Saturday, August 9, 2025

Netanyahu's Endless War in Gaza - Interview with Dr. Yoav Peled

Dr. Yoav Peled, Emeritus Professor of Politcal Science, Tel Aviv University
Guest Contributor Dr. Yoav Peled is an internationally recognized politcal scientist and an Israeli attorney. He has published many books on Israeli and ethnic politics, both in English and Hebrew.  His publications include Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship (with Gershon Shafir) and, most recently,  The Religionalization of Israeli Society (with Horit Herman Peled).  In this comprehensive interview, Dr. Peled explains the dynamics driving the Gaza War and the domestic political power structure which has thus far failed to force the far-right Netanyahu regime to end it. 

Netanyahu’s Endless War on Gaza

Yoav Peled - KPFK/Jacobin Radio interview, July 21, 2025; broadcast on KPFK July 27; on Jacobin Radio on July 30

Suzi Weissman: Welcome to Beneath the Surface. I'm Suzi Weissman. Today we return to the Israeli political landscape with Yoav Peled, professor emeritus of political science at Tel Aviv University. Yoav is going to help us unpack the intersection between Benjamin Netanyahu's domestic survival strategy and his military offensives.

All politics are local, but Netanyahu has a very international way of expressing them. We last spoke with Yoav as the one year anniversary of the October 7th Hamas attack approached. Since then, Israel's war on Gaza has intensified in destruction and disregard for Palestinian lives and has become systematized. Ethnic cleansing through bombardment, starvation as a weapon, and siege.

The resumption of aid, controlled by Israeli and American contractors has resulted in nearly a thousand deaths, as the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) regularly shoot hungry Palestinians seeking sustenance in humiliating, barbaric and deadly conditions. The Wall Street Journal reports that even Palestinians holding white flags while seeking food have been shot. There are now more child amputees in Gaza than anywhere in the world. Plus, the West Bank is witnessing settler violence with near-total impunity, and Israel's military escalation has spread to Lebanon, Syria and Iran while Netanyahu clings to power. Today, we're going to get Yoav’s assessment of Netanyahu's rule and Israel at war. 

We're also going to ask about the weekly protests inside Israel and whether public confidence has collapsed. A new poll reveals public support for ending the war, even at the cost of a political deal with Hamas. So there's a lot to unpack there. But let me just introduce you to our audience. 

Yoav is professor emeritus of political science at Tel Aviv University. He is coauthor, with Horit Herman Peled, of The Religionization of Israeli Society that was published in 2019 but is increasingly a critical text for all of us to understand. He's also coeditor with John Ehrenberg of Israel and Palestine: Alternative Perspectives on Statehood, and his book, coauthored with Gershon Shafir, Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship, won the 2002 Albert Hourani Award, given by the Middle East Studies Association of North America for the best book published on Middle East Studies that year. Currently Yoav is writing about the rise of Israeli populism. So with all that, Yoav, I'm happy to have you back.

The subject is never good. So let's begin, I guess, with the big picture. You've long argued that Netanyahu's war policies are primarily about domestic political survival. How do you understand this logic now? And do you think that Netanyahu is trying to make peace impossible because peace would mean the end of his government?

Yoav Peled: Well, to a very large extent this is true. We have to understand that, ideologically, Netanyahu or Bibi, as I would like to call him, is not that different from the extreme right in his government – Bezalel Smotrich, Itamir Ben-Gvir and so on. But Netanyahu, or Bibi, is an opportunist. And because he's an opportunist, he was also a pragmatist. All of this before his trial for corruption. Since his trial for corruption he set out on basically two courses of action. One is debilitating the Israeli judicial system, most importantly the apex court, the High Court of Justice, which is the Supreme Court sitting as an equity court. The other one is this endless war. 

Both of those things will help him get out of his trial as a free man. His trial has become a circus anyway, because the judges just let him run the show. It's just ridiculous. But I won't get into that. And then in terms of the war, or various wars, that he is conducting, this also extends his rule, even though, like you said, 70% or more of the Israeli public support ending the war and returning all of the hostages that Hamas has, reportedly 20 of them still alive, but probably on the verge of death. All of them. But that 70% is not manifested in people going out on the street.

Suzi Weissman: This new poll that you're just beginning to talk about -- we can go back later to the bigger picture of what Netanyahu's survival strategy is, but the poll is really a fascinating window into Israeli public opinion, which seems, well, you can explain it, seems both ambivalent and disillusioned.

Yoav Peled: Well, yes. You see, those 70% don't show up on the street. As you know very well, Saturday night we had a demonstration, like every Saturday night. This time it was a march from the IDF headquarters to the American Embassy. There were several tens of thousands of people in the march, but tens of thousands is not good enough. In order to make a dent, we would need hundreds of thousands. And the hundreds of thousands who support ending the war don't go out on the street because, well, you can think of many reasons why they don't, but they don't. And therefore those demonstrations, impressive as they may look, are not effective.

Suzi Weissman: Well, it's kind of a crazy question to ask you because it's a back handed question, but do you think that either the outcome of this endless war, or maybe the purpose of it, is to finally divide and exhaust public disapproval of what’s going on, whether it's just weekly demonstrations that weary the population? And as you said, they're in the tens of thousands, whereas a year ago, they were in the hundreds of thousands.

Yoav Peled: There were hundreds of thousands before the war. Yes, before the war, when the fight was over what the government euphemistically called judicial reform, and which I would call a constitutional counter-revolution. Since the war, we haven't had hundreds of thousands, because October 7th had a tremendous impact on the consciousness of everyone. October 7th was such a big blow for most Israelis that I think this is the main reason why they don't go out in the same numbers as they did before, when the issue was simply domestic constitutional change.

Suzi Weissman: But then there's this other aspect of it too, and that is, I look at Haaretz newspaper's daily summary and it gives you a count every day what's going on today. And when this is being aired, it's day 660 since the offensive on Gaza began right after, as you said, the horrific attack by Hamas. But now the difference is not only just internally, but externally. Israel is increasingly seen as a pariah state, with many countries in Western Europe now calling this a genocide and other war crimes, and Netanyahu has been charged in the International Criminal Court. But even the Sunday New York Times printed Omer Bartov's big article declaring that, finally, this is a genocide and he's a genocide scholar. 

But internally, as you're saying, the demonstrations are not as large as they were before. I'm wondering what you think about the lack of a plan for the day after that Bibi was criticized for at the beginning of the war. Is there increasingly the idea that this is just going to go on forever and it's going to continue to exhaust the population? But also that there's disregard for the hostages being held as they continually attack even areas where they think the hostages are being held? In other words, you said that the October 7th attack and the taking of all of those hostages traumatized Israel, and yet the families are losing patience. How does that figure into this general perception of how the war is being conducted and what Netanyahu is doing?

Yoav Peled: Well, Netanyahu doesn't care about the hostages. Netanyahu doesn't care about anybody or anything except himself, his wife and his son, whom I don't want to characterize. Everybody knows what they are. But I have to point out that the demonstrations, even the ones that are going on, like the march on the U.S. Embassy Saturday night, are meant for the hostages. For most participants they are not to end the war because of what is happening in Gaza. I would guess that most participants in those demonstrations don't really care about what's going on in Gaza. Of course, the Israeli media doesn't give you a full account of what's happening, although some outlets do give you more and more. The Israeli media does represent some of what is happening, but nothing like you get on foreign media outlets. But for most people, this is not the issue. The issue is to get the hostages back.

Suzi Weissman: This a very interesting point that you've just brought up, and you've talked about it before, that Israelis don't really care that much about Palestinians, or don't show empathy for Palestinians. But earlier on there was not that much news about it inside Israel. But as you just indicated, it's more and more evident. And of course, people do have internet and I'm guessing - you tell me -- that the internet is not censored. People have access and are able to see what's going on if they want to.

Yoav Peled: Exactly, if they want to.

Suzi Weissman: Right. And then there's also these horrible reports about prominent settlers and others who are in favor of starvation as a weapon who are okay, with the idea to ethnically cleanse Gaza, as if this will somehow get rid of the problem. So, I want you to talk a little bit more about how you see the various numbers in the poll, because 73% of the public say they support returning all hostages, even if it means ending the war. 52% say they still support returning hostages, even if Hamas remains in power and isn't disarmed. 

And then there's also the question of how Israelis see the state that they're in, you know, in terms of international reputation that has suffered and whether or not there's blame? Who do they blame for the war or for the lack of negotiations? What we see here, and it's almost embarrassing that Israeli spokespeople continually blame Hamas for every single thing that happens. They're not getting food. It's because Hamas steals it. That's why they had to do this thing. And it's almost like rote and embarrassing. It doesn't pass the smell test for truth. But how does it work in Israel?

Yoav Peled: Well, 54% of the people who voted for the present coalition government, a slight majority, but a majority nonetheless, say they want the war to end and the hostages to return. So that's one thing. Then the other question is, yes, you're right. The vast majority of Israelis don't care. Many of them are happy with what's happening in Gaza, and many others don't care what's happening in Gaza. And you're right, they blame Hamas for everything. And they have a good argument because October 7th was Hamas’s doing. And the thing was so traumatic, so horrible, that for a lot of people this excuses everything that Israel has done since then and will continue to do, including ethnic cleansing. 

And, you know, they all cite this harebrained idea that Trump threw out, you know, the offhand remark, that the Palestinians will leave the Gaza Strip. In Israel this was translated into the "Trump plan." They call it the Trump plan. And they set up an agency to start planning it. That's why they want to concentrate the Palestinians in this euphemistically called humanitarian city in Rafah. And from there send them to where? Now they even have candidate countries to accept them: Indonesia, Libya and Ethiopia. I don’t think these countries are very happy about it. So this is the situation right now. 

But I have to say again that you see more and more in the mainstream media skepticism about the whole thing, and the realization that this is Netanyahu's war, or Netanyahu's war for survival. They see that what is the motivation here. And so, yes, this is the situation. And on top of that, you know, the other big issue now is to pass a law that would legally exempt the ultra-Orthodox from serving in the army, while the people who do serve in the army, both regular and reserve, are just exhausted and falling down. In the last two weeks, there were four soldiers who committed suicide because of these pressures. Still, the government, that is Bibi, there's really nobody there, it's a bunch of nobodies. He fights very hard to try to pass this law that would legally exempt the ultra-orthodox and keep his government going.

Suzi Weissman: I was going to ask you about that because we've talked about this many times in the past, including when Netanyahu formed this coalition with the far right in order to stay in power. Now you see that they're leaving the government, and yet Netanyahu is still there. There are no calls, right, for a new election, because there's one that's going to happen. When is it? Next September?

Yoav Peled: October 2026.

Suzi Weissman: October 2026. Okay, so I guess people are just waiting. But is there, and I see also in this poll, since we're still talking about this poll, that Netanyahu received a four point out of ten approval rating for his handling of the hostage crisis. And you've just mentioned the big issue, which is the that there's a shortage of conscripts, clearly, for the Israeli military.

Yoav Peled: Both conscripts and reservists. Yes.

Suzi Weissman: Yes. And that there's also suicides happening and I'm sure we mentioned last time the level of PTSD is, is probably, it's going to be with Israel for a long time to come. So how big of an issue is this, the fact that the military itself is having trouble continuing in this respect, that they have to resort to threatening the coalition by drafting the ultra-Orthodox? Talk a little bit about this so our listeners get a bigger picture of what this means.

Yoav Peled: Well, the military cannot draft the ultra-Orthodox without the government telling them to do that. So they are sending out these orders for the ultra-Orthodox to show up. But nobody believes that anybody will actually show up, because if the government is not behind it, nothing can be done. So the interesting thing is, and here Bibi, not just Bibi, some other politicians too, are torn by a dilemma, because among Bibi's base, a majority want the all ultra-Orthodox to serve. 

Because the young people in Bibi's base do serve and they are physically and mentally exhausted and they want the ultra-Orthodox to serve.  On the other hand, the ultra-Orthodox, who are vital for his coalition, are saying, if you don't go through with this law, which is the law of they call, euphemistically, the recruitment law, but is really a non-recruitment law, as the media call it. So he's torn between these two things. But for him the important thing is the immediate political situation. And the immediate issue is to keep the coalition, and to keep the coalition he has to placate the ultra-Orthodox parties.

Suzi Weissman: How big of a divide, though, is it in Israel? Is it there a lot of resentment against the ultra-Orthodox because they don't serve?

Yoav Peled: Yes, absolutely. There is a lot of resentment. 

Suzi Weissman: And how big of a sector is this? Is this a minor part of the population or…

Yoav Peled: No, it's about 10% of the population. But since they are a young population, because they have tons of kids, they are now 15% of every age cohort that is supposed to be called up. I mean, people at 18, they are 15% of the 18 year olds every year, so it's more than their overall ratio of the population. And, you know, 15% of the cohort that doesn't enlist is a big issue, especially in the current situation.

Suzi Weissman: Feeding on this dissatisfaction that's now extended even to the ultra-Orthodox, not because they're upset about what's happening in Gaza, but because they don't want to be forced to serve in the army, how does that figure into these weekly protests that you see? Who joins the weekly protests? And even though there are far fewer (protestors) than before the war, when there was a gigantic movement against Netanyahu and his corruption, do you think these current protests could be part of some kind of antiwar bloc? Or are they simply about a desperation over the situation with no movement and Netanyahu's staying power?

Yoav Peled: I guess it's not really anti-war, per se. It's anti-war because they realize that the only way to release the hostages is to end the war. If there were no hostages, most of these people would not be against the war. This is my guess, but I think it's a pretty educated guess.

Suzi Weissman: Let me ask you another question about that. How do most Israelis that you see and talk to react to the international position on Israel, where it (Israel) is increasingly seen as a rogue state? Even Jews who are in the forefront of the pro-Palestinian movement in Europe and the United States are openly saying this war is genocidal, more than ethnic cleansing. How do people react to that?

Yoav Peled: Well, the people I talk to are, you know, reacting like you would react. Since most of the people that I talk to are academics, they are concerned about “will I be accepted to this conference or that conference,” and so on. So people like that are very much aware and in general this whole protest movement before the war, but also during the war, is made up of the middle class and upper middle class and professional elite. These are the people who protest and very, very few religious people. Very, very few.

Suzi Weissman: So all right, well, there was an interesting piece today by the liberal Ezra Klein, host of the New York Times' Ezra Klein Show, who's arguing -- and this is an American perception, but after New York City has overwhelmingly elected Zohran Mamdani, who is a non-Zionist, we can say that this election and this war and these protests have made clear that there's a generational divide among American Jews. Until recently most Jews were Democrats, and they were supportive of Israel, with some criticism. But they were Zionist and supportive of it. But that's now come to an end.  

Ezra Klein is saying there can no longer be that -- Jews can no longer be both liberal and support the state of Israel, because it's an illiberal state, and that these two values, Liberalism and Zionism, just don't fit together anymore. Another writer, Shaul Magid, has written that what Israel is doing to Gaza could be seen as the equivalent of the destruction of the Second Temple, forcing a complete transformation of what it means to be Jewish. Given the public attitudes that you've expressed about Israeli society, I wonder how that would go down in Israel if they understood the crisis that this war is creating for Jewry internationally.

Yoav Peled: Well, again, you know, some people are understanding, and these are the people who are connected to this liberal Jewish American milieu, which is to say that most Israelis either don't know or don't care about it. Of course, they do care about the fact that it's become unpleasant for Israeli tourists to go to many countries. Here and there there are incidents where Israeli tourists are mistreated verbally or sometimes even physically. And this makes a lot of news, but that's only because of the inconvenience of limiting the horizon of where you can go as a tourist. The real core issue of what it does to Israel’s standing in the world which they brush off as anti-Semitism. You know, everyone who is not for us is an anti-Semite. That goes without saying. In general, in the Israeli public and in the Israeli media, there is no differentiation at all between anti-Israel and anti-Semite. It's just one and the same thing.

Suzi Weissman: And that's been surprisingly successful internationally, too. That started, as we've already talked about in previous interviews, Yoav, that definition managed to cost Jeremy Corbyn the UK election and get him kicked out of the Labour Party. It's been increasingly the case here too. It's the basis of attacks on higher education in general and Harvard and Columbia and other institutions in particular. The pro-Palestinian movement, led primarily by Jews, is now called anti-Semitic. This has been surprisingly successful. And really, I think puzzlingly so as well. But I wonder how long you think that definition can hold. The other part of it is that Israel was founded in many ways because of the Holocaust, as a home for refugees, for those who survived the Holocaust. That has been such a primary part of its narrative. I'm wondering if you think that that narrative will continue in Israel given the sort of genocidal politics that Israel is committing now against Palestinians.

Yoav Peled: You can't compare. If you compare the two, you know, that's the end of you. You cannot compare. This is unique and this has nothing to do with what's happening in Gaza. For most Israelis, what's happening in Gaza is a just war. It's a just war because of the October 7th attack. So no matter what happens, that is something totally different than what happened in the Holocaust.

Suzi Weissman: I'm not saying, let me just correct this, because I'm not saying that it's the equivalent, but I'm saying that because everybody knows the Holocaust is unique and that the scale is beyond even conception. But there is the use of collective punishment, and it appears to be agreeable, essentially, that it would be okay to expel the Palestinians, the rest of the Palestinians, from Gaza if there's a place where they can be dislocated. You have Holocaust studies experts now saying that this war is genocidal and that this tarnishes even the notion that Israel claims for itself, as you know, with the Holocaust as the central part of its founding.

Yoav Peled: Really, it does everywhere but in Israel itself. Not everywhere, because some countries are totally supportive, but let's say in the, let's call it the Western world, there it works the way you just said, but not in Israel. In Israel, it doesn't work that way at all. And (genocide and Holocaust scholar) Omer Bartov writes in The New York Times and in Haaretz. How many people in Israel read The New York Times and Haaretz together? And of those who read, not everybody agrees with him, of course. So this is really not a big issue.

Suzi Weissman: Okay. All right. So given that, and you said that there's going to be another election in October 2026.

Yoav Peled: Maybe earlier, maybe earlier.

Suzi Weissman: Because you mean they could force the resignation of the government? No confidence in the government because two partners of the coalition, have left the coalition?

Yoav Peled: They haven't really left. It's kind of a fake leaving because they say they left, but the Knesset now goes into recess until after the High Holidays, so it doesn't mean anything. Then we'll see what happens. I don't think the chances are high, but there's a lot of speculation that the elections will come earlier than October 2026.

Suzi Weissman: But if they do, and given Netanyahu's overall rating, which the last time we spoke had gone up because of his success. Before you answer that question, let's talk about his military offensive outside of Gaza, because that's very important to his standing both in Israel and elsewhere. And what we've seen is regional escalation. First, we saw Netanyahu extending the war to the West Bank, where settlers are killing Palestinians with impunity, leading even to Mike Huckabee, who's the ambassador to Israel and a Christian Zionist now very upset because an American Palestinian was beaten to death by settlers. So it's at least calling a little bit of attention to that. 

But more importantly, we saw last year that Netanyahu arrogantly and importantly perpetrated an act of state terror with the pager bombings that killed 3500 or so Lebanese members of Hezbollah, but probably others as well. The aim was to defeat the Hezbollah leadership. And then doing the land grab in Syria after the collapse of the Assad regime. Of course, the coup de gras was bombing Iran. And that seemed to be to sabotage Trump's renegotiating a nuclear deal with Iran. Again, this goes back to the very first thing that I asked you, that the last thing that Netanyahu apparently wants is peace, because that undermines his standing. How do you see all of that?

Yoav Peled: Well, Bibi definitely doesn't want peace. But the question of Iran is complicated. There are two, let's say, schools of thought about Iran. And I'm talking only about serious people who are holding these two schools of thought. I'm not talking about propaganda. One says that Iran was really on the verge of something, probably blowing up a nuclear device. Still far from a bomb, but a device. And other people, including at least one American intelligence agency, because Trump frightened all the others, said Iran was 2 or 3 years away from being able to do that. So since there are serious people on both sides, 

I don't find myself in a position to decide, although I tend to believe the ones who say 2 or 3 years, but I cannot say it with any confidence, because maybe the other side is correct. And in that case, then you could see the Iranians were stalling on the negotiations with the US, and maybe they were. Well, it's their nature to stall, but maybe they were stalling in order to get even closer to their ability to explode this device or be very, very close to it. In this case, it's hard for me to say anything clear about whether there was a legitimate motive for the bombing or not.

Suzi Weissman: Okay. That's acceptable, but I think it still fits into the general narrative that it wasn't in Israel's favor for the United States to negotiate a new nuclear deal with Iran.

Yoav Peled: Israel meaning Bibi, there's no Israel. There's only Bibi and he was against it, of course.

Suzi Weissman: And Bibi, let's just call him Bibi. He's had the same speech for 20 years about the danger of Iran and possibly even more.

Yoav Peled: 30 years.

Suzi Weissman: 30. I was going to say possibly even 30. Yes, this has been a sort of mantra of his, to destroy Iran and to destroy any enemy of Israel. And speaking about his popular support and whether it's gone up or down, I would have imagined that his efforts in both Lebanon and killing the leaders of Hezbollah and then taking out, or perhaps at least damaging the nuclear facilities in Iran, were popular and would do well for him. Is that the case?

Yoav Peled: Very, very little. People were surprised. Likud’s standing in the polls rose very, very marginally. And you saw that in this recent poll he gets four – it’s like in American terms an F – for his handling of the hostage crisis. Right. So this is what his standing is even now. There was a little bit of an uptick right after what they described as a huge victory over Iran, but it was small and then it declined and went back down.

Suzi Weissman: The other side of it is that it appears that Israel's enemies have shown more restraint, even though the attack on Iran did provoke an Iranian attack on Israel. Can you talk a little bit about what that was like living in Tel Aviv? Did you have sirens all the time. Or was this restricted to other areas?

Yoav Peled: It was very much concentrated in Tel Aviv, and this was nothing like we experienced before. In order to be safe we ran several times a night to an underground parking structure that, luckily, is across the street from us, because we don't have the shelter room that new apartments have, since our house is 100 years old. But luckily, across the street we have this underground parking structure that goes three floors underground. And we, and a lot of people from the neighborhood went to the second level underground. 

This happened for 12 days, several times a day, mostly at night. So it was very, very noticeable. The closest one to hit near us was about ten minutes’ walk from us, probably aimed at the American Embassy. It didn't affect our house, but we heard the explosion two levels underground. We heard the explosion of that one very, very loudly. So yes, it had a great impact, not only in Tel Aviv, but Tel Aviv and several military bases and a big hospital in Beersheba and the Weizmann Institute, which is Israel's top research university, that was largely demolished, and so on.

Suzi Weissman: Well, that war lasted -- if it's a war, for 12 days. It's over now. But what did it do? For what? How is it perceived now? You showed me the poll. We've talked about the poll. Bibi still gets an F, but is there a sort of division? He gets an F for Gaza? But his action on Iran is higher, perhaps?

Yoav Peled: The F was for the hostages. So at the beginning, maybe his standing with respect to Iran, maybe it was higher, but more, you know, at the beginning when Trump said, we obliterated Iran's nuclear capability and so on. But gradually the reports started coming out that this is not exactly the case, that Iran can recover its nuclear capability pretty easily and pretty quickly. 

And, by the way, who says this war is over? It's not at all certain that it's over. The Iranians, it is reported, are determined to avenge that.  We saw that they can do that, and that they are very effective. They have a very good learning curve, because their hits were improved, improved from their point of view, during those 12 days, because they learned how to do this, they learned how to avoid the Israeli defense missiles and so on. So I'm not at all sure that this war is over. By the way, we thank Trump for stopping it after 12 days, because, you know the story about the 52 fighter planes that were over Tehran ready to drop bombs, and Trump ordered Bibi to call them back. This was in the last day. So we're very grateful to Trump for that. We cannot deny that.

Suzi Weissman: In other words, you're saying that Bibi ordered a new attack on Iran.

Yoav Peled: Well, it was a retaliatory attack because Iran, shortly before the ceasefire, very, very shortly before the ceasefire, was supposed to take effect, had its most devastating attack. Bibi was going to respond to that with a much bigger attack on Tehran. And because of the time difference, Trump was asleep. When he woke up, the planes were over Tehran already. People say it was 2 or 3 minutes before dropping the bombs. That's when Trump said “they don't know what the fuck they are doing." He ordered Bibi to call them back, and he did.

Suzi Weissman: How is it perceived now that Bibi is attacking Syria, ostensibly to protect the Druze community? But I guess the question that I'm asking is whether or not, and you do say that those who demonstrate represent the middle class and those who are already more liberal, but is there a sentiment that there has to be other kinds of solutions, more diplomatic ones, rather than constantly attacking militarily? Or is that not part of the conversation?

Yoav Peled: No, it is part of the conversation, of course, in that sector of the population that you just mentioned. Of course, this sector of the population gets a very high representation in the media, and we have a number of retired generals who all along said that even if this war is just, and even if the war makes sense, there has to be a political solution at the end. Most of them have already been saying for months that it should have ended then, and some kind of a political solution found. So, yes, this opinion gets a lot of coverage in the mainstream media. Among the population, again, 70% support that, but they are not committed to that enough to do something about it.

Suzi Weissman: But is there a sense that, you know, we started at the very beginning about whether or not Bibi is fighting in Gaza and elsewhere to extend his own power, to prevent peace rather than to achieve it. Do you see this as the ruling group in Israel protecting itself from the growing discontent by distracting the population? For example, how is the attack on Syria perceived? Is that seen as something that was a retaliation or just an offensive?

Yoav Peled: Well, there were two stages of the attack on Syria. One was after Jolani took power and then Israel attacked to destroy whatever was left of the Syrian army so that Jolani would not be able to use it against Israel. What's happening recently is an attack on the major concentration of the Druze population in southern Syria, and the Druze in Israel were very mad about it and were pushing the government to react. Again here, who knows what the motive is. Part of the motive was really the pressure of the Druze. You know, the Druze, unlike the ultra-orthodox Jews, do serve in the military and some of them reach very senior positions. So you have to listen to them. On the other hand, you can never deny the element of trying to grab more land, which historically has been the policy on many fronts. So it's hard to tell, but it's probably some kind of a combination of both.

Suzi Weissman: So this takes us back again to looking at the kind of contradictions that are opening up in Israel. We see that support for Netanyahu has waned, that he gets an overall bad rating. And yet he remains in power. And now you're saying that it's possible that there could be a vote of no confidence in an election before October 2026, but in any case, there will be elections in October. What are his chances of surviving that kind of an election?

Yoav Peled: Well, Bibi is a political magician, as we all know. He got out of very, very tough situations before, and I don't think that anyone can predict. I think one issue that we haven't talked about is the Arab political parties, which are under huge attack. As you probably know, they tried to expel from the Knesset the chairman of the Communist Party, who's, naturally, an Arab. They failed, but a lot of people, even from the liberal opposition, voted to expel him.

Suzi Weissman: On what basis?

Yoav Peled: On the basis that he said something that compared the release of Israeli hostages with the release of Palestinian prisoners from Israeli prisons. And he said he's happy about both, you see. But if you say that you're happy about both in the same breath, then you're, you know, a supporter of HAMAS.

Suzi Weissman: Something else about these other political parties. But also just on that issue, because the question of exchange of hostages for Palestinians in Israeli prisons is part of the negotiations. So what are you saying about that, that Israelis don't support that, they don't want them exchanged?

Yoav Peled: They support it, but they call them terrorists. They don’t in any way think that they should be compared to the hostages who were kidnapped, you know, on October 7th. To some extent, it is true, because those people were totally innocent civilians, most of them. Some were soldiers who were kidnaped from their beds while they were at home.

Suzi Weissman: Or at a rock concert!

Yoav Peled: At the rock concert. But the Palestinian prisoners, regardless of how strong the evidence against them was, there was clearly at least for most of them some involvement in something. And they went through some kind of trial, you know. But to say that comparing the two, or being happy about the release of both, means you're a traitor to the State of Israel and therefore cannot serve in the Knesset, that’s something else. But the broader issues is that I think there's going to be a move to not allow the Arab political parties to run in the next elections.

Suzi Weissman: This will, of course, amplify even more, internationally, the notion that Israel is apartheid. So let's talk about which parties and what is the Liberal opposition saying about all of this?

Yoav Peled: Well, unfortunately, most of the so-called liberal opposition doesn’t have any problem with it, even though it means that it will never win an election, because without those Arab parties the liberals can never win an election. There have been attempts before to disqualify this or that or two Arab parties from competing in the elections, but then the Supreme Court always restored them. But now we have a Supreme Court that is much more right-wing than it used to be. Court packing is one of the strategies, you know, of populist regimes (as when you look at your own Supreme Court), and they were pretty successful. So now it is more conservative and much weaker and cowardly than it used to be. Maybe there is a good chance that once the one, 2 or 3 Arab political parties are disqualified, and this time the Supreme Court would not restore them to the race. I think this is a real possibility.

Suzi Weissman: This, as you're talking about it in your book, The Religionization of Israeli Society, is a very key factor of creating a very different alignment in Israeli politics. But is there any sign now, because of the disaffection that we're seeing and, and showing in the polls, that there is some kind of realignment politically happening?

Yoav Peled: Realignment in what sense?

Suzi Weissman: Well, I mean, what about, because we've seen the far right divided, I guess not just the far right. They've left the government over this question of the ultra-Orthodox serving. But is there any political realignment, let's say, among voters or within the security establishment over the general situation and the conduct of the war and everything that we've been talking about?

Yoav Peled: Well, Bibi was very successful in taming the security organizations. You know, he got rid of the former chief of staff of the IDF, he got rid of the former head of the Shin Bet, the head of Mossad just went to Washington to discuss this ethnic cleansing with Witkoff. And the current chief of staff of the IDF is very much Bibi's patsy. So the security organizations are now securely in his hands.

Suzi Weissman: But with growing opposition outside, of former members of the security establishment?

Yoav Peled: These people are mostly ten or more years out of the system. It's a very different generation. And among the political opposition, again, there's hardly anyone that I would even call liberal, except this one guy. You know, the Labor Party changed its name. Now it's the Democratic Party. Right. And it's headed by another retired general, Yair Golan, who was the deputy chief of staff of the IDF and was sure to become the chief of staff. This was some time ago. 

But he said in a speech, when he was the deputy chief, sure to become the chief, he said in his speech on Holocaust Remembrance Day that he identified in Israel processes that reminded him of Germany in the 30s. Because of that, he lost the chieftainship of the IDF. Now he heads this Democratic Party, and they get in the polls about ten seats in the next Knesset. This is the only party that I would even call liberal. All the other ones are, you know, not even that.

Suzi Weissman: So, how many seats in the Knesset do they have, the Labor or so-called Democratic Party?

Yoav Peled: In the polls they have about ten seats in the House. Right now they have only four.

Suzi Weissman: Okay.

Yoav Peled: Four, which is the minimum you can get.

Suzi Weissman: And by renaming themselves the Democratic Party, is this going to increase support? What effect do you think it will have?

Yoav Peled: They united with this party that didn't make it into the Knesset last time, the most liberal party in Israel, called Meretz. So the two united and I think their poll numbers increased because of this guy Golan. Of course, he's a Zionist and he's a military man and so on, but he really, truly expresses liberal positions on every issue, most pointedly on the issue of the war. So I think that's the reason why their support increased. But again, you know, 10, 12, is around 10% of the Knesset. So what does that mean?

Suzi Weissman: Yes. Well, how much does the far right represent, the parties that Netanyahu needed in order to stay in power?

Yoav Peled: Well, it depends on who you define, who you call the hard right. Let's say Netanyahu's current coalition at its highest point had 68. In order to govern, you need 61. Now, with all this fake leaving of the ultra-Orthodox parties, it has 49, I think, or 50. But that doesn't really mean anything because they're not going to bring him down, even if they wanted to. The Knesset goes into recess at the end of the week. But they don't really want to bring him down. So it's pretty much a show. The fact that they left is pretty much a show. So he's secure. At least until the next elections he is secure.

Suzi Weissman: And is there any question within Likud of changing leadership or is that completely out of the question?

Yoav Peled: The Likud’s so-called leadership is a bunch of nobodies. Bibi worked very, very hard to remove anybody who could be a potential threat or even a potential successor. So it's really a bunch of nobodies. That's why I'm saying there's no government, there's no Israel, there's only Bibi.

Suzi Weissman: It's amazing. All right. So let's go then to the liberal opposition, since you said we didn't talk enough about the political parties. Yair Lapid is still the head of the liberals. Yes?

Yoav Peled: His official title is head of the opposition. But in the polls he gets, I don't know, 4 or 5 seats, or something like that.

Suzi Weissman: Give us a panorama of the parties that will contest the new election and what kind of support they have.

Yoav Peled: Well, on the right we have, of course, Likud. We have Ben Gvir’s party that also has around ten seats in the polls. The other guy, Smotrich, is not getting in at all according to the polls. And then you have the ultra-orthodox. The ultra-orthodox have about 20 together. You know, there is a Sephardic and an Ashkenazi ultra-orthodox, but they are separate. They have together about 20 seats. And on the other side it's a range of parties, beginning from a hard-right party in the opposition, Avigdor Lieberman's party. Lieberman is a fierce right winger. He's a fierce right winger, but he hates Bibi, so he's in the opposition. 

Then you have Naftali Bennett, who was formerly Prime Minister. He was prime minister when his party had only 6 seats . Now he heads a virtual party, which doesn't exist yet, except in the polls. It exists only in the polls, and it's the leading party. He gets more than Likud, a few more than Likud. 22-25 each of them gets. 

And then you have this right wing, but let's call it maybe a little moderate, moderately right wing party, headed by this guy Benny Gantz, another former chief of the IDF general staff, who some years ago had some 30 seats in the polls. But he's, it's very unpleasant to say, not too smart. So he twice saved Bibi’s ass. Can I say ass on KPFK? He saved Bibi’s ass twice when Bibi was really on the ground, and he promised him all kinds of things, which everybody knew he was not going to fulfill, except this Gantz. So now he's barely showing in the polls. 

And then there's Lapid, who is a little bit above not getting in. He's getting in securely with very few seats in the polls. And then there is this Democrats with Yair Golan, which is the largest party in the opposition, not including the right-wing opposition of Lieberman. So among the ones who could even remotely be called liberal, Yair Golan is leading. Okay, this is the picture.

Suzi Weissman: So let me ask you then, finally, because we will be running out of time here. But I want to know the main issues around which parties are organizing now? How important is the endless war issue, the occupation issue? How important is the authoritarian politics of Netanyahu and his increasing fight against democratic rights, including the judiciary and his own trial? What we're really asking is what are the main contradictions and issues that might create newer coalitions in this next election?

Yoav Peled: The two main issues are, first of all, the war and then what they call the judicial reform, which is really a constitutional coup d'état. These are the two main issues.

Suzi Weissman: And what about clericalism? I was going to ask about the religionization. How does that have any position on the issues that we're discussing here. Authoritarianism, the judicial coup and occupation?

Yoav Peled: Well, the occupation is not an issue, has not been an issue since the year 2000. That's not an issue in Israeli politics. Clericalism is only about this military service. Everybody is mad about the ultra-Orthodox not serving in the military, but if and when the time comes and this supposedly liberal opposition parties are close to being able to form a government, and the ultra-Orthodox would be willing to join them, they will take them and they will give them everything they want. Just like Bibi is trying to do.

Suzi Weissman: Well, I guess that really gives us the kind of big picture that I had hoped for, Yoav. As always, not much light, but at least I think things will get more interesting as we move toward the election in Israel. Of course, at that point, I'm going to ask you to come back to explain it all. Any final thoughts?

Yoav Peled: Well, the final thought is that both of our countries are ruled by this type of character, which I don't want to characterize, because free speech is now under attack, too. But we all know what kind of characters they are, and the two of them together are creating a disaster for us. Maybe upon you, too, but upon us it's much more a matter of life and death.

Suzi Weissman: No, it's a disaster here, too. Especially right here in the city of Los Angeles, where Trump is under siege. But of course, it doesn't affect most people. But for immigrants, it's an entirely different story. So, yes, it's a terrible alliance. And we have to include Putin in this part as well, who is waging war in Ukraine. But on the other hand, I think there's some divisions that we can talk about at another point because Trump has his own policies and does seem to want to stop the wars. And so in that, in that way, he comes into conflict. And, and here, I guess you could finally just say that the tail is wagging the dog. And most people disregarded it. Netanyahu and Putin are the junior partners that do very much try to wag the dog. They're the tails that try to wag the dog. In Putin's case, by delaying any negotiations. And in Netanyahu's, by trying to prevent any deal with Iran.

Yoav Peled: Right, or with HAMAS.

Suzi Weissman: Or with Hamas. Yes, yes, it's a terrible situation. Yoav, thank you so much for joining us yet again on the show. Thank you. And we'll talk to you soon.

Yoav Peled: Thank you.

Suzi Weissman: All right. Okay. So we'll end it there. Wow. You know, I'm always looking for some hopeful note, but I guess it's hard to find it in Israel. And it's hard to find it here, too. Although here at least we have, you know, a huge mobilization. We don't have a political expression for it. You know, as a party, the Democrats are horrific. But you do see giant opposition to what Trump is doing, including now even among Republicans who do not want to see these wholesale deportations. 

And, you know, ICE running around the streets with masks on. Now with this big bill, you know, they've got a huge infusion of money. And my daughter was looking at the recruitment. They said that every ICE agent has to have a college degree. The starting wage is higher than teachers. If they're going to try to recruit so many, they're not going to be, you know, that particular about who comes in. This part is very scary.

Yoav Peled: Yes. Right.

Suzi Weissman: All right. Well, good to talk to you. 

Yoav Peled: Yes. Thank you.

Thursday, July 31, 2025

What is the Status of the "Axis of Resistance" After the Israel-Iran War?

Asa'ib Ahl alHaqq Fighters Marching in Baghdad

Israel's attack on HAMAS, Lebanon's Hizballah and the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU) in Iraq has had a devastating impact of Iran's so-called "Axis of Resistance."  Since HAMAS attacked Israel a year and a half ago, Iran's proxy militias have all, with the exception of the Houthis in Yemen, lost considerable military and political influence. What then is the future of these militias? Will they be able to continue to destabilize the Eastern MENA region? What does their status tell us about Iran's future ability to project power and influence in the Middle East?

A key variable in answering these questions which has yet to be given adequate attention is the degraded state of Iran's economy. Iran's losses after Israel's bombing have placed limits on the degree to which it can provide its proxy militias with weapons and funds. In 2018, Iran faced an annual inflation rate of 18%. It has since increased to 40%,seriously undermining the value of the Iranian rial. Iran suffers from crippling sanctions and a crumbling infrastructure. Extensive state corruption and mismanagement have only exacerbated these problems.

Iran is experiencing a severe water crisis. Already, some areas in its south west provinces have been forced to evacuate famers and other residents because water supplies have completing dried up.  Much more analysis of this crisis is required because the MENA region is suffering from the adverse effects of climate change more than any other of the world's regions.

With the toppling of Syria's al-Asad regime in December 2024, Iran no longer can use the country as a conduit for arms and other goods across the so-called Shi'a Crescent, i.e., through Iraq, Syria and into Shi'a majority southern Lebanon. Competing with discounted oil prices which Russia provides China and India to  offset the sanctions it has faced for invading Ukraine in 2022, has hampered Iran's ability to expand its oil sector and hence export more oil and natural gas.  

Clearly, HAMAS has been organizationally and militarily degraded to the point where its actions are limited to sniper attacks by small groups of militants on Israeli soldiers in Gaza. Reports indicate that HAMAS' approval rating is at an all time low and that is hated by a significant sector of Gaza's Palestinian population. In short, it is difficult to see HAMAS ever returning to the position of political and military power it enjoyed before October 7, 2023.

Hizballah has likewise been seriously degraded militarily. Consequently, its political hold on the Lebanese government has also been weakened. Prior to HAMAS' attack on Israel, Hizballah's strength was evident in its control of half of Lebanon's cabinet ministries. In May, 2008, during militia clashes in Beirut  resulting from Hizballah's demand for greater political representation in the Lebanese government, it became clear that competing militias and the Lebanese army troops were no match for its military power.

Most analyses of the status of Iran proxy militias following the 12 day Iran-Israel War in June 2025 fail to examine the economic consequences - the political economy - of Israel's devastating attack on Iran's nuclear facilities and infrastructure. 

Iran's proxy militias are much more than military and political forces. To support their organizational needs and ability to resort to violence to enforce compliance by the populaces they control, they require a steady, predictable source of funds. Without such funds, these militias could not survive.  

Even though Iran will be unable to provide its proxy militias with the type of weaponry and financial support that it has in the past, one of the legacies of Iran's regional influence is the spread of criminality. While the ties linking the militias to Tehran will diminish, their criminality will persist,

Hizballah is as much a crime syndicate, much like in Southern Italy, as it is a political and military organization. Its tentacles stretch into Europe and Latin America where it engages in drug and contraband smuggling, identity theft, and money laundering. Hezbollah's Networks in Latin America

Although Iran, its main patron has been diminished militarily, politically and economically, Hizballah can continue to pursue its criminal activities, even while it has lost considerable political power based on Israel's killing of its top leadership and destroying it as a military power. Lebanon's President Aoun Urges Hezbollah to Give Up Arms

Along with other government and military officials, Hizballah has consolidated its hold over the port of Beirut to control the import of illicit goods. Although it didn't cause the August 4, 2020 chemical blast which killed 200 Lebanese, wounded 7000 more and destroyed much of downtown Beirut, it bears much of the responsibility for the horrific explosion of nitrogen chemicals which had stored in a port warehouse for several years. 

Because the Lebanese government is prohibited by Hizballah from inspecting parts of the port, and government officials are often bribed to look the other way and not report the arrival of contraband goods, the dangerous chemicals which exploded was never addressed, even though many officials knew it presented a serious danger. Following the blast, Hizballah intervened to prevent the Lebanese judiciary from investigating who bore responsibility for the tragedy.

In Iraq, the PMUs (al-Hashad al-Sha'bi) have developed a parallel economy, in effect creating a state within a state.  In multiple areas of the country, government officials, not even the prime minister, can enter zones where the militias have stockpiled goods as they are being prepared for sale.

Even as Iran's proxy militias have reigned in their attacks on American troops in Iraq, as instructed by Iran, they continued to enjoy strong political support. Currently the Iraqi parliament is considering a law which would integrate the PMUs into the Iraqi army. 

While Prime Minister Muhammad Shia' al-Sudani argues that this process will give the state greater control over the militias, this reason for presenting the bill is false.
The PMUs already occupy key positions in a number of key ministries, especially the Ministry of the Interior, and thus would only obtain added legitimacy if the law is passed.

For many militia leaders, the new bill contains an ominous article. If passed, it would require all militia leaders above the age of 60 to retire. Falih Fayyadh, who is head of the Shiite Coordination Framework and the PMUs, is 63 years old and, under the terms of the new law, he would lose his position. This legal stipulation would apply to many other PMU leaders whose age exceeds 60. Debate over PMU reform sharpens as the US threatens sanctions

Qa'is al-Khazali, head of the notorious Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous People), is one of the main advocates of the proposed law. His organization hopes to gain more patronage if it is able to marginalize older, more established PMU leaders once the law passes.  

Led by the former minister of agriculture, Khazali's forces recently stormed Iraq's Ministry of Agriculture as a new minister was being appointed. Asa'ib fighters engaged in a firefight with government security forces and killed a police officer and wounded 9 others as they attempted to prevent the former Minister of Agriculture being replaced with a new one. This type of "wild West" behavior demonstrates how violent Iraq could become if internal cleavages intensify between the 6 main PMU forces.Gunfight in Baghdad kills one as paramilitary group storms ministry

Meanwhile, the Trump administration has been vigorously lobbying against the proposed law to integrate the PMUs into Iraq's security forces. It argues that once this process is completed, it will be difficult to disentangle the militias from Iraq's armed forces.  

The US State Department recently withdrew a sanctions exemption which has allowed Iran in the past to sell electricity to Iraq. Coming during Iraq's increasingly hot summers, it will cause a major disruption to Iraq's citizens and businesses. The Trump administration is also pressuring the al-Sudani government to reign in Iraqi banks especially established launder dollars transferred to Iran.

On another front, Iraq's Shi'a PMUs have been attacking oil installations in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRU) in lieu of targeting US troops at bases near Baghdad and in the KRG. The militias claim the KRG assisted Israel in its attacks on Iran.  Because the KRG is closely aligned with the United States, these attacks are seen as sending a message that Iran's proxy militias can still harm American interests in Iraq.سقوط ثلاث مسيرات في أربيل وكركوك

To conclude, Israel's military attacks have severely degraded the "Axis of Resistance."  However, there are still many ways in which Iran's proxy militias can undermine political stability in the Eastern MENA region, especially the Popular Mobilization Units in Iraq.
















Sunday, June 29, 2025

How "Ayn Breira," Monopoly's Get Out of Jail Free Card, and Yogi Berra Help Explain the Israel-Iran-United States Crisis

President Donald Trump and Ayatolla Ali Khamenei

After the Israeli attack and US bombing of Iran, a number of analysts now speak of a "New Middle East." The MENA region is already difficult enough to understand. So how do we address the question of interpreting what the ongoing Iran-Israel conflict, in which the United States is now directly involved, implies for understanding the region?

Ayn breira Let's begin with the Hebrew expression "ayn breira"(there is no choice). Since the 1948 Arab-Israeli War which followed the foundation of Israel, a mentality developed that there was no choice facing Israel in terms of its Arab neighbors other than the use of force. Indeed, force rather than negotiation  has been the strategy of choice for most of Israel's existence.  

Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu has built on this worldview to pursue his attacks on Gaza which have, according to the Gaza health Ministry, killed more than 55,000 Gaza Palestinians, mostly women and children.  If we look back at Israel's wars, 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982, 2006, 2014, 2023-25, do we find Israel stronger or weaker in the larger Middle East? 

In Abraham and Isaac, Israeli filmmaker Ilan Ziv uses the metaphor of God's order to Abraham to kill his son Isaac as the basis for his film.  Abraham's devotion and loyalty to God is tested and Isaac is given a reprieve just as he is about to be slain by his father.  Ziv focuses on the idea of "ayn breira" as a legitimating tool which condemns future Israelis generations to conflict and a "fortress mentality," namely, teaching them that violence and death are the only recourse the country has to defend itself.

In the film, Ziv argues with his mother who remembers the battles of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War and asserts that there is no other choice beyond war to deal with Israel's enemies. He also argues with his younger brother who wants to become a paratrooper in the Israeli army. Neither relative recognizes the long-term consequences of war. These are clear in Ziv's poignant comments about his military unit's comrades who died in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War but who are now "are only memories represented in photographs." 

Ilan Ziv's Abraham and Isaac was prescient.  Here we are in 2025 and Israel is engaged in not one but two wars.  It has lost widespread international support and great harm has been done to its reputation. The fighting over a year and a half since the HAMAS terrorist attack, and now in Iran, has seriously damaged its economy. Israel’s War on Iran Is Costing Hundreds of Millions of Dollars a Day 

Israel did choose negotiations at one point in its history. Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, Israel and Egypt established diplomatic relations through signing the historic 1978 Camp David Accords mediated by President Jimmy Carter.  The Accords led to the ties established with Jordan in 1994.  Israel and its two former enemies have sustained peaceful relations ever since.  

However, a major incentive for then Israeli prime minister Menachem Began to sign the Camp David Accords was its exclusion of the Palestinian question and failure to establish an independent Palestinian state.  Indeed, the Accords created widespread anger in the Arab world because the Palestinians were excluded from its terms. The Accords certainly contributed to Anwar al-Sadat's assassination while reviewing a military parade celebrating the October 1973 War in October 1981. 

The take away from this analysis is that, had Israel pushed a policy of creating an independent Palestinian state after 1978, including using its Shin Bet and Mossad intelligence agencies to protect the leaders of the new state, Iran would have lost much of the legitimacy for its raison d'être, namely the supposed "liberation of Jerusalem." In fact, I would probably not be writing this post had an independent Palestinian state been established after Camp David or after the 1995 Oslo Accords.

Monopoly's "Get Out of Jail Free" card Any of us who have played Monopoly are familiar with the "Get Out of Jail Free" card. How does this card help explain the Israel-Iran crisis?  Benjamin Netanyahu, who is under indictment for widespread corruption, desperately seeks to avoid being convicted and sent to jail.  In Israel's history, one president and one prime minister have already spent time in jail after being convicted of crimes.

Monopoly's "Get Out of Jail Free" Card
Despite the sword of Demacles hanging over Netanyahu's head, the Western media has almost entirely ignored one of the main drivers behind his order to attack Iran, namely avoiding being sent to prison. This fear is also true of Netanyahu's motive in keeping the war in Gaza going, even though his generals and intelligence chiefs have indicated that Israel has achieved all its military goals. 

The universal support Netanyahu has engendered among Israels after the attack on Iran has lifted his support in public opinion polls (even though demonstrations continue to bring back the remaining Israeli hostages in Gaza). Nevertheless, multiple intelligence agencies in Israel, the United States and elsewhere have argued that Iran was not on the cusp of developing a nuclear weapon.

If Netanyahu loses the support of the ultra-nationalist far-right members of his cabinet, particularly, Minister of Finance, Bezalel Smotrich, and Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben Gvir, his government will fall and he will lose his immunity from prosecution. Riding high in popular support as a result of his attack on Iran, Netanyahu's continuing the struggle with Iran and the Gaza War gives him a "get out of jail free" card.

Yogi Berra Anyone who has followed American baseball knows the legendary Yogi Berra, the late great catcher for the New York Yankees during the 1950s and 1960s. Berra is known for his sayings, e.g., "The place is so crowded, no one goes there anymore."  For our purposes, two Yogisms stand out.  The first is: "It ain't over, til' it's over."

Donald Trump sees his foreign policy decisions through the lens of his career in real estate. Every foreign decision is a discrete event. In real estate transactions, the deal involves negotiation - even bluster and threats - until it's concluded. Once the deal is signed, the seller puts it in the books and move on to the next issue. Unfortunately for Trump, foreign policy doesn't work that way and cannot be treated as a series of real estate deals.

While Iran should never be allowed to possess a nuclear bomb, its seems clear from the International Atomic Energy Commission that, while severely damaged, Iran still has the capacity to enrich uranium and ultimately build a nuclear bomb. Thus, echoing Yogi Berra's saying, Irans' threat to the Middle East is definitely not over  U.N. nuclear watchdog says Iran could enrich uranium again in 'a matter of months

"If you come to a fork in the road, take it" is yet another well-known Yogism. Trump came to a fork in the road and decided first to negotiate with Iran to end its nuclear enrichment program, telling Netanyahu that the US wouldn't support an attack on Iran. However, Netanyahu, fearful that a US-Iran deal would negatively affect his political fortunes, decided to attack anyway, with or without the US' permission. 


Once Trump saw Israel's success in its attack, he decided to take another fork in the road. Suddenly, POTUS was using the term "We," meaning "We (the United States) are in control of the skies over Iran." Following the US bombing of Iran's nuclear facilities, Trump was furious when leaked intelligence reports contradicted his assertion that Iran's nuclear program had been "obliterated." In deciding on the attack, Trump was apparently convinced to do so by Senator Lindsay Graham (SC) who argued that he would get great credit for the attack.Lindsey Graham Swayed Trump on Striking Iran. Here’s What’s Next

Contra Trump's claim, the "Iran deal" has not been settled and permanently placed in the books. Trump should have remembered George W. Bush's presumptuous May 1, 2003 "Mission Accomplished" speech aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln when he declared victory in Iraq. It took until 2011 before US troops left Iraq. Even today a residual 2,500 member US military contingent remains there today to fight Islamic State terrorists. 

Where does the Israel-US-Iran crisis go from here? If the United States had pressured Israel to establish an independent Palestinian state long ago, the repressive Tehran regime would have had the wind taken out of its sails. Under multiple proposals formulated in the past, Israel and the new Palestinian state would have shared Jerusalem as their respective capitals. The Old City would have been placed under an international condominium for 25 years until both parties decided on its final status in relation to the larger city.

As long as Netanyahu is at the helm in Israel and Trump is in the White House, we will not see that type of peacemaking effort anytime soon. Still, a reformed Palestinian National Authority, with Mahmoud Abbas removed from office - because he's thoroughly corrupt and hasn't held elections since 2013 when they were legislatively scheduled - could administer the new Palestinian state.  

Dr. Salam Fayyad, a University of Texas economics Ph.D., who Abbas fired as prime minister in 2013 as a result of his efforts to tackle PNA corruption, would make an excellent head of the new Palestinian state. Meanwhile, an Arab military force could rid the Gaza Strip of the remaining HAMAS terrorists. Such developments would open the way for diplomatic and commercial ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia. It would also empower Israel's Palestinian citizens who could serve as interlocutors between the two states and the large Arab Gulf. Beyond Historical Amnesia, Revenge and the Good-Evil Binary: Solving the Israeli-Palestinian Dispute Once and For All

In a recent article, Thomas Friedman argues that the continuation of the status quo in the Israel-Iran conflict could result in a great irony.  We could see Benjamin Netanyahu and the Israeli far-right return to their efforts to eviscerate the power of Israel's Supreme Court and move Israel in the direction of the type of the authoritarian theocracy we currently see in Iran. Iran, in turn, might see the fall of the Tehran regime and the country move towards a moderate form of democracy. If This Mideast War Is Over, Get Ready for Some Interesting Politics

Whether such changes will occur has yet to be seen. Clearly, new initiatives to bring peace and stability to the Middle East are needed. Unfortunately, neither the current Israeli nor American political leadership has a strategy to move in that direction. There is a choice. It's whether the relevant power brokers in Tel Aviv and Washington, DC, decide to make it.

Next post: "How the Israeli-US Attacks on Iran have Affected Tehran's Proxy Militias in Iraq."