Food shortages, poverty and authoritarian rule
It’s already become clear that the Ukraine War has led to a spike in food prices as Russian and Ukrainian exports of corn, barley, sunflowers (for cooking oil), and especially wheat, have been dramatically curtailed. Even if hostilities were halted soon, the 2022 agricultural season has been irreparably damaged.
With many MENA region countries dependent on wheat and other products from Ukraine and Russia, as well as Belarus, which is an important exporter of fertilizer, predictions are that severe food shortages will affect both the MENA region and the African continent. Starvation may even result in a number of countries. Regarding wheat, the most important crop, other countries such as the United States, Brazil and Argentina will not be able to make up the shortfall caused by the Ukraine war.
To take Egypt as an example, 85% of its wheat is imported. Prior to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February, inflation was growing, and food prices were on the rise. In 2016, Egypt received a large $12 billion IMF loan, which was intended to diversify the economy and address poverty, with afflicts a third of the country.
Mideast Feels Pinch of Rising Food Prices as Ramadan Nears
Instead, President ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi’s regime used the IMF loan for other purposes. Funds were invested in real estate development and to construct a lavish new Egyptian in the desert outside Cairo. Clearly, al-Sisi was more interested in meeting his personal interests and those of the Egyptian political elite, than the needs of the populace at large. Understandably, there has been rising discontent at the inability of the regime to address rising prices which have skyrocketed just before the onset of the month of Ramadan.
Not only will Putin’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine cause disadvantaged sectors of society throughout the Middle East, Africa and other countries of the Global South to suffer, but it will increase political instability. As the Egyptian case suggests, rising food prices and the resulting food insecurity will intensify the focus on state corruption and the manner in which authoritarian regimes fulfill the interests of the small elites which support them while ignoring the needs of their citizenry.
Increased opportunities for mercenaries
Russian miscalculations of Ukrainian resistance have not only foiled its efforts to seize Ukraine’s major cities but have resulted in a very large casualties among its forces. Indeed, Putin has been forced to move troops from eastern Russia and even from the breakaway Russian occupied regions of Georgia to come fight in Ukraine.
Reports indicate that over 40,000 Syrians have volunteered to fight for Russia in Ukraine. While one might think this reflects support for Russia and its goals in attacking Ukraine, interviews with Syrians going to fight in Ukraine indicate otherwise. Those getting ready to fly to Russia indicate that they cannot support themselves and their families given Syria’s ravaged economy. With Russia willing to pay $7000 per month for those willing to serve on the frontlines, and $3500 for those willing to serve in ancillary military roles, the material needs of many males of combat age are such that they are drawn to taking up Putin’s offer, albeit reluctantly.
With the MENA region facing droughts, water shortages and rising temperatures, resulting from the impact of the global Climate Emergency, we can expect instability in the region to increase, regardless of the Ukraine war, especially in those countries which lack significant resources, such as oil and natural gas. As local economies, such as those of Egypt, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Yemen, Algeria and Lebanon, face ever greater challenges, autocrats like Putin will find a growing source of mercenaries ready to fight for whoever is willing to pay them salaries.
Russia’s ability to exercise power in the MENA region
What few analysts have speculated on thus far is the extent to which the sanctions to which Russia has been subjected will affect its global foreign policy. What will be the sanctions’ long term impact? While the impact has yet to be fully felt, Russia will no doubt remain a pariah state long after the Ukraine war has ended, especially if Vladimir Putin retains power. Will the myriad Western corporations which have shut down their operations in Russia be willing to return to the status quo ante after the war is over?
When looking at Russia’s role in the MENA region, Syria immediately comes to mind. Will Russia have the economic wherewithal and the manpower needed to continue its active support of Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria? The Syrian economy is on life support and al-Asad’s control of much of the country is tenuous at best. In what ways could the Russian-Syrian alliance be a causality of what is increasingly an enormous blunder which Putin made in attacking Ukraine?
Russia has committed to building a new nuclear reactor in Iran. However, the rigorous sanctions which have been imposed by the West, Japan, South Korea, and other countries have severed Russia’s access to crucial technology, such as microchips. There have been reports that Russia is having difficulty in servicing and repairing its energy industry’s infrastructure due to a lack of spare parts and other technical requirements. Under these circumstances, will Russia be able to exert political influence though development projects which it can no longer implement?
Perhaps more significant is the drones which Turkey has supplied to Ukraine’s military. The Bayrakter TB2 is an inexpensive ($2 million each) and slow-moving drone. However, it is simple to operate and has been responsible for large numbers of Russian casualties thus far in the Ukraine war. Further, the drones have been key in providing the Ukrainian government with visual imagery of the large number of Russian tanks and armored personnel carriers which Ukraine has been able to destroy.
Cheap but lethal Turkish drones bolster Ukraine’s defenses
Changing alliance structures in the Middle East
Another area which requires more study is the impact Russia’s invasion of Ukraine will have on local alliance structures. Israel has been criticized for its tepid condemnation of Putin’s invasion of Ukraine and its unwillingness to impose sanctions on Russia. Israel has developed a tacit agreement with Russia that it can attack Hizballah units in Syria and Lebanon, as well as Iranian arms shipments to Syria, despite Russia’s support of the al-Asad regime.
However, Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett has come under increasing criticism from within his own governing coalition, especially from Foreign Minister, Yair Lapid, and members of the US Congress. Will the Israeli-Russian tacit agreement over Syrian and Lebanon withstand the test of the Ukraine war, especially as Russia reduces Ukrainian cities to rubble, as it has already done with Mariupol?
Finally, what impact has the war had on the MENA region’s core conflict, namely the struggle for regional hegemony between Iran and Saudi Arabia and its Arab allies? With the recent summit in Israel’s Negev Desert, which bought together the UAE, Bahrain, Egypt, Morocco and Israel, will the anti-Iranian alliance become stronger? Will Russia lose influence as it’s left to maneuver between the competing forces, namely Iran and the Arab-Israel alliance?
If anti-Iranian forces feel empowered through Israel's support, and become more aggressive towards Iran, especially if its Houthi allies in Yemen continue to send drones to bomb Saudi and UAE targets, how will Putin respond? Will Putin double down on Russia’s support for the Tehran regime, or will he moderate his support for Iran in hopes of retaining ties to Arab states, some of which have purchased Russian arms, such as Egypt, as well as Israel?
A spread of terrorism?
Little attention has been given to the possible spread of terrorism in the MENA region caused by rising food prices, an important driver of the Arab Spring uprisings. With increased economic disruption, it is conceivable to envision Libya and Syria becoming venues for the spread of terrorist groups loyal to the Islamic State, and to seeing an increase of the Islamic State’s ongoing attacks in northern and north central Iraq.
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