After the Uprising: Whither Iran?

The massive uprisings in Iran which began on December 28the after Iran's currency collapsed have now been suppressed by the Tehran's regime forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Estimates indicate that as many as 30,000 protestors may have been killed during the demonstrations, many shot at point blank by government forces.  Even though the protests have been quelled for the moment, what does the current unrest suggest about the future of the so-called Islamic Republic? What Happened at the Protests in Iran?

The end of the Islamic Republic The argument presented here is that the Islamic regime must be toppled. Not only it is guilty of crimes against humanity in the killing, torture and imprisonment of countless thousands of Iranians, but it has spread violence and terror thought the Eastern Middle East.  Tehran's clerics have supported HAMAS which has brutally repressed the Gaza Palestinians and which attacked Israel in October 2023 leading to the killing of 1,200 Israelis and the onset of a war in Israel has killed over 70,000 Gazans largely destroyed the Gaza Strip. The Cost of Inaction Over Iran: ‘We Are Left With Graveyards’ 

Iran also armed Hizballah which allowed the militia to take control of Lebanon's government , repress democratic forces and become a major player in international drug trade. Not only did it undermine the stability of the Lebanese political system, Hizballah, working with Russian forces, played a critical role in keeping Bashar al-Asad's genocidal regime in Syria in power.

Iran has provided Russia with its inexpensive but lethal drone, the Shahed-136. Russian forces have used the drone to kill large numbers of Ukrainian troops, to attack apartment buildings in Kyiv and other cities killing many innocent civilians, and to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure, especially its energy grid. Indeed, it has even helped the Putin regime build a factory to produce the Shahed drone inside Russia.

Based on its highly repessive rule and spread of violence and instability in the Eastern MENA region, the regime must be overthrown.  Either this regime change can occur though the Tehran elite being coerced into making meaningful democratic reforms, or it can be accomplished through econominc sanctions and military means.

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 To begin with some history, it should be remembered that the uprising which toppled the highly repressive regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1978-79 was not motivated by an Islamic ideology. Rising inflation during the 1970s, which led the Shah to reduce regime funding for urban construction, on which many workers who had migrated from rural to urban areas depended, created an economic crisis.  

When demonstrations began in Iran's cities, the Shah sent the military to suppress them. When soldiers refused to fire on the demonstrators, and even in some instances joined them, the regime's future was sealed. With the loyalty of the military in doubt, the Shah fled Iran in late 1978. Already suffering from advanced cancer, he died in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1980.

The revolution which overthrew the Pahlavi regime was comprised of many forces. It included secular liberals, Marxists, oil workers, moderate clerics, e.g., Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, Islamic socialist followers of Ali Shariati, and the hard line clerics who supported Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  Clearly, those who supported the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 didn't seek to replace a secular dictatorship with an repressive Islamic one

Consolidating a tyrannical dictatorship During the early 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini's ability to consolidate his rule, which involved the execution and imprisonment of thousands if Iranian suspected of being disloyal to the regime, was enhanced by Iraq's invasion of Iran in September, 1980. Nationalist "rally around the flag" sentiment strengthened Khomeini's rule during the 8 year war which led to a truce in 1988. 

Iraq's use of chemical weapons, which had a devastating impact on Iranian forces, and the many youth "Islamic martyrs" who died running though mine fields in the advance of Iranian troops, kept Iranians' focus on the war, not on domestic politcis.

Khomeini's death in 1989 lay bare that the regime had failed to practice what it preached. It was not Islamic norms which informed its behavior but the concentration of power in the hands of hardline clerics and the IRGC, and the ruling elite's ability to benefit from the massive spread of corruption.  Thus, the Tehran regime's legitimacy was compromised. A new generation pf Iranian youth knew little of the Shah's rule but could clearly see that they weren't the beneficiaries of clerical rule.  Patron-client relationships, not professional expertise, determined employment opportunities for the educated middle class.

The regime loses legitimacy In 2005, corruption reached new heights. Khomeini's successor, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and then president Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, announced a policy to liberalize the economy. Supposedly, this move would invigorate investment, strengthen markets and lead to higher economic growth.  

In reality, it was a shrewd effort to enrich the regime's elite, particularly among clerics, the IRGC high command and bazaar merchants, the traditional mainstay of Iran's economy. This decision encouraged regime members and their clients to develop private industry and commerce which benefitted from government subsidies and a variety of corrupt practices.

Because new financial ventures were considered to be part of the private sector, there was no oversight of  their formation or functioning.  As favored enterprises benefitted from large infusions of government funds, those who controlled them to become very wealthy. The political-economic elite went on to purchase homes abroad, send their children to elite foreign schools, spend vacations in Europe, and to drive around in expensive automobiles.

Meanwhile, little was done to improve the lives of the working classes and rural poor. Even though the regime used oil revenues to create foundations (bonyads) which were intended to be charitable trusts, these organizations became giant monopolies with no government oversight.  They favor members of society who supported the Islamic Republic. The bonyads have been used by regime clerics as an open-ended source of funds to use as they see fit.  

While failing the improve the living standards of the Iranian people, despite having access to considerable oil revenues, the Tehran regime has spent large amounts of money building proxy forces which it has argued will "liberate Jerusalem."  It has also used state revenues to develop its nuclear weapons program, including the latest effort to situate it under a large mountain in the Zagros range.

What should be done to protect Iranian protestors? Given the thousands of Iranian civilians killed in uprisings in 2009, 2014 and 2026, there must international action to prevent the Tehran regime from continuing to commit these crimes against humanity. Despite being led by despicable leaders who lack any respect for democratic governance, the only 2 countries which have the capability to stop the Tehran regime's repression are the United States and Israel.

What could each of these countries do?  First, the United States could set a deadline for Iran to disassemble its long-range ballistic missiles which it has partially reconstituted after the June 2025 strike by the US and Israel. The United States attacked Iran's nuclear facilities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant under a mountain near the holy city of Qum while Israel destroyed military assets and infrastructure and killed the top leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Trump has already specified one condition for Iran to avoid an American attack and that is eliminating its long range ballistic missiles. He has threatened that, if this step isn't taken, then the US and Israel could strike and destroy the missile bases. Eliminating Iran's ballistic missiles would severely curtail any attack by Iran on Israel or on US bases in the region.  Thus, Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf nations' fears of an Iranian retaliatory attack were US forces to strike Iran would be reduced. 

However, the most powerful weapon at the international community's disposal in forcing the Iranian regime's to end its repressive behavior is to undermine its ability to sell its oil in the world market. The United Nations, the United States and the European Union have all placed sanctions on Iran which is one reason, together with corruption and mismanagement, that its economy is currently in free fall. 

A much more effective effort to cripple the Iranian economy would be to end its use of the so-called "Shadow Fleet."  The Shadow Fleet consists of several thousand older oil tankers which have been used by Russia, Iran and, until recently, Venezuela, to export their oil as a way to circumvent international sanctions.  These tankers are owned by shady companies, often lack insurance, and change name and country registry frequently to make it difficult to detect them.

Iran apparently has shipped oil beyond the Persian Gulf and then transferred the oil cargo on the high seas to a shadow fleet tanker.  With help from Nato allies, the US should track Iranian oil tankers and seize them, or the shadow fleet ships, which are transporting sanctioned oil in contravention of international law.  Although this would be a difficult exercise, all Iranian tankers must go through the narrow Straits of Hormuz at the southern end of the Persian Gulf which makes them easy to detect as they begin their journey to India, China and other ports of call.

Iran earns considerable revenues from Russia for providing it with ammunition, shells and military hardware, especially the Shahed-136 drone. Bloomberg reported on January 12, 2026, that Iran has sold $2.7 billion of arms to Russia. As noted above, Iran has helped Putin build a drone factory in Russia. Iran Sent Russia $2.7 Billion Worth of Missiles Alone 

To cut off these sales, the United States should use Israel's network of intelligence agents in Iran to destroy the energy supplies to the factories producing these munitions, further disrupting the Iranian economy. During the June 20205 attack, Israel destroyed several key natural gas pipelines which shut down plants producing electricity for Iran's manufacturing sector.  If the factories producing the Shahed drone and other munitions are shuttered, that results in a loos of regime revenue.

The United States and Israel should use cyber-warfare to disrupt the command and control capabilities of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Private messages should be sent to top IRGC commanders that they face assassination if they don't leave their positions. Given the ease with which almost the entire top command structure of the IRGC was eliminated during the joint US-Israel attack in June, 2025, such messages would spread fear among the newly appointed IRGC commanders.

Israel and Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states fear Iranian retaliation. But Iran's military is very weak and must pay attention to urban and rural unrest.  During the recent uprisings, the regime was very disturbed that it lost control of several areas of major cities.  Regime forces only reestablished control by a violent crackdown on demonstrators. 

The fears of Iran striking out beyond its borders are exaggerated.  The shutdown of the Internet during the protests has cost the Iranian economy dearly. The regime has promised to reimburse businesses which were adversely affected by the protests but lacks the funds to do so. The idea that Iran is ready to fend off military attacks and retaliate against US forces in the Gulf and Iraq belie its inability to even keep the economy operational. Iran Update, January 27

Now is the time for the International community to come together and rid the Middle East of the despotic and hated regime in Tehran.  Arab states, who don't want to see regime change in Tehran because it may bring democracy a d threaten their own rule, argue that the end of the Islamic Republic will bring chaos.  Nonsense, widespread chaos already exists, in Iran and throughout the Eastern MENA region where its spread of violence has produced massive instability. The ultimatum must be: democracy or a harsh economic and military attack. The Days of the Iranian Regime Are Numbered

The structure of corruption in Iran

“Governability” or Displacement? – Israel’s Negev Bedouins

Dr. Yoav Peled is an attorney and Professor of Political Science emeritus at Tel Aviv University.  He has published extensively on Israeli politics.  His latest study, co-authored with Horit Herman Peled, is The Religionization of Israeli Society (Routledge). This post was originally published by the Los Angeles Times.

In the summer of 1980 I accompanied my wife, Horit Herman Peled, on a research trip to Israel’s Nakab (in Hebrew Negev) region for her study of traditional Bedouin women’s weaving. In October of that year the Los Angeles Times published my op-ed article, “Bedouins: Defiance, Vows of Resistance,” based on our conversations with the region’s Bedouins. 

The concluding paragraph of that article began with: “So far the Bedouins have been remarkably calm, and have not engaged in acts of hostility against the Israeli government. But … I often heard vows of resistance and defiant statements to the effect that ‘we are not going to submit peacefully any longer’.” Now, many of the children of the Bedouins we had spoken with 45 years ago have indeed turned to violence.

That violence, however, does not take the form of armed resistance against the state but rather that of criminal activity. Reports abound about Bedouins engaged in protection rackets, possession of illegal firearms, illegal growing and smuggling of cannabis, terrorizing motorists on the highways that cross their region, and sexual harassment of women on the streets of Beersheba, the area’s major city. 

Other social ills as well plague the Bedouin communities: polygamy, practiced by about 20% of the men, which often results in large dysfunctional families; marrying off of minor girls to older, married men; violence against women; murder of women for allegedly violating “family honor.” The public discourse in Israel treats this issue as a problem of “governability,” ignoring the underlying conditions that give rise to this kind of behavior.

Using this criminal activity as pretext, the police, led by the extreme right-wing Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, recently placed the Bedouin community of Tirabin al-Sanaa under siege for two weeks, terrorizing the population and killing one resident who did not pose any danger to them. 

They also confiscated all of four rifles, two handguns and several hand grenades. According to police, two more Bedouin communities are up for similar treatment in the near future.

At the heart of the matter is a dispute over land between the Bedouins and the State of Israel. At the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, only about 12,000 Bedouins were left in the Negev, out of 70,000 who had lived there before. The rest left, or were expelled, to the Gaza Strip (then under Egyptian rule) or to Jordan. 

Those who remained were concentrated in the eastern Nakab where they lived under military rule until 1966. When the military rule ended, the Bedouins demanded to be returned to their original lands, but because of the erratic nature of land registration in that area most of them did not possess title deeds. 

In 1984 Israel’s High Court of Justice, relying on a spurious interpretation of the Ottoman land law of 1858, determined that the entire Nakab was state land and the Bedouins, therefore, were trespassers there. Still, in recognition of the fact that many of them had lived in that area for generations, the state did not proceed to evacuate them by force, but tried to reach agreements with them.

The essence of these agreements was that the state would recognize the Bedouins’ ownership of their land, provided they agreed to move to townships established for that purpose and receive there, as compensation, much smaller parcels of land than the ones they originally claimed. Since 1966,

seven such townships have been established, which are among the poorest communities in Israel.

Of the 250,000 Bedouins in the Negev, about 70% live in the townships and in villages recognized by the state as legitimate communities, and the rest, unwilling to accept the terms offered by the state, live in forty-five “unrecognized villages,” shanty towns lacking the most essential infrastructure – water, electricity, sewage, paved roads, etc. 

All dwellings in those villages are considered to be illegal structures and are constantly under threat of demolition. Over the years the High Court of Justice mandated the establishment of a few schools and medical clinics in some of those villages, but these are far from providing adequate services to the population.

In 2018, before the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and the Gaza war, the unemployment rate among the Bedouins in the officially recognized communities was more than double the national average, and the average income of a Bedouin wage-earner in the recognized communities was about two-thirds of the national average. 

During the school year 2018-2019, the rate of Bedouin twelfth grade students who gained a matriculation certificate, required for admission to higher education, was about 50%, compared with a national average of 70%. No comparable figures are available for the unrecognized villages, but the situation there is undoubtedly worse.

The Bedouins who live in the unrecognized villages are willing to settle with the state, but they demand adequate compensation, in the form of sufficient land and water allocation to establish agricultural communities, like the many Jewish agricultural communities in the area. 

So far the state has refused these demands and insists on relocating the Bedouins to the townships, while planning to establish additional Jewish settlements on land the Bedouins claim as their own. This approach, supposedly meant to enhance the state’s “governability” in the Negev, is not going to solve the problem of violence there, only to aggravate it.