The New York Times published
a lengthy article, “Both Arsonists and Firefighters: Saudis Promote Jihadist
Ideology but also Fight Terrorism,” on August 26, 2017 (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/26/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-islam.html). What was striking about this article was the
delay in its publication. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) has been in the
forefront of spreading its puritanical and deviant form of Islam, Wahhabism, for
decades. The question arises: why are we
just now seeing exposes of the KSA and its relationship to the spread of terrorism?
The key variable neglected in the New York Times article is the lack of a historical and political
economic context. It also fails to address whether the United States, and its Western allies in the EU, will try to pressure the KSA to reduce its support for radicalism around the world, which is amply documented in the article.
KSA influence has been directly correlated with the collapse of the state system in the Middle East. This collapse is not recent but has been a long time in the making and was evident by the abject defeat of Arab states by Israel in the June 5-10, 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
KSA influence has been directly correlated with the collapse of the state system in the Middle East. This collapse is not recent but has been a long time in the making and was evident by the abject defeat of Arab states by Israel in the June 5-10, 1967 Arab-Israeli War.
The 1967
Arab-Israeli War The June War began the decline of one party authoritarian
states, such as Jamal cAbd al-Nasir’s (Nasser) Egypt and Ba’thist
Syria and Iraq, which lost legitimacy given their inability to keep their
promise to bring victory to the Palestinian people in their struggle with Israel. Once the residents of Egypt’s Suez Canal
cities were forced to move westward following the war, many to Cairo, and other Delta towns, and
the Canal was shut down with the consequent loss of transit revenues, the Nasir
regime found itself facing severe economic hardship.
Egypt’s economic
dependency on the KSA The KSA’s used its extensive oil wealth to weaken
the Nasir regime - which it saw as its main adversary in the Arab Middle
East – by creating an economic dependency in which a tacit agreement was forged, leading Nasser to tone down his anti-Saudi and anti-monarchical rhetoric in
exchange for financial aid.
KSA political and ideological
penetration of Egypt However, the critical post-1967 war legacy was the ability of the
Saudis to use their new found influence in Egypt to support the Muslim Brotherhood
and other Islamist political forces. The
US tacitly supported this effort because the Nasir regime was seen as a Soviet
ally in the Middle East.
US support for
Islamism The same mistake of supporting intolerant Islamism following the
1967 War presaged the mistake the US made again when it trained and militarily supported
Islamist forces (so-called al-mujahideen) in ousting Soviet forces from Afghanistan
during the late 1980s. In both cases,
the US felt that the KSA could be used to promote its Cold War agenda, namely
reducing Soviet influence in the oil-rich Middle East. In both instances, the US learned the meaning all too well of the admonition “play
with fire and you'll get burned."
Wahhabism as a ploy
for Western economic and military ties Among its shortcomings, the New York Times article fails to mention a key reason why
Wahhabism is viewed in instrumental and not just ideological terms by the
Saudi royal family. Anyone who has visited
the KSA knows that the social-cultural reality of the public sphere differs dramatically
from the behavior of the political elite behind closed doors in private palaces
and mansions. (Johnny Walker Red was the alcohol du jour when I visited the KSA).
By empowering an austere and repressive clergy to control
behavior in the public sphere, and enforce strict codes of gender relations (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Women_to_drive_movement), the
royal family can manipulate Wahhabism, an ersatz caricature
of Islam (better referred to as al-inhiraf),
to offset criticism of the close economic and military ties which the KSA
maintains with the West, especially the United States. Using the public veneer of what the KSA calls “Islam”
– Wahhabism – Saudi royals make the argument to the KSA’s citizenry, and
Muslims elsewhere, that the kingdom’s public persona makes it the most “authentic”
(asil) Muslim state on the planet.
Domestic, regional and
global Wahhabism As the New York Times article correctly
notes, the KSA’s alliance with Wahhabism serves an important legitimating function. However, the relationship cannot be
comprehended only by referencing the ties of the founder of Wahhabism, Muhammad ibn cAbd
al-Wahhab (1703-1792), with the Al Sacud tribe in the al-Najd region
of the Arabian Peninsula. To fully understand the significance of this relationship requires
situating it in the contemporary politics of the Middle East.
As noted, Wahhabism serves a domestic function by allowing
the KSA to suppress internal dissent, e.g., directed against the regime’s authoritarianism,
corruption, and dependency on the West, through arguing that the kingdom
embodies the “true form” of Islam.
Saudi blogger Raif Badawi - flogged for seeking free expression |
In the current political situation in the Middle East, Wahhabism has assumed a virulent anti-Shi'a tone. The anti-Shi'a rhetoric is directed against the KSA's current nemesis, the so-called Islamic Republic of Iran. This policy only feeds into the brutal policies developed by the so-called Islamic State which made killing Shi'a one of its signature acts of violence.
At the global level, Wahhabism represents a strategy for
offsetting a mono-culture economy, namely one built on oil wealth, a relatively
small population, and, apart from the Hijaz, a weak entrepreneurial sector of
the overall economy. By exporting
Wahhabism to the nation-states of the Middle East, Pakistan and Afghanistan, and countries and regions farther
away, such as Malaysia, Indonesia, Central Asia and North America, the KSA has created
not only a global network of ideological ties but a parallel network of political,
economic and cultural ties as well.
To give examples of Saudi behavior, during the UN sanctions regime of the 1990, the kingdom paid money to Iraqi Sunnis who agreed to pray 5 times a day and to Iraqi Sunni women who wore the hijab . When a Saudi delegation arrived in the Kurdish region of Iraq, after the 3 majority Kurdish provinces broke away from Saddam Husayn's regime after the 1991 Gulf War, they informed the Kurds that they have arrived with funds to help them build their new autonomous political entity.
The Kurds, in turn, informed the Saudis that they welcomed the visit because they needed funds for schools, hospitals roads and municipal services. When the Saudis replied that the funds they had brought were only for building mosques, the Kurds immediately realized the hidden Wahhabi agenda and sent the Saudi delegation packing.
To give examples of Saudi behavior, during the UN sanctions regime of the 1990, the kingdom paid money to Iraqi Sunnis who agreed to pray 5 times a day and to Iraqi Sunni women who wore the hijab . When a Saudi delegation arrived in the Kurdish region of Iraq, after the 3 majority Kurdish provinces broke away from Saddam Husayn's regime after the 1991 Gulf War, they informed the Kurds that they have arrived with funds to help them build their new autonomous political entity.
The Kurds, in turn, informed the Saudis that they welcomed the visit because they needed funds for schools, hospitals roads and municipal services. When the Saudis replied that the funds they had brought were only for building mosques, the Kurds immediately realized the hidden Wahhabi agenda and sent the Saudi delegation packing.
The “chickens come
home to roost” The title of the New
York Times article conflates two phenomena, spreading radical Islamism and
fighting terrorism. The KSA only began
to take terrorism seriously after al-Qacida was established and set
up shop in Yemen, and attacks against the kingdom were initiated by the
so-called Islamic State (Dacish).
In other words, if we review KSA policies extending back to the 19670s
and afterwards, there were no efforts to fight terrorism in the MENA region.
It is true that the seizure of the Grand Mosque of Mecca by
Saudi religious radicals in 1979 constituted a serious attack against the Saudi monarchy
(an uprising which some analysts claim was actually suppressed by Israeli troops
in unmarked uniforms after Saudi forces were unsuccessful in
recapturing the mosque).
Only after the 1991 Gulf War, when Usama bin Ladin used the presence
of US military forces on Saudi soil to establish al-Qacida, did
fighting terrorism become part of the KSA political agenda. Thus the title, “Both
Arsonists and Firefighters” is misleading, because the KSA is a late-comer to
fighting terrorism, and only once it threatened the Saudi homeland.
Will the US change its
policy towards the KSA? Don’t expect any meaningful change of US policy towards
the KSA, whether during the remainder of the Obama administration or under what
will probably be a Clinton presidency.
Because the KSA feels highly threatened by the P5+1 deal with Iran to
curtail its nuclear weapons development program, the US and its allies do not
want to alienate the KSA and other Sunni allies such as Egypt, Jordan and
Turkey, by exerting pressure on the KSA to stop its global promotion of
Wahhabism and, with it, Saudi political influence.
Further, there is a tacit alliance between the KSA and Israel who have been cooperating for years in intelligence sharing (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/opinion/sunday/can-israel-and-the-arab-states-be-friends.html). This unstated alliance includes Egypt, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states, and is considered essential to the United States in its struggle against the so-called Islamic State and other terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East. Thus the US is reluctant to put too much pressure on the KSA to force it to curtail its financial support of radical Islamist organizations, including so-called "charities" and "religious schools" (al-madrasa; pl. al-madaris).
Further, there is a tacit alliance between the KSA and Israel who have been cooperating for years in intelligence sharing (http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/28/opinion/sunday/can-israel-and-the-arab-states-be-friends.html). This unstated alliance includes Egypt, Jordan and the Arab Gulf states, and is considered essential to the United States in its struggle against the so-called Islamic State and other terrorist organizations operating in the Middle East. Thus the US is reluctant to put too much pressure on the KSA to force it to curtail its financial support of radical Islamist organizations, including so-called "charities" and "religious schools" (al-madrasa; pl. al-madaris).
The role of the “oil
curse” The only variable which may lead the Saudi monarchy to play down it
reliance on Wahhabism is the collapse of oil prices in the world market. While highly conservative, the current KSA
leadership realizes that, unless the regime changes its economic development
model, the Saudi state could experience some rough sledding in the coming
decades.
The political economic
contradictions of Wahhabism If the Saudi state does not remove Wahhabi
clerics from positions of power within the kingdom, women will not be able to
be fully integrated into the Saudi economy.
Saudi males will not be able to be taught the types of business and
entrepreneurial skills which would allow the economy to move from its
overarching dependence on oil to one characterized by economic diversity.
Saudi youth and future
of the KSA Perhaps most important is the simmering discontent of large segments
of Saudi society, especially the large youth demographic which chafes at the social and cultural restrictions,
which many consider Medieval, and the lack of any meaningful political participation
for those outside the royal family in the political system. Unless Saudi youth can be motivated to support the monarchy, and that can only happen through greater political participation and personal freedoms - at this point a contradiction in terms - the KSA faces yet another enormous impediment to implementing reformist change.
The role of Iran Given
the large Shica population in the KSA’s 2 oil-rich provinces of al-Hasa
and al-Qatif in the northeast of the country and the growth of Shica
populations in the Arab Gulf, the future behavior of Iran will strongly influence
any moves towards reform by the Saudi monarchy.
If the current radical elite of Ayatollah Khamenei, the Guardian Council
and the Revolutionary Guards continue to spew vitriol against the KSA and the
Arab Gulf states as lackeys of “the Great Satan,” then those within the
monarchy who seek to curtail Wahhabi influence will face a difficult time.
In the KSA, Islam explains
everything and Islam explains nothing Islam – or more precisely Wahhabism, a deviant
form of Islamism – is ubiquitous in the KSA.
As I have argued, the manipulation of Wahhabism has little to do with orthodox
Islamic doctrine and everything to do with protecting and expanding the domestic,
regional and global power and influence of the Saudi royal family and political
elite.
Journalists and analysts who write for The New York Times and other
forms of mass media in the West do their readers no service by constantly
viewing the contemporary Middle East through the prism of something they call “Islam,”
to the detriment of other forms of explanation, especially historical context,
and the political economy of inter-elite and inter-state conflict, and the efforts of states such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to cast a global political and economic reach.
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