Will the US make the right decision in Egypt?

The remarkable events in Tunisia have been followed by even more spectacular developments in Egypt. The idea of an "inert" Middle East that suffers from a "democracy deficit" is belied by the thousands of Egyptians marching in the streets of cities throughout the country chanting slogans that call for freedom and democracy.

Unfortunately, the demonstrations have been marked by violence on the part of the security forces and have caused many casualties. However, with the withdrawal, at least temporarily, of the hated CSF (Central Security Forces), Egypt has experienced not only political protest but looting, including destruction of priceless artifacts at the Egypt National Museum in Cairo.

Thus far, the military has exercised restraint regarding the demonstrations and has not moved forcefully to suppress them. However, it seems that the Mubarak regime withdrew police forces from the streets to send a message that the protests will lead to chaos, thus preparing the populace for the redeployment of the CFS. If this occurs, and the regime orders the military to back up the police, we could see extensive bloodshed in Egypt in the days ahead.

One of the key question that remains is what the response of the Obama administration will be towards the popular uprising in which calls for fair elections, freedom of expression and assembly, and the elimination of the corrupt Mubarak regime continue to ring out.

Once again, radical Islam is the specter that continues to haunt Western policy-makers. Focusing almost exclusively on the possibility of an Islamist takeover by the Muslim Brotherhood, the Obama administration and the European Union have been tepid in their response to the protests that have engulfed Egypt. They continue to call on the Mubarak regime to exercise restraint in suppressing the demonstrations, allow for the free expression of ideas and enact social reforms (but reforms which have been left largely undefined).

What Western powers fear is a repetition of the events in 1978 and 1979 in Iran where street demonstrations resulted in bringing to power the repressive regime of Ayatollah Khomeini. These considerations pose a problem for the Obama administration. What action should it take regarding the popular uprising against President Husni Mubarak's regime in Egypt?

Unfortunately, the US has shown great equivocation regarding events in Egypt. When the demonstrations began, Secretary of State Clinton at first assured the world that the Mubarak regime was stable. Subsequently, President Obama encouraged the Egyptian government to respect the rights of the demonstrators and to minimize the loss of life. He underlined that the US wants to see the same freedoms we enjoy in this country respected in Egypt as well and he called on President Mubarak to enact long over due reforms. These statements were accompanied by remarks by White House Press Secretary, Robert Gibbs, that US aid to Egypt - $1.3 billion per year, of which all but $250,000 is for military aid - was under review.

While it is true that the Muslim Brotherhood and even more radical Salafi groups in Egypt seek to exploit the uprising, they did not initiate it. Rather it was Egyptian youth, most of whom do not have an Islamist agenda, who began the uprising. While the Islamist movement in Egypt will be the topic of another posting, now is the moment for the US to show its true colors in Egypt and the Middle East and come out full square for democracy.

If the US does not take strong action to force the Mubarak regime to implement immediate and concrete reforms, such as holding truly free elections rather than the sham parliamentary elections in which only 16 opposition candidates were elected to office out of 518 parliamentary seats, the US will lose what little credibility it has among the Egyptian people. It will only play into the hands of the radical Islamists, potentially creating a self-fulfilling prophecy about their rise to power.

If a major and bloody suppression of the demonstrations does occur, and the US watches from the sidelines, it will represent a failure of potentially catastrophic proportions for the US. Democracy activists will be further marginalized and Islamists strengthened. US inaction will only pour more oil on the politically explosive fires that are rapidly spreading in the Middle East.

Instead, the US should threaten to drastically reduce US aid unless the Mubarak regime enacts immediate and meaningful political and economic reforms. Food supplies are already running short in Egypt. The regime may have the military muscle to suppress the demonstrations, but it does not have the economic wherewithal to sustain 85 million Egyptians should foreign funds and food imports begin to dry up.

Yes, a future Egypt without Mubarak is, for many Western policy-makers, a frightening scenario given the uncertainty that his departure would bring. However, we all know what sticking by the side of the Shah of Iran to the bitter end in 1978 brought in its wake. Does the US and the West want to see a recurrence of Iran in Egypt?

Beyond the Secular-Islamist Divide in Middle East Politics

Despite the Western media's obsession of viewing Middle East politics through the lens of radical Islam, events taking place in Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon have little to do with religion.

In Tunisia, radical Islamist groups were delighted with Zine al-Abidine Bin Ali's overthrow and hoped to exploit the unrest to establish an "Islamic Amirate of Tunisia." To the chagrin of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (North Africa), Tunisians have shown no interest in such bombast and instead have emphasized the secular nature of their protest movement.

In Lebanon, Hizballah has dramatically increased its power, but only through cross-confessional cooperation. Hizballah has proposed a billionaire Sunni prime minister, Najib Miqati. A graduate of the American University in Beirut with a Masters of Business Administration degree, he is hardly a radical Islamist. To put him in office, Hizballah has required the support in parliament of Michel Aoun's Maronite and Walid Jumblatt's Druz factions .

In Egypt, the Mubarak regime is trying to blame the Muslim Brotherhood for the unrest that is sweeping the country. The Brotherhood denies any involvement and demonstrators who have been interviewed by the press say their protests have nothing to do with Islam. As one young activist put it, "If we were the Brotherhood, we'd be much better organized."

What are the drivers of the current unrest in the Middle East?
There are many factors behind the current unrest in Tunisia, Egypt and Lebanon, unrest that may spread to other countries as well. First, there is large unemployment and underemployment in these countries, as in many others in the region. This unemployment disproportionately affects youth, who make up a large demographic in most countries of the Middle East, often well over 60% of the population under the age of 25. Second, there is the problem of massive corruption and nepotism within the state apparatus, made all the more intolerable by the increasingly sharp divide between the rich and poor. Third, protesters are no longer willing tolerate political systems that continue to be dominated by a small group of entrenched elites who refuse to share power with anyone else. All this combines to undermine any sense of hope in the future.

With the dramatic increase in social media in the Middle East, this discontent is widely shared on the Internet among large segments of the populaces of the region. Social media help offset feelings of inefficacy because they demonstrate that the same same feelings of discontent transcend national borders. Social media also provide a way to organize opposition to authoritarian regimes, as we saw in Iran in June 2009 after the election of president Mahmoud Ahmedinejad, which many think was rigged. Social media facilitate the organization of demonstrations and are difficult for the state to control.

Is the Jasmine Revolution transportable?
But is the Tunisian model of regime change applicable to other countries of the Middle East? One of the most important elements in the Jasmine Revolution has been the support for the demonstrators by the military and, more recently, the national police. The Tunisian army is a relatively small force and largely apolitical. The refusal of its commander-in-chief, Gen. Rachid Ammar, to obey the orders of deposed president Bin Ali to fire on demonstrators, was seen as key to forcing Bin Ali and his family to flee the country.

In Egypt, the military is much more politicized, having seized power in the July 1952 Revolution. Military officers subsequently became directors of nationalized companies, that came to form Egypt's large public sector, where many made large fortunes for themselves and their families. Other former officers added to their wealth and power through occupying key positions in the state bureaucracy and intelligence services. The Egyptian army, by which I mean the upper echelons of the officer corps, will most likely fight vigorously to prevent the ouster of the Mubarak regime (although it may seek to replace him with another autocrat in an effort to placate the current demonstrators).

One key variable in assessing the possibilities of democratic change in the Middle East is the degree to which corruption has pervaded the upper echelons of society. The greater the degree to which there is an institutionalized system of corruption, the larger the number of political actors and groups who will oppose democratic political change, realizing that such change will curtail their power and wealth.

Lebanon presents a very different situation from both Tunisia and Egypt. Ethnically and confessionally divided, it has always had a weak state, and is subject to pervasive and negative "neighborhood effects" - namely interference in its political affairs by Syria, Israel, Iran and many other states in the region. Many of the drivers of discontent in Tunisia and Egypt are operative in Lebanon - unemployment, corruption and nepotism, lack of government services and a small political elite that monopolizes power and is unresponsive to the need for political and economic change.

When analysts ask how Hizballah was able to transform itself from a shadowy organization that was connected to the bombing of the US marines barracks in Beirut in 1983 to a movement today that, in effect, controls Lebanese politics, they only need look to the country's political elite which has always ignored the needs of the poor Shi'a of south Beirut and southern Lebanon. This segment of the population has grown dramatically over the past two decades, and was forced for almost 20 years to confront Israel's occupation of the south. Had the Lebanese government taken the south's problems seriously during the 1950s and 1960s, well prior to the Israeli invasion of 1982, it is doubtful that Hizballah would have acquired the power that it has today.

Hizballah, and its backers, Syria and Iran, will attempt to prevent the type of change that is occurring in Tunisia from happening in Lebanon. With the country's different ethnic and confessional groups divided along many ideological lines, it is unlikely that the type of national unity that we are seeing in Tunisia will crystallize in Lebanon.

Still, Lebanon has a largely democratic political culture, and Hizballah will be forced to take responsibility for the country's problems, now that it, for all intents and purposes, rules the country. If it pursues a sectarian agenda which leads to more conflict, it may alienate many of its own supporters who, like most Lebanese, yearn for political stability following the devastating civil war of 1975-1990 and continued political instability. If, as is expected, the unsealing of the indictments by the Special Tribunal for Lebanon of those alleged to have assassinated former prime minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 show that they were members of Hizballah, the organization could lose considerable credibility in Lebanon.

What is the role of the international community in the Jasmine Revolution?
Even if it is doubtful that either Egypt or Lebanon will move towards greater democracy in the near future, what can the international community do to help the Jasmine Revolution consolidate its gains? If Tunisia establishes a functioning democracy after its forthcoming elections, elections that the military vows it will make sure are fair and transparent, a danger lurks if the new government is unable to address the economic problems that were the reason for the uprising against the former Bin Ali regime. Educated professionals, workers and others may be delighted to have freedom or expression and assembly, the right of political participation and other benefits of democracy, but these will soon lose their attractiveness if there is no improvement in the economy.

Already the UN has sent a team of advisers to Tunisia to provide assistance to the new interim government. The UN should be the focal point for a large international effort to provide economic assistance to Tunisia. The UN, the US, the European Union, Turkey and other countries should encourage foreign investment in the Tunisian economy. International lending agencies should provide micro-credit for small merchants, such as the vegetable and fruit vendor, Mohammed Bouazizi, whose self-immolation set the Jasmine Revolution in motion. International agencies, both governmental and non-governmental, should help the new Tunisian government provide better services to its citizenry, such as health care and job training.

Tunisian universities should receive assistance that would allow them to upgrade their curricula, thereby providing better educational opportunities for the large youth demographic in the country. Universities in north America, Europe, Turkey and elsewhere could establish "sister university" relationships where foreign universities partner with their Tunisian counterparts to improve the educational system, both secondary and higher. All these efforts would provide the critical social and economic underpinnings for the Tunisian economy. They also would send a strong message to the populaces of other authoritarian states in the Middle East that democratic change is possible in the region, the assertion that it suffers from a "democracy deficit" notwithstanding.

Religious devotion should be respected by everyone. But forcing one's religion on someone else is antithetical to the spirit of tolerance and brotherhood/sisterhood that characterizes all of the world's major religions, including Islam. Muslims throughout the Middle East have discovered that Islamism - by which we mean requiring the wearing of a certain type of dress and following certain codes of behavior - cannot, on its own, bring about the improvements in the quality of life sought by the peoples of the Middle East.

Jobs, better education, accessible health care, and increased opportunities for women require much more than the outward trappings of religious belief. Above all, this type of progress requires a civic, participatory and democratic citizenry that works together, across religious lines, and that includes both men and women and old and young, to bring about the positive change we see occurring in Tunisia. Religious fanaticism has no role to play in this type of political movement.

Youth in the Middle East: a New Force for Change?

The toppling of Tunisian President Zine al-Abadine Bin Ali goes far beyond the ousting of an aging, repressive and corrupt autocrat. Bin Ali is the first Arab president to be forced out of office by non-violent civil demonstrations. Perhaps most importantly, the impetus of the movement that led to his fall was the actions of Tunisian youth who kept up demonstrations against his regime for more than a month. Responding to the self-immolation last December of a 25 year old unemployed Tunisian, Mohamed Bouazizi, who the police had prevented from selling vegetables in the town of Sidi Bouzid, Tunisian youth took to the streets to protest a repressive and increasingly unpopular government. Despite the estimated killing of 50 demonstrators by the police, they refused to leave the streets. What was most significant was the role of youth in the first toppling of a sitting Arab leader. What are the implications of youth activism for political change elsewhere in the Middle East?

My own research with Iraqi youth over the past two years, which was recently featured on National Public Radio's All Things Considered (Wide Gulf Divides Youth from Older Generation), indicates a pattern throughout the Middle East, namely the deep disaffection of youth. While Iraqi youth may be less disaffected than youth in more repressive countries, because at least Iraq has democratic elections, they reject sectarianism and the manipulation of religion for political ends. While highly attracted to Western culture, Iraqi youth know little about their own country's history. While some are very active in civil society organizations, others are cynical about politics which they view as the realm of corrupt elites. Because Iraq's youth constitutes 65% of the population under the age of 25, we find the same "youth bulge" that exists in many countries of the Middle East, including Tunisia. Youth comprise an important demographic that represents the future of the Middle East and one that calls out for more study.

Yet the older generation, as we see in Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere, is very out of touch with young people in the region. These elites have done little to prepare these youth for the future or to build economies that would provide them with jobs. Freedom of speech is suppressed and the national media strictly censored. To legitimate their rule, Islam is manipulated for political ends. Secular leaders like Bin Ali, Egypt's president Husni Mubarak, Syria's Bashar al-Asad, and Algeria's Abd al-Aziz Bouteflika, argue that authoritarianism is necessary to prevent Islamists from coming to power. Islamist regimes, such as those in Iran, Saudi Arabia and Sudan, completely distort Islamic doctrine to suppress individual freedoms and prevent any form of dissent.

These conditions suggest a dangerous and explosive future for the region. Lack of jobs, and hence little hope in the future, widening disparities in income distribution, combined with increased awareness of the high life led by corrupt and nepotistic rulers, made all the more evident by social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter, provide all the elements for a "perfect storm" of social unrest and uprisings against unpopular regimes. While some oil-rich regimes, such as Saudi Arabia, may be able to co-opt dissidents, this is not an option in many of the region's dictatorships that do not possess such resources.

The role of social media will continue to fuel the flames of discontent. As the blogosphere in the Middle East has expanded, young people have access to even more information about the sharp contrast between the lack of freedoms in their own country and the freedom enjoyed by youth in the West and elsewhere. Even a cursory examination of events in Tunisia during the past month indicates the power of the Internet in fomenting and organizing the discontent that led to the toppling of the Bin Ali regime.

Even in countries where elections matter, such as Turkey, Iraq, Israel and Lebanon, large numbers of youth see their respective political leaders as unimaginative, corrupt, and unresponsive to the wishes of the populace at large. In the remainder of the region's authoritarian countries, which range from the milder regimes in Jordan and Morocco, to the highly repressive in Iran and Saudi Arabia, most youth have either given up hope or are ready to take to the streets.

As educational opportunities began to expand in the Middle East during the 1950s and after, young people became ever more conscious of the problems facing their countries. For many, having a degree meant little if they did not have the influence (wasta) among the political elite that would allow them to obtain meaningful employment. Indeed, Tunisian youth interviewed during the recent demonstrations speak of not having the necessary funds to bribe officials to obtain employment.

For many educated youth, escape to Europe, North America, Australia or elsewhere provided a release for some of this frustration. But, as the global economy has deteriorated, and now seems to face an extended crisis, the educated are no longer able to "vote with their feet." If we add to the disaffected middle classes - the main social force behind the demonstrations in Tunisia (and in Iran during the protests following the rigged June 2009 presidential elections) - the growing urban poor, many of whom are under the age of 30, we see that a revolutionary situation is in the offing.

Of course, many of the urban poor often support populist and would-be authoritarians, such as Muqtada al-Sadr in Iraq. One of the trends to keep an eye on will be the extent to which disaffected youth from the middle and lower classes can make common cause to improve their economic status and political freedoms. Clearly, for the poor, improving their material fortunes takes precedence over more abstract values , such as freedom of speech and assembly.

Tunisia's "Jasmine Revolution" reflects the frustration that all societies in the Middle East feel as the result of political leaders who lack vision and refuse to enact democratic change. This is clear from the enthusiasm and shock waves that events in tiny Tunisia have sent throughout the Middle East. All across the region, citizens in various countries are asking themselves: could this be the beginning of a new democratic era? This is especially true of young people who are the main force behind the social media that is deluging the Internet with commentary about what is taking place in Tunisia.

Tunisia's first president, Habib Bourguiba, who ruled from 1957 to 1987, promoted education, a secular culture and women's rights. While he was as much of an autocrat as Bin Ali, the results of his policies are evident. Islamists have played almost no role in the past month's events in Tunisia. Instead, we see a movement of the secular middle classes pushing for democracy and social justice. That Tunisia has a large middle class, albeit economically distressed, that believes in democratic freedoms and is no longer willing to live under autocratic rule should send a message to all political elites in the area.

Political protest in Tunisia contrasts sharply with recent events in Pakistan, where young lawyers - trained during the repressive regime of the late General Zia ul-Haq - who imposed a harsh and intolerant form of Islam during his rule from 1977 to 1988, showered rose petals on Mumtaz Qadri, the assassin of Salman Taseer. the secular governor of Punjab Province. Taseer's "crime" was his persistent criticism of the so-called Blasphemy Laws imposed by General Zia which harshly punish those considered to have insulted Islam. Before his assassination, Taseer had been trying to overturn the sentence of a Christian woman who had been convicted of insulting Islam under these laws. While Bourguiba's regime produced a large secular middle class, Zia ul-Haq's rule spread intolerance and bigotry.

While radical Islamism is still strong among some sectors of the Pakistani population, Islamism in its authoritarian variant has run its course in the Middle East. The June 2009 demonstrations which led to Iran's Green Revolution, that protested the rigged reelection of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, are a good example of the disgust many Iranian youth feel for the so-called Islamic Republic, which they see as neither Islamic or representing republicanism in any meaningful definition of the word. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood has experienced serious internal cleavages as young members have increasingly opted for democracy and have challenged the prerogatives of the movement's aged leadership. In Morocco, many Islamists have opted for non-violent action in their efforts to create a truly democratic polity.

Many youth int he Middle East realize that Islamist parties have no programme for creating jobs, improving educational opportunity, offering better health care or expanding individual freedoms. Indeed, in Iraq, many young people are increasingly rejecting Islamism in its intolerant variants as they see sectarian leaders manipulate a distorted version of Islam for their own personal political and economic ends.

The upheaval in Tunisia is far from over, the movement for democracy there is still in formation,and it is unclear who will lead the country out of its current crisis. Still, Tunisia may represent the first chapter in a process leading towards greater freedom in the Middle East. A successful transition to democracy in Tunisia could have a "domino effect" throughout the region. The recent demonstrations may also presage an ever more active role for the youth of the Middle East who have nothing to gain and everything to lose from the continuation of authoritarian rule and "politics as usual."

Iraq's water crisis threatens its economic and politcial development

While Middle East analysts have focused on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Islamic radicalism and nuclear proliferation, a more serious problem looms ever larger, namely the shortage of water facing many of the region’s countries. Despite being known as Mesopotamia - the Land Between the Two Rivers - Iraq is confronting what could be an existential challenge. The Tigris and Euphrates rivers, which have given life to the Fertile Crescent, are in the process of being significantly degraded, threatening not only Iraq’s agriculture but virtually all aspects of the country’s life. What are the origins and development of this crisis? What the probable political outcomes of Iraq’s severe water shortages and can their negative consequences be confronted?

The argument is often made that the Iraqi state has not, historically, pursued prudent water control and preservation projects. In this view, Iraq’s water shortage problem is a function of state policies which have both neglected and even exacerbated it. This argument does have some merit. However, it fails to recognize that many steps were taken by various governments during the 20th century to try and control and better allocate the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates.

The Hindiya Barrage, built on the Euphrates River in 1913 by the famous British engineer, Sir William Wilcox, was the first effort to control the Tigris and Euphrates river system. The Kut al-Amara Barrage, which was constructed between 1935 and 1939 by 2500 Arab and Kurdish workers had a salutary impact on farming, spreading irrigation to a wide area surrounding the barrage. The Wadi Tharthar Project, created by the Iraq Development Board with funding from the World Bank, is set in a large depression near the city of Samarra, 160 miles northeast of Baghdad. It was begun in 1952 and intended to protect Baghdad from the annual flooding of the Tigris River and to increase irrigation waters which could provide irrigation for a half million acres when filled to capacity. The Samarra Barrage, opened in 1956, is part of the diversion scheme to funnel excess water to the Wadi Tharthar. Lake Habanniya, a natural lake near al-Ramadi, has been used since 1956 to contain the flow of the Euphrates when a barrage was built to divert excess water to it.

The Falluja Barrage, first proposed in 1923, was not built until much later, having been completed in 1985 with the intent of expanding irrigation in al-Anbar Province. The al-Haditha Dam, constructed between 1977 and 1987, was designed to produce hydroelectric power, regulate the waters of the Euphrates and increase irrigation around the town of al-Haditha. In 1980, a German consortium began work on the Mosul Dam which was intended to capture the snow runoff from Turkish mountains to the north, to provide hydroelectric power and expand irrigation. The dam is the fourth largest of its kind in the Middle East. Historically, it seems clear that many of the water projects in Iraq have benefited the north central or so-called Sunni Arab triangle.

In the Kurdish region, there is the Dukan (Dokan) Dam, in al-Sulaimaniya Province, on which construction began in 1954 and which came on line in 1959. Initially intended for irrigation, by 1979, it also was able to produce hydroelectric power. Over time, it became so degraded that its ability to produce electricity today cannot be relied upon. The other large dam in the Kurdish region is the Bekhme Dam Project about which more is said below.

It should be clear from this cursory overview that a variety of Iraqi governments have taken water issues seriously. What analysts really mean when they speak of the state’s neglect of water issues is the period between 1980 and 2003 when wars and political instability curtailed most state-run projects. Under Saddam Husayn’s rule, dams and barrages were built in many areas south of Baghdad between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers not for agriculture but to drain them for military training purposes (Islam Online; 2008). The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the UN sanctions regime imposed on Iraq between 1991 and 2003 effectively stopped all projects designed to deal with Iraq’s water needs. As pointed out in an excellent article in al-Sharq al-Awsat (Feb. 8, 2010) by Dr. Hasan al-Janabi, Iraq's representative to the FAO in Roem, it was only in the 1990s that Iraq began to face serious water problems.

During the war, Turkey built tunnels that were completed in 1986,diverting one-fifth of the Euphrates River’s water to the huge Ataturk Reservoir. Because Iraq did not want to antagonize Turkey during its war with Iran, it offered only muted protests against Turkey’s actions. Here is a clear example how Saddam’s wars negatively impinged upon Iraq’s water needs.

Despite the tremendous casualties during the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars, and Intifada of February-March, 1991, Iraq’s population nevertheless increased from 13 million in 1980 to over 29 million in 2010. During a period when the country’s resources should have targeted to increase agricultural productivity and food supplies, they were instead diverted to two disastrous wars. Indeed, the UN allied coalition bombing of Iraq in January 1991 pushed Iraq back to industrial levels of the early 1960s.

The most obvious impact of the water crisis has been its impact on Iraqi agriculture, both in the northern and southern portions of the country. Although Iraq’s main source of revenues is derived from oil, agriculture still plays a key role in much of the country. In 2009, 25% of the population was employed in agriculture which generates 10% of GDP. In Diyala Province, one of Iraq’s most unstable areas, 70% of the province is dependent on agriculture.

Iraqi agriculture was already in a weakened condition in 2003 after 12 years of UN sanctions which prevented any form of major development or improvements. By 2002, 80-100% of many of Iraq’s staples were imported. Even though Iraq’s three Kurdish provinces became an autonomous region in 1991, still Iraqi Kurdistan was importing 65% of its agricultural products in 2006 with its own agricultural sector only producing 35% of the region’s needs.

Irrigation in Iraq has been severely curtailed through a combination of drought, restrictions of water flow in the Tigris and Euphrates by its two upriver neighbors, Syria and Turkey, a lowering of the water table of underground aquifers due to excessive pumping, and by the inability of post-2003 governments to implement a national policy to conserve water and regulate water flows.

Rice production has been severely curtailed and even banned by the government in southern Iraq because not enough water is available to allow it to be cultivated. This problem has cultural overtones, making it more difficult for Iraqis to purchase high quality and expensive Anbar rice which is coveted in Europe for making beer and by Iraqis for meals during religious holidays. Many rice farmers have been reduced to collecting and selling salt gathered from drainage ditches along the Euphrates River.

The outcome of reduced agricultural output is that Iraq has been forced to import more food crops from abroad. The necessity to import food crops from abroad places greater strain on Iraqi hard currency reserves because food prices worldwide are on the rise (“UN Data Notes Sharp Rise in Food Prices,” The New York Times, Jan. 6, 2011 ).

Although the northern part of Iraq benefits from greater rainfall than the south, this region has suffered from its own problems with water which are both naturally induced and political in nature. Due to neglect and over pumping of wells, lack of government technical support, and political instability, many of the underground canals (karez/qanat) that have provided irrigation waters since time immemorial to Kurdish, Arab, Turkman and farmers of other ethnic groups in the north have been destroyed. A 2009 UNESCO study found that, after 4 years of drought, 70% of the karez that were still operating in 2005, the year the drought began, had been abandoned. This led to the displacement of 100,000 people in northern Iraq.

Much of this destruction of northern Iraq’s irrigation system occurred during the 1980s when Saddam Husayn decided to ethnically reconfigure the region of the Ninewa plains by removing Kurds who lived and farmed there. During the notorious Anfal Campaign, between 1986 and 1989, 3.5 million Kurds and other minorities were displaced and as many as 150,000 people died. Hundreds of villages were destroyed and with them the irrigation infrastructure that had supported them.

In the south, which has not received as much state attention to water resources as the north (e.g., it received much less electricity than Baghdad or Iraq’s Sunni Arab provinces during the 1990s), the situation is dire in many areas. Iraq’s signature agricultural crop, date production, one that has defined Iraq’s culture over time, has suffered not only from the persistent drought, but from the drop in the water level of the Shatt al-Arab, where the Tigris and Euphrates join, which has resulted in the increased salinization of the river water. Many date palms have died in the far south and the entire industry in this region is threatened with destruction.

With the significant decline in the size of Iraq’s lakes, many have become highly saline making it difficult for fish to reproduce. Fishermen on Iraq’s lakes have also been adversely affected. Many have been forced to leave the Lake Habbaniya area and move to urban areas where they place more pressure on limited government services and employment. This also means that urban areas receive smaller amounts of fish, the amount of which had already been in decline due to the pollution of the Tigris River which led the Iraqi government to ban fishing in it in the area around Baghdad.

Virtually all Iraq’s industries, from cement to oil, are adversely affected by the water shortage problem that the country is facing. Water is necessary for cement and oil production and for many other forms of manufacturing. Once a rural area loses its agriculture production, small industries can also be hurt as they lose the farmers who often serve as part-time workers in these industries to supplement their farm income.

While the al-Maliki government has provided a limited amount of loans to farmers to help them improve agricultural output, there is little official infrastructure through which to make these loans effective. The government has not provided loan guarantees for potential agribusiness investment. With water levels dropping, increased soil salinity and the lack of government support for agricultural exports, the incentive for companies to invest in agriculture has declined. Many government officials support the ban on agricultural imports because otherwise Iraqi farmers could not compete. However, many likewise favor price supports for consumers so that they will not be adversely affected by the sharp rise in local food prices.

An important outcome is that, once economic activity has been adversely affected in rural areas, it is often difficult to reintroduce it (something we already see in the KRG farm sector). Once crops have been destroyed and farmers have been forced to leave their land, it is not easy to entice these farmers or other agricultural workers to return to the land if suitable conditions of cultivation cannot be reestablished, and if they do not have access to urban amenities.

Not all is doom and gloom. In Ninewa Province, Iraq’s breadbasket, grain production of wheat and barley grew by 370% in 2010 due to favorable rains followed by mild winter temperatures and is expected to have continued high productivity in 2011. This is also true of Arbil, Dohuk, Sulaimaniya and al-Tamim governorates.

At present, the greatest problems caused by the water shortage are being felt by those sectors of the Iraqi populace who are most adversely affected by the drought and its social, economic and cultural impact. Peasant farmers who have been forced to migrate from their ancestral villages to urban areas where life is very difficult are angry that the government has done little to help them sustain their farms. Among families who remain in the villages (and those in urban slums), the lack of fresh drinking water, which requires purchasing water from private tanker trucks, places an added economic burden on the family.

Others who have been adversely affected by Iraq’s water shortages are urban consumers who see the prices of vegetables, fruits and grains rising sharply. Price rises are both due to reduced size of crop output and a government policy designed to help farmers by banning foreign imports of many agricultural products. Prices of vegetables have doubled in some parts of Iraq. While the Ministry of Agriculture has banned the import of a variety of fruits and vegetables to protect Iraqi farmers, the policy has created outrage among many consumers. Water affects the price equation in another manner because farmers need to resort to pumps to bring water deep in wells to the surface given the contraction of Iraq’s aquifers, further adding to the costs of production.

In the KRG, we see a more focused problem as many peasant farmers were already forced off their land by Saddam Husayn’s Anfal Campaign (1986-1989) and/or by the degradation of the Kurdish agricultural sector due to neglect on the part of the two dominant political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) after the region became autonomous in 1991.

Because so many farmers have been forced to leave their farms, many are now dependent on the KRG for their livelihoods as an estimated 90% of all jobs in the KRG are under the patronage control of the KDP and PUK. Because Kurds need to have ties to and influence (wasta) in one of these two parties, securing employment is often not easy. With the inflation rate in the KRG putting sharp pressure on salaries, which have not risen as quickly, there is much resentment towards the KRG leadership, as I discovered in my own interviews with Kurds, which is seen as permeated by corruption and nepotism.

There has been some effort by the KRG to lure Kurds back to agricultural pursuits. This would make the KRG less dependent on food imports and reduce population pressures on urban areas. However, Kurds will be reluctant to pursue farming unless there is a good livelihood to be made. And such a livelihood will not be possible unless local water resources are improved.

As water shortages place ever greater constraints on Iraqi agriculture, a process that began in the 1920s and 1930s has increased, namely migration from rural to urban areas (especially by the so-called al-shurugi/pl. al-shargawiya). This not only depopulates villages but undermines tribal and other social networks. This creates an ever larger social stratum that lacks employment, housing and other social services once migrants arrive in towns or, more often, large urban areas such as Baghdad or Basra.

Young people are more inclined to migrate from rural areas than their elders. Older farmers are usually more tied to the land, often more fearful that leaving the land will not produce a better outcomes than remaining in the village, or too infirm to leave. This creates a “perfect storm” for political instability because youth are more susceptible to recruitment by criminal gangs and sectarian organizations when they arrive in urban areas and are unable to find employment and lack social connections that would help them find employment, housing and other services.

As US forces have withdrawn from Iraq, new sectarian militias have emerged in the south of Iraq, while the so-called Islamic State of Iraq has increased its acts of violence in the so-called Sunni Arab triangle and in Baghdad and Mosul. One of the drivers of this new uptick in violence is not just the recent nine month imbroglio over forming a new government as Iraq’s political elite fought over the prime ministerial post and cabinet positions, but also the rising unemployment of youth as the government still has not been able to confront this problem in a serious manner.

As Muqtada al-Sadr has now returned to Iraq, and his movement holds important posts within the new al-Maliki government, it will be in a better position to increase its strength by channeling discontent against Iraq’s political elites among the urban masses whose day to day economic status is very precarious.

Political tensions have already emerged between the central government in Baghdad and the KRG over the Bekhme Dam Project. The idea of the project was first put forth in 1950, but it was only under Saddam Husayn’s regime that it began in earnest. Already in 1975, villages were depopulated in anticipation of building the dam and filling a large valley with water which would produce irrigation, significant hydroelectric power - enough to power the homes today of most Kurds in the KRG - and create tourist attractions. The problem with the dam is that it will displace several Kurdish villages and inundate priceless historical sites that relate to ancient Kurdish culture. Because the dam will be placed on the Greater Zab River, which supplies 33% of the Tigris’ waters, Baghdad has reacted with alarm that the KRG wants to build it.

With the central government and the KRG already struggling over control of oil in the north of Iraq, over the city of Kirkuk, over villages along the so-called Green Line that separates the KRG from the Arab provinces to the southwest, and control of the peshmerga, the KRG militia, adding the problem of water resources will only make a bad situation significantly worse.

It is true that myriad laws and regulations exist from the period of the Hashimite monarchy (1921-1958) and onwards that are intended to regulate water usage. However, most of these rules are not obeyed, e.g., restricting the use of water for irrigation purposes, because neither the central government or the KRG has the power or the will to enforce them. To date, both Baghdad and the KRG have been focusing on different issues, such as control of Iraq’s oil resources, control of the oil rich city of Kirkuk, and the military balance of power between the two governments.

Only when the central government and the KRG realize the extent to which water shortages can have disastrous consequences for both parties will there be an incentive for the two sides to cooperate in developing a national Iraqi water policy that can serve both Arabs and Kurds. If the other main issues that separate the two sides see some progress - which is highly doubtful in the short term - then water issues may also be treated in a more systematic and cooperative manner.

What policy changes can we expect in the near term? As an indicator of government concern with the water shortage problem, Minister of Water Resources, 'Abd al-Latif al-Rashid, signed a $35 million contract in April 2010 with two Italian firms (MED and SGI) to develop a comprehensive water resources plan for Iraq through 2035. At a Baghdad conference on water resources in 2009, government officials spoke of an impending disaster. In discussing the drop in water levels in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Ali Baban, the Minister of Planning, was quoted as saying that, “Our agriculture is going to die, our cities are going to wilt, and no state can keep quiet in such a situation.”

For the first time, Iraqi officials seem to be taking seriously the need to develop a regional water policy and no longer view the problem of water shortages as simply a domestic issue. Ali Baban visited Turkey and Syria and made the case that Iraq needs their cooperation if it is to avert a national water crisis. Inserting himself once again into important domestic issues, Grand Ayatallah Ali al-Sistani has proposed that Iraq provide oil at reduced prices to those countries (meaning Turkey Syria and Iran) that provide Iraq with water.

The KRG needs to reconsider its water policies. A prominent Kurdish engineer who worked on the proposed Bekhme Dam believes that it can be broken down into several smaller manageable dams without having a detrimental impact on the region where they would be constructed. He argues that 90% of the building material for these small dams could be generated from the site and the surrounding areas, making the dams less destructive of surrounding villages as well as more cost effective. The engineer also points out that all of Iraq’s dams are in poor condition and in need of repair. This state of affairs was especially evident after the US invasion of 2003 when there were fears that the Mosul Dam might collapse. Here is an area, namely dam repair, where the Federal Government and the KRG could cooperate in sharing information on dams and in making the necessary repairs.

One area where little has been done is that of water conservation. The winter runoff of waters from the mountains in the KRG could be used in the summer throughout Iraq, but is not being so used at the moment. A team of foreign experts, in addition to the Italian companies already under contract with the Iraqi government, should be brought to Iraq to develop a sound conservation policy, and more effective means of finding above and underground safe water storage. The more time that passes, the worse the crisis and its long-term consequences for Iraq will become.

Keeping the politicians honest in Baghdad

Despite the continued machinations of Iraq's political elite over forming a new government now 8 months after last March's parliamentary elections, civil society continues to flourish and grow in Iraq. While civil society organizations are not going to be able to solve Iraq's myriad problems, it is important not to focus only on Iraq's political elite, however important. The Iraqi populace has been very active in using blogs, the media, and a wide variety of organizations. Women's rights organizations, student groups, conflict resolution organizations, blogs, labor organizations, artistic groups, and professional and business associations point to a rich social network. Unfortunately, the media in the West (and the Middle East) tend to focus excessively on elites, not realizing that democracy in Iraq will not work unless the citizenry at large is committed to that end.

Most recently, a large number of civil society organziations filed a suit in Iraqi courts to force Iraq's newly elected parliamentarians to begin work to confront the country's many pressing needs (see al-Hayat, Nov. 16, 2010). These organizations were furious that the newly elected members of the Council of Deputies were earning salaries of $11,000 per month but had, at the time the suit was filed earlier this fall, had met only once and then for less than a half hour. In addition, delegates who do not live in Baghdad receive $6000 per month stipend to cover local living expenses.

The suit that was filed demanded that the delegates return almost $40 million that represented salary that they had already received from their election to the time that the suit was filed 7 months after the election. According to Huda Adwar, president of the Iraqi NGO, al-Amal, the suit's aim was to protect Iraq's public wealth (al-mal al-'amm) and prevent its misuse. While the suit was not the reason for the parliament's finally beginning its work this past November, certainly the publicity generated by the suit placed great pressure on the new delegates who were well aware of public anger, especially in light of continued unemployment and lack of government services, to get the parliament moving. That the delegates were receiving what are very high salaries compared to national average, while the bulk of the populace is suffering from economic deprivation, was galling to Iraqis.

Some criticism was directed at the civil society organizations because they filed their suit in the wrong court. Constitutional lawyer, the attorney Tariq Harb, said the suit should have been filed in the Higher Administrative Court rather than the Karrada Municipal Court. Nevertheless, the use of courts to try and influence the government shows a level of sophistication that is lacking in most Arab countries. That Iraqis are resorting to the courts represents a step forward in strengthening the rule of law in Iraq.

In Iraq, Don't Abandon the Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Vice-President Joseph Biden's admonition in a recent New York Times Op-Ed column (November 21, 2010) that the US not abandon Iraq at this critical juncture in its efforts to establish political stability, prosperity and functioning democracy couldn't be more true. After all the blood that has been shed since 2003 to move Iraq forward, the Iraqi people do not deserve yet another tragedy given the suffering they have faced over the past several decades.

One of the most successful models in promoting positive social change in Iraq has been the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program which was introduced into Iraq in 2005 and then expanded in 2008. PRTs have deployed American and other foreign personnel throughout Iraq to work on a wide variety of projects. The beauty of the PRT model is that it enshrines a "bottom up" approach to development. Iraqis, not foreigners, set the social reconstruction agenda and then the PRTs work to implement the goals of that agenda. Unfortunately, the PRT program is scheduled to be phased out in 2011. Given the program's success, it there a way it could be saved?

In his Op-Ed, Vice-President Biden pointed out that Iraq suffers from many problems but has also made much progress since 2003. One commendable form of progress has been the use of elections and negotiations rather than violence to solve its problems. Of course, Iraq's political process is not a pretty one. And some political leaders, such as Prime Minister al-Maliki and KRG President Masoud Barzani, have shown distinct authoritarian tendencies. Nevertheless, no one faction can dominate the political process and thus a form of democratic politics is bound to persist for the foreseeable future. However, whoever leads Iraq will have to deliver the necessary social services to the Iraqi people if they are win their loyalty and thereby insure the country's continued transition to democracy.

As complaints over government inaction in many areas have mounted - such as electricity shortages that led to riots in Basra last summer - social reconstruction looms ever larger among a disgruntled population, whether Arab or Kurdish. Complaints over the high salaries of parliamentarians, who have met only 4 times since last March's elections, have led to lawsuits against the government (see my forthcoming post on this issue). The rise of insurgent activity, while still relatively limited, also reflects a sense that the government is not serving the interests of the populace at large, particularly the minority Sunni Arab population, and poor Shiites in the south.

One of the best models for providing services has been the Provincial Reconstruction Teams that were formed after the US changed its policies in Iraq in 2005 and 2006. Having participated in the training of PRTs for the past 3 years, I have heard numerous success stories. One that is particularly inspiring comes from al-Falluja in al-Anbar Province. Many will remember the killing of 4 private security guards who worked for the Blackwater Corporation in al-Falluja in 2004. Subsequently their bodies were burned and hung from the town bridge that crosses the Euphrates River.

PRT members related to me how they helped farmers in the al-Falluja area reclaim 17000 acres of land. The farmers indicated that, during Saddam Husayn's regime, they had been told what to plant and then given a pittance for the harvest. As a result, there was little incentive for them to maintain the quality of their land. Based on the needs they expressed, the PRTs helped the farmers repair their irrigation canals and dams and showed them how to use new fertilizers. Soon they were producing fruits and vegetables for expanding urban markets and making a tidy sum in the process.

What pleased the farmers most was not that they were making a good income. Their greatest concern was that, if their farms could not provide enough income, their children would be forced to migrate to Baghdad or other urban areas where they might be forced to join criminal or insurgent organizations. Further, they lamented the fact that their family traditions would be lost as well. I was struck by the parallel between this story and an article I had read a few years ago about farmers in the Dakotas who indicated that a rise if soy bean prices allowed them to repay their debts and save the family farm for their children. Clearly, farmers throughout the world share the same concerns, not just to prosper but to keep an important tradition alive.

In a few short years al-Falluja has been transformed from a town whose residents were very hostile to the US to one where the residents no longer evidence such feelings. Indeed, an unlicensed Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant opened in the town a few years ago and had lines stretching far down the street when it first began business. The key here is that the residents are enjoying a modicum of prosperity. Give people hope in the future and their attention will be focused on taking advantage of that opportunity. The PRTS alone did not turn al-Falluja around but they did contribute to helping its farmers enjoy a better life.

American officials have indicated that the PRTs must be phased out now that US forces are greatly reduced in number in Iraq and thus are no longer able to provide for the safety of American and other foreign personnel. However, there is a way to save the PRT model and that is to have Iraqis provide the technical services formerly provided by Americans. Iraq is awash in technical personnel who could provide the services that the country needs to rebuild its education and health care systems and improve municipal services and its national infrastructure.

PRTs could be attached to the provincial councils that were elected in January 2009 throughout the Arab regions of Iraq. In both the Arab and Kurdish regions of Iraq, NGOs that are working to provide services, such as the Iraqi Peace Network and the Women for Women International chapter in Baghdad, could provide important assistance to the new Iraqi PRTs. Having the PRTs placed under the supervision of local provincial councils but also linked to the appropriate ministries in Baghdad and Arbil would both strengthen local governance and create stronger ties between center and periphery.

Iraq's PRTs could be divided according to the services they provided. Thus there could be PRTs that focused on education, health care, refugees and displaced families, single family households, women's issues, municipal infrastructure, conflict resolution, youth issues, agricultural development, small business and environmental issues.

These PRTs would provide employment for professionally trained Iraqis and would send a message that the Iraqi government is truly concerned with the needs of the populace at large. The new PRT network would undoubtedly include many young Iraqis. Recent research that I have conducted with youth throughout Iraq indicates that many are cynical about their political leadership, whether in Baghdad or Arbil. Were they able to participate in social reconstruction, many would find a new sense of purposes and develop greater faith in the political system. Constituting 65% of the population under the age of 25, it is critical to inculcate Iraqi youth with a sense of civic responsibility and pride.

The US could continue to provide assistance to the PRTs from its embassy and consulates in Iraq, via visits from technical teams to Iraq and visits by Iraqi professionals to the US, and via videoconferencing. The European Union, Turkey, India and other Arab countries such as Egypt could provide assistance as well. UN agencies such as the FAO in Rome, which is served by the very capable Iraqi representative, Dr. Hasan al-Janabi, would have a national service network in Iraq with which to more effectively interact.

The cost of the new PRT network would be not be prohibitively expensive. If social reconstruction does not proceed and Iraq slides back into a serious insurgency, the cost of the PRTs would be nothing compared to what it would take to militarily suppress a new uprising in Iraq. Already, there is restiveness in the areas of the so-called Sunni Arab triangle and new Shiite militias have emerged in the south now that US and British forces have largely withdrawn from that area.

Surely the US could find a way to finance a new PRT system in Iraq. It could seek funds from its allies in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf who do not want an unstable Iraq to their north, especially one that provides greater opportunity for Iranian meddling in its internal affairs. Turkey, Malaysia and the European Union could also be asked to contribute funds. Further, countries that help Iraq now will no doubt be given favorable treatment as its oil and natural gas industries - both of which have huge reserves - begin to expand over the next 5 years. The time to act is now, so as to keep Iraq on track to becoming a truly stable, prosperous and democratic nation-state. Dos the US have the will to help Iraq achieve these ends?

Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency or Social Reconstruction?

US and Western efforts in Afghanistan are based on a number of dubious assumptions. First, the Obama administration continues to think in terms of a military victory. The original idea of a draw down of US troops by the summer od 2011 has now changed as President Obama recently indicated that substantial numbers of American troops may remain in Afghanistan until as late as 2014. Meanwhile, President Hamid Karzai recently indicated that the US troop presence should be reduced as he seeks to find an accommodation with the Taliban. Unfortunately, the focus remains on the military, rather than on a larger societal perspective.

Second, the US and its NATO allies continue to think that the Hamid Karzai regime will be able to rule Afghanistan once the draw down of Western forces occurs. However, all Afghans know that the Karzai regime is highly corrupt and that it offers them little in the way of security and social services. Countless journalists have reported that consistent American efforts to pressure President Karzai to change his ways have been ineffective. Although Karzai invariably agrees to crack down on corruption, there has been no significant change in his behavior at all. To expect that the Afghan leader will develop a greater civic consciousness and seriously try to help his people is naive in the extreme.

Third, the US and its Western allies, but especially the US, continue to conceptualize Afghanistan's problems in term of political elites. Essentially, there are three sets of elites, those who are part of President Karzai's circle, the Taliban leadership, and local warlords who are not linked to either. None of these elites offer much hope for the future for the Afghan people and thus cannot be viewed as the basis for a long term solution to Afghanistan's problems.

President Karzai views the country as his own privy purse, the Taliban seek to impose once again an incredibly repressive regime on the country (which Afghans reject), and most local warlords combine the worst aspects of the central government and the Taliban. Indeed, one reason the Taliban was so successful in taking power in the mid-1990s was the popularity it gained by suppressing the warlords who had ruled after expulsion of Soviet forces in 1990. The warlords' arbitrary and repressive behavior, including stealing from the people, seizing their daughters, and imposing tariffs throughout the country that hampered commerce made them highly unpopular.

Fourth, the US and NATO view Afghanistan as a unitary state. Given the country's ethnic diversity and regional traditions, it makes much more sense to think of it in federal terms. Here Iraq has something to tell us about Afghanistan. Local provinces should have greater powers, especially in light of the limited services they receive from Kabul. This consideration also suggests why defeating the Taliban will not occur through Kabul but rather through the provinces.

Finally and most problematic, the US and the West continue to think of Afghanistan in short term policy goals. The time frame here spans 2-5 years at most. As I argue below, the problems of Afghanistan suggest the need for a much longer time frame. Developing policies according to the above mentioned assumptions suggests that the the US and NATO will lose in Afghanistan. But is there another approach?

The approach suggested here is built on two counter assumptions - assumptions related to a social reconstruction approach. First, defeating the Taliban must take place at the local level and largely bypass the Karzai regime. What I am suggesting here is the development of "regional security-development clusters." This entails finding local leadership that is willing to work with the international community, not just to provide security for the inhabitants but to help develop local agriculture and small scale artisan production and industry.

One step that has already been taken in that direction is the development of agricultural cooperatives in many areas of Afghanistan. One example is the successful triangulation between the Parwan Raisin Producer Association, which is located about an hour north of Kabul, Mercy Corps, a NGO located in Portland Oregon, and Fullwell Mill, a producer of organic and fair-trade foods located in Sunderland, UK. The US Agency for International Development has provided important funding to help the project succeed.

In return for participating in Mercy Corps.' training on how to grow organic raisins, local farmers now have a foreign outlet in Fullwell Mill which pays them excellent prices for their high quality Afghan raisins. While 35 farmers signed up to participate in the program when it began, 200 are now participating once the community saw that Fullwell Mill has kept its promises to purchase the cooperative's raisins at the attractive price they originally offered.

While the example of the raisin producer cooperative is a small one, it is indicative of the way in which the Taliban can be defeated in Afghanistan. Development here is based on a "bottom up" model. Rather than trying to create large costly projects designed in the West that do not fit with existing economic activity and customs, small scale projects such as the export model for Afghan raisins point to the manner in which Afghans can become economic stake holders and develop incentives to prevent the Taliban from winning adherents in their communities.

Once these communities prosper, and, more importantly, see a sustainable development model that will serve them well into the future, there will also be less problems with security. Afghans recruited to the police forces and army will now have an incentive to protect their communities because their families are enjoying ongoing economic benefits. Here we need to realize that the number of Afghans drawn to the Taliban because of its radical Islamist ideology is very small. Further, we need remember that few Afghans want to see the reimposition of the type of brutal Taliban rule that existed prior to the fall of 2001. Thus the Afghan populace is not inclined to support the Taliban if the correct mix of economic and security conditions are in place.

The Western counterinsurgency model does not adequately theorize the type of approach to thwarting Taliban efforts to seize control of Afghanistan because it still thinks too much in terms of military strategy and narrowly and short-term policy goals. The idea that foreign troops can wear the Taliban down and force them to the bargaining table does not address the long-term development problems faced by Afghanistan. Unless Afghans have the resources to provide for their families, there is no reason why the Taliban, and its highly lucrative opium production, will not reassert itself after a Western withdrawal from the country if Afghans have no other economic alternatives. Such an outcome would simply mean a return to the status quo ante with much Afghan, American and NATO blood having been spilled and huge amounts of monies spent to no benefit for Afghans or the West.

The second counter assumption challenges the idea that the US and NATO alone can prevent a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. When we see the large budget deficits being run by almost all Western countries, we need to realize that problems like the Taliban in Afghanistan have been to be addressed by a large international coalition. This means spreading the economic costs among a greater number of players. Saudia Arabia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Brazil are all countries that could contribute funds and/or technical resources to help with the type of massive development effort required in Afghanistan (but one that need not be excessively costly if the focus remains developing already extant local production and resources).

What is needed in Afghanistan is a larger vision. This vision could be addressed by a series of international conferences in which democratic countries - all of whom face threats from radical extremists such as the Taliban and al-Qa'ida - work to develop an international response to the problems of failed states or quasi-failed states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and many others.

"Winning" in Afghanistan does not mean the temporary defeat of the Taliban only to see it reemerge yet again to repress the Afghan people and provide a safe haven for organizations like al-Qa'ida. A Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be terribly destabilizing to Pakistan, which is experiencing separatist movements and its own Taliban threat. While military action is obviously important in preventing a Taliban victory, the Obama administration's should move beyond its focus on force levels to addressing the underlying causes of radical extremism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Defeating radical extremism is a long term project. The West needs to get used to that idea. Local populaces must be given hope in the future. Developing an international alliance of states with mutually shared goals and values, and, equally importantly, creating stakeholders among the local populations caught in the violent crossfire, is the only way to win this struggle.