off the ground.

In a future posting, I will report on my findings with focus groups of Iraq youth between the ages between 14 and 30. The positive findings are that these youth are not supportive of sectarianism. Young people realize that sectarianism threatens their future. They know that. all too often, they are the ones who suffer from ethnically based violence.

To purchase the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studiesspecial issue on sectarian identities in Iraq go to:
http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/journals/view-Journal,id=144/view,page=1/

What Iraq "enjoys" unlike any other Middle Eastern country - two authoritarian governments!

2011-04-25T22:03:00.040-04:00

Iraq has the distinct disadvantage compared to all other countries of the Middle East of having not one, but two authoritarian regimes. In Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government has not only suppressed peaceful protests but has systematically moved to eliminate any system of checks and balances that would constrain his power. In the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), President Masoud Barzani has likewise worked to remove any challenges to his authority. In this process, his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) had been supported by the other power broker in the KRG, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Put differently, Iraqis are oppressed by two authoritarian governments, one Arab and one Kurdish.

With all the current attention on Libya, Syria and Yemen, Iraq has been neglected in the Western media. However, demonstrations have continued both in the Arab and Kurdish areas of the country. These demonstrations have led to numerous arrests, and demonstrators being wounded and even killed. Despite ethnic differences, Arabs and Kurds in Iraq are protesting against the same issues.

In Baghdad, demonstrators continue to protest state corruption, the lack of public services, and the failure of the government to abide by transparent governance and the rule of law. Iraqi protesters have demanded that the al-Maliki government implement its election promises and cease attacking peaceful demonstrators who are trying to exercise their rights. On February 26th, 23 protesters were killed as Iraqis, following democracy activists elsewhere in the region, began their own "Day of Rage."

Following widespread arrests over the past two months, protesters are now demanding that the al-Maliki government release those who have been arrested. In other Middle Eastern countries, the slogan "Day of Rage" has characterized the regular Friday protests that follow mosque prayers. In Iraq, protesters have now added to that slogan, "The Friday commemorating the imprisoned innocents" ((jum'at mu'taqal al-abriya').

As reported by al-Hayat, (April 2), Iraqi security police have arrested women, children and the elderly and not just young men. These arrests have sparked more protests as security forces have blocked off streets around Liberation Square (Sahat al-Tahrir) in central Baghdad to prevent more Friday demonstrations.

Iraqi protesters have a right to be concerned with corruption. The Iraqi parliament's Integrity Committee has been investigating numerous cases of corruption which have been given greater impetus by country-wide protests that have condemned misuse of public funds (see al-Hayat, April 23). According to the committee's assistant chairperson, Ibrahim al-Juburi, financial and administrative corruption is widespread. He asserted that the lack of oversight since 2003, and the control of government funds by political parties and powerful political figures, explains Iraq's corruption problem.

The cases that the Committee are investigating range from contracts for buying aircraft from Canada, to expired foodstuffs that were purchased to be distributed to needy Iraqis, to metal detectors that do not function, to the purchase of a plot of land in downtown Baghdad on which a new university will be built. The new university, which will be known as al-Sadiq University (Jami'at al-Sadiq) will be run by one of al-Maliki's advisers, al-Shaykh Husayn Baraka al-Shami. The conditions under which the land for the new university was purchased are very suspect.

One of the important steps taken by the Iraqi parliament has been to abolish Article 136 of the District Courts' Foundational Law that prevents investigative agencies such as the Parliament's Integrity Committee, or the Agency for Financial Oversight (Diwan al-Riqaba al-Maliya), from prosecuting high ranking employees of government ministries, namely those who are director-generals or above.

Even with the Parliament's action, an unnamed high ranking member of the Integrity Committee expressed fear that the elimination of Article 136 would be prevented on political and legal grounds. al-Maliki's efforts to eliminate the independence of the Independent High Electoral Commission and the central bank, among other government agencies, raises questions of how much power Iraq's parliament can exert in controlling maleficence in the executive branch.

In the KRG, the Western and Arab media have been particularly remiss in not reporting the continuing demonstrations in the region's second largest city, Sulaimaniya. These demonstrations, which have been ongoing since last February 17th, follow the same pattern as in the Arab south. Protesters have demanded accountability on the KRG's part, an elimination of corruption, and the awarding of government employment on the basis of merit and not on the basis of ties to one of the two main political parties, the KDP or PUK.

While demonstrations have continued, security forces have attacked demonstrators and arrested numerous journalists who have sought to report on the protests. Reporters Without Borders has said that at least 14 journalists have been beaten and/or arrested in various areas of the KRG in connection with the demonstrations (al-Hayat, April 21).

Meanwhile, Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, also PUK head, has accused the new Gorran (Change) Party of inspiring the unrest. Gorran is a party that was formed in 2009 that split from the PUK in demanding democratic reforms in the KRG. It successfully contested the July 2009 KRG Regional Parliament elections, winning 25 seats.

Talabani's response to peaceful protests parallels that of al-Maliki and other authoritarian leaders throughout the Middle East. Rather than confront legitimate grievances, blame is cast on "troublemakers, outside agitators, and Islamists." In this instance, his ire has been directed at Gorran for "stirring up trouble."

What developments throughout the Middle East suggest is the need for greater coordination among democracy activists. In Iraq, it would make great sense for Arab and Kurds (and Turkmen and other groups) to unite in a cross-ethnic coalition, much as occurred during the period of the powerful Iraqi nationalist movement (1908-1963) which brought together all Iraq's ethnic groups, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Jews, Turkmen and others.

Indeed, the Gorran Party flag contains the Arabic word for "change" (taghyir), indicating that it is not hostile to Arabs. Because many of the demonstrators who support Gorran in the KRG are young, like many of the demonstrators in the Arab south, there is the opportunity for both groups to use social media to coordinate their activities and make known to the rest of the world the oppressive behavior of both the al-Maliki government and the KRG. In other words, a Kurdish-Arab coalition, inspired by Gorran, could become a powerful force for democratic change in Iraq.

Ultimately, it would be helpful to have all democratic movements, from Egypt's April 6th Movement to Syria's Insan human rights organization to Gorran in the KRG, share websites that would serve as clearing houses for information, strategies and tactics throughout the Middle East. As we know, democracy is never a gift. It only comes to those who organize.

Welcoming Dr. Tariq Ramadan to Rutgers University

2011-04-19T23:02:00.006-04:00

The following remarks that I delivered were intended to welcome Dr. Tariq Ramadan and contextualize a lecture that he gave at Rutgers University on April 19, 2011.

It is my great pleasure to add my welcome to Dr. Tariq Ramadan who we are very fortunate to have lecture to us tonight on the topic of “Religion, Radicalism and the Quest for Pluralism.”

In his recently published, The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, Dr. Ramadan begins his study by pointing to a world lacking in self confidence, a feeling that he rightfully argues is closely associated with fear.

While I am not a student of religion but rather of politics, much of what Dr Ramadan argues in The Quest for Meaning and his other writings resonates with my own research on the Middle East, especially the problems of youth, sectarian identities and democratization . Thus I would like to share some thoughts as a political scientist on the topic of the evening, namely how do we arrive at a more pluralist and tolerant world.

Among the many important questions that Dr. Ramadan raises in The Quest for Meaning, one for me as a political scientist is particularly telling In his chapter on freedom, he asks: What can thinking about freedom and society mean, if society does not guarantee me the preconditions for my humanity?

This question took me back to my days at the University of Chicago when I conducted a study for my MA thesis on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. I had begun my study as a comparative analysis - comparing religio-politcial movements in the United States with those in the Middle East. However, the Brotherhood quickly captured my attention.

As I focused on the Brotherhood, to my surprise, I discovered that the large sample of its members that I was able to develop through my research included few clerics or ‘ulama. Instead, I learned that most Brothers were well educated and from secular backgrounds, mostly from the teaching and other professions. What was characteristic of all the members of my sample was that they were both horizontally and vertically mobile. In other words, they were migrants from rural areas to Cairo and to other large Egyptian cities who aspired to upward mobility.

Unable to achieve this mobility once they arrived in urban areas because they lacked the requisite wasta or influence that would have allowed them to turn their education onto success, the Muslim Brothers often turned to radical politics and even violence. The name the Brothers used for the cells they organized was al-usra or family - an indicator of the alienation from society that they felt.

What I had discovered in my study of the MB was the beginning of what we refer to today as globalization. While authors such as Thomas Friedman and others extol the benefits of globalization, my own research in Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East has pointed to its dark under side.

What we see taking place throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century is the destruction of the agricultural sector of the economy and a massive rural to urban migration. With limited job creation in urban areas, the economies of Egypt and many other Middle Eastern and non-Western countries cannot absorb the migrants or their booming population growth . Egypt alone needs to create 250,000 jobs each year just to keep abreast of population growth.

The irony of globalization is that, on the one hand, we live in a world that is economically integrated . However, at the same time, we lack the political and social institutions as well as cultural knowledge that would allow us to interact as a global community based on values of pluralism, tolerance, mutual respect and social justice- all themes that are central to The Quest for Meaning.

Just as the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were angry that they could not realize their aspirations and dreams earlier in the 20th century, so too do many people in advanced capitalist countries and non-Western countries find their dreams thwarted as well. The so-called Tea Party with its xenophobic rhetoric, including anti-Muslim attitudes, indicates that the question of pluralism is global in nature and not a problem of the non-Western world alone.

In the Middle East, the problem of being able to look forward to a rewarding future is especially difficult for the large population of youth - what sociologists refer to as the “youth bulge” - where 70% of the population is under the age of 30. As economic inequality increases, employment opportunities shrink, education becomes more difficult to obtain, and health care is increasingly the realm of the privileged, many of those adversely affected by these processes of globalization are retreating from totalizing cross-cultural discourses, namely secularism liberalism and various forms of socialist thought.

Exactly at a time when the world is becoming more economically interdependent, the angry and the alienated withdraw into narrowly conceived forms of political discourses. These new forms of political discourse construct build rigid boundaries between “Us” ands “Them, between those who are “Authentic” such as the Tea Partyiers who claim to be the true and authentic patriots, and the vilified “Other” who becomes the scapegoats for all of a group or nation’s problems. These disaffected groups substitute hostility and sometime even violence for rational discourse based in shared values and negotiation. In this process, as Dr. Ramadan points out, pluralism, tolerance and mutual respect are the casualties.
While the process I have just described is often thought by Westerners to characterize the non-Western world, it permeates the West as well. All too often in the West, Islam is accused of standing against pluralism and reform, and of being supportive of intolerance, the suppression of women and authoritarian political practices. Certainly, such thinking reflects the undertone of the recent Congressional hearings on so-called radicalization of Islam in the United States that were held by Representative Peter King of New York.
It also explains why television evangelist Pat Robertson and Fox News Talk show host Glenn Beck recently supported the deposed president of the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo. Despite his having decisively lost the November 2010 presidential elections, and having refused to leave office and the fact that he was a repressive and corrupt ruler, Mssrs. Robertson and Beck still supported him. They argued that, despite losing the presidential elections, the West could not allow Gbagbo to be pushed from office because the rightly elected president of the Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara, was a Muslim, and his taking office would mean yet another African nation-state falling under the control of Islam. This view of Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion that is hostile to the West is the antithesis of the pluralism that Dr. Ramadan advocates in The Quest for Meaning.
What my comments about the Muslim Brotherhood and Westerners are intended to suggest is that those who are hostile to Islam (or any other religion) do not understand the meaning of religion. The religion of those who are characterized by fear and anger is really politics pretending to be religion - what in Arabic is referred to as al-din al-musayyas or politicized religion. In this instance, basic tenets of religion are distorted to produce desired political outcomes, almost always at the expense of other groups in society.

One of the most notorious examples of politicized religion in the United States is the Ku Klux Klan that invoked Christianity to lynch innocent African-Americans in an effort to intimidate them and exclude them from political and economic life. The irony is that those who promote politicized religion rarely know the fundamentals of the religion of which they purport to believe.

This evening we, the members of the audience - whether Muslim or non-Muslim - are not here to address an “problem of Islam, ” but rather to ask what role can religion - in the true meaning of the term- play in promoting our ability to live together as a global community. We are all God’s children. The famous section in Voltaire’s Candide where the two armies, one comprised of Christian Bulgarians and the other of the Muslim Turks pray to God to vanquish their respective enemy highlights the absurdity of thinking that God loves one social group more than another.

In his interpretation of Islam in many scholarly texts Dr Ramadan argues that religion needs to constantly be subject to examination as to how it applies to contemporary life. This calls attention to the dispute between Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib when the Khawarij condemned him for negotiating with his enemy, the Ummayids. When accused of substituting human reason for God’s word, Imam Ali laid a Qur’an on the table and asked it to speak. To this the Khawarij responded that the Qur’an is not human and therefore cannot speak. Imam Ali replied by saying that this is precisely the case since it is human beings who must interpret God’s word and hopefully apply it in the proper manner in their daily lives. This rejection of fanaticism and more humble approach to religion is precisely what is required if pluralism is truly to become a widely accepted value.

My recent research with Iraqi youth between the ages of 14 and 30 provides reason for hope, as does the mass movement of youth throughout the Middle East who are calling for freedom of expression and thought and the right to decide their own destiny. The Iraqi youth in my focus groups - both Arab and Kurd - are anti-sectarian and look to a future Iraq where employment is right of all citizens, where building a family is not beyond their reach, and where political leaders serve their constituencies rather than their wallets.

On the other hand, many of these youth know little about the history of their country or about religion. Clearly, education - another central theme in Dr. Ramadan’s writings, precisely what is happening here tonight, must capture more of our resources and attention if we care to transcend insecurity and fear of the Other.

In The Quest for Meaning, Dr. Tariq Ramadan argues that “Analytic reason does not recognize any dogma” (30) His writings seek to provide us with ways of transcending our fear of the world by coming together under a “big tent” in which all well intentioned people can enjoy the benefits of pluralism, grow as human beings and live together in peace and social justice. Working together, even in small ways, we can make his vision of the world a reality.

Thank you.

Social Media: A Force for Political Change in Egypt

2011-04-13T10:39:00.009-04:00

Guest author: Kira Baiasu

There has been much debate surrounding the role of social media in the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Though the movement that led to the ousting of President Husni Mubarak has been dubbed the “Facebook Revolution,” it is not the first time that foreign media has been quick to connect a social networking site with a popular uprising.

The 2009 Iranian protests were labeled the “Twitter Revolution,” and ever since there are those who are adamant that social media is a vital instrument for mobilizing the masses while others argue that social media is just a new means of communication in a history of popular uprisings that fared quite well without these new technological innovations.

While social media is not necessary for organizing revolutions it served three important functions leading up to the Egyptian Revolution. It aided in building a politically conscious civil society over the course of a number of years prior to the Revolution, it lowered the threshold for engaging in political dissent by providing a relatively anonymous space for political debate in a country that outlaws gatherings of five or more people, and it allowed organizers to plan protests more easily and anonymously.

One of the first scholars to coin the term “cyber-resistance” in the context of Middle Eastern social movements was Mamoun Fandy. As far back as 1999, Fandy identified that Saudi opposition movements, such as the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA), were using the internet as a tool for circumventing the ever watchful eyes of the oppressive regime.

Fandy found that the internet offered both opposition groups and the state an intermediate space where they were able to disseminate information in a virtual space that was beyond limited conceptual and physical spaces. The internet provided “a new space for airing grievances with minimal risk.” By emailing opposition newsletters and information throughout the Kingdom, MIRA was able to promote its cause without the physical risk of going out into the streets in protest or holding illegal meetings that could be shut down by the authorities.

Critics might argue that there was little difference between the use of email and the more traditional method of distributing cassette tapes by anti-regime clerics, but the novelty was that by using email, information could be disseminated simultaneously and immediately to a large number of people simply with a click of the mouse.

Other than the work of Fandy and a few others, there was little written about the use of social networking in political protest movements for quite a while. While the media began to latch on to the importance of social networking after Facebook and Twitter helped rally the youth vote in the 2008 American presidential elections, it was during the protests following the 2009 Iranian presidential elections that social networking sites were deemed such a central tool in mobilizing the masses that the uprising was labeled by many as the “Twitter Revolution.”

Within the Iranian context, Twitter was used to organize protests and disseminate information. According to Time magazine, Twitter was the medium of the movement because it was easy for average citizens to use but difficult for government authorities to control. The purpose of Twitter is for news to spread and spread fast, which makes it an ideal method for organizing a mass protest. Even when the government attempted to block Twitter, proxy servers were set up to allow Twitter content into Iran through network addresses that had not been blocked.

In June 2009 the U.S. State Department reached out to Twitter and asked the company to delay its planned upgrades so that Iranian protesters using the social networking site would be protected and would have access to it as a means of communication. This request by the U.S. government highlights the importance of sites such as Twitter and Facebook not only for casual social networking but also as a political instrument, a fact that governments both promoting democratic initiatives and attempting to maintain authoritarian rule are beginning to recognize.

Just as soon as the media began to proclaim that social networking was pivotal for mass mobilization in the Iranian uprisings, others began to question how important these sites really were and claimed that their centrality was overstated. Throughout history, protests against oppressive regimes occurred without the use of social networking sites. People still managed to organize and amass large crowds virtually overnight before the advent of Twitter, including during the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Wasn’t Twitter just a new way of doing the same old thing?

The debate over the importance of social networking continued during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution. Just as the Iranian protests had been labeled the Twitter Revolution, the foreign press was quick to cast the Egyptian uprising as the Facebook Revolution. However, as quickly as the name caught on, it was called into question on January 27, 2011 when the Egyptian government took the unprecedented step of shutting down all internet service in the country.

In addition to the Internet blackout, a large number of Egyptians lost mobile service. Despite the unanticipated loss of virtually all modern technological means of communication, protest organizers were able to bring out larger crowds than ever using flyers and leaflets, word of mouth, and mosques as centers for congregation.

If protest organizers were still able to amass large crowds in such a short period of time without the use of social networking then why bother to call it a Facebook Revolution at all?

The importance of Facebook in the Egyptian Revolution lies in the events leading up to the Revolution. Revolutions are not usually spontaneous events. While outsiders may not anticipate the uprising until it occurs, revolutions often take careful planning and slowly unfold over a long period of time.

In 2008, the April 6 Youth Movement used Facebook and YouTube to organize a nationwide strike in support of workers in al-Mahalla al-Kubra. During the strikes citizen journalists used Twitter, Facebook, and Flickr to report on strikes and draw attention to their cause. By 2009 a New York Times article reported that the April 6 Youth Movement Facebook group had 70,000 members, mostly young educated Egyptians who were novices to the political scene.

The group members’ primary political grievances have centered on free speech, government nepotism, and economic stagnation. In addition to followers using the Facebook page as a public forum for political discussion, the organizers of the April 6 Youth Movement are able to post politically relevant news articles and videos to their wall and send out messages to followers providing political updates, accurate information, and news about upcoming events and protests.

In terms of bringing people off the web and into the streets, it has been a place for debating and planning protests and calling followers to engage in political activism. In a relatively closed society with government controlled media, the Movement was able to use Facebook as a tool for developing a young, politically informed civil society. Social media, in this case Facebook, lowers the threshold for political participation in countries ruled by authoritarian or closed regimes. While individuals’ private preferences may be in favor of regime change, the risks to one’s safety are often too large to publicly display such preferences.

The Internet provides a greater degree of anonymity where citizens can express their political ideas with less fear of reprisal. It also allows groups to circumvent the Egyptian Emergency Law that criminalizes the assembly of 5 or more people in a gathering that could "threaten public order." Facebook allows citizens from different areas of the country, who might otherwise never meet, to share political views and realize that they are not alone in their feelings of opposition to the regime. In short, Facebook aids in the development of civil society, particularly in countries where open political opposition is often curbed by force.

The April 6 Youth Movement is not the only group to use social media to reach the Egyptian masses. We are all Khalid Said, founded by Google executive Wael Ghonim as both a Facebook page and blog, was created in response to the death of twenty-eight year old political blogger Khalid Said at the hands of Egyptian police in Alexandria after Said posted a video on his blog exposing police corruption.

The purpose of the pages was to end torture in Egypt by exposing the brutality of the Egyptian regime. Posting graphic pictures and videos and providing information on Egyptian torture, the pages outraged many Egyptians and in 2010 more than 11,000 people heeded the call for silent protests in Cairo, Alexandria, and across Egypt against Khalid Said’s death. These protests were organized on the "We are all Khalid Said" Facebook page. We are all Khalid Said has become the largest Egyptian dissident page, attracting over one hundred thousand followers, who again came out in protest during the 2011 Egyptian Revolution.

In addition to the April 6 Youth Movement and We are all Khalid Said, other groups such as Kifaya, a grassroots coalition that opposed Husni Mubarak’s presidency, began using social networking to organize protests against the regime in 2004, close to the time of the 2005 presidential elections.

There have been numerous smaller political pages that have popped up around the country from Suez to Port Said. However, it is not only the number of followers that a page has that is so important in forming a revolution. If one looks solely at the development of a politically conscious civil society, then the number of followers is a good measure of political activity.

However, the Egyptian Revolution began on January 25, 2011 as an interaction between smaller organized groups, such as the April 6 Youth Movement, We are all Khalid Said, Justice and Freedom, Muslim Brotherhood youth, ElBaradei's campaign, The Popular Democratic Movement for Change (HASHD), and The Democratic Front, and a larger mass of disorganized, everyday citizens with economic grievances.

Though small, the organizing groups were clearly effective in bringing people to the streets who had never engaged in political activity a day in their lives. While organizers did meet in person, social media was sometimes a safer way to interact and plan. In protests organized in the years preceding the revolution, oftentimes organizers would never meet in person, conducting all planning and coordinating through Facebook.

While there will remain skeptics who feel that the role of social media leading up to the Egyptian Revolution has been overstated, one thing is certain. If one logs onto Facebook today, there are more Egyptians than ever before using the site to discuss the constitutional referendum, the role of the military, and a host of politically pressing issues. It appears that at least in the near future, Facebook will provide one of the primary forums for Egyptian youth’s political debates.

Qaddafi: My Imminent Downfall will be the End of the King of Africa's Kings and the Dean of the Arab Rulers

2011-04-10T13:26:00.008-04:00

Guest author: Dr. Abdelhamid al-Siyam

القذافي: سقوط انفرادي محتوم لملك ملوك أفريقيا وعميد الحكام العرب
عبد الحميد صيام

في عام 1992 قام وفد صغير من الأمم المتحدة بالوصول إلى خيمة القذافي جنوب طرابلس وقام رئيس الوفد الروسي الجنسية بتسليم العقيد رسالتين واحدة من الأمين العام بطرس بطرس غالي يدعوه فيها للتعاون مع المنطمة الدولية في مكافحة الإرهاب وتسليم المتهمين عبد الباسط المقراحي والأمين خليفة فحيمة كما نص القرار الذي اعتمد للتو 731 (1992). أما الرسالة الثانية فكانت موجهة للعقيد من عضوين دائمين في مجلس الأمن وقد طلب من الوفد تسليمها فقط كأمانة. تلك الرسالة التي غيرت سياسة القذافي الخارجية من زعيم داعم للثورات وحركات التحرر إلى رئيس دولة صغيرة وقع في شرك الدول الكبرى وليس أمامه إلا أن ينصاع انصياعا كاملا لما هو مطلوب منه دون مناقشة أو اعتراض. وتحمل الرسالة سبعة عشر شرطا طلب من العقيد تنفيذها بالكامل كرزمة واحدة لا مجال للمساومة أو الاختزال أو التخفيف منها. وبقاء النظام أو انهياره كان الفرق بين تنفيذ سلة المطالب تلك أو عدم تنفيذها.

إذن بعد حادثة لوكربي عام 1988 شعرالعقيد أنه وقع في الفخ وأن الأمريكان والبريطانيين لن يغفروا له هذه الجريمة، واقتنع أن نظامه الشمولي الغريب من نوعه لا يستطيع البقاء أمام ضغط أمريكي بريطاني حقيقي، فاختار الاستسلام والخنوع المذلين لإملاءات السياسة الأمريكية البريطانية دون نقاش أو حق اعتراض.

في السبع سنوات التالية ولغاية تسليم المتهمين في نهاية عام 1999 عمل العقيد على تنفيذ كل ما جاء من إملاءات أمريكية بريطانية مقابل عدم الإطاحة بحكمه. تخلى عن الفصائل التي كان يدعمها وقدم قوائم وكشوفات بكل الجماعات التي تدربت في ليبيا أو تلقت مساعدات منها من الجيش الجمهوري الإيرلندي إلى ثوار المورو في الفلبين وصولا إلى كافة الفصائل اللبنانية والفلسطينية والأفريقية وأوقف كل برامج ودراسات ومعامل تتعلق بأسلحة الدمار الشامل وكشف عن الخبير النووي الباكستاني عبد القدير الذي ساعد ليبيا ودولا أخرى في إنشاء برامج نووية وأغلق معسكرين للتدريب ذكرا بالإسم وأبدى استعداده للتعامل مع إسرائيل حيث أرسل قافلة مكونة من 200 ليبي للحج إلى مدينة القدس في الأول من شهر حزيران (يونيو) عام 1993 والهدف بالتأكيد لم يكن للتقرب إلى الله من ساحات المسجد الأقصى بل التقرب إلى إسحاق رابين في تل أبيب لكن مغامرته المكشوفة هذه باءت بالفشل الذريع. بل وذهب أبعد من ذلك عندما قام في أيلول (سبتمبر) عام 1995 بطرد 30,000 فلسطيني وصادر أملاكهم ورمى بهم على الحدود مع مصر ليتبث للغرب أنه انتقل بالفع لا بالقول إلى جانب الولايات المتحدة وحليفتها إسرائيل بل إنه أشد قسوة على الفلسطينيين من إسرائيل نفسها.

كان يتمنى القذافي لو أن تسليم المتهمين سيحل الأزمة إلا أن بريطانيا وأمريكا لم تكونا في عجلة من أمرهما خاصة وأن مجلس الأمن كان تحت سيطرة الدولتين تماما بعد انهيار الاتحاد السوفييتي. في السنوات السبع تلك شهد نظام القذافي ضعفا وتفككا ومعارضة داخلية واسعة وذلك لأسباب ثلاثة:
أولا: الانصياع الكامل لإملاءات الولايات المتحدة وبريطانيا وتبديد بلايين الدولارات للتعامل مع الأزمة وخاصة بعد الحصار الذي فرض على ليبيا
ثانيا: زيادة القمع غير المحدود
ثالثا: المغالاة في تأليه شخصيته للتغطية على إذلاله وانصياعه الكاملين.

القمع منذ البداية
محنة الشعب الليبي مع هذا المهرج المصاب بجنون العظمة ليست جديدة بل تعود إلى البداية عندما فشل في تسويق نفسه كزعيم قومي ووريث شرعي لعبد الناصر. ثم تحول إلى قائد أممي مع بداية عام 1977 وأطلق ما سمي الكتاب الأخضر والنظرية الثالثة وأعاد تسمية البلد وغير أسماء الأشهر وغير التاريخ الهجري وكاد أن يتلاعب في آي القرآن الكريم. تعامل مع المعارضة بمنتهى الوحشية حيث بدأ يعلق المعارضين على أعواد المشانق أمام الناس وفي مداخل الجامعات ليرهب الناس ويزرع الخوف في قلوبهم. وأدخل البلاد في حروب فاشلة بهدف تفتيت ما تبقى من الجيش مرة مع مصر عام 1977 ومرات عديدة مع تشاد ابتداء من عام 1978 إلى غاية عام 1987 ومرة مع تونس عندما دعم تمردا سيطر على مدينة قفصة في الجنوب عام 1980.

وكلما أوغل العقيد في مسخرة اللجان الشعبية وتأسيس ما سماه أول جماهيرية في التاريخ كلما زادت نسبة التبرم الشعبي وبالتالي يوغل في سفك الدم والتقتيل والتعذيب ليس فقط داخل حدود البلاد بل وفي الخارج أيضا. واستطاع عبر توزيع الرشاوي أو الخداع أن يستدرج أويختطف عددا من المعارضين في الخارج ليفرمهم في الداخل. وكان السيد منصور الكيخيا، وزير الخارجية الأسبق والممثل الدائم لليبيا في الأمم المتحدة أبرز هؤلاء الرموز. فقد تم اختطافه من مصر أثناء مشاركته في مؤتمر عن حقوق الإنسان عام 1993 وتصفيته فورا، خاصة وأن اختطافه تزامن مع محاولة اغتيال العقيد في "بلد الوليد" البعيدة 100 كم جنوب شرق طرابلس حيث تم إعدام نحو 1500 من أبناء البلد.

لقد استطاع القذافي أن يخمد المعارضة الليبية بالعنف المفرط وتهميش الجيش خوف الانقلاب والإغداق علــى رجال الأمن الجهلة الذي أخرجهم من المدارس ولا يعرفون شيئا إلا التسبيح والحمدلة للعقيد.

بعد إعادة تأهيله من قبل الدول الغربية ابتداء من عام 2001 وبعد أن دفع التعويضات الهائلة لضحايا الطائرتين الفرنسية والأمريكية وبعد أن سلم مجلس الأمن رسالة خطية يعترف فيها بمسؤوليته عن حادثة لوكربي- بدأ القذاقي يغالي في تأليه نفسه متجها بملايينه إلى الدول الأفريقية بعد أن ابتعد عنه العرب شعوبا وحكومات. بدأ يتحدث وكأنه يمسك بين يديه ناصية التاريخ والفلسفة والحكمة والعلم والدين. فوضع حلا لقضية فلسطين ضمنه في كتابه الأبيض وأسمى الدولة "إسراطين" لكن أحدا لم يأخذ برأيه، وأعلن أن حلول مشاكل العالم الاقتصادية والاجتماعية والسياسية كلها موجودة في كتابه الأخضر الذي لم يقرأه أحد خارج جماهيريتيه لتفاهته ودعا إلى وحدة اندماجية لكل الدول الأفريقية وأطلق جائزة لحقوق الإنسان وكان أول الفائزين بها، ثم أصبح كاتب قصة ومنح نفسه لقب ملك ملوك أفريقيا وعميد الحكام العرب ومفجر ثورة الجماهير وصاحب أول جماهيرية في التاريخ. وكلما أوغل في تأليه نفسه كلما زاد العالم ازدراء له وتعاظم تململ الشعب الليبي من هذا المهرج المستبد.

السقوط الانفرادي
ليس من الغريب إذن بل ومن المنطق، عندما هب الشعب الليبي الطيب الصبور ليعلن نهاية حكم الطاغية، أن يجد العقيد نفسه محاصرا دون أصدقاء لا في الممالك الأفريقية ولا عند القادة العرب ولا عند ثوار أفريقيا وآسيا وأمريكا اللاتينية الذين يدعي أنه قائدهم ولا عند الدول الإسلامية التي يدعي أنه يتصدى باسمها لحرب صليبية جديدة. ها هو قائد جماهيرية الوهم محاصر في باب العزيزية دون أنصار ودون أصدقاء ودون أتباع. يترنح قبل السقوط النهائي ولا يجد حوله أحدا إلا بعض أبنائه وحفنة من زبانيته الفاسقة ومن تبقى من المرتزقة الذين استأجرهم لذبح شعبه. وكغيره من الطغاة، لن يجد في هذا الكون من يذرف دمعة عليه بل ستسري موجة من الفرح لدى أبناء الشعب العربي كلهم وفي أولهم أحفاد عمر المختار الذي أذلهم وبدد ثرواتهم وأمعن في احتقارهم وخاصة عندما قرر نقل رفات أسد الصحراء من بنغازي إلى بلدة سلوق في مجاهل الصحراء عام 1980 وإقامة سوق تجاري مكانه لأن الطاغية لا يعترف بتاريخ لليبيا قبل انقلابه المشبوه في الفاتح من أيلول (سبتمبر) 1969. ولن يمر وقت طويل قبل أن نرى ليبيا خالية من صوره وكتابه وأفكاره البلهاء وشعاراته الجوفاء ويعود الشعب الليبي الطيب الصبور المتسامح جزءا عزيزا من أمته العربية يعيش حالة سلام مع الذات ومع الآخرين ويستغل إمكاناته الهائلة لتنمية بلده ومساعدة أمته وترميم الخراب الذي تركه نظام فردي شمولي كاسر أهلك البلاد وأذل العباد لمدة 42 سنة.
____________________________________
أستاذ دراسات الشرق الأوسط والعلوم السياسية بجامعة رتغرز بولاية نيوجرزي

Change Without Revolution: Jordan's Missed Opportunity?

2011-04-09T07:49:00.004-04:00

Guest author: Andrew Spath

The makings of a revolution are not in Jordan. Opposition is divided, the monarchy maintains widespread support as an institution, and reformists are directing grievances against Prime Minister Marouf al-Bakhit, who succeeded Samir Rifa’i after the king dissolved the cabinet in February, and his new government. In general, the reform activists are appealing to King Abdullah II to expedite responses to their demands, not calling for his ouster.

Despite a lack of full consensus among the opposition, demands generally include a new and representative election law to replace the law drafted last May and used in the November 2010 elections; dissolution of parliament; a new election, based on a new law, to replace parliament; stronger parliamentary power relative to the executive; greater freedoms of speech, assembly, and press; and major strides against corruption and profiteering among government officials.

But opposition is highly fragmented, and the divisions and disagreements among the opposition are hurting their overall cause. In an attempt to bring the formal opposition parties to join a national dialogue on reforms, King Abdullah established the National Dialogue Committee (NDC) in March under the patronage of the president of the Senate, Taher Masri. The Islamist movement, particularly the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is calling for PM Bakhit to resign and for the NDC to be under the patronage of the King himself, making him the reference point for demands and reforms. Parties among the leftists and pan-Arabist opposition are more willing to wait for the government’s response to the suggestions of the National Dialogue Committee in the coming months, as are the centrist parties like the National Constitutional Party (NCP).

These blocs of formal opposition not only differ in respect to their on the prime minister and his cabinet, but also on the character of a new election law. There is a shared call for abolishing the one-person, one-vote system, but the Islamists support for party list elections worries the less-established centrist and leftist parties. The formal opposition blocs also diverge on their views of the kingship, with calls for reduced executive powers of varying degrees. The king currently appoints the prime minister by royal decree, and many opposition groups want to revoke those powers and give them to the parliament. Resulting from these disagreements and others, formal opposition parties have postponed holding the Friday protests that have become regular in the last two months.

There seems to be little movement among the informal opposition this weekend as well. Successive episodes of reformist mobilization in the form of street protests and sit-ins turned violent at the antagonistic countermobilization of anti-reformists. Two Fridays ago, a demonstration led by Jordanian youth called March 24 Shabab (March 24 Youth) populated Gamal Abdel Nasser Square outside the Interior Ministry in Amman. After 30 hours of populating the square in peaceful protest, anti-reformist protesters and the introduction of the darak (riot police) escalated the situation to a violent attack against the reformists leaving two dead. The protests and subsequent clashes may have taken a temporary toll on the efforts of the constituent youth associations, exposing disagreements among the constituent groups. Last Friday, two prominent factions of the March 24 Shabab Movement did not participate in the sit-in at Ras al-Ain in downtown Amman. Jayeen (We Are Coming) officially withdrew from the March 24 Shabab Movement, and Wihda (the youth of the Democratic Popular Unity Party) did not withdraw but decided not to attend as a result of disorganization.

There is a real window of opportunity here, in the wake of violent events and amidst a temporary recess in the mass street demonstrations of previous weeks, for positive government intervention. The Jordanian government has a chance to exhibit a real commitment to political and economic reforms before potential escalation.

Pessimism abounds, however, as previous opportunities have been largely squandered. Last May, for example, seven months after King Abdullah II dissolved the parliament (for a second time since he took power in 1999) amidst allegations of corruption and inefficacy, the government’s new electoral law – marketed to be a significant step toward political fairness and transparency – was a major disappointed among reformists and opposition groups hoping for fairer representation. Patience among pro-democracy advocates is wearing thin after successive iterations of what Jillian Schwedler identified as the cycle that stagnates Jordanian politics: “new elections law, new parliament, stalemate on economic reforms, dissolution of parliament, flood of temporary laws, repeat.”

The Jordanian government would be mistaken to think that the protests will be placated by small economic measures or shuffling cabinet positions. Since January, the government has increased salaries and pensions for public employees and the military, increased subsidies on fuels and staple foods, drafted a law creating a teachers union, replaced a cabinet and prime minister, established the National Dialogue Committee, and recommitted publicly to continued economic and political reforms without specification. King Abdullah stated last week that he personally guaranteed the changes suggested by the National Dialogue Committee and the potential for constitutional amendments, but only time will tell the seriousness with which he is willing to do so and whether he is willing to cede some of his own power in the process.

Taking a short-term view, these are positive developments. But while these efforts are surely welcomed and constructive, the protesters and reformists have been calling for significant structural changes in Jordan’s politics and comprehensive freedoms. King Abdullah, and King Hussein before him, have pulled short-term levers to pacify dissent on numerous occasions, only to disappoint on long-term, transformational political reforms.

Seizing the opportunity is all the more important in the face of serious threats to stability. Reinforcing social cleavages in Jordan make for a tension-filled political situation, especially during a period in which society is increasingly mobilized and politicized. Despite significant internal diversity, Jordanian social cleavages include a division between East Bank Transjordanians and Jordanians of Palestinian origin. But the divisions are reified in other identifiable ways. East Bank Jordanians constitute the influential tribes in Jordan, maintaining “tribal culture” through traditional networks, while the Palestinian Jordanians, partly as a function of historical uprootedness, rely primarily on the immediate family. The East Bank Jordanians hold the highest positions in the military and security apparatus and are heavy in public sector employment, while the Palestinian Jordanians dominate the private sector. Recent and impending economic reforms therefore exacerbate these divergent identities and create tension among these social groups. As does Jordan’s relationship with Israel and its policies and positions on Palestinian and Israeli peace.

Recent protests exemplify these troubling signs of division. Naseem Tarawneh provides a revealing first-hand account and analysis of the social divide playing out during recent weeks of protest and social activity. She describes the way that public discourse turned away from politics and economics and possibilities for reform, and instead slowly became dominated by the issue of loyalty, pitting the “loyalist” anti-reformists against the reformers who were painted as the traitorous Islamist Palestinians. These divisions are not only manifest on the street but online. Tarawneh points to facebook groups for “Pure Jordanians” for “100% Jordanians only,” and the “[s]eemingly endless calls in support of all the ‘brave Jordanians’ who ‘cleansed’ the Interior Circle from the ‘insurgents’, the ‘Islamists’ and the ‘Palestinians.’”

Calls for, and affirmations of, national unity are ubiquitous in Jordanian political discourse. The government has established major initiatives in recent years for the purpose of creating a sense of national unity with the “Jordan First” and “We Are All Jordan” campaigns. It is clear to anyone who has lived in Jordan or follows the politics of the country that these campaigns have failed to achieve their purpose.

Guest author: Andrew Spath

Empty promises and weak responses to reformist demands will maintain an ever-risky status quo. While it may be impossible to bridge the social divide in the country, significant liberal reforms are the only means to create a sense of fairness in the system and satisfy political demands. King Abdullah has the opportunity to truly champion these reforms, satisfy some of the key demands of the reformists without risking his own position, and prevent an uptick in social unrest. We will find out after the NDC’s suggestions and the government’s decisions on implementation whether the regime will continue tweaking the system incrementally or re-energize a now stagnant process of liberalization.

2011-04-07T22:04:00.011-04:00

Meaningful and Positive Secularism in Lebanon
Guest author: Lawyer John Nassif Soueid

لبنان وا لعلمانية الحقيقية أو الإجابية

إن ما يجري على الساحة اللبنانية من مظاهرات ولو محدودة، تدعو إلى تطبيق مبدأ العلمانية في مجتمع تسوده لا بل تتحكّم به الطائفية والمذهبية، أمر يدعو للتفائل.

بالامس سمعنا عن مظاهرات جابت شوارع مدن بيروت، وصيدا ومناطق عديدة من لبنان، كلها تنادي بالتخلّص من الانظمة الطائفية وبدء تطبيق النظام العلماني الحقيقي الذي يساوي بين المواطنين،والذي لا يتعارض مع الدين.
هذا وقد طرح موضوع العلمانية في وثائق السينودوس من اجل الشرق الاوسط في الفاتيكان لاول مرة في شهر تشرين الاول 2010 كحل جدّي لما يعاني منه أبناء الطوائف المسيحية في تلك المنطقة المجذرة بالطائفية.
وبالامس القريب ايضاً، صرّح غبطة البطريرك المنتخب مار بشارة بطرس الراعي،إثر انتخابه،بما مضمونه بان العلمانية قد تكون النظام الافضل للبنان، كونه لا يتعارض مع الدين إطلاقاً، لا بل على العكس يثبّت أسسه المبنية على العدل والحرية والمساوات لكافة أبناء الوطن الواحد، مهما كانت طوائفهم، ومعتقداتهم، باعتبار أن القوانين المدنية هي الصالحة للعلاقات بين المواطنين إلى اي مذهب او طائفة إنتموا دون اية تفرقة.
من جهة أخرى،لقد صرّح مفتي الجمهورية الشيخ محمد رشيد قباني من على منبر صرح بكركي مركز البطريركية المارونية بما يدعو ايضاً الى التفائل وهو الاسراع في تحضير لاجتماع للمسلمين في بكركي للبحث في هذه الامور.
أما على المستوى السياسي، وبالرغم من أن النظام الطائفي مكرّس في الدستور، والقوانين، والاعراف، وعقليات بعض السياسيين المستفيدين من هذا النظام الطائفي. إلا أن البعض الاخر
جاهد وما زال يجاهد في سبيل تطبيق العلمانية، إيماناً منه أنها النظام الامثل للبنان.
نلاحظ أن موضوع الدولة العلمانية المدنية كان مطروحاً في الحقبة الاخيرة من القرن العشرين.
فعميدالكتلة الوطنية ريمون إده كان من اوائل الدعاة لهذا المشروع. فالعميد عارض مشروع
تقسيم لبنان إلى دويلات طائفية كما كان معروفاً بمشروع كيسنجر وآثر البقاء والعيش فيما كان
يسمى المنطقة الغربية حيث الغالبية المسلمة.
بعض الاحزاب اللبنانية حافظت على المبادىء العلمانية في دساتيرها. على الرغم من إشتراكها
في الحرب الطائفية البغيضة التي إجتاحت الوطن لاكثر من ثلاثين سنة. نذكر على سبيل المثال
لا الحصر، الحزب الشيوعي، والحزب القومي السوري الاجتماعي حيث أن اعضاء هذه الاحزاب تتكوّن من مجمل شرائح وطوائف ومذاهب الوطن.
يبقى أن الاكثر علمانية بين الاحزاب اللبنانية هو التيار الوطني الحر، الذي يقوده العماد ميشال عون. وهو مؤمن بان الخلاص للبنان يكمن في تطبيق مبادئ العلمانية وبشكل واع وهادئ،
لادخاله في ثقافة المواطنين، عوضاً عن النظام الطائفي الراسخ في النفوس منذ عهد الاستقلال.
ولم تكن وثيقة التوافق بين التيار الوطني الحر من جهة وحزب الله من جهة اخرى إلا في سبيل ذلك، على ان يتابع مع باقي الطوائف. أما في إنتخابات سنة 2009 فقد خاض التيار الوطني الحر هذه الانتخبات كما دوّن في كتابه المعنون"نحو الجمهورية الثالثة" ما يلي:
في الاهداف: تطبيق ما يرد في الدستور اللبناني من مواد تعزز الصفة المدنية للدولة اللبنانية.وتطويرها بمواد إضافية مكملة.
في الخطوات العملية: العمل على إقرار القانون المدني للاحوال الشخصية، ليطبق على جميع اللبنانيين دون إستثناء.
العمل على إلغاء الطائفية السياسية، بتشكيل هيئة وطنية لدراسة الطرق الكفيلة لتحقيق ذلك.
الحاق المحاكم الشرعية والروحية بوزارة العدل.
فطالما إن العلمنة هي الطريق الاسلم لصهر المواطنين في مجتمع واحد، يحفظ حقوقهم المدنية جميعاً دون تفرقة، وطالما أنه يزيد الولاء للوطن وليس للكيانات الطائفية، وطالما أنه يؤمن المساواة والحرية لجميع أبناء الوطن وشرائحه. وطالما أن العلمنة لا تتعارض ولا بشكل من الاشكال مع حرية المعتقد والدين. فيبقى دين الانسان ومعتقده وعلاقته بالخالق كما هو يؤمن. ويصبح دين الدولة أي نظمها هو العلمنة. ويصبح جميع أبناء الوطن متساوون في الحقوق والواجبات دون اية تفرقة.
لم يعد هناك سبباً يؤخّر تطبيق العلمنة في لبنان ويعرقل مسارها، فالكل يعاني، والكل ينتظر خطوات أيجابية وفعالة خاصة من السياسيين للنهوض بالوطن من بؤرة الطائفية.
كرة الثلج بدأت بالانحدار نأمل أن لا يعرقل انحدارها تدخلات خارجية كما هو حاصل في معظم الامور، والمواضيع الاخرى.
لا بدّ من الاشارة أخيراًإلى أنه صحيح ان معظم الاحزاب والتيارات السياسية بالمبدأ علمانية إلاّ انها في النظام الطائفي الحالي، تعمل بالعقلية الطائفية للحفاظ على مصالحها الذاتية ومصالح الطائفة التي تنتمي إليها وتمثلها، مما يؤخر ويعرقل مسار الوصول إلى العلمانية المبتغاة.
من هذا المنطلق،لا بدّ لهؤلاء الشباب المتحمّس للعلمانية من المثابرة على العمل الطويل والجاد
مع الاجيال الصاعدة في المدارس، ومن على شاشات التلفاز والفضائيات ، والمنابر، وبكافة الوسائل والمناهج التثقيفية والعلمية المتاحة لهم لغرس مبادئ العلمانية في النفوس.
المهم هو الثبات على المواقف والمثابرة على العمل، اقتداءً بقول الشاعر:
لا تقل قد ذهبت ايامه كل من سار على الدرب وصل

المراجع:
- نص وثيقة المؤتمر الكاثوليكي للكنائس الشرقية- حاضرة الفاتيكان في 10 تشرين الاول 2010
- نحو الجمهورية الثالثة – انتخابات 2009 change- 2009.com. -

المحامي جان ناصيف سويد

Eric Davis and Daniel Serwer of the US Institute of Peace discuss the current crises in the Middle East (Apr. 1, 2011)

2011-04-04T13:43:00.004-04:00

Achieving Political Pluralism: The Emergence of Political Parties in Post-Revolution Egypt

2011-04-02T14:30:00.019-04:00

Guest author: Dalia F. Fahmy

The Egyptian revolution that began on January 25, 2011, and ended 18 days later on February 11 with the ouster of President Husni Mubarak, ushered in a new era of competitive politics. The revolution not only ended Mubarak's reign, but it also ended the dynamic of limited political contestation and participation in Egypt through the introduction of new and alternative political voices. These change have not only brought about institutional changes such as the new Law on Political Parties, but have also forced traditional parties, both religious and secular, to articulate alternative political platforms.

A New Dawn for Secular Parties in Egypt

Contentious politics was not possible under Mubarak’s authoritarian political system. In 2007, The Political Parties Court rejected the legalization of 12 parties, 11 of which were considered secular, on the grounds that they all offered similar political platforms, and could not garner the necessary signatories required from each of Egypt 29 provinces. This placed parties articulating a secular platform (whether liberal or socialist) struggling for representation within a closed political environment against the National Democratic Party, which maintained a hegemonic party status.

Furthermore, this exclusion posited them against the Muslim Brotherhood, the regime’s single most organized opposition movement, to vie for popular support. Secular parties in Egypt lacked the organizational structure and social support the Brotherhood enjoyed even under political constraints. As a consequence, under Mubarak, secular parties (in 2006 over a dozen registered political parties were secular) faced two kinds of challenges: institutional constraints and organizational limitations.

Even during the much lauded 2005 multiparty parliamentary elections that resulted in the Muslim Brotherhood wining 20% (88) of the contested seats, the registered secular parties of al-Wafd, al-Ghad, and the two leftist parties of al-Tagammu’ and the Arab Nasserite parties, together won only 5% of the contested seats.

However, on March 28, 2011 the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces revealed the new Law on Political Parties. This new law requires parties applying for registration to gather 5000 signatures from only 10 of Egypt’s 29 provinces, with the guarantee that their application will be reviewed within 30 days. This new law is being lauded as lifting the political limbo that most parties had found themselves in the past. Since the discussion of this law began weeks ago, dozens of parties have submitted applications for official party status.

One such party is the newly formed Egyptian Democratic Social Party, founded by Amr Hamzawy, which is comprised of hundreds of professionals and university professors. Hamzawy envisions the new party garnering the support of Egyptians, both Muslim and Coptic, and being represented by prominent secular figures such as Emad Gad and Fatima Naaot, to help articulate a new vision for post-revolution Egypt.

On March 31, 2011 the secular Wafd party hosted a symposium for all Egyptian secular parties, both old and new, to join forces to establish a coalition to secure a greater public and political representation in the coming parliamentary elections, currently slated to occur later this year in September.

On March 19, 2011 seventy-three members of Egypt’s oldest leftist party, al-Tagammu, walked out of the party’s conference accusing the leadership of the party of being too close to the remnants of the Mubarak regime, and called for the formation of a new party. They in turn joined the Popular Alliance, a new coalition attempting to bring the fragmented leftist parties of Egypt under a single umbrella organization independent of past political allegiances, with economic freedom with social justice as their new platform of social democracy.

It appears that for the first time since President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s overthrow of the Egyptian Monarchy in 1952, that the secular parties of Egypt 's secular parties are emerging as alternative voices in the Egyptian political landscape. And while, in the wake of the revolution, Egypt's party formation has yet to be finalized, it appears that the newly formed political vision of the Egyptian leftist and secular forces are gearing up for a new era of political contestation, that will manifest itself in the forthcoming September’s parliamentary elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the end of their Monopoly of Islam

Just as the past six weeks have ushered in a new era for the leftist and secularist parties, the reign of the Muslim Brotherhood as the single opposition party vying for political power and representation in Egypt has been replaced by several alternative voices, also articulating a Muslim democratic platforms, the political ideological position of the Muslim Brotherhood since 2005.

On February 19, 2011, the first party to gain recognition by the courts in post-revolution Egypt was the previously illegal Wasat Party (The Center Party). Founded by Abul Ela Madi, and several other former members of the Muslim Brotherhood, along with Coptic leaders, and women, the Center Party’s political vision for Egypt is inspired by conservatism but not articulated through Islamism. Members of the Wasat Party, such as Amr Farouq, were integral in the 2004 popular uprising that led to the establishment of the Egyptian Movement for Change, or Kifaya.

In the wake of the revolution, the Brotherhood has found itself caught between the dual commitments it has struggled with over the past decade, whether to remain engaged in politics or return to its roots in da'wa (religious outreach). The latter approach involves a movement relegated to the social sphere that aims to foster a more pious Muslim community, through preaching, social services, and integrity by example. This bifurcation in vision has culminated along the generational divide that has been developing in the Brotherhood since 2005 (see Eric Davis, "Who's Afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood?," February 13, 2011).

The divisions within the Brotherhood are further exacerbated by the organization's youth, whose participation in the protest movement was not only essential to the success of the revolution, but also gave the youth a legitimacy they previously did not enjoy. Thus, the Brotherhood finds itself trying to hold on to its activist youth who during the revolution began to see their leadership as increasingly out of touch with Egypt's social and political realities.

On February 23, 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood's Guidance Bureau (Maktab al-Irshad) announced that it would establish a political party separate from the movement called The Freedom and Justice Party. The new party would be led by Saad Al-Katatni, former head of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Parliamentary bloc from 2005-2010. And while the new party would still be banned due to its articulation of religion as its source of guidance, an indication of sectarianism which still renders a party illegal in Egypt, on March 29, 2011, the party invited Coptic Christians to join its membership.

On March 26, 2011, high-ranking Guidance Bureau member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, announced to the gathering of Muslim Brotherhood youth that he would be forming a more liberal Islamic party. This party would still reflect the core ideals of the Muslim Brotherhood, namely piety and social justice, but it would move ideologically beyond the Muslim Brotherhood and embrace "liberal Islamism" as reflected in Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Another high-ranking Muslim Brotherhood member, Ibrahim al-Zafaarani, who is widely respected by the Brotherhood's youth, announced the establishment of the Nahda Party ("Revival Party") that aims to become a party rooted in Islam, with political pluralism and democracy as its main goals.

As younger Islamists have begun to distance themselves from the Muslim Brotherhood's Islamist political identity, moving instead towards a pluralistic framework where the past signifies a part of a strategic evolution of Islamism that is now over, the Brotherhood finds itself in a predicament.

The Muslim Brotherhood is no longer the single voice of Political Islam in Egypt. Over the past six weeks, a new Egyptian political landscape has not only opened the political arena, but is has also created a new marketplace of ideas in which new and different Islamisms are emerging. Islamism, as a reactions to and alienation from the state, is being replaced by pluralistic approaches to justice and development.

And while today much of the public debate on the future of the country centers on questions of the timing of parliamentary and presidential elections and the consequences of the March 17, 2011 vote on the constitutional referendum—one thing remains certain. Egypt has witnessed the end of single-party authoritarian rule with only one organized political movement - the Muslim Brotherhood - standing in opposition. Authoritarian rule has been replaced by a political landscape that has yet to be determined but is well on its way to political pluralism.

Iraqi Protesters to al-Maliki: "The People's Oil belongs to the People and not to the Thieves"

2011-03-31T22:51:00.041-04:00

While Western journalists and pundits continue to fret over the role of Islamists in the ongoing protests in the Arab world, few of them have made a serious effort to examine the protesters' motivations.

A sign at a recent demonstration in Baghdad is emblematic of the protesters' goals. It read: "The people's oil belongs to the people, not to the thieves" (naft al-sha'b li-l-sha'b wa laysa li-l-haramiya). The sign sums up the anger and aspirations of the demonstrators, namely the desire for governments that have a civic consciousness, and work for the common good, especially the economic well being of the populace at large.

Creating an Islamic state is not the goal of the vast majority of those who have taken to the streets to express their discontent with their respective governments. What then are the motivations behind the protests? How do we discover what they are?

While survey research data is still limited, an easy way to learn about the protestors' goals is to read the Arabic press. Among the best newspapers for understanding the nature of the protests is the London based, al-Hayat. In its March 12th issue, two excellent articles on Iraq tell us much about the current political aspirations of the peoples in the Arab world.

Under the titles, "Protests Spread throughout Iraq from the North to the South," and, "The Ministry of Interior's Inspector-General: High Ranking Officers Have Failed to Present Reports Detailing their Sources of Income," we learn that economic equality, accountability, and representative government are the key demands of the citizens of Arab countries.

In the first article, al-Hayat reporter Khulud al-'Amari interviews many people who participated in a large protest in Liberation Square (Sahat al-Tahrir) in Baghdad as well as in other Iraqi cities. What is striking is the themes of economic well being and anti-corruption that run through all the demonstrators' responses.

In Baghdad, one demonstrator complained that the $192 pension he receives after 25 years of government employment is not enough to support him. He asks whether this is any way to treat someone who has served his country for such a log period of time. A woman who said she is raising 4 children and taking care of brother who is mentally ill, sells trinkets in the streets but finds that this does not provide enough income to live on. A recent graduate of Baghdad's al-Mustansiriya University said the government's main concerns should be tacking unemployment and eliminating corruption.

Other demonstrators indicated that they were fired from their employment after 2003 and cannot understand why they are not allowed to return to their jobs. Even though they are entitled to return to their positions, they have been prevented from doing so for what they feel are sectarian reasons. Demonstrators in al-Falluja who were interviewed felt that sectarian factors have likewise precluded them from obtaining government employment.

The protests discussed in this article include al-Najaf which is, of course, the religious and cultural center of Shiism in Iraq. Here demonstrators protested the lack of government services and carried signs condemning the state's "plundering of wealth" (nadab al-tharwat). Other signs read, "Have mercy on the poor" (Arhamu al-fuqara') and "No to social classism and to corruption" (La li-l-tabaqiya wa-l-fasad).

The article also reports on "thousands of demonstrators" in the Kurdish city of Sulaimaniya who likewise were protesting government corruption and the lack of jobs. In the southern city of Hilla, demonstrators carried signs calling for the removal of the provincial council and improving electricity supplies. Thus the article makes clear that the same concerns and demands span all of Iraq's ethnoconfessional groups - Shi'a, Sunnis and Kurds alike.

The second article on corruption within the Ministry of Interior, also written by Khulud al-'Amari, points to its pervasiveness in Iraq's ministries and the difficulty of those whose responsibility it is to fight corruption to do so. It also underscores the unwillingness of the al-Maliki government to address in any serious manner the problem of corruption. While those such as the ministry inspector-generals and others who are charged with fighting corruption are not being assassinated as many were just a few years ago, these officials still lack the backing of the al-Maliki and KRG governments and, as a result, their efforts still remain ineffectual.

A third article by Jawdat Kadhim provides additional insights to those included in Khulud al-'Amari's articles. "The Commander of the Rapid Response Brigade is enmeshed in a Network of Corruption" reports that the general who leads the rapid response force in the Ministry of Interior, Brigadier-General Nu'man Dakhil, was ordered by Prime Minister al-Maliki to turn himself in to the minstry's Anti-Corruption Unit. The officer is accused of having taken a $50,000 bribe in return for arranging the release of a leader of al-Qa'ida from a prison in the north central city of Tikrit, Saddam Husayn's home town.

Obviously, in high profile cases such as this one, corruption is prosecuted. But this case represents the exception not the rule. The persistence of corruption is undermining support for Iraq's fragile democracy. One group of demonstrators that Khulud al-'Amari interviewed in Baghdad complained that Prime Minister al-Maliki had not kept his election promises. These demonstrators also indicated their "regret" for having participated in last march's parliamentary elections. It is evident that the al-Maliki government, by failing to address the problems of unemployment, corruption, improving social services, and respect for individual freedoms, is undermining support for democracy.

By failing to address the core drivers of discontent in the Arab world - unemployment, corruption, repression of individual rights - and instead focusing on a perceived threat of radical Islam, Western journalists, pundits and academics are helping local political elites divert attention from the concerns that have led the peoples of the Arab world to demand political change.

Syria: The Art of "Branding" Political Reform

2011-03-31T22:51:00.014-04:00

Guest author: Ghaidaa Hetou

The political change permeating the Middle East is widely considered an unstoppable process. The push for greater personal freedoms and accountable government is feeding off the success of the Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions, as much as being propelled by the counterproductive and typical defense mechanisms of the archaic authoritarian institutions that still dominate many countries of the region.

There are similarities between the popular uprisings in a number of Arab countries in that the demands for change focus on individual freedoms, better living standards and political pluralism. However, there has been a tendency to reduce the current political dynamics to a singular process that fails to recognize the different characteristics of the countries in which calls for change have occurred.

What role do country specific characteristics play, if at all, in the overwhelmingly popular demands in the Arab world? Can an Arab leader still afford to mobilize the same “national priorities” – anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism and so on - that have consistently been used to eclipse individual freedoms? How does a reform minded regime confront the fact that it is part of the problem, but potentially could be part of the solution if it would consider implementing meaningful reforms? How does the Syrian government’s stance of “resistance” differentiate its experience with political reform from other countries in the region, if at all?

Syria tried to celebrate what it felt was a triumphal moment when it sensed that the troubling winds of uprisings that were affecting other Arab countries had passed it by. Since demonstrations and calls for change had not yet materialized, the regime of President Bashar al-Asad began publishing self-congratulatory articles in popular magazines and issued an open invitation for President Barack Obama to visit Syria. This public relations offensive was too audacious and too soon, coming as it did right before the unrest in the southern Syrian city of Dar’aa.

The sense of exceptionalism that is ingrained in the Syrian political experience does have some grounding in reality. Compared to Tunisia and Egypt, Syria, especially during the last ten years, has promoted economic and social development as well as educational reforms. Syria has no external debt to the IMF or other international financial institutions, guaranties minority rights, and is the leader of a popular foreign policy that is officially opposed to the so-called American and Israeli agenda in the region. The roots of the Syrian president’s popularity among large segments of the Syrian populations stem from the above mentioned policies. When Bashar al-Asad says that he supports political reform, many Syrians believe him.

The Syrian president’s self-proclaimed reform agenda – underway since 2000 - has been almost nonexistent in the political realm. There has been no move towards greater personal freedoms or political pluralism. Yet events in Tunisia, Egypt, followed by the dramatic developments in Libya, not to mention the events in Dar’a, have put the spotlight on Syria. If the Syrian regime hopes to contain the current protests, its strategy of dealing with possible unrest will need to take into consideration a number of factors.

First, there is a need to minimize the use of recycled reactionary rhetoric and terms such as Fitna (actions that lead to chaos), conspiracy, infiltrators, and so on. The standard political discourse that has been trotted out in the past by authoritarian leaders such as President al-Asad has become irrelevant. It no longer works to contain popular political protests since the sophisticated political understandings of the majority of Syrians has come to associate this discourse with a “regime in crisis,” and one that refuses to eliminate the repressive national security state.

Second, the regime needs to appreciate the fact that time is crucial and not on its side. There is no time for a “wait and see” attitude since the regime’s window of opportunity for leaving a historic legacy of peaceful political restructuring and reform will soon close. We know that Tunisian president Zein al-Din Ben Ali and his Egyptian counterpart Husni Mubarak’s failure to address the desire for political change was what ultimately led both to be swept aside.

Some features of the anti-Syrian government rhetoric have actually helped the Syrian government. For example, some Arabic channels raised, albeit only for a few days, the typical and obvious sectarian accusations of the Syrian regime as Nussairi, Alawi and minority based.

Not only is this approach counterproductive, and even laughable, because it underestimates the intelligence of Syrians, but it fails to offer a concise and meaningful political argument for the “illegitimacy” of Bashar al-Asad’s regime. The tactic of invoking sectarianism to question the Syrian regime’s legitimacy might have garnered some traction during the 1980s at the height of religious tensions when Hafiz al-Asad, Bashar’s father, brutally suppressed the Muslim Brotherhood in the city of Hama.

But Syrians in recent years have enjoyed greater religious freedoms, which includes the Sunni majority, whose political rights have been expanded with the introduction of a degree of political pluralism. Raising the issue of sectarianism in a country like Syria to undermine the regime’s legitimacy resembles shooting oneself in the foot.

The Syrian regime’s method of dealing with the widespread demands for reform has to account for bureaucratic resistance for reform within the state apparatus, as well as the intricate balance between security, stability and gradual political change. If the regime of Bashar al-Asad does embark on the road to the gradual political change it has promised, it could possibly introduce a new model for political change in the region. No doubt, a Syrian made transition would look very different than the Tunisian, Egyptian, and the Libyan experiences.

Despite the ongoing protests, grass roots pressures will most likely not overwhelm the current regime, which has been able thus far to curb demonstrations in Dar’aa, Damascus, Latakia and in other Syrian cities. While President al-Asad has promised widespread reforms, his March 29^th speech to the national parliament was defiant and once again blamed Syria’s unrest on unspecified “foreign elements,” and “conspirators,” especially those encouraged by Israel. It did not address one of the key demands of the protesters which is abolishing the national security laws that have been in effect since 1963.

The dynamic of the Syrian government’s response to the change sweeping the Arab world is still unclear. The beginning of meaningful reforms – reforms that the Syrian regime has promised since 2005 but still has not implemented - could create a dynamic of good will between the people and the government, especially in light of the popularity Bashar al-Asad still enjoys. However, if the regime continues to refuse to implement political change, this good will could harden into further political opposition, possibly destabilizing the country, with serious regional consequences.

At this point, it is up to the Syrian regime whether a new momentum of good will develops among the Syrian populace or whether Syrians will continue to be disappointed by a further lack of responsiveness by the government to their legitimate demands for political and social change

A Multidimensional Approach to Waziristan: Developing an Alternative to Taliban Rule

2011-03-28T15:49:00.010-04:00

Guest author: Farah Jan

"In traditional society man accepts his natural and social environment as given. An attempt to change the society is not only blasphemous but also impossible. Change is absent or imperceptible in traditional society because men cannot conceive of its existence.’'(Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, 1968. p. 99)

Pakistan’s tribal belt is the quintessential traditional society that Huntington talks about in the above statement. Change seems to be absent or almost inconceivable in that region, where as the rest of the country, albeit slowly, has progressed and transformed - the tribal agencies have experienced inconsequential change in their social and economic structures.

Pakistan’s tribal agencies only came to focus from their obscure existence after the events of September 11, 2001 and the preceding war in Afghanistan. Since then, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) has served as a sanctuary and recruiting grounds for radical extremist groups to manipulate the poorest region of Pakistan. FATA is composed of seven agencies, Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan and South Waziristan.

Source: CAMP Report 2010

The tribal belt is home to various Pashtun tribes who abide by the strict Pashtunwali code. North and South Waziristan is home to the Wazir and Mahsud tribes. The name itself means, ‘the land of the Wazirs.’ Before going into the details of Waziristan, its important to clarify the Pashtunwali code, what it means and what it stands for? Pashtunwali constitutes a set of cultural values, rules and regulations, which are all intertwined with each other. It is based on five basic components, tora (courage), badal (revenge), melmastia (hospitality), nanawatee (magnanimity to an opponent asking for peace), and jirga (tribal counsel for dispute resolution). Tribal life revolves around each one of these aspects.

It was the Afghan Soviet war, which led to an influx of foreign fighters and refugees in the tribal belt. At that crucial time in history for the Pashtuns of FATA, the principles of badal, melmastia, and tora were all part of helping their Pashtun brothers on the other side of the Durand line. Similarly, after October 2001, the Allied war in Afghanistan triggered cross border movement of refugees and militants and under the tribal code of Pashtunwali, the extension of melmastia to these foreign actors was paramount obligation. Thus, Pashtunwali is everything for the tribal Pashtuns – they live and die by this code of conduct.

Waziristan

Waziristan plays a crucial role in the talibanization of the region – it is the birthplace of the Pakistani Taliban and one of the most radicalized agencies of the tribal belt. In 2009, it earned the appellation of being ‘the headquarters of Islamist terror.’ (Economist, Dec. 2009) The topography of Waziristan adds further to the austerity of its already complex cultural and political situation. The terrain is rugged and inhospitable and covers about 5000 square miles of mountain land.

This is also one of the poorest regions in Pakistan, with unemployment, illiteracy and infant mortality at alarming levels. The economy is mainly pastoral, with agriculture practiced in a few fertile sections, and thus the economic framework of Waziristan is limited to subsistence agriculture and small-scale business conducted on a local level. This lack of economic development has created a continued migration pattern and led to demographic changes. The impact of demographic changes, adds to the shortage of doctors, teachers and skilled workers, further compounding the socio-economic situation.

	Pakistan	FATA
Literacy Ratio	43.92	17.42
Male	54.81	29.51
Female	32.02	3.00
Population per doctor	1,226	7,670

The literacy rate in FATA is 29 percent for men and a shocking 3 percent for women, in comparison to Pakistan where it is 55 percent for men and 32 percent for women. It is estimated that the literacy levels are even lower in Waziristan. About 80 percent of the boys are being educated at the madrassahs who adhere to Deobandi school of thought.

The political status of the tribal belt is similarly disarrayed. FATA is territorially a part of Pakistan, and it is represented both in the upper (Senate, 8 members) and the lower (National Assembly, 12 members) chambers of the parliament; but the laws drafted and formulated by the legislature do not apply to FATA, unless it is a direct presidential order. (Constitution of Pakistan, Article 247) Since the independence in 1947, the government of Pakistan has continued with the British policy of proxy rule in FATA. Thus, the political structure, of the region has a peculiar system of administration, and the people are governed by their local chieftains called Maliks, through financial compensation controlled by the Federal government in Islamabad and exercised by a political agent.

Likewise, the judicial system or the jirga, is homogenous to the political arrangements. Neither the Supreme Court nor the High Courts of Pakistan can exercise any jurisdiction in relation to the tribal areas. The jirga acts as the instrument of dispensing justice.

Tribal Jirga in session

Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP):

In December 2007, an alliance between twenty eight taliban groups formed a group known as the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) or the Movement of the Taliban in Pakistan. This is the largest taliban group in Pakistan - other taliban factions are not Waziristan based and are a mix of various jihadi groups. The central concern is the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and what led to the emergence of this group? The Pakistani Taliban today threatened the state structure of both Pakistan and affects the state building process in Afghanistan. In its initial stage, the TTP was under the leader ship of Baitullah Mahsud, but after his assassination, Hakimullah Mahsud has led it. The objectives of the TTP are resistance against the Pakistani state, and enforcement of Sharia law in Pakistan.

The TTP emerged in South Waziristan under primordial ethnic identity, along with the lack of state initiated economic and political institutions. Its member base is composed of young tribesmen who have been radicalized by the jihadi rhetoric of the Deobandi madrassahs. The U.S. war in Afghanistan further complicated the already complex structures in Waziristan and contributed in the formation of TTP. A report published by New America Foundation maintains that the security situation in South Waziristan took a drastic turn when the U.S. and NATO forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001 - the Afghan Taliban, Arab Al Qaeda, and foreign fighters form Uzbekistan, Chechnya, and Tajikistan slipped into Waziristan looking for refuge. The extension of melmastia (hospitality) to these foreigners was stipulated on them, since refusing refuge would be a violation of Pashtunwali. South and North Waziristan has since been targeted the most with the U.S. drone attacks and military campaigns in the tribal region.

FATA	Drone Strikes	Non-militants killed	Militants killed
Orakzai	1	0	10 - 12
Bajaur	3	13	18 - 98
Khyber	1	0	5 - 15
Khurram	2	31	0
Mohmand	0	0	0
North Waziristan	91	169 - 241	418 - 590
South Waziristan	45	76 - 203	251 - 363

Source: New America Foundation.

Multidimensional Approach to Waziristan:

Besides other factors, there are two major constituents that have played a role into the talibanization of Waziristan. Firstly, the continuation of the British colonial policy of proxy rule by the Pakistani government led to the impediment of economic growth and political alienation of the indigenous population. Secondly, the demographic changes that took place due to high unemployment (created by the economic and geographic constraints) and the relocation of the local population of Waziristan to more accessible terrain, left the region open and available for non-state actors.

The military operation and U.S drone attacks are an extremely sensitive issue within Pakistan, as well as in FATA. Both methods have not proven to be successful in containing terrorism in Pakistan. Instead the backlash, which in the Pashtunwali terms would be badal (revenge), has had a dual effect – against the Pakistani state in which the intended target is the Pakistani army, police, political leaders and citizenry; and against the NATO forces in which the target is the torching and bombing the supply line for the forces in Afghanistan. The first target has been more costly and culminated in the loss of innocent lives in the bazaars and streets of Peshawar, Karachi, and Lahore.

The rational approach to Waziristan/FATA would involve a combination of a stick and carrot strategy. The primary tactic for the state should be to establish a social contract with the people of FATA. The nonexistence of a social contract between the Pakistani state and its citizens in FATA, is a major factor contributing to the current crisis. In this case, it is the state’s responsibility to extend security to its subjects and provide for a rule of law. The tribal belt should be fully integrated in the political structure of Pakistan. Political parties should be permitted to contest elections in the tribal areas and that would create competition for the dominant religious groups.

The transgression of state boundaries also contributed to the emergence of TTP, Hence strengthening international boundary laws on the Durand line would provide the region with some stability. The importance of the economy should not be ignored; the poverty of the region has played a crucial role in the fragmentation of civil society. Cheap religious education provided by the Deobandi Madrassah’s in Waziristan resulted in the radicalization of young tribal boys. A society cannot flourish if half of its population is alienated from the social, political and economic spheres. The lack of education for girls is an issue that needs to be addressed both by the Pakistani government and the tribal society.

To conclude on a note by John Spain, who describes Waziristan succinctly, ‘South of the smiling Kurrum valley lies a five thousand square mile tangle of hills with the sinister sounding name of Waziristan. Here Pukhtunwali is the only way of life. Here the Pathan may be found at his cruelest – and his noblest.’ The Pakistani state needs to search for the noblest Wazirs and Mahsuds, to contain the talibanization of this region.

Are the Islamists the new "communists" of the Middle East?

2011-03-26T17:57:00.026-04:00

As protest movements spread throughout the Middle East, the Western news media continues to focus on the possible takeover by radical Islamists of opposition movements in Egypt, Tunisia and now Libya. According to Western journalists, radial Islamists are said to be more organized than other groups, have well-established nation-wide networks and therefore likely to win the forthcoming elections that we can expect to take place at least in Egypt and Tunisia. While this concern has its merits, are Western policy-makers making yet another mistake in their understanding if the Middle East?

Between the late 1940s and the late 1980s, but especially during the 1950s and 1960s, Americans were obsessed with a communist takeover of the world. The fear of communism led to such excesses as the McCarthy Hearings in the US Senate and the destructive witchhunts of the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Indeed, I can remember as a young child being fearful that the communists would steal my toys (although I wondered how the Chinese would cross the Pacific Ocean to arrive at my house).

With Russia, China, Eastern Europe and North Korea under communist control by the mid-1950s, and later followed by Cuba, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, Western countries had a right to fear a communist threat. But can the same be said of Islamism, or more correctly radical Islamism which, at this time, is only in control of one country, the Islamic Republic of Iran?

There are numerous indications that Islamists do not control the protests that are sweeping the Middle East. At the same time, it is clear that Islamists have joined these movements. However, the report in the Italian newspaper, Il Sole 24 Ore , that Abd al-Hakim Hasidi, who was formerly associated with al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan in 2002, is active in the Libyan opposition, has led to a slew of articles indicating that radical Islamists are going to take over the opposition movement in Libya.

I agree with Fouad Ajami's comments on CNN that the opposition movement is largely made up of ordinary Libyan citizens who seek to throw off more than 40 years of oppressive rule by a ruler and his family who have squandered the country's oil wealth. We should be less concerned with Islamists, who the West has little opportunity to control in any event, and more concerned with making Libya's nascent opposition movement and those in Egypt, Tunisia and elsewhere a success.

Does the Libyan opposition include radical Islamists who seek to impose a new type of authoritarian rule? No doubt it does. But the West's attitude is once again to adopt a condescending approach that refuses to recognize that peoples in non-Western parts of the world understand their interests and are sophisticated enough to know who opposes these interest.

The obsession with communism led the United States to make many bad decisions in the Middle East. The US gave the Shah of Iran unequivocal support which ultimately resulted in the creation of a radical Islamist regime that has engaged in destabilizing the region. In other words, the US helped bring about the very outcome which it so feared.

Helping the first Ba'thist regime overthrow Abd al-Karim Qasim in Iraq in 1963 not only deposed a non-sectarian and honest leader who was truly concerned with the interests of his people and began a period of unstable and authoritarian regimes which has still not finished playing itself out in Iraqi to this day.

Seeing communists behind every rock in the Middle East led the US and its allies to support autocrats such as Husni Mubarak and Zein al-Dine Ben Ali. In the process, we alienated large segments of Middle Eastern society and created great distrust for American policies in the region.

If we fail to realize that much of the support for Islamism is based on great ideological fluidity in the Middle East, we attribute more influence to Islamist movements than they actually possess. Arab nationalism has lost its legitimacy. Socialism on the model of the former Soviet Union is an ideology of the past. Middle Easterners want social justice but they also demand freedom. They are not going to cede the hard won freedom that they have won from the secular autocrats only to turn over control to radical Islamist autocrats.

The people of the region are searching for new models of the future. Rather than look at this with fear, the West should realize that there are great opportunities for change, especially among the region's youth

There are those who would point out that those who supported the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 also sought freedom and look where it ended up. Conditions are different today. Iran was an isolated event in 1979, there was no social media at the time, and Iranians know today that the revolution has not lived up to its promises. The Iranian regime is highly unpopular, especially Iranian youth who make up 70% of the population under the age of 30.

The US and the West need to keep their eyes on the prize, namely helping Middle Easterners achieve democracy, build civil society and create economic opportunity that will provide the necessary jobs for the large number of unemployed people in the region especially youth.

Yes, the US should be concerned when radicals become active in opposition movements which claim to support democracy. However, these radicals will lose their ability to recruit new members when the countries of the region are able to provide their citizens with freedom, employment and other social services.

If the West is really sincere about preventing radical Islamists from taking over the nascent democratic movements of the region, it will work hard to bring social justice to the Middle East.

Impose a no-fly zone and recognize Libya's democracy movement now

2011-03-11T12:11:00.023-05:00

As the struggle to oust Muammar al-Qaddafi shifts in favor of his regime, the Arab world and the West are doing very little to help the Libyan rebels. The waffling by the international community is very disturbing. Libya is not Iraq. No one is calling for foreign troops to invade the country. Instead what is needed is to provide the forces seeking to oust the Qaddafi regime with the necessary material and political support that will allow them to be victorious. Will the international community meet its obligations?

Muammar al-Qaddadi is culpable for human rights abuses, both in Libya and beyond its borders. It is clear that he has indiscriminately killed large numbers of Libyan civilians, many of whom are not even involved in the current uprising that seeks to end his rule. A former member of his regime has indicated that Qaddafi personally ordered the downing of Pan-Am flight 103 over Lockerbie Scotland in December 1988. We also know that Qaddafi was involved in terrorist attacks in Germany and elsewhere in Europe. By any legal standard, he is responsible for the deaths of countless innocent people, both in Libya and abroad. Thus there is a prima facie case for his removal from power under international law.

The rebels have said that they do not want to see foreign troops enter the current conflict. Nevertheless, there is much the international community can do. As many commentators have noted, US Defense Secretary Robert Gates' assertion that imposing a no-fly zone over Libya would be difficult was exaggerated and even he has backed down somewhat from his original statement in testimony before the US Congress. As Qaddafi's air force - both helicopter gunships and fighter aircraft - continue to bomb rebel emplacements, inflicting serious collateral damage in the process by killing more civilians, there is a strong basis in international law for intervention by the international community to stop these massive human rights violations. What form should international intervention take?

As for material support, the critical first order of business is to impose a no-fly zone. Thankfully, former US president Bill Clinton has come out in support of this action. A no-fly zone would prevent Qaddafi from continuing to bring in more mercenaries to bolster his forces, especially from sub-Saharan Africa. There are reports that Qaddafi still has billions of dollars in cash on hand which he is using to recruit new fighters. It would also prevent his fighter bombers from attacking rebel and civilian targets. Second, the runways of Libyan air force bases should be destroyed so fighter aircraft can no longer take off to engage in attacks on rebel and civilian targets.

Third, rebel forces should be provided with weaponry, especially surface to air missiles, that will allow them to fend off attacks by Qaddafi's helicopter gun ships as well as press on with their efforts to oust his regime. Fourth, the international community should impose a naval blockade that would prevent shipping from entering or leaving Libyan ports, except those controlled by rebel forces.

Finally, the Libyan rebels and people in areas under their control are in desperate need of medical supplies and personnel. Physicians, nurses and medicine should be sent to Libya along with other humanitarian aid to help those in need of medical treatment and food.

At the political level, the international community should recognize the nascent democracy movement as the legitimate government of Libya. So far, only France has had the courage to do so. If more countries would join France, this would give tremendous moral support to the rebels as well as boost their self-confidence.

While the "realist" pundits in the West continue to caution against intervention because of the instability that it is causing in global financial and energy markets, they should realize that it is precisely the rule of brutal autocrats such as Muammar al-Qaddafi that presents the greatest threat to the long-term economic stability of the world market. International intervention in Libya is not just a moral imperative but an economic one as well.

Here in the US, we need remember that the American Revolution would not have been successful had France not intervened to support it. Had the Revolution failed, its leaders no doubt would have been hung for treason by King George III. If the Libya uprising fails, there will be a bloodbath of enormous proportions in which not only the rebels but large numbers of civilians will be killed by the Qaddafi regime.

When the day is done, does the UN, the Arab league, and NATO want to have such a bloodbath on its conscience?

After the Revolt: The Four Stages of Arab Democracy

2011-02-25T21:33:00.046-05:00

Despite the claims that there is an "Arab democracy deficit" and that Islam and democracy "don't mix," we can already see in less than a few weeks that the beginnings of a democratic transition is taking place in the Arab world. We need, of course, to be extremely cautious about predicting where this "Arab spring" will lead. However, we can divide democratization in the Arab world into 4 stages. While these stages are not discrete, since they can overlap, each one poses certain challenges for the future.

The Arab world is currently in the first stage of democratization - ridding the region of its tyrants. So far, the results are impressive. Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali was gone in a month, and Husni Mubarak was ousted in two weeks. Most Arab leaders who have not been forced from office have made at least some concessions, whether deciding not to seek office again or enacting long overdue reforms.

Stage two involves writing new constitutions and electoral laws and moving towards fair and free elections. This stage is just beginning in Tunisia and Egypt. At least in Egypt, the signs are very positive. Prominent intellectuals have been appointed to important positions in the committee tasked with suggesting constitutional reforms. Tariq al-Bishri, a well known scholar of Egyptian nationalism and Islamist movements, has been appointed head of the committee to rewrite the constitution. A former state court judge, he seeks to end the emergency laws and military rule. A Coptic Christian judge, Sami Yusef, and a Muslim Brother and lawyer, Sobhi Saleh, are also part of this committee.

Already the committee has called for reducing the term of president to four years and imposing a two term limit on the office. This demonstrates rapid and important progress in Egypt. A number of the new ministers in the Egyptian government likewise point to democratic change. Dr. Gouda Abdel-Khalek, a close friend and one of Egypt's most prominent economists, has been appointed Minister of Welfare. Dr. Abdel-Khalek is a member of the left-leaning Tagammu' Party which, despite its secular orientation, has defended the Muslim Brotherhood from government repression in the past.

While the Mubarak regime consistently denied, from the mid-1990s, permission to the "Moderate Party" (hizb al-wasat) to form, the new Egyptian government has approved the party's petition for a license. As a number of analysts have noted, the Wasat Party is an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. But this comment misses the point. The party counts among its founding members a Christian. It derives its name from the Prophet Muhammad's emphasis in the Qur'an on moderation in all life's affairs, hence the name Moderate Party. The leadership has indicated that, if the membership wants to elect a Christian as party head, that would be acceptable.

In Tunisia, demonstrators continue to protest the inclusion in the Interim Government of members from the former Ben Ali regime. A new Higher Political Reform Commission, headed by the prominent and widely respected lawyer, Yadh Ben Achour, is trying to decide whether to amend the existing constitution of create a new one. Meanwhile, demonstrators continue to protest the retention of the last member of the former Ben Ali regime, Mohammed Ghannouchi, who continues to serve as prime minister.

At the same time, both Egypt and Tunisia continue to be ruled by decree. In Egypt, the military under the head of Mubarak's Defense Minister, Muhammad Hussein al-Tantawi, and in Tunisia, the Speaker of Parliament, Fouad al-Mebazaa, possess dictatorial powers.

Still, Iraq points to the benefits of democratization. Despite the very unfortunate killing of demonstrators by security forces in Mosul and elsewhere in Iraq, protesters are not calling for the overthrow of the system, as they are elsewhere in the Arab world, but for better services and accountability. In other words, the demonstrators show support for democracy but not for their current political leadership.

Stage three will come after the new elections, promised to be held in Tunisia, later this year or early next year. Here questions of national identity, political participation, individual liberty, and human rights will come to the fore. Will Islamists be allowed to participate in politics? Will women's rights be fully protected, both de jure and de facto? Will secularists and Islamists, old and young, Muslims and Christians, rich and poor be able to find common ground in an accepted definition of political community? Will tolerance and pluralism assume a dominant role as core political values in the new post-election polities?

Much will depend on the good will of Tunisians and Egyptians from all political ideologies and walks of life. In Iraq, we have seen that, while tensions exist between secularists and Islamists, thus far they have been able to co-exist, albeit sometimes uncomfortably. But young people throughout the Arab world, who seem less enamored of ideology than personal freedom, may actually provide the political clout that forces their elders to approach politics in a more tolerant manner.

Perhaps educators, historians, and artists can play a greater role here by using their talents, whether through history textbooks, films or other media, to recall the nationalist uprisings of an earlier era, such as the Egyptian Revolution of 1919, and the Iraqi Revolution of 1920, in which all segments - Muslims, Christians and Jews, men and women, the young and old - helped forge a sense of national identity. Democratic activists in the Arab world and the larger Middle East have yet to fully evoke the power of historical memory.

The fourth stage will require addressing the problem of social democracy. Egypt, for example, will need to create 250,000 jobs each year if it is to just keep pace with population growth. Unemployment is endemic throughout the Middle East, especially among youth.

We know that youth comprise 65% of the population in most countries of the Middle East. This "youth bulge" will continue for the next two decades. Free elections and the right of political expression will fall on deaf ears if there are no jobs and youth continue to feel that there is no hope for the future. The recent arrival of over 4000 Tunisian "boat people" in Sicily, most of them youth, indicates that democratic freedoms alone will not solve the problems of the Arab world and the larger Middle East.

The European Union is concluding a favorable new trade treaty with Tunisia in the hopes of stemming a large flow of refugees to the shores of the northern Mediterranean The UN, US, and EU, working together with prosperous Muslim majority countries, such as Turkey, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, should work to address the problems associated with this last phase of democratization. If the new democracies are to be consolidated, they will need outside assistance. Those countries in the West and elsewhere that support democracy should not view what's occurring in the Arab world as a "spectator sport."

The Arab world is on the cusp of a possible sea change in its internal politics. The forces of democracy there need external support. Democracy flourishes when its enjoys a supportive political culture. "Democracy without bread" is a recipe for radical elements to manipulate politics with an aim of suppressing hard won freedoms and imposing authoritarian rule. We only need remember the collapse of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the Nazi Party in 1933 after a lengthy period of economic suffering by the German people.