US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq

The end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the United States and Iraq signed in December 2008 calls for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still unclear whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant change. What will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic importance both in the Middle East, and to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts at democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of U.S. troops?

U.S. policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual interest to both countries, all of which are interrelated. Their focal points include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion, economic growth and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of tensions that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba'thist regime. An effective U.S. foreign policy will require treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.

The following article was published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It can be read in its entirety by clicking here.

Syria’s Arab Spring: Phase Two of the Crisis

Guest writer Ghaidaa Hetou has conducted extensive research in Syria during the past year. She is currently writing her PhD dissertation on alliance behavior in Syrian foreign policy and the determinants of Syrian foreign policy making between 1970 and 2010.

It has been six months since protests erupted in Syria. The current political sluggishness in Syria, where calm has not been completely restored by the government, nor have the protests gained traction in major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, has ushered in the next phase in the ongoing crisis.

During the first six months, various opposition groups have insisted on the peaceful nature of the protests. However, violent clashes that have occurred in Jisr al-Shughur, Homs, Hama and other towns. In addition, the declarations of the armed Syrian opposition committee have marred the efforts of thousands of Syrians who have continued to peacefully brave the wrath of the totalitarian apparatus of Bashar al-Asad's Ba’thist regime.

The conflicting efforts of protesters and armed rebels mirror the ideological competition among the various opposition groups. From the secular left to the religious conservatives, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the contrasting political agendas of the Syrian opposition are impeding its ability to develop a united front. It has now become the norm for these various opposition groups to send their delegates to Washington, Europe and Moscow to meet separately with government representatives. A number of Syrian opposition conferences - in Turkey, Qatar, France and Germany - have tried to narrow the gap between the opposition group’s conflicting ideological agendas, but with little success.

On the domestic front, two minority groups in Syria, the Kurds and Christians, have adopted a position of neutrality towards the uprising. Their position has been reinforced, especially after recent chants of some demonstrators of “" عربية, عربية “"عمر, عمر” and “ المسيحي على بيروت أو للتابوت”, the first saying that this is solely an “Arab movement,” the second using the slogan of “Omar” in an effort to underscore the Sunni nature of the movement, and the last chant stating that the Christians have two choices, either to leave Syria for Beirut or in a casket. These chants prevail among groups that are calling for armed confrontation. In a demographically diverse society, social movements can easily, in an effort to garner popularity, alienate minority groups who might have otherwise tipped the scale in their favor.

What has ushered in the next phase in Syria’s crisis is precisely the country’s stagnant situation, with neither the government nor the opposition able to achieve their objectives. It is clearly a time of reassessment of means and ends by both sides in the conflict. Recent statements by opposition figures, like Ammar al-Qurabi in Moscow, indicate that they are ready for a “conditional dialogue with the regime.” From its part, the Syrian government has recently encouraged its allies, especially Moscow and Iran, to host these negotiations. Dr. Nabil al-Arabi, head of the Arab League, visited Damascus today to hand the Syrian president an Arab endorsed proposal containing 13 provisions to end the crises.

Due to lack of a unified opposition, any perceived attempt by one opposition group to negotiate with the government is sidetracked by another group, accusing it of treason and short selling Syrian sacrifices to date. Unfortunately, the stagnant situation, characterized by protests, bloody crackdowns and confrontations, will continue, until a number of opposition groups are able to consolidate their positions and form a majority in order to coordinate and legitimize their strategies.

The dust that has been stirred up by the sudden political awakening in Syria is settling. The euphoria that the protestors created by breaking the wall of fear and silence is being replaced, among many Syrians, by a frantic search for a political outlet, reflecting decades of frustration. The political upheaval that was silenced in 1962 has reawakened with the same political fury that prevailed in the 1950s in Syria, namely the struggle between conservatives and progressives, large urban areas and their suburbs, and between more prosperous cities and smaller towns that are outside the economic mainstream. This struggle manifests itself in a dispute over political identities and loyalties, which are all symptoms of a painful and ongoing process of state formation and the slow evolution of what it means to be a “citizen” in post-colonial Middle East.

Nevertheless, one thing is absolutely clear. Syria is on the road to transition and there is no possibility of a return to the status quo ante.

The Tea Party and the Middle East

As President Barack Obama's approval ratings decline, pushed ever downward by a global and domestic recession that shows little sign of abating, the prospects of a Republican in the White House in 2012 loom ever larger. It is not at all out of the question that, if a Republican is elected, she or he will have strong ties to the Tea Party.

Thus far, little attention has been given to the implications of a Tea Party dominated White House for US foreign policy, especially in one of the world's most volatile regions, the Middle East. What would be the consequences of a Tea Party administration for US policy and interests in that region?

As others have already been noted, there are (at least) two trends in the Tea Party movement regarding US foreign policy. One, a neo-isolationism advocated by the supporters of Ron Paul (but perhaps by those of Rick Perry as well), reflects the isolationism that characterized much of US history prior to World War II.

The other, which argues for the decisive use of force against our enemies in the region, calls for strong support for Israel and relying on it to fight terrorism in the Middle East and to help restrain Iran. This policy is considered especially important for the US and the international community's efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At least two candidates with close ties to the Tea Party, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Santorum, fall into this camp.

The problem with the Tea Party is that it has no policy for reconciling declining American economic power - both in absolute and relative terms (especially in relation to China) - with sustaining US global influence. The US has faced severe constraints in fighting two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US were forced to militarily engage Iran, especially if it were to attack Israel, as well as simultaneously confront an outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula, an unlikely but possible scenario, the US would be hard pressed to mount the forces necessary to meet such as a challenge.

Tea Party advocates either call for US withdrawal from much of the world to improve the budget deficit or the use of military force to intimidate our enemies. Both of these perspectives fail to appreciate the implications of our economic crisis for US "hard power" (the use of military force). They also fail to comprehend the opportunities for enhancing US policy in the area of "soft power" (public diplomacy, technical and educational support, and direct engagement of our adversaries where appropriate).

Tea Party supporters make an important point when they argue that US government spending has outstripped its ability to pay for this spending. Clearly the US economy is experiencing serious economic difficulties caused largely by the mortgage lending debacle that came to a head in 2008.

But do the US' financial problems imply the need for an isolationist strategy? Likewise, is there an alternative to the second policy prescription, namely a reliance on force as the primary element of our foreign policy in the Middle East? Is there not a third way that could achieve our objectives in the Middle East but without "breaking the bank"?

As the "Arab Spring" has shown, there is considerable convergence between Arab and US political interests in the Middle East. The warmth of the Libyan people towards the US over the past 6 months, especially now that the Libyan dictator, Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi has been overthrown, is just one indicator of those interests. It suggests that, even in a country that has been under repressive authoritarian rule, citizens can both quickly embrace democracy and reject decades of anti-American and and anti-Western rhetoric and propaganda.

Rather than making an effort to better understand the political, cultural and economic dynamics that currently engulf the Middle East, Tea Party candidates have, to date, opted instead for a simplistic approach to US foreign policy. Either we need to withdraw into "fortress America" or hit our enemies hard when they challenge our interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. The problem is that neither of these approaches will work, Indeed, they both pose a serious threat to the US' national interests in the region.

What, then, are the dynamics that Tea Partiers have failed to grasp? First, the Middle East is ripe for serious and positive change. It has a "youth bulge" which means that a large percentage of the region's youth, 70%, is under the age of 30. As my current research with Iraqi and other youth in the region indicates, many of these youth admire American popular culture and values, especially our values of freedom of expression and creative freedom.

Although most youth in the Middle East have not had the benefit of a social science education, either in secondary schools or at the university level, many intuitively understand that there is a strong relationship between individual freedoms and personal success. They also realize that the countries where individual freedoms reign are precisely those countries that enjoy prosperity and political stability - key factors for these youth if they are to have any hope in the future.

Second, Tea Partiers fail to see the need to reach out to other cultures which they often assume are hostile to American values. Many Tea Partiers have wrapped themselves in a mythical American Golden Age during which the United States was supposedly close to being a perfect society.

While the US did make tremendous progress throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries to become the world's industrial and military superpower, such thinking forgets that such growth had its dark side - the political and economic marginalization of women and African Americans, labor strife, the Great Depression, two world wars and the struggle against communism. This is not to direct criticism at the US, but simply to point out that selective readings of history do not produce good domestic or foreign policy.

The US should be proud of its values and accomplishments. The desire of so much of the world's population to emigrate to the US is a striking reminder of that. However, we are now a global society in which "Golden Age" politics, in whatever form, no longer has a place. Inter-cultural understanding is not a matter of being "politically correct." Rather, it is absolutely necessary that our political leaders make a serious effort to understand the cultures of the Middle East and engage its peoples so that they can make the most effective decisions as they affect US interests in the region.

While Israel is a strong and trusted ally, the idea that we can rely on Israel alone to pursue American interests in the Middle East is naive. To link US support for Israel to Christian Biblical injunctions is no substitute for a rational foreign policy, nor is it in the interest of Israel, much less the peoples of the Middle East. As the most prominent Tea Party candidate to view the Middle East through the prism of the Bible, Michelle Bachman's advocacy of a foreign policy based on her interpretations of Biblical texts is a strong example of why our Founding Fathers sought to keep religion out of politics.

In the Christian world, the idea that God has bestowed His (Her?)grace on a particular group of people brought us the the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the 100 Years War, and many other examples of religious intolerance. Voltaire noted the absurdity of the notion of a "Chosen People" in Candide when he described the (Christian) Bulgars and the (Muslim) Ottoman Turks praying to God for victory over their enemy as the sun began to rise over the battlefield on which they would fight later that day.

The US has lost many allies in the Middle East in recent years. Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, and Libya (yes Qaddafi supplied the US with intelligence after agreeing to end his WMD program in 2006) are the most prominent examples. Likewise, Israel finds itself more isolated than ever in the Middle East.

With the election of an Islamist government in 2002, Israel no longer has a close ally in Turkey. Following Husni Mubarak's ouster in Egypt, ties with that country have deteriorated as well. Turkey's recent recall of its ambassador from Israel and the conflict with Egypt over containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip are only the most recent examples of Israel's deteriorating relations with its former allies.

If the Tea Partiers sincerely want to reduce the deficit, enhance our influence in the Middle East, and help strengthen Israel, our closest ally in the region, they need to eschew basing foreign policy on Biblical injunctions, and prescribing withdrawal, or an exclusive use of force as the main tools in the US' foreign policy arsenal. The NATO success in Libya is probably not going to be replicated elsewhere in the region anytime soon (although US and EU cooperation in squeezing Syria economically may end up ousting the Ba'thist regime of Bashar al-Asad as well).

Using American technical expertise in the Middle East, much as it has been done by developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, should become the model for encouraging economic growth and development, along with improvements in education, health care, housing and agriculture. Such assistance, especially if it is based on local needs (rather than prescribed by the West), can help to develop close ties with the countries of the Middle East. There is a reason why developed countries do not engage in wars or experience serious political instability - the citizens of these countries have very little incentive to engage in such activity, especially when they have hope in the future.

Offering US technical assistance (a great way to put unemployed American professionals to work overseas), offering Middle Easterners scholarships to study at American universities, and engaging the peoples of the Middle East, especially youth, whether thorough social media and/or exchange programs, would cost much less than military engagement and building new weapons systems that were appropriate for an earlier era of wars among nation-states, but now are much less effective in fighting terrorism and "asymmetric war."

Engaging the youth who have been the main force behind the Arab Spring will demonstrate that our rhetoric of supporting democracy has teeth. Many Middle Eastern youth realize that autocrats such as Qaddafi used anti-Zionism as a propaganda tool to distract attention from domestic repression and lack of government services. If the US can move forward the creation of Palestinian state, living side by side in peace with Israel, along with engaging the peoples of the region, much of the region's anti-American rhetoric and radicalism will dissipate.

As we approach the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001, all those who aspire to the US presidency owe it to the American people to offer them well thought through foreign policy alternatives. We need to develop a smart foreign policy in the Middle East which views the peoples of the region as potential allies, not as inherently hostile to our interests and way of life. With the stakes so high in the Middle East, and with the economic challenges facing the US, empty rhetoric is clearly unpatriotic.

Libya is not Iraq

It is unfortunate that many Western commentators are making comparisons between Iraq after the US invasion of March 2003 and the overthrow of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya. What does tie Iraq and Libya together is the lessons that US foreign policy makers have learned from the mistakes of the Bush administration in Iraq. Eschewing a "top down" approach, the Obama administration has allowed the Libyan National Transitional Council(NTC)to take the lead in setting the agenda for the campaign to rid Libya of Qaddafi's rule and to map out the broad outlines of the post-Qaddafi era.

One of the main differences between the overthrew of Saddam in 2003 and the end of the Qaddafi regime was the manner in which the US approached the two countries. Both pre-invasion and post-Saddam policy in Iraq involved limited consultation with a small number of Iraqis. Even the main political actors that dominated Iraqi politics in 2003 and 2004 were handpicked by the Department of Defense and the White House.

In Libya, the main political actors have emerged from the struggle against the Qaddafi regime. Some may be suspect for once having once been part of that regime. But we do not hear any talk of the functional equivalent of "de-Ba'thification" in Libya, namely preventing anyone associated with the Qaddafi regime from participating in post-Qaddafi politics. Only those who were at the core of the ancien regime will have to face trials.

Another major difference between Iraq and Libya is that the Qaddafi regime has been overthrown by the Libyan people. True, NATO warplanes and logistical support have been crucial in that victory. Still, it has been the Libyan people, especially youth who make up 75% of the population under 30, who have made up the casualties in the struggle to rid Libya of its repressive dictator. Even if NATO had not been involved, it is highly likely that we would still have seen a protracted struggle such as that which is currently underway in Syria.

In Iraq, the US military that was completely responsible for ridding the country of the Ba'th. Iraqis had little or no sense of having contributed to the Ba'thist regime's downfall. The manner in which the Bush administration failed to control extensive looting in Baghdad in April 2003, including protecting the priceless artifacts of the Iraq Museum, created anger and distrust among Iraqis of US objectives in Iraq. It also undermined support for the Bush administration's professed goal of creating a democratic Iraq. Many Iraqis did not trust the Bush administration who they felt did not seem to have developed a well defined policy for post-Saddam Iraq.

In Libya, on the other hand, the US, NATO, the UN and the international community generally have used a light touch when dealing with rebel forces and their political arm, the NTC. Libyan rebels have been forced to make their own decisions and suffer the consequences when these decisions have not worked out, e.g., overstretching their supply lines when engaging Qaddafi's loyalist forces. They have not been able to blame anyone but themselves and in the process have undergone an important learning process.

As rebel forces have struggled to oust the Qaddafi regime, groups of fighters representing different regions, ideologies and tribes have had to cooperate and work together to develop joint military and political strategies. This is not to say that these differences have been overcome and won't reemerge in the new post-Qaddafi era. However, informal groups of rebel fighters have already been formed throughout the country and developed a certain level of trust as they have fought together against what were often better trained and equipped forces.

In Iraq, post-Saddam politics quickly fell under the control of exiles who had not lived in Iraq for many years, in some cases decades. These new leaders have been referred to by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael as "carpetbaggers." Indeed, many Iraqis were highly suspicious of these politicians who came to Iraq in March and April, 2003 with US forces and who had not suffered under Saddam as had the populace at large.

Unlike the political leadership that developed in Iraq after Saddam was toppled, the NTC and military leaders in Libya are much closer to the Libyan citizenry. Yes, some of them were part of Qaddafi's regime, and at least one, the NTC's military commander, Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, was assassinated for having served Qaddafi. Yet the majority of the new leadership has not only shown great courage, especially in the beginning of the struggle when it was not at all clear that Qaddafi would be defeated, and in their measured approach to the struggle. What has been particularly impressive in the NTC's focus on national reconciliation, and their mantra that Libyans not engage in revenge killings and treat their captives with respect.

In short, the old adage that democracy is not a gift that one nation can give to another but must be created by the people through a process of struggle, has played itself out in Libya, as it has in Egypt, Tunisia which are also engaged in the "Arab Spring." All the doubts that Western commentators have expressed about Libya being a "tribal society" in which all the institutions of civil society were destroyed by Qaddafi are arguments of those who doubt that Libya (or any of the countries of the Arab Middle East) can become truly democratic nation-states.

Iraq has made impressive strides towards democracy, even with the many mistakes made by the US occupation administration in 2003 and 2004. It held free and fair parliamentary and provincial legislative elections in 2005, 2009 and 2010. In the March 2010 elections, a secular nationalist coalition led by a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, won a majority of seats and garnered electoral support from all of Iraq's major ethnoconfessional groups. All observers agreed that the elections were fair and free.

Iraq boasts over 6000 registered civil society organizations. The press plays a vigorous role in criticizing the government for not providing needed social services, while the heads of the Shiite and Sunni communities, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samara'i respectively, constantly demand that the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki eliminate extensive corruption and nepotism within its ranks.

In many ways, it can be argued that Iraq has had faced an even more difficult road than Libya in its efforts to implement a democratic transition. Not only did it experience extensive sectarian based violence after 2003, but it has suffered from a fragmented and dysfunctional political elite that spends more time focusing on infighting than trying to work for the interests of the Iraqi people.

Unlike Iraq, Libya will most likely be able to avoid regional, tribal or sectarian based conflict, e.g., Arab against Berber. Libya's political elite seems much more cohesive than its Iraqi counterpart and more closely linked to the populace at large. The NTC and its successor government may use Libya's oil wealth for corrupt ends as have Iraq's Arab and Kurdish political elites. But there are many indications that the NTC benefits from a "civic core" within its ranks that will work to prevent widespread abuses of power such as we saw under the Qaddafi regime

Many would argue that Iraqis have a stronger sense of national identity than do Libyans. This may be true. However, the fact that Iraq, Libya and most of the countries of the Middle East are experiencing a "youth bulge," where a large percentage of the population refuses to adhere to the shibboleths of the past, loses sight of the fact that we are witnessing not just an Arab Spring but the birth of a new generation of political leadership throughout the Middle East.

In Libya, the new generation does not find that tribalism offers them much in the way of improving their lives. Tribalism was more effective for leaders like Saddam and Qaddafi who used it to create social and political cleavages that were intended to "divide and conquer" the populace. However, in the process, Saddam and Qaddafi atomized tribes, often killing their leaders if they refused to follow their dictates. The result was that the tribal system in both countries was undermined and has lost much of its social and political legitimacy.

Observers, Western Arab and others, have every right to be concerned about the form of the new political system that will emerge in Libya now that the Qaddafi regime has been toppled. But we need to avoid the temptation to trot out the old and tired stereotypes about "Islam," "tribalism" and l"lack of national identity" preventing a transition to democracy in the Arab world, so as to not encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Instead, the Obama administration, NATO, Turkey, Qatar and other friends of Libya's NTC should continue their policy of patient, wise and non-obtrusive counseling, supplemented by whatever technical expertise they can offer the new Libyan government. The Arab Spring will enjoy a much greater probability of success if it can count on consistent and long-term support from its allies, both inside and outside the Middle East.

This type of support - namely providing support for the new Libyan government's needs as it defines them - is the best way to avoid the mistakes of Iraq. For those who want to see Libya become a functioning democracy, it is also the most appropriate way to honor all the Libyans who have died so their their countrymen could be free.

Soap operas, elite politics and security in Iraq

On August 13th, the Iraqi parliament voted to ban the showing of the soap opera, al-Hasan and al-Husayn on Iraqi television channels. In a video recording of the session, the parliament speaker declared that the film is causing sectarian conflict (al-fitna) in the Muslim world. The film is being shown throughout the Arab world during the holy month of Ramadan. al-Hasan and al-Husayn continues a recent tradition of showing films on topics important to Islam during Ramadan. Such films have drawn large audiences and al-Hasan and al-Husayn is no exception.

The banning of the soap opera shows not only the continued salience of sectarian identities in the Arab world but the lack of effort on the part of political elites to confront the problem of national reconciliation. The problems that led to the banning of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in Iraq are linked to the larger realm of Arab elite politics. This form of elite politics, which refuses to take national reconciliation seriously, threatens the security of Iraq (and that of other Middle Eastern countries where this type of politics is all too often replicated).

As we saw this week, Iraq experienced a devastating series of attacks throughout the country, all of which had sectarian overtones. The groups that organized these attacks need to find recruits to carry out their deadly attacks. Only when all sectors of society feel that they are part of the political process will the recruits for such attacks dry up.

In Iraq's banning the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn, what are the political dynamics of the relationship between culture, politics and national security? In other words, what do the dynamics of banning a soap opera tell us about the politics of national reconciliation in Iraq? And what impact does this form of politics have on Iraq's security situation?

The topic of the assassination of Hasan and Husayn is extremely sensitive since it encompasses the origins of the schism between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Even before it aired, the title of the program was changed from al-Hasan, al-Husayn and Mu'awiya, to al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The omission of Mua'wiya is indicative of the sensitivity of the film's topic. Not only did Mu'awiya organize the attack on Hasan and Husayn's father, the caliph Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was himself murdered in 661 CE, but he was seen as complicit in the deaths of Hasan and Husayn.

The film seeks to edify Muslims about an important event in the history of Islam. Ramadan has become a particularly appropriate time to air lengthy films about complex historical topics because television viewing increases substantially as Muslims fast and spend much of their daytime fast at home.

Taking 3 years to complete, and produced in several Arab countries, the film is comprised of 30 one hour segments. A large number of prominent clerics, religious scholars and historians served as consultants to the producer, Muhammad al-Anzi, of the Kuwaiti Al-Maha Productions company. As al-Anzi has pointed out in several interviews, he tried to present a balanced account of the lives of the two imams, Hasan and Husayn.

The film has elicited criticism throughout the Arab world, including from al-Azhar, the preeminent religious institution in Sunni Islam. The Azhar's calling for the film not be shown based on Sunni Islam's prohibition of showing human representations of Muslim religious figures was underscored by the opposition from the head of the Sunni Religious Endowments (al-Awqaf) in Iraq, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samarra'i and the his counterpart, the head of Shi'i religious endowments, Salih al-Haydari. Likewise, through a representative who delivered the Friday prayer in Karbala', Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani indicated his opposition as well, claiming that the film was filled with factual errors and constituted a deviation from Islam.

However, as a commentator to an article on the controversy noted, the film only became political in Iraq once the parliament voted to ban it from all Iraq's television channels. The problem then is the unwillingness of politicians to tackle head on the sectarian divide that still afflicts Iraq and other Arab countries. Rather than open the historical record to scrutiny, political elites instead prefer to repress efforts to examine the past.

While many viewers in the Arab world have been drawn to watch al-Hasan and al-Husayn given the controversy surrounding it, many others indicate their interest in it stems from their lack of knowledge of the historical events that are depicted in the film and their desire to know more about them. Once again, we see the divide between elite and mass politics. By not allowing a healthy discussion of what led to the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, Arab countries are prevented from moving forward with the process of national reconciliation.

The lack of national reconciliation is a key factor that allows sectarian identities to persist. And the persistence of sectarianism is good news for Sunni Arab organizations like al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and their Shi'i counterparts. As long as historical grievances are not confronted, such organizations can find recruits, especially when the government provides limited services and is characterized by extensive corruption.

For political elites, serious efforts at national reconciliation represent a threat to their power base. Indeed, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has dismissed calls for national reconciliation in the past, emphasizing instead that a focus on the rule of law and the constitution is more important (al-Nahar, May 25, 2009).

Once reconciliation becomes part of a meaningful political process, all parts of the political spectrum must be given access to political participation. Once the political process is opened up, the ability of elites to maintain vertical forms of social and political identity are undermined. The cohesion of their political base is threatened. To achieve their narrow personal goals, it is more effective to play the sectarian card rather than pursue a politics of national inclusion.

In Iraq, the al-Maliki government's sectarian based politics has led to the exclusion of important sectors of the population, such as the tribal groups of al-Anbar Province. Many Anbaris who participated in the Sons of Iraq movement (Sahwat al-'Iraq) are understandably resentful that al-Maliki has not kept his promise to integrate them into the army, security forces or state bureaucracy. al-Maliki would like to exclude the Kurds but needs them to offset challenges from the al-Iraqiya list that won the 2010 national parliament elections and is led by his nemesis, Ayad 'Allawi

The pursuit of a sectarian based politics is compounded by political discrimination based on social class. al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition shows very little concern or compassion for poor Shi'a in Iraq (much less the poor of other ethnoconfessional groups). The party is based largely in the prosperous Shi'i merchant and professional middle classes who see the Shi'a poor as aligned with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Trend and thus threatening to their interests. This neglect provides an opening for radical elements such as the Sadrists and other sectarian militias, such as the "League of the Righteous" (Asa'ib al-Haqq)to recruit among the Shi'a poor.

Further, the failure of the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi political elite to confront sectarianism through an emphasis on national reconciliation has had a negative effect on Iraq's security forces. It is well known that units in the army profess loyalty to individual political parties and leaders rather than to a unified army command.

The failure of members of Iraq's Arab political elite to come to terms with their Kurdish counterparts means that the Iraqi army and the Kurdish pesh merga remain separate military forces. If the two forces could cooperate on national rather than local security, Iraq would be better positioned to assert control over its national territory. While pesh merga units have helped repress terrorist cells in Baghdad in the past, little has been done to integrate these units into the larger Iraqi army.

What the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn indicates is the potential power of historical memory. The past can be used to bring Iraqis (and other peoples in the Middle East) together if done in an open and honest manner as the screen writer, director and producer have attempted to do in the film, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The fact that the most recent Iraqi school textbooks have avoided all controversial topics and fail to confront the legacy of Saddam Husayn's brutality is indicative of the weak and ostrich-like approach of the political leadership in Iraq.

If the Iraqi government and the Obama administration think that Iraq's security problems can be solved through continued training of the Iraqi army and security forces alone, they need to rethink their assumptions. As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down." Structural changes are needed among Iraq's political elite if the horrific attacks of this week are to become a thing of the past and meaningful security for the Iraqi people is to be achieved.

Will US Troops Remain in Iraq?

As the deadline nears for the Iraqi government to decide if a contingent of American troops will be allowed to remain in Iraq after the end of this year, the Obama administration has expressed mounting frustration that a decision has yet to be made. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s blunt language during his recent visit to Baghdad, which criticized Prime Minister al-Maliki’s indecision, reflected that frustration. However, no amount of American criticism or behind the scenes pressure can, by itself, alter the basic political dynamics that constrain Iraqi decision-making regarding US troops remaining in Iraq. Rather the al-Maliki government is going to have to make some difficult choices and make them soon.

One constraint is the profound sense of nationalism that characterizes the Iraqi people. At one level, the US should welcome this expression of nationalism because it underlines a sense of national unity that is belied by the usual focus in the West on Iraq as a nation-state rent by sectarian and ethnic divisions.

While the Kurds are much more amenable to US troops remaining in Iraq, neither Iraqi president Jalal Talabani nor Kurdish Regional Government president Masoud Barzani has been making a public case for retaining American troops after December 31, 2011. If US troop are to remain in Iraq, there will need to be justification by the Iraqi government as to how those troops serve its national interests.

A second constraint is more problematic from the US perspective. This reflects the problem created by the pressure being exerted on al-Maliki by his erstwhile ally, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend and former Mahdi Army (now partially reincarnated as the Army of the Promised Day - Jaysh al-Yawn al-Maw’ud).

The Sadrist Trend, which is represented in the Iraqi parliament by the “Liberals” (al-ahrar) reflects a fundamental problem of Iraqi society, namely the continued deterioration of the quality of life for large segments of the country’s poor and marginal social strata. The agrarian sector’s decline means that agriculture cannot support the rural population, thus producing a steady stream of migrants to urban areas. These migrants tend to be young and uneducated and highly susceptible to recruitment to militias and criminal organizations.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government, both under al-Maliki and former prime ministers, has done little to curb extensive state corruption. The lack of any serious effort to bring corruption under control has created an even more pernicious dynamic. It sends a message to cabinet minsters that they need not make an effort to improve government services. Corruption not only wastes huge amounts of public funds but produces a political culture in which holding a government office is viewed as a source of patronage, rather than an as institution whose raison d’être is to provide a public service. Corruption is also linked to nepotism because relatives and friends are given choice positions within government ministries.

These conditions result in poor and inadequate services and widespread cynicism among the populace at large. They create the “perfect storm” for populist and proto-authoritarian organizations such as the Sadrists who argue that they are the true embodiment of the common will, because only they take the public interest seriously.

In this respect, the Sadrists parallel movements in other parts of the Middle East where the government has abdicated its responsibilities towards its citizenry. Hizballah in Lebanon demonstrates many similarities with the Sadrist movement given the Lebanese government’s historical neglect of the Shiite dominated southern region of the country. Likewise, the PKK in south eastern Turkey and Hamas in the Gaza Strip would not have acquired popular support had the Turkish government and the PLO respectively been more attentive to the local populace’s needs.

A third constraint on American forces remaining in Iraq is the influence of negative “neighborhood effects.” As I have mentioned in previous postings, none of Iraq’s neighbors with the exception of Turkey, wants to see a democratic, pluralistic and tolerant political system develop in Iraq.

June 2011 was the worst month for US troop casualties in 2 years and almost all the deaths can be attributed to Shiite militias in the south who have been supplied with sophisticated arms by the Iranians. Clearly, Iran continues to put pressure on the US so as to hamper its ability to achieve its goals in Iraq, particularly through strengthening Shiite militias and encouraging them to attack US forces. By increasing tensions between American forces and these militias, focus continues to be placed on the presence of US forces in Iraq and the December 31 deadline for them to leave. These developments place more constraints on al-Maliki’s behavior.

According to the al-Hayat (July 5), the Iranians have let the US know through back channels that they would be willing to agree to some US troops remaining in Iraq if the US agrees not to pressure Hizballah concerning the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, not to topple Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria, and to pull back in its efforts to punish Iran for continuing to develop its nuclear energy program which the US sees as intended to produce nuclear weapons.

The US will not accept such conditions and agree to strike such a bargain with Iran. Therefore, we can expect Iran to continue encouraging Shiite militias to attack US forces and to instruct the Sadrist movement to insist that all US forces withdraw from Iraq. The al-Maliki government’s failure to suppress these militias and to arrest their leaders has created great resentment among US forces in Iraq and can only serve to drive a wedge between the US and Iraq.

There is a solution to the problems just outlined but it would require al-Maliki to change course politically. Adopting a statesman-like approach in which he explained to the Iraqi public why some US forces must remain in Iraq after December 31, al-Maliki would detail the need for these forces to complete the training of the Iraqi army, assist Iraq in building an air force that can monitor and control the country’s borders, and help Iraq’s national police force acquire the skills it needs to insure control of terrorist and criminal elements.

In this process, al-Maliki can expect the withdrawal of Sadrist members of parliament from his government in protest of his decision to allow some US forces to remain in Iraq. The resulting political deficit could be filled by having al-Maliki reach out to his arch-rival Ayad Allawi. Al-Maliki would need to create what he has been calling for ever since the March 2010 elections, namely a “national unity government.”

With the support of the Kurds, and Allawi, al-Maliki’s government would not fall. However, the Iraqi Prime Minister would need to make concessions to Allawi. This would include allowing Allawi to have an important say in the selection of the ministers of defense and interior, positions which still have not been filled since the March 2010 elections.

It would also entail giving meaningful powers to the position of Director of the new National Council for Strategic Policies which the US proposed be created after the March 2010 elections to break the logjam over who would become prime minister. The idea was that Allawi, while unable to become prime minister, would still receive a meaningful political position in the new Iraqi government. By heading the new National Council for Strategic Policies, Allawi would be able to temper the prime minister’s power by having control over defense and national security issues.

Will al-Maliki see the necessity of forcing the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq with Muqtada al-Sadr, other Shiite militias and their patron Iran? Or will he give in to current political pressures and cede political influence to theses groups that pose a major threat to Iraq’s democratic development and its ability to maintain Iraq’s autonomy from Iran?

What Iraq requires is bold leadership. Prime Minister al-Maliki needs to face down the Sadrists and nascent Shiite militias, make clear to Iran that Iraq will no longer tolerate meddling in its internal affairs, clean up the political mess in Baghdad by coming to terms with Ayad Allawi and his al-‘Iraqiya List, and then use this political foundation to attack the pressing social problems facing Iraq which are security, job creation and economic development, and the provision of government services.

Such bold action would allow Iraq to more forward. It would place the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq in its proper context, namely helping Iraq achieve its national agenda.

What does Iraq's political crisis tell us about the Arab Spring?

How is Iraq confronting its own Arab Spring? What does Iraq’s current political crisis tell us about the possibilities of success for the Arab Spring? Much of what happening in Iraq today has important ramifications for the best candidates for a transition to democracy, Egypt and Tunisia. While all 3 countries are very different, Iraq's experience points to one of the main problems that emerges after the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. That problem is the inability of competing factions within the political elite to develop cohesive policies and adopt a civic as opposed to personalistic approach to politics.

Iraq celebrated the holding of successful parliamentary elections in March 2010. Iraq’s Higher Elections Commission and foreign observers agreed that the elections were fair and violence was almost non-existent. Voter turnout was 62.5% nationwide and as high as 70% in Iraq’s 3 northern Kurdish provinces.

In a rejection of what voters perceived as the parliament’s inefficacy in fighting corruption, over 60% of the sitting members of the parliament elected in 2005 were turned out of office. Further, a national coalition, al-Iraqiya, which rejected sectarian politics won 91 seats, the largest number of any political grouping. The fact that al-Iraqiya was led by a Shiite, former prime minister Ayad Allawi, and received significant votes from all 3 of Iraq’s main ethnic groups created great optimism about the future direction of Iraqi politics.

However, these expectations did not materialize. Sitting prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki refused to cede any power to Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition and instead worked to marginalize it by reaching out to the Iraqi National Alliance, which included the Sadrists and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, and the Kurdish Alliance. This maneuvering angered Allawi and al-Iraqiyia, especially the Coalition’s rural Sunni Arab supporters who felt that Maliki was trying to exclude them along sectarian lines.

It took until November 2010, over 7 months, before al-Maliki was able to form a new government that largely excluded al-Iraqiya. The Kurds stepped as king makers by brokering a compromise that allocated the prime minister’s position to al-Maliki, the position of speaker of parliament to al-Iraqiya, and the president of the newly created National Strategic Council, that was supposedly intended to coordinate national defense and security policy to Allawi. But the actual powers of the newly formed council were never clearly defined and Allawi refused to accept the position.

At the same time, Maliki has had to fight out attacks by his erstwhile coalition partner Muqtada al-Sadr upon whose parliament members he depends. Sadr has pounded away at the need for all US forces to be out of Iraq by the agreed date of December 31, 2011 as agreed by upon Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded between Iraq and the US in 2008.

While no one expects Sadr to actually be able to act on his threat to reactivate the Mahdi Army if US forces aren’t withdrawn, he recently organized a march of thousands of his supporters in Sadr City who were dressed in a quasi uniform (Shirts emblazoned with the Iraqi flag), as he keeps up relentless pressure on al-Maliki’s government.

Although nominally al-Maliki’s ally, Sadr continues to attack the government for the lack of and jobs and services, and for failing to fight corruption. Thus the Sadrists are trying to assume the mantle not only as the political force that will protect Iraq against Western domination, but also bring transparent government and one that delivers the type of social services that the populace craves.

If the inter-elite cleavages were not destructive enough of effective governance, increased tensions have developed between al-Maliki and local government, both provincial governors and provincial councils. Not a day seems to go by that the Iraqi and Arab press fail to report some form of conflict between the central government and the provinces. Invariably these problems are caused by decisions by taken by Baghdad that rides roughshod over local rights. These decisions include appointing and removing local officials, failing to provide the provinces with funds to which they’re entitled or making investment decisions that concern local oil and natural gas resources without consulting local officials (in violation of the constitution).

What Iraq points to is the legacy of authoritarian rule for democratic transitions in the Middle East. Saddam Husayn destroyed all political institutions and civil society during 35 years of Ba’thist rule. He also killed any members of the political elite who he thought might at some point challenge his rule, even his former childhood friend who he appointed as defense minister during the Iran-Iraq War, Adnan Khayrallah.

Most of the players in Iraq’s unstable political game fled the country and hence were expatriates during Ba’thist rule. None enjoy any significant level trust among the populace at large. Constant infighting - often over what appear to the Iraqi electorate as petty matters - has further undermined the elite's popularity. That was certainly evident from research I recently completed among Iraqi youth who consistently used pejorative terms to refer to Iraq’s political class.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Iraq is making economic progress. It plans to invest $150 billion in infrastructural development over the next 3 years, especially to rehabilitate oil and natural gas pipelines. Inflation rates have dropped from a high of over 20% in 2007 to an expected level of 6.2% in 2012. Oil export revenue has increased with the global rise in energy prices (Iraq earned about $7 billion in revenues from oil sales this past March). GDP growth is up from 1.5% in 2007 to a projected 10.9% in 2012.

But investing in the hydrocarbon sector does not produce many jobs. The revenues derived from the sale of oil and natural gas has not been translated into job creation or improved services. Indeed, 1 out of 6 Iraqis still lives below the poverty line on $2 per day, a situation that infuriates large segments of the populace.

Most analysts blame the recent uptick in violence in Iraq on the inability of the political elite in Baghdad to reach a national solution to the country’s political crisis. The lack of a political solution has recently seen an increase in attacks on prominent Iraqi political figures. There were unsuccessful assassination attempts on Atheel al-Nujayfi, the governor of Ninewa Province and an important figure in the Mosul-based al-Hadba' Party, and on al-Iraqiya's candidate for Defense Minister, Major-General Khalid al-Ubaydi.

The core component of a national solution to solving Iraq;s current crisis must center on giving all sectors of the elite a place at the political table. As long as al-Maliki refuses to do this, as evident in his continued reluctance to appoint al-Iraqiya members to the vacant positions of Defense and Interior ministers, resentment by those who feel excluded will persist and violence will be one of the results. How might such a national political solution come about? This is a topic to be explored in future postings.