Iraqi Youth After the US Withdrawal

Iraqi youth feel increasingly frustrated as the prospects for democracy and national reconciliation narrow. In the following article in the Washington Post, Dan Zak discusses the results of his conversations with Iraqi youth during a recent stay in Iraq, His article also summarizes some of the research that I have conducted with Iraqi youth over the past year.

This research is part of a larger project I am conducting on Iraqi youth and youth elsewhere in the Arab world who are struggling to bring about democratic change. Youth constitute a large demographic in the Arab world and have been at the center of the Arab Spring. The outcome of the current struggles taking place in the Middle East will help determine whether these youth become cynical and withdraw from politics or whether they continue the struggle for meaningful political change. Such change must result in their becoming true citizens who enjoy individual rights, social justice and a political culture based in tolerance, cultural pluralism and national reconciliation.

Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Part 2)

(For a discussion of the overall goals and logic of these postings on the Arab Spring, see Part 1, Nov. 6, 2011)

Egypt is at the core of the Arab Spring. What happens there will be critical to the success or failure of the larger Arab democracy movement. As Egyptians go to the polls for what is the most free election since the 1952 military coup d'etat that overthrew the monarchy, what are the prospects for Egypt making a transition to democracy?

What many analysts have failed to mention is that Egypt has been under military rule since 1952. There were only been 3 presidents between 1952 and 2011 and the last two were vice presidents for their predecessors (Sadat for Nasser and Mubarak for Sadat). As Leonard Binder pointed out some time ago in his study, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt, the Egyptian military has been a highly cohesive organization given its social base in what he termed a "rural middle class." While the military (known officially as the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces or SCAF) has evolved since Binder's 1978 study, it still demonstrates incredible cohesion at the upper echelons of the officer corps.

To speak about the military is to really speak about a military-industrial complex. Following the 1956 Tripartite invasion of Egypt by Britain, France and Israel after Gamal Abd al-Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal, all major foreign enterprises were nationalized. This policy was followed in the early 1960s by a similar wave of nationalizations as domestic industry and financial institutions were taken over by the public sector. From that time forward, the "commanding heights" of the economy have been under state control.

While Anwar al-Sadat's famous "liberalization" of the economy (al-infitah) in the early 1970s suggested a step away from the public sector dominated economy of the Nasser years, this was not to be the case. The public sector actually grew after 1973, only now in partnership with foreign investors. In the process, corruption spread as did the spectacular growth of the nouveaux riches who were the engineers of the new economic order.

Why are these considerations important for understanding Egypt's efforts to shed authoritarian rule and move towards democratic governance? The military is above all the most powerful institution in Egypt. But it is much more than that. It is more conceptually accurate to speak of it as a "military-industrial complex" because the military has developed a parallel economy over time. This parallel economy not only gives the military a monopoly over the instruments of coercion but control of the national economy as well.

From an institutional perspective, the choice to develop a state controlled public sector in the late 1950s and early 1960s created a "path dependency" which is difficult to reverse. This development of this massive institution - the public sector in alliance with foreign capital - has created a huge set of material interests among the military-industrial-commercial elite. This political-economic elite views the demands by democracy activists for open and accountable governance as threatening the very core of its power. Thus it is not surprising that the military has tried to create a post-Mubarak political universe that parallels its economic universe, namely one in which it beyond the reach of civilian control.

The conclusion one can draw from the structural conditions of Egypt's military-industrial complex and the SCAF's behavior since the toppling of Mubarak is that it will not concede any meaningful power to civilian rule. The key question is not just whether Islamists in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood will acquire power in the Egyptian parliamentary elections but whether the military will be forced to transform itself into a different and accountable institution.

What might be some of the incentives that would lead the military to change course in the face of continued tenacious demonstrations throughout the country? The military claims that its efforts to restrain demonstrations are intended to prevent the country from slipping into complete disorder. Using the very potent Arabic term "fitna," the SCAF has tried to frighten non-activist Egyptians that they have everything to lose if they support pro-democracy forces and the country slips into chaos.

This argument might be more powerful if the ongoing demonstrations were indeed limited to Cairo's Tahrir Square. Both the military and its civilian supporters have been fond of stating that "Egypt is not Tahrir Square." However, this argument is belied by the spread of demonstrations throughout the country. In many cities and towns in Egypt's provinces, local security forces have been totally overwhelmed by demonstrators who have taken over local security offices and police stations (see, al-Hayat, Nov. 23).

The anger of the demonstrators that the military has "stolen" the revolution continues to energize large numbers of Egyptians, and not just youth. That the military refuses to place its budget under civilian control in the new constitution that is to be written after elections take place tells many Egyptians that unless they keep up the pressure, the SCAF will continue to rule much as did Husni Mubarak.

What concerns the military is what we might call the "Iran factor." During the revolution that overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy in Iran, troops refused orders to fire on demonstrators which hastened the Shah's downfall (as we have seen occur in Syria as well where troops have defected rather than kill civilian demonstrators). Continued demonstrations might undermine the willingness of the Egyptian army and security forces to suppress them. Were that to occur, the SCAF would lose its ability to control the street and hence its political power.

Where do the Islamists fit into this equation? The Islamist movement suffers from fragmentation and from not having demonstrated sufficient commitment to the pro-democracy revolution. The Muslim Brotherhood was very tentative about the anti-Mubarak demonstrations that developed last January and did not support renewed demonstrations this month against the military. The Brotherhood fears that demonstrations and the violence that invariably accompanies them will give the military the excuse to cancel elections. Because the Brotherhood is confident that it will do well in the elections, it does not want to alienate the military by pressuring it to make additional concessions.

The Brotherhood has alienated part of its base among youth who have come to view it as yet another Machiavellian political party whose real interest is to gain power rather than implement democratic governance and provide Egypt's citizenry with needed social services. To its right, as it were, the Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party is being challenged by Salafists from the Party of Light (hizb al-nur), which is especially strong in Alexandria, and by more moderate Islamists and secularists to its left.

After 80 years of trying to win power, the Brotherhood may end up with limited political authority given the SCAF's unwillingness to cede any meaningful power. It may also engender hostility from Salafists, and Islamist and secular moderates, who see it as developing an accommodation with the SCAF and not challenging military authority given its desire to acquire political power.

Where does this leave Egypt's pro-democracy revolution? Demonstrations will continue and perhaps even become even more threatening in the provinces beyond Cairo's Tahrir Square. The military may decide that, from a cost-benefit analysis, it has more to lose by continued unrest, and the impact that such unrest will have on the Egyptian economy, than in trying to continue to suppress the demonstrations.

The SCAF's policy of trying to mobilize Egypt's so-called "silent majority" does not seem to have worked, although elections may temporarily take some of the wind out of the demonstrators' sails. However, what the SCAF does not realize is that many Egyptian, especially the young, have little hope in the future. There is every incentive for demonstrators to continue the struggle since there is little cost to them when compared to returning to a status quo ante which offers few possibilities for advancement.

Egypt's "stalled" transition to democracy could unfortunately continue for the indefinite future. In both Yemen and Syria, protests and conflict have not abated, despite the state's use of violence to suppress opposition forces. In Egypt, the negative economic (and political) consequences of this protracted conflict are now becoming clear.

The United States, the EU, and Turkey - to mention the external actors with the most influence among the SCAF - would do well to bring to its attention that democratic change is not all that is needed in Egypt. Changes in the privileges enjoyed by those who control Egypt's military-industrial complex are long overdue as well.

(The next post on Egypt will discuss the role of ideas in efforts to bring about democratic change and the uneasy alliance between Islamist and secular forces and between the Muslim Brotherhood and the military)

Making Sense of the Arab Spring (Part 1)

This posting is the first in a series that examines the Arab Spring. Now that 3 autocrats have been deposed and free elections held in Tunisia, it makes sense to ask where the democracy movement in the Arab world is heading. Will the Arab Spring be successful? Does it represent a new "wave" of democratic change in a region that has not been known for democratic governance? What approaches best help us explain the origins and development of the movement?

The postings in this series take 3 forms. One focal point is to examine individual countries and try and ascertain whether they will be able to establish a stable democracy and, if so, when. The second focal point is to assess the extent to which existing theories of democratization, almost all of which have been developed by Western scholars, actually explain what is taking place in those Arab countries where citizens have opposed authoritarian rule. The final postings will tease out the implications for US foreign policy in what is shaping up to be a very different Arab world than the one many analysts have traditionally known.

It is appropriate to begin with Tunisia, where Mohammed Bouazizi's self-immolation in the town of Sidi Bouzid became the catalyst for the Arab Spring. In less than a month between December 2010 and January 2011, and in a non-violent manner, demonstrators enraged by government corruption and Bouazizi's death, toppled the regime of long-time dictator, Zine al-Din Bin Ali.

If we begin with the assumption that the first phase of the Arab Spring involves the removal of autocratic rule and replacing it via free and fair elections, we now have the results of the recent Tunisian elections. These results are, in many respects, very promising.

First, the elections were held without significant disruption. There were protests prior to the elections that the main Islamist party, Ennahda (Harakat al-Nahda) had behaved unfairly and "rigged" the elections by receiving large amounts of funds from conservative Arab Gulf states that wanted the the party to win. After the vote, there was some minimal violence in one one town (Sidi Bouzid - the origins of the Arab Spring) where Ennahda was accused of manipulating the vote. Aside from this incident, the elections occurred without any serious problems.

Ennahda won 89 of 217 seats in the new parliament (41%) which constitutes an impressive showing. Before jumping to the conclusion that this vote was somehow an indicator that Tunisia might become an Islamic republic, we need realize that the party reflects much more to its supporters than its Islamist credentials.

Ennahda has attracted many members of the urban lower middle classes, similar to the social base of Islamist movements in many other Arab countries (see my "Ideology, Social Class and Islamic Radicalism in Modern Egypt" for earlier data on the Muslim Brotherhood's social base in Egypt). The reason for this social support extends beyond religion.

For many Tunisians, secularism is synonymous with the country's Francophone elite, many of whom reject Islamic culture. There is certainly a social class element in the secular-Islamist divide because secularists are often more well off than those who are drawn to Islamic culture. Islamism acquires its strength both due to Ennahda's valorization of traditional culture and because it offers a voice for the have-nots, especially the urban lower middle classes. A vote for Ennahda is less about voting for religion in the formal sense of the term. Social class is partially disguised as "religion," meaning that many Tunisians expressed their dissatisfaction in the elections with the more prosperous members of society who are frequently Francophone, secular and generally Western in orientation.

What many observers have missed is that, what is often perceived as a "secular-Islamist" divide, actually represents a struggle between the haves and the have-nots. As with Islamist parties in Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere, many less fortunate Tunisians, especially those with aspirations for upward mobility, associate secularism with that social class which benefited under the regimes of secular autocrats, such as former dictator, Zine al-Din Bin Ali.

I would also underline that we should not separate social class from Islamist ideology. For many supporters of Islamism, the issues of economic sustenance and maintaining an authentic (asil) heritage reflect two sides of the same coin: social justice, on the one hand, and Tunisia's identity as a nation-state and who will define that identity, on the other. In other words, we cannot separate religion (understood as much as traditional culture as formal religion), social class and identity politics.

So what are the prospects for Tunisian democracy? One important indicator of the direction of political change in Tunisia can be seen in the defensive position adopted by Ennahda and other Islamist parties regarding the issue of women's rights, individual freedoms and a commitment to abide by electoral results. While some would argue that Ennahda merely used "progressive rhetoric" to win more votes, many observers believe that it will not try to impose Islamic law on Tunisian society. The party seems to realize that to do so would provoke a serious negative response among secularly minded youth and the educated middle classes.

Moving beyond the parliamentary elections, we need to examine larger historical-structural variables when assessing Tunisia's prospects for democratic change. Tunisia is considered by many to be the most progressive Arab state, if by progressive we mean politically tolerant and endowed with well developed human resources. For all his faults, former president Habib Bourguiba (1956-1987) promoted education – including education for women - literacy and universal health care, birth control and family planning, and a moderate form of Islam.

Gender equality is all too often ignored when analyzing democratic transitions. Unlike many Middle Eastern states, women were highly educated in Tunisia under Bourguiba’s rule. Prior to the 2011 Revolution, women held 23% of the seats in the Tunisian Parliament (a higher percentage than in the US). Tunisia has a strong civil society as evidenced by a robust trade union movement, women’s organizations and extensive use of social media. Over 3.5 million Tunisians are regular internet users, 1.6 million are Facebook users and there are hundreds of internet cafes, known as “publinet.”

Unlike Syria and Libya, where the "father leaders" destroyed all meaningful elements of civil society and repressed all efforts at autonomous political and social behavior, Tunisia under Bourguiba was more tolerant. As his rule demonstrates, not all autocrats are cut from the same political cloth. A certain amount of institution building occurred under authoritarian rule that can provide support for Tunisia's nascent democracy.

The prospects for a consolidation of democracy are strengthened by the fact that Tunisia does not suffer from significant social cleavages. It does not have ethnic differences (such as Iraq and Syria), confessional differences (such as Egypt and Iraq), or tribal cleavages (such as Yemen and Libya). It also benefits from a relatively large middle class. Indeed, per capita income in Tunisia is has been relatively high (currently at $4,070), despite its being a relatively resource poor country.

My prediction is that Tunisia will develop a government based on a stable parliamentary coalition. Tunisia will most likely approximate the Turkish model where there is an uneasy but stable coexistence between Islamist and secularists. Indeed, the October parliamentary elections in which neither the Islamists not secular forces were able to dominate suggests such as outcome. Because Ennahda did not win a majority of the votes in the elections, it will be forced to form a collation with a set of secular center-left parties. We can call this new form of governance, a contested coalitional democracy.

In a broader analytic sense, how do we assess Tunisia's so-called Jasmine Revolution? What factors facilitated the overthrow of authoritarian rule? Clearly, economic variables represent a key "tipping point" in the Arab Spring. Mohammed Bouazzizi engaged in self-immolation. Like many other politically conscious Tunisian youth, he experienced tremendous frustration working as a street pedlar and not being able to make a living and provide for his extended family.

After having been forced off the street by the police for many years because he didn't have the necessary money to bribe them, he was already highly frustrated and angry. The final straw came when he was forced to stop selling his vegetables yet again by a government inspector who took the scales from his cart when she discovered that he had no license. After being unable to retrieve them at the town's municipal offices, he poured gasoline on his body and set himself on fire.

Why wasn't the state able to suppress the demonstrations engendered by Bouazizi's death? One key factor was the refusal of the military to crush the demonstrators and its withdrawal from the political sphere after the flight of former president, Zine al-Din Bin Ali. Hence the coercive apparatus in Tunisia should be viewed as more professional than patrimonial. Unlike Egypt, the military is not involved in day to day politics which bodes well for Tunisia’s short term future.

Many theorists of democratization avoid comparative historical analysis. If we consider Turkey, we see that the nation-state spent many years under the rule of what was euphemistically referred to in the early post-colonial period of the late 1940s and 1950s as "guided democracy."

Despite periodic elections, Ataturk's Republican Peoples' Party controlled the Turkish polity until the elections of 2002 which brought the AKP to power. Prior to 2002, the army had removed any regime that it considered threatening to the secular principles of Kemalism and its own corporate interests. Neverthless, many of Ataturk's policies resulted in important institutional development that paved the way for the current consolidation of democracy.

In terms of institutions, during his years as president, Bourguiba promoted limited development of an incipient civil society. More importantly, he stressed the importance of education, including the education of women. In the 1960s, his regime pursued family planning. These policies created a strong presence for women in Tunisian society. Women even were able to form some civil society organizations which established a degree of semi-autonomy from state control.

In other words, the institutional legacy of quasi-authoritarian regimes can be an important factor in establishing the groundwork for the transition to democracy. In the recent Tunisian elections, 50% of the candidates were women. This is not only remarkable for the Middle East, where limited number of women occupy public office, but remarkable for advanced industrialized democracies where women do not constitute such a high percentage of candidates.

The economic development literature constitutes a popular approach to the study of democratic transitions. This literature traces its intellectual pedigree to the late Seymour Martin Lipset and his seminal 1959 essay, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," and to the 1966 study by Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World. Unlike the writing of many current theorists, such as Adam Przeworski, Fernando Limongi and their colleagues, Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, and Christian Houle (who will be discussed in later posts), their models are, in certain respects, much less sophisticated than those of Lipset and Moore.

A political sociologist, Lipset was not burdened by the rational choice (rational actor) theory (RAT) that informs much of the current economic development and democracy literature. Rather than create the somewhat artificial binary of authoritarian elites and oppositional mass publics, Lipset cast a much broader conceptual net.

Instead of focusing on economic development in the narrow sense of per capital income/GDP, Lipset included such variables as literary and media access, urbanization, the size of the middle class in relation to other social classes, and the structure of income distribution. Lipset offers a multivariate approach contra the more unidimensional approach followed by many current theorists of economic development and democracy. Unlike Lipset, Moore's analysis opted for a comparative historical approach that was based on several countries whose development he studied over time. Above all, Moore emphasized the need for a strong (entrepreneurial) middle class and a resolution of what he called the "peasant problem," namely integrating the peasant population into the process of economic modernization.

Turning to Tunisia, we see that both Lipset and Moore offer many analytic insights that help explain its transition to democracy. Literacy rates and urbanization are high as is media consumption. Salaries are also relatively high. Tunisia's Gini Index is actually better than the US, having improved between 1995 and 2005. Tunisia has a large and politically sophisticated middle class and a diversified economy.

As Dankwart Rustow pointed out in a famous 1971 article, "Transitions to Democracy: Towards a Dynamic Model," the conditions that bring about the fall of authoritarianism are not the same as those than sustain democratic governance. While the economic development literature may be able to help us understand why democracies are able to consolidate themselves, it cannot easily explain the dynamics of the key "tipping points" that have led to the coalescing of the popular uprisings that challenged authoritarian rule in the Arab world.

To situate Tunisia's transition to democracy in a still broader context, we need to return to the education policies of the Bourguiba regime and the demographics of Tunisian society. Even though it does not suffer the "youth bulge" that characterizes many other Middle Eastern nation-states, it still needs to provide employment for the large cohort of educated youth that are the product of the education system introduced by the Bourguiba regime.

The social requisites and historical institutional analysis that have been used to explain Tunisia's move towards democracy can also benefit from demographic analysis. The work of Stimson Center demographer Richard Cincotta is important here in that he points to the significance for political stability of the maturing of the Tunisian population, which now has a median age of 29. Cincotta demonstrates a correlation between authoritarian rule and a large youth demographic between the ages of 15 and 29. The decline of the youth bulge tends to support political stability and democratic governance.

Still, we need to better understand the dynamics of the processes suggested by demographic analysis. If rational choice or rational actor theory (RAT) has told us nothing else, it is the need to focus on individual preferences and choices. While Mohammed Bouazzi was not the selfish utility maximizer that characterizes human actors in RAT (he was known for giving some of his produce to poor families), he was interested in bettering his economic condition as well as that of his family, as seen by his support for his family and paying the university tuition for one of his sisters. Ultimately, it was his choice to burn himself to death that provided the spark for the much larger conflagration that became the Arab Spring.

Looking to the future, the Achilles heel of Tunisian political development is and will continue to be the political economy. The state has few resources at its disposal and tourism - a major source of external funds – has been severely compromised by the recent political instability. The return of many Tunisians who were working in Libya has reduced foreign remittances as has the slowing of the economies of southern Europe where many expatriate Tunisians live and work.

If the current unemployment rate of 15% persists, it may not bode well for continued support for democracy, especially among those Tunisian youth who do not have much hope in the future. A key variable will be exogenous in nature, i.e., whether the EU, US, Turkey and neighboring Libya provide investment capital for the Tunisian economy.

A stagnant economy will most likely place more strains on the political coalition that is currently in the process of formation. Ennahda supporters may call for greater efforts to regulate the economy and even for the appropriation of the wealth of the upper classes. Such actions would certainly undermine foreign investment and dampen European Union support for the Tunisian government.

If Tunisia's democracy is not to become a "spectator sport" for the US, EU, and Turkey - the main stakeholders in the success of its fledgeling democracy - they would all do well to move as quickly as possible to prop up its economy. Mobilizing an international coalition to achieve this end makes the most sense. While Tunisia is a small country in the larger Arab world, the demonstration effect of its becoming a successful democracy should not be underestimated.

(Elite driven) sectarianism is alive and well in Iraq

Despite public opinion polls and my recent focus groups with Iraqi youth that show a rejection of sectarianism, the behavior of Iraq's political elite threatens to undermine the gains that have made in the effort to implement a democratic transition. Sectarianism continues to manifest itself at the highest level as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki refuses to budge on his unwillingness to come to terms with Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya Coalition which received the largest number of seats in the March 2010 parliamentary elections.
When the conflict between al-Iraqiya and Maliki's al-Da'wa Party first flared after the elections, the two Kurdish parties that dominate the KRG welcomed the split. Their reasoning was simple. If the Arabs fight it out in Baghdad, they'll have less time to devote to us. A power struggle in Baghdad would preclude a unified Arab front which would to try and block Kurdish interests.

Along the lines of the adage, "be careful of what you wish for," the Kurds have discovered that a dysfunctional government in Baghdad is actually not in their interest. Sectarian leaders often discover that, when you play with fire, you often get burned. The Kurds increasing unease with the stalemate in Baghad was evident in the Central Committee meeting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that was recently held in Sulaimaniya (ses al-Hayat, Oct. 21). PUK leader and Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, expressed serious concern with the "uncertainty" surrounding a solution to the crisis pitting al-Iraqiya against Maliki's political alliance which seems to have no end in sight.

Even the Kurds, who seek a weak central government in Baghdad, realize the danger that exists if the present stalemate between Nuri al-Maliki and Ayad Allawi persists. Iraq's ability to defend itself, to develop its hydrocarbon wealth - oil and natural gas- and to create the necessary feelings of trust that will allow all of Iraq's regional and ethnoconfessional groups to work together to get the country moving forward are increasingly jeopardized.

Clearly, the fault here is not the Iraqi people but their ineffectual and narrowly partisan leaders. Whether as a result of pressure from Iran, or fears of being outflanked by populist elements such as the Sadrist movement, Maliki refuses to come to terms with Allawi and the members of his al-Iraqiya Coalition. Because al-Iraqiya won the majority of votes, it needs to be given a say in the daily functioning of the Iraqi government. As a primarily Sunni Arab coaltion, Maliki's unwillingnessl to bring al-Iraqiya into his government smacks of sectarianism among much of Iraq's populace.

By refusing to ceded any power to Allawi and al-Iraqiya, Maliki is stoking the fires of sectarianism. If he were a true statesman, he would put the interests of Iraq and the Iraqi people above his own sectarian partisanship.

A second indicator of the seriousness of sectarianism is the "struggle of the flags." Since the downfall of Saddam Husayn's Ba'th Party, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has refused to fly the Iraqi flag. It is nowhere in sight when one crosses the border from Turkey into Iraq, nor does it fly elsewhere in the KRG. Because the flag still invokes memories of Ba'thist Pan-Arabism, and inscription "God is great" (Allahu akbar) was added by Saddam Husayn just before the Gulf War of 1991 to attract support from Muslim majority countries, the KRG has been loath to have the flag flying in its Kurdish majority provinces.

However, the Kurds have used the symbol of the flag for their sectarian purposes. When Iraq won a Cinderellaesque victory in the 2007 Asia Cup beating Saudi Arabia, many Kurds raised the Iraqi flag to celebrate the vicotry, especially since Iraqi Kurds play on the national team. Nevertheless, those Kurds who had raised the Iraqi flag were threatened with imprisonment if they did not immediately remove the flag from their homes.

In 1996, during the height of the Kurdish civil war that pitted the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) against its arch-rival, the PUK, Masoud Bazzani, the current KRG president, asked Saddam Husayn to send tanks into the Kurdish region to help him stave off a military defeat by PUK forces. As the tanks of the Iraqi army proceeded north into the KRG, Iraqi flags adorned the roads. This was the same Iraqi army that had been involved in the infamous ANFAL campaign between 1986 and 1989 in which Saddam's forces leveled 175 Kurdish villages, destroyed the Kurdish agrarian sector and killed thousands of Kurds in the process.

The most recent crisis is the order that the Kurdish flag be removed from government buildings in the city of Khanaqin, a Kurdish majority town in Diyala Province, not far from Iraq's northwest border with Iran. The town suffered under Saddam's Arabization policies as many Kurds were killed and their homes taken over by Arabs. However, during the the 1940s, and 1950s, Arabs and Kurds in the Khanaqin region enjoyed good relations and many shared membership in local labor unions, particularly oil unions since the area has important oil fields.

Whether Maliki ordered the KRG's flag removed, or the order came from an official in the Ministry of Interior, the issue has become intertwined with Maliki's introduction of a oil and natural gas bill into the parliament that apparently caught the Kurdish bloc in the Council of Deputies (national parliament) off guard (al-Hayat, Oc. 17). The order to remove the flag led to demonstrations in Khanaqin by its Kurdish community and the formation of a Kurdish delegation to go to Baghdad to demand that the order be rescinded.

The Kurdish suggestion for a new Iraqi flag that would resemble if not replicate the flag used under the rule of General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), which used the ancient Mesopotamian star of Isis, is not unreasonable and is supported by many Iraqis. However, the "struggle of the flags" is really not about symbols but rather part of a larger power struggle between the Maliki government and the KRG. The winner's prize will be Iraq's vast hydrocarbon wealth (oil and natural gas).

Yet another example of the corrosive effect of sectarianism in Iraq is the decision of the Maliki government to dismiss 145 Iraqi professors at Tikrit University in Salah al-Din province, a province comprised primarily of Sunni Arabs. After the fall of Tripoli, former Libyan National Transitional Council prime minister Mahmud Jibril flew unexpectedly to Baghdad to inform Maliki that the NRTC had discovered that the Qaddafi regime was involved a plot with former Ba'thists to overthrow the Iraqi government.

It is unclear how serious the plot was since no documents have been released. Nevertheless, Maliki quickly moved to arrest many former Ba'thists. Because the party recruited a disproportionate number of Sunni Arabs, the arrests have strong sectarian overtones. The firing of professors at Tikrit University was particularly egregious because it is difficult to imagine that such a large number of academics at one particular university could have all been involved in a plot against the government. University professors are not know for their skills in organizing coups d'etat against the state.

Since almost everyone under Saddam was forced to join the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi parliament passed a law in 2008 amending the de-Ba'thification process to include only those who occupied positions that harmed other Iraqis. Clearly, the faculty members who lost their positions at Tikrit University were not in this category. The firings of the professors only enhanced the idea that Maliki was using the news of a plot to marginalize Sunni Arabs.

Aside from Ayad Allawi, who deos seem to want to create a government with a broad social base were he to become prime minister, most members of Iraq' s political elite suffer from sectarianism tendencies and promote policies that undermine inter-ethnic and inter-c0nfessional trust. Their behavior is motivated by their desire to increase their polticial power and enhance their economic wealth. Although Maliki himself has not been associatedwith economic corruption, he has done little to try and eradicate it.

As for Maliki, "the fish rots from the head down," as the adage goes. Not only is he failing to provide strong, civic leadership that could promote national reconcilaition - a key component of building the necessary trust to enhance security, political cohesion and economic development - but he is promoting policies that further inflame sectarian tensions.

Under these conditions, the ability of Iraq's political institutions to develop is severely curtailed. Prospects for implementing a democratic transition require effective eladership and a political culture of tolerance and political pluralism. Such a political culture represent the prerequisite for rebuilding the necessary trust that Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist henchmen worked so hard to destroy in Iraq.

What can the US learn from Turkey in the Middle East?

During the 1990s, Turkey was a relatively unstable country. The Islamist government of Necmitten Erbakan was removed by the military in 1997 following a longstanding pattern of Turkish generals removing any prime minister who threatened their prerogatives. Efforts to gain membership in the European Union were going nowhere and ethnic conflict between Turks and Kurds was growing as seen in the spread of support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

By the beginning of this century, Turkey was experiencing solid economic growth. EU membership was no longer a top priority, Turkish-Kurdish relations within Turkey were beginning to be addressed, and the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was behind bars. Gradually, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has won two parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 following its initial victory in 2002, has been able to eliminate the power of the army to intervene in the political process. While there have been attempts to manipulate the constitution and the judiciary, most Turks seem quite content with AKP rule.

Perhaps Turkey's most impressive achievement, beyond its economic growth, has been its ability to become one of the dominant powers in the Middle East. It has skillfully deployed "soft power" to inject itself into a number of volatile conflicts that threaten the region's stability.

By concluding important economic agreements with the Iranian government, particularly in the energy field, Turkey has pacified Iran, its historic enemy. In championing the Palestinian cause, and backing away from its traditional close ties to Israel, Turkey has ingratiated itself with the Arab countries of the region, the core provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. It has also situated itself as a possible intermediary given its ties to both Israel, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and the Arab states, on the other.

While its foray into Lebanese politics in early 2011, where it sought to bring together the country contentious ethnoconfessional groups, was unsuccessful, Turkey is now a major player in efforts to force the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad to cede to the demands of democracy activists who fill the streets of many Syrian cities demanding the end of authoritarian rule. Turkish army maneuvers along the border with Syria have sent a strong message to Syria's Ba'thist regime that the wanton killing of its citizenry who are calling for democratic reforms cannot continue indefinitely.

Turkey's rather spectacular rise in power is paralleled by a decline in US power in the region. With the Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats, Zine al-Din Bin Ali and Husni Mubarak, no longer in power, and authoritarian rulers such as Ali Abdallah Salih in Yemen and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, who formerly cooperated with US anti-terrorism initiatives, likewise gone from power, the US has now to deal with governments that lack the stability and coherence of the autocratic regimes which have been deposed.

In Iraq, the US faces the ironic outcome that its removal of Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist regime has led to much greater influence of its arch-enemy, Iran. The government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Malaki seems determined to demonstrate that it is not an American puppet as it seeks to placate Iran. Maliki's tilt toward Iran is most evident in his unwillingness to commit to allowing any significant number of US troops to remain in Iraq after the end of the Status of Forces Agreement on December 31 of this year (read my analysis, "US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq" by clicking here).

In the energy field, not only has Turkey signed energy contracts with Iran, but it is at the center of the 7.9 billion Euro Nabucco Pipeline Project that will channel natural gas from Central Asia, and Iraq through Turkey to an energy hungry Europe, allowing Europe to become less dependent on Russian energy supplies and those of Russia's surrogates.

What can the US learn from Turkey's almost meteoric rise to a regional power in the Middle East? How can it develop policies based on mutually beneficial interests that align US foreign policy in the Middle East with that of Turkey? How can the US work with Turkey to offset its declining options in the Middle East?

To answer these questions requires greater scrutiny of the Turkish success. First, Turkey is exercising its economic muscle in the Middle East based on impressive GDP growth rates over the past 5 years. While economic growth was minimal in 2008 and even dropped in 2009, in 2010, real GDP growth reached 8.2%. Turkey has used its investments in Syria but especially in Iraq to influence domestic policy in both countries. While this policy has not prevented Bashar al-Asad's regime from brutally suppressing pro-democracy demonstrators, it has weakened the Syrian economy. Many analysts argue that if the Syrian economy continues to decline, the business elites of Damascus and Aleppo, a core component of the regime's political base, will turn against the regime, possibly bringing it down in the process.

In Iraq, Turkey has invested heavily in the Iraqi economy to the tune of more than $6 billion. Its investments are still largely concentrated in Iraq's 3 majority Kurdish population provinces that comprise the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). While investments in the KRG have not led to an end of PKK attacks on Turkish forces that originate in Iraq's
mountainous Kurdish region, it has developed a greater inventive on the part of the KRG to reign in the PKK and prevent it from attacking Turkey.

Clearly, Turkish economic might has played and will continue to play a central role in its effort to become the regional hegemon. A key question here is whether the US is following Turkey's lead. Obviously it is not. On strategy might be for US firms to seek to form joint ventures with Turkish firms, such as the energy giants, Enerco Energy and BOTAS, to explore the region's undiscovered oil and natural gas resources

In Iraq, US-Turkish cooperation could not only benefit US firms and hence American overseas investment, but lighten its political footprint in a country that is still very sensitive to the charges by many political groups that the US' goal is to dominate Iraqi politics as a means to control its extensive hydrocarbon wealth (both oil and natural gas).

Turkey's foreign policy success is based on the fact that it treats other Middle Eastern states with respect and promotes a strong democratic agenda. Although it sent out ambiguous signals at first, evoking much anger among anti-Qaddafi forces, Turkey soon joined the chorus of states calling upon Muammar al-Qaddafi to step down from power. Its support for Mubarak's ouster in Egypt and its campaign against the Asad regime in Syria have strengthened its democratic credentials in the Arab world.

The US has not been as forceful as Turkey in supporting popular protest movements of the "Arab Spring." Continued public declarations of support for democratization in the Middle East would serve US interests, much as Turkey's support for democratic change has endeared it to Arab populations throughout the region. The mild Islamism of the AKP underscores the need to develop a model of democracy in the Middle East that reflects local cultural preferences. Here the US needs to recognize that a "one size fits all" definition of democracy can be counterproductive.

In comparing the foreign policies of the US and Turkey, we need realize that the government of President Recip Tayyip Erdogan faces few domestic constraints in exercising its foreign policy preferences. The US Congress has placed many roadblocks in the Obama administration's efforts to pursue American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. Efforts to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiating table have been labelled as "anti-Israeli" and "undermining our closest Middle East ally," as a number of Tea Party Republicans have declared. And Congress has yet to confirm the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, who has been using visits to areas where pro-democracy demonstrations have taken place as a means to put pressure on the Asad regime to end the killing of demonstrators.

What the US needs to learn from Turkey is that investment strategies which are multilateral in nature, such as the Nabucco Pipeline project, can not only have important economic multiplier effects, but can exercise enormous political influence. More active engagement of Turkey in bi-lateral meetings where the US seeks to forge ties around policies, both economic and political, that both countries are pursuing in the region, can become a "win-win" situation for both countries.

This is not to argue that the US should forgo its traditional foreign policy goals in the Middle East simply to placate Turkey. Nevertheless, both Turkey and the US seek to prevent Iran from undermining regional stability. Turkey is as horrified at the prospect of an Iranian-Israeli military conflict as is the US. Turkey, like the US, realizes that economic development and democratization are the keys to the region's stability, especially to meeting the aspirations of the region's large youth demographic, which is often referred to as the "youth bulge."

Turkey still faces a major problem in enacting national reconciliation with its own restive Kurdish population which is growing at a faster rate than the indigenous Turkish population. Here the US can create greater good will by trying to help the Turkish government develop policies that will promote such reconciliation. If the US can become more involved behind the scenes in helping Turkey tackle what is clearly its most significant domestic problem, then it will ingratiate itself with the Erdogan government. Helping Turkey's Kurds meet their demands for economic, cultural and political reforms will undermine support for the militant wing of the PKK which advocates the use of violence to achieve those goals, rather than through the use of peaceful means.

What Turkey demonstrates most clearly is that a bold, forceful and consistent foreign policy is, at the end of the day, one that is most effective in the Middle East. It has also shown that it can learn from its mistakes, as it did in Libya. Greater attention to the manner in which Turkey has been able to develop such an effective regional foreign policy policy could teach the US how to increase its own success in the Middle East as well.

جائزة نوبل للربيع العربي ممثلا في المرأة اليمنية

The article below, "The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Arab Spring is represented by a Yemeni Woman: Tawwakul Karman," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, and appeared in the Jerusalem newspaper, al-Quds,

ثلاثة هم الفائزون بجائزة نوبل للسلام: المرأة اليمنية المناضلة المجسدة في شخص السيدة توكل عبد السلام كرمان وباقة النساء المناضلات من

حولها في صفوف الثورة اليمنية من أمثال أروى عبده عثمان وسامية وفاطمة الأغبري وبشرى المقطري ونادرة عبد القدوس وهدى العطاس وناديا الكوكباني وسارة جمال وهند وآمنة النصيري ونبيلة الزبير وأسوان عثمان ومنى لقمان وسعاد عطا وأروى أحمد عون ، وأمل الباشا ومها البريهي وأروى الخطابي ووفاء الأكحلي، والفائز الثاني هو الربيع العربي ممثلا في ثورة اليمن العظيمة التي حافظت على سلميتها رغم استفزازات النظام الدموي المتآكل، والفائز الثالث هو المرأة العربية المناضلة بشكل عام من جميلة بوحيرد إلى الشهيدة ليلي السرميني ابنة ال 45 ربيعا والتي سقطت يوم الرابع من هذا الشهر برصاص القتلة من أتباع النظام الدموي في سوريا في بلدة تلبيسة قرب حمص أمام عيون الكاميرا ومن بعدها أمام عيون العالم.

توكل عبد السلام كرمان إمرأة تجسد أمة ناهضة تتململ بعد غياب طويل صنعه أعداء الأمة ووكلاؤهم المحليون وهي على وشك أن تكسر الأغلال وتطيح بالطغاة واحدا بعد الآخر. أمة ستضع الآن تاجا من الغار على جبين توكل الطاهر الشريف ابنة اليمن السعيد الواعد بإنجاب المزيد من المناضلات. لقد شرفت توكل كل الرجال والنساء والشباب والشابات العرب من الغلابى والمضطهدين والعاطلين عن العمل والباحثين عن لقمة عيش وجرعة كرامة والذين قرروا أن يثوروا ضد العملاء والخانعين والقتلة والمجرمين والفاسدين وأجهزة البلطجة والبلاطجة والشبيحة ودوائر المخابرات والقناصة والمرتزقة.

تكريم توكل اليوم من السيد ألفرد نوبل اعتراف بدور المرأة العربية الجديدة التي تصنع فجرا ومستقبلا لأمتها وتشق طريقا وعرة بين أكوام الخراب التي خلفها هؤلاء الطغاة في شرق البلاد وغربها، شمالها وجنوبها. وجائزة نوبل هذه صفعة حامية على جبين النظام الكالح الجاف القبيح الذي يوجه رصاصه لصدور أبناء اليمن الغر الميامين ولم يكتف بأكثر من 33 سنة حكم، خرب فيها البلاد وأذل العباد ونهب الثروات وفرق الناس إلى تجمعات قبلية وعرقية ودينية كي يسهل مهمة القبض على خناق الوطن، ثم أدخل أطياف الشعب اليمني في حروب داخلية وساوم على سيادة البلد حيث أعطى صكا لدول خارجية لملاحقة أبناء اليمن وقتلهم على أرض اليمن.

هذه الجائزة تكريم لكل نساء اليمن اللواتي صرخن في وجه الطاغية الأمي: إرحل إرحل. هذه الجائزة هدية لفتيات ميدان التحرير من الشهيدة سالي زهران إلى إسراء عبد الفتاح، المرشحة العربية الأخرى لنفس الجائزة، وأسماء محفوظ وأمينة الطنطاوية وزميلهن وائل غنيم المرشح الآخر لنيل الجائزة والآلاف الذين حولوا ميدان التحرير إلى موقع لميلاد مصر الجديدة المناضلة العائدة إلى أمتها بعد سنين الاغتراب . هذه الجائزة أيضا لك يا راضية نصرواي ولك يا لينا بن مهنا ، المرشحتين التونسيتين لنفس الجائزة، ولزميلاتكما المناضلات في الثورة التونسية العظيمة ولابن سيدي بوزيد الشهيد محمد بو العزيزي ونساء ورجال تونس الذي تسلحوا بأطواق الياسمين وأسقطواعصابة بن علي و ليلى والطرابلسي.

وهذه الجائزة لمناضلات الثورة الليبية من إيمان العبيدي وإسراء بن محمود وهدى أبو زيد إلى عائشة قدور وفاطمة بريدان وأمل بشير، وكل الشباب والشابات الذين طاردوا الطاغية وأولاده من بيت لبيت ومن شارع لشارع ومن زنقة لزنقة فولى هاربا كالجرذ يفتش عن دهليز أو جحر يختبئ فيه مع أوهامه التي يبدو أنه ما زال متمسكا بها.

وهذه الجائزة باقة من الورد تقدم للفتيات السوريات اللواتي يتحدين الرصاص والتعذيب والموت ويناضلن، كل واحدة بطريقتها، لوقف تقدم الجيش والمخابرات والشبيحة والأمن السري والعلني من المناضلة مي كساب إلى الحقوقية رزان زيتون إلى الشهيدة ليلى السرميني. إنها جائزة للشباب الذين يتحدون الموت ويخرجون في الليل والنهار رافعين شعارا واحدا تلتف حوله كل فئات الشعب: سوريا بدها حرية.

وهذه الجائزة اعتراف بالمرأة العربية المناضلة من عهود الاستعمار إلى عهود الطغاة من صفية زغلول في مصر إلى سناء المحيدلي في لبنان ومن دلال المغربي وليلى خالد في فلسطين، إلى جميلة بوحيرد في الجزائر. إنها هدية للمناضلات اللواتي عبدن الطريق نحو الثورة المباركة. من هدى شعراوي ونوال السعداوي إلى توجان الفيصل ولويزة حنون وأسيرات الحرية في سجون الاحتلال: غفران زامل وسنا عامر ودعاء الجيوسي ومريم أبو دقة وجيهان دحادحة وفاطمة الزق وصونا الراعي وغيرهن.

هذه الجائزة إقرار بأن المرأة العربية لم يعد دورها مقصورا على المطبخ وغرفة الولادة. لقد ساهم الربيع العربي في إعادة تأهيل المرأة لأخذ دورها الحقيقي في التنمية والبناء والنهضة والتطور والتقدم، كما ساهمت المرأة أيضا في صقل الربيع العربي وإعلاء الجانب الإنساني والاجتماعي والحضاري منه. لقد خرجت إلى الشارع لتشارك الزوج والأب والإبن والأخ والمعلم والموظف والتاجر والعالم والمبرمج والسائق في نسج خيوط فجر يكاد أن ينبلج من بقايا ليل يكاد أن يمّحي.

نتمنى أن تحرك هذه الجائزة العروق في بقية الشعوب العربية التي ما زالت تقرفص على السياج بانتظار انقشاع غبار االثورات في اليمن وسوريا. ونريد لهذه الجائزة أن تضخ عزيمة مضاعفة في نساء هذا الوطن لينزعن الصورة النمطية التي تصور المرأة العربية خانعة ساكنة طائعة وطيّعة ومهيضة الجناح التي كرسها المجتمع الذكوري والفكر المتمترس في مجاهل التاريخ الذي فصّـلوه على مقاس كراسيهم.

نتمنى لجائزة توكل أن تخترق الحدود الموصدة على ملايين النساء في بلدان مجاورة، محرومات حتى من حق قيادة السيارة أو المشي أو السفر بدون محرم حيث اختصرت الأنظمة المتخلفة والمسلحة بالفتاوى دور النساء على أن يكن كومة لحم فقط مغطاة بالسواد دون وجه أو أنف أو عينين أو عقل.

تحية للسيدة المناضلة توكل وتحية مماثلة لزوجها الفاضل محمد إسماعيل الذي وقف مساندا ومشجعا ولولاهذه العقلية المنفتحة والمتفتحة لما كنا نحتفل هذا اليوم بفوز توكل بهذه الجائزة الكبرى. تحية للشعب اليمني العظيم وهو يكتب الفصول الأخيرة في نهاية حكم هذا الطاغية الأبله الذي يصر أن يبقى هو وأولاده في السلطة حتى ولو على جثث الآلاف.

دعونا نفرح هذا اليوم مع الشعب اليمني ومع مناضلاته الماجدات. دعونا نفرح ليوم واحد على الأقل لهذا الانجاز الكبير قبل أن نستأنف المسيرات السلمية وحمل الشهداء إلى موائلهم الأخيرة في صباح الغد في تعز وحمص وسرت وصنعاء ودير الزور وبلد الوليد، حيث يصر هؤلاء الطغاة أن "يأخذوا حصتهم من دمنا قبل أن ينصرفوا"، أما نحن فلنا ما ليس يرضيهم "لنا المستقبل، ولنا في أرضنا ما نعمل"

عبد الحميد صيام*

* أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

القانون الدولي والاعتراف بالدول.. خلفية من أجل فلسطين

عبد الحميد صيام

This article, "International Law and its Acceptance by the International Community: the Case of Palestine," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, for the Jerusalem paper, al-Quds, September 22, 2011

تستعد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية للتقدم للأمم المتحدة بطلب الاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية مستقلة على حدود عام 1967 في شهر أيلول الحالي موعد انعقاد دورة الجمعية العامة السادسة والستين التي يرئسها الممثل الدائم لقطر السيد ناصر عبد العزيز النصر.

ورغم الضغوطات والتهديدات الأمريكية الإسرائيلية التي تمارس على القيادة الرسمية وخاصة التلويح بوقف المساعدات المالية إلا أن الأخيرة ما زالت مصرة على التقدم بمثل هذا الطلب لمجلس الأمن وفي حالة استخدام الولايات المتحدة لحق النقض سيتم تحويل الطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بعد تفعيل قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام" الذي يخول الجمعية العامة بمناقشة الموضوع بسبب فشل مجلس الأمن ويكون للقرار المعتمد بغالبية الثلثين سلطة القانون ويصبح شرعيا لا غبار عليه مثل سلسة القرارات التي اتخذتها الجمعية العامة في معالجة أزمة السويس عام 1956 بعد أن فشل مجلس الأمن في التعامل مع العدوان الثلاثي بسبب الفيتوين الفرنسي والبريطاني.

سيكون لهذا القرار في حالة نجاحه قوة قانونية ومعنوية وسياسية هائلة فتصبح دولة فلسطين كيانا معترفا به دوليا. صحيح أن أجزاء من أراضي هذه الدولة واقع تحت إحتلال بلد أجنبي (إسرائيل) لكن دولة فلسطين المستقلة والمعترف بها ستعمل ضمن القانون الدولي لإنهاء الاحتلال بالمفاوضات بين بلدين مستقلين متكافئين ومن حق كل طرف أن يدفع باتجاه تحقيق الحد الأقصى من طموحاته وإذا ما حدث وتم الاتفاق على كافة المسائل الخلافية فسيتم حينئذ إبرام معاهدة سلام شاملة بين دولتين بضمانة المجتمع الدولي الممثل في الأمم المتحدة وفي حالة تعنت إسرائيل في الرضوخ لمتطلبات الاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية تستطيع هذه الدولة جرجرة إسرائيل إلى محكمة العدل الدولية وتستطيع كذلك التقدم بشكوى رسمية إلى محكمة الجنايات الدولية بعد انضمامها لعضوية المحكمة لملاحقة محرمي الحرب الإسرائيليين. إستخدام الولايات المتحدة للفيتو في مجلس الأمن سيسبب إحراجا شديدا لإدارة أوباما التي ما فتئت تتحدث عن قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة وعندما جاءت اللحظة الحاسمة لترجمة ما وعدت به تلك الإدارة ها هي تقف وحيدة أمام العالم لوأد تلك الخطوة مما سيزيد من عزلتها أمام المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك حلفاؤها الأوروبيون وسيعلم العالم كله أن الولايات المتحدة فقط هي من يقف حجر عثرة في طريق إنشاء الدولة الفلسطينية. الخوف كل الخوف أن تكون السلطة الفلسطينية غير مستعدة للتعامل مع نتائج هذا القرار وتعود الأمور إلى سابقها وتعتبر القرار انتصارا معنويا "وكفي المؤمنين شر القتال" وتصبح تلك الدولة حبرا على ورق والقرار الجديد يضاف إلى عشرات بل مئات القرارات التي داست عليها إسرائيل أمام المجتمع الدولي دون رادع أو حساب أو حياء بسبب الدعم الأمريكي لتلك الدولة المارقة. وأريد أن أناقش هنا شروط قيام الدول والوضع القانوني الذي يحول كيانا ما إلى دولة رسمية على قدم المساواة أسوة بمائة وثلاث وتسعين دولة.

الدولة وشروط قيامها

استنادا إلى نتائج مؤتمر وستفاليا (ألمانيا اليوم) للسلام عام 1648 بين الدول والكيانات والإمارات الأوروبية المتنازعة، تم الاتفاق على أن هناك ثلاثة شروط لقيام الدولة ذات السيادة وهي: وجود شعب بشكل دائم ومستمر، في رقعة جغرافية محددة ، وحكومة تمارس سيادة على الأرض والشعب. وقد أضيف شرط رابع عام 1933 في معاهدة مونتفيديو بالأوروغواي وهو إعتراف دولي بتلك الدولة بحيث تستطيع الدخول في معاهدات واتفاقيات ثنائية أو متعددة الأطراف مع أية دولة تختار.

منذ تأسيس الأمم المتحدة عام 1945 تم الالتزام بالشروط الأربعة والعمل بها عند ضم أعضاء جدد للأمم المتحدة بشرط موافقة مجلس الأمن الذي يرفع توصية للجمعية العامة والتي بدورها تصوت على العضوية بأغلبية الثلثين. فمثلا تتوفر الشروط الثلاثة الأولى في "تايوان" لكنها ليست دولة معترفا بها بسبب وقوف الصين بالمرصاد لاستخدام الفيتو فيما لو تقدمت بطلب الإعتراف الدولي من مجلس الأمن. بورتو ريكو فيها حكومة منتخبة تمارس سيادة ناقصة على شعب في رقعة جغرافية محددة لأن السيادة العليا في يد الولايات المتحدة وهي لا تستطيع إقامة علاقات مستقلة دون رضى واشنطن ولذلك هي ليست دولة. حكومة كردستان العراق تمارس سيادة في رقعة جغرافية محددة وعلى شعب متجانس ومستقر لكنها ليست دولة لأن المعادلة الإقليمية قادرة على منع الاعتراف الدولي بها حتى لو أعلنت عن قيامها. وجمهورية قبرص التركية تتوافر فيها الشروط الثلاثة إلا الاعتراف الدولي حتى لو اعترفت بها تركيا. وإقليم كوسوفو يعاني من نفس المأزق حتى لو اعترفت به معظم دول أوروبا والولايات المتحدة إلا أن الإقليم ما زال لا يتمتع بالاعتراف الدولي القانوني رغم تمتعه بما يسمى في القانون "الاعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع" لأن الفيتو الروسي قادر على وأد المحاولة في المهد أو مقايضة الاعتراف بكوسوفو باعتراف دولي بجمهوريتي أبخازيا وأوسيتا الجنوبية في جمهورية جورجيا وهو أمر شبه مستحيل على الأقل الآن. أما أفغانستان تحت حكم حركة طالبان (1996-2001) فكانت دولة رغم أن هناك ثلاث دول فقط كانت تعترف بها هي السعودية والإمارات وباكستان. أما بقية دول المجموعة الدولية فكانت لا تعترف بحكومة أفغانستان لا بدولة أفغانستان. والعكس صحيح، فإن إعتراف عدد كبير بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية لا يعني إعترافا بدولة فلسطين لعدم توفر شرط قيام الدولة. فاعتراف الجامعة العربية ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي ومجموعة دول عدم الانحياز لا بفلسطين كدولة بل بكيانية منظمة التحرير كممثل لشعب فلسطين الذي يناضل من أجل قيام الدولة. وللتذكير فقط فإن رسالة الاعتراف التي بعثها إسحاق رابين، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل آنذاك، للمرحوم ياسر عرفات، رئيس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، في 9 أيلول عام 1993 تمهيدا لاتفاقية أوسلو المشؤومة نصت بالحرف الواحد على إعتراف إسرائيل بمنظمة التحرير "بصفتها الممثل الشرعي (فقط دون كلمة وحيد) للشعب الفلسطيني"، بينما نصت رسالة ياسر عرفات "بالاعتراف بحق دولة إسرائيل في العيش بسلام وأمن" وشتان بين الاعترافين، فالأول اعترف بسلطة شرعية والثاني بدولة. إذن من المهم أن نفرق بين الاعتراف بالدولة والاعتراف بالحكومة وكذلك بين الإعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع (تايوان) والدولة من الناحية القانونية (193 دولة من توفالو بآلافها العشرة إلى الصين الشعبية بملايينها الألف والثلاثمئة).

فالاعتراف الدولي بأية دولة شرط أساسي ويجب أن تقره الجمعية العامة بأغلبية الثلثين بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن كما حدث مؤخرا مع جمهورية جنوب السودان. إسرائيل مثلا، إعطيت شرعية ضمن قرار التقسيم 181 الصادر عن الجمعية العامة بتاريخ 29 تشرين الثاني 1947 الذي منح نفس الشرعية لقيام دولة عربية وأعلن ديفد بن غوريون قيام الدولة عشية الرابع عشر من أيار 1948 لكن الإعتراف بها لم يتم إلا بعد قيام مجلس الأمن بالتصويت على قرار الإعتراف رقم 69 بتاريخ 4 آذار1949 الذي أوصى الجمعية العامة بالإعتراف بإسرائيل. بتاريخ 11 أيار 1949 اعتمدت الجمعية العامة القرار 273 والذي شرعن وجود دولة ذات سيادة اسمها إسرائيل وصفها بأنها "دولة محبة للسلام تقبل التزاماتها المنصوص عليها في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وهي قادرة وراغبة في تنفيذ تلك الإلتزامات". وكم كانت رؤية الجمعية العامة ضالة ومنحازة عندما وصفت ذلك الكيان بانه دولة محبة للسلام وملتزمة بنصوص الميثاق.

أما سحب الإعتراف بحكومة دولة ما فهو أمر جائز في القانون الدولي ونود هنا أن نذكر بأن الجمعية العامة طردت من عضويتها حكومة الفصل العتصري بجنوب إفريقيا عام 1974 لكن ذلك لا يعني سحب الاعتراف بالدولة بل سحب الإعتراف بالحكومة العنصرية وعندما انهارت الحكومة العنصرية عادت الحكومة المنتخبة لتملأ المقعد الخالي في قاعة الجمعية العامة في 23 حزيران 1994 .

إذن آلية الإعتراف الطبيعية لا تصل إلى الجمعية العامة إلا بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن. ومن هنا نعود إلى المربع الأول ونقول إن الولايات المتحدة قادة على إجهاظ فكرة الاعتراف بدولة فلسطين قبل إكتمال شروط الولادة وتكون الجمعية العامة التي ستعقد جلسة طارئة خاصة تحت سلطة قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام"هي المخولة شرعيا بمناقشة هذا الطلب واعتماده بأغلبية الثلثين.

شروط قيام دولة فلسطين من الناحية القانونية

وعلى فرض أن الجمعية العامة إعتمدت القرار فالسؤال الآن هل شروط قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة ذات سيادة كاملة أسوة ببقية الدول متوفرة حاليا؟ هل هناك رقعة جغرافية محددة ذات حدود مرسمة يسكنها شعب واحد متجانس ذو ذاكرة جماعية واحدة وفيها حكومة قادرة على ممارسة السيادة على كافة أبناء الشعب في تلك الرقعة الجغرافية المحددة؟ الإجابة ليست صعبة على هذه الأسئلة فالرقعة الجغرافية غير واضحة المعالم وممزقة وغير متصلة ليس فقط بين جناحي الوطن في الضفة وغزة بل وفي كانتونات الضفة وخاصة في منطقة القدس. كما أن الشعب في تلك المناطق مقطع إلى أجزاء كل جزء تحكمه قوانين مناقضة ومخالفة للقوانين التي تخضع لها المناطق الأخرى، فليس سكان القدس الشرقية كسكان غزة ولا المجموعتان كثالثتهما في الضفة. بالإضافة إلى أن هناك استبعادا لغالبية الشعب الفلسطيني في المنفى والذي يشكل الغالبية من المجموع الكلي للشعب الفلسطيني. والأخطر من ذلك وجود مجموعات سكانية طارئة لا تنتمي للشعب الفلسطيني داخل نفس الرقعة الجغرافية وتخضع لمنظومة قوانين مناقضة تماما لقوانين الدولة الفلسطينية. وبالتالي سيكون هناك مجموعتان من السكان في رقعة جغرافية واحدة تحكم كل مجموعة منظومة قوانين مختلفة بل ومتناقضة، وهذا يخل بمبدأ سيادة السلطة المركزية التي ستجد نفسها غير قادرة على إنفاذ أي قانون في مناطق المستوطنين الصهاينة، ومن المؤكد أنهم سيشكلون تحديا لهيبتها وسلطتها مرتكزين على حائط الإسناد القوي المتمثل في دولة إسرائيل.

إذن فالشروط الثلاثة غير متوفرة لا الشعب ولا الأرض ولا السلطة القادرة على ممارسة السيادة على الإثنين. أما عن القدرة على عقد الاتفاقيات بعد توفر الاعتراف الدولي فليس لهذا البند إلا قيمة معنوية إذ إن الكيان المنبثق عن هذا الاعتراف غير قادر على استقبال ضيف يحل زائرا على السلطة نفسها التي لا تسيطر على حدود ومعابر تلك الدولة ولا مجالها الجوي ولا شريطها الساحلي ولا الحركة من وإلى الدولة.

ترجمة القرار إلى واقع على الأرض

نخلص إلى نتيجة أن التقدم بطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بالاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية حتى ولو نجح بغالبية الثلثين (129 دولة على الأقل) لا يعدو عن كونه انتصارا معنويا لا يمكن ترجمته على أرض الواقع حتى لو أعلن الفلسطينيون قيام دولتهم كما فعلوا في 15 تشرين الثاني عام 1988. لكن القرار يمكن أن يكون سندا قانونيا لشن حملة قانونية لطرد الاحتلال بالمقاومة السلمية المتواصلة وتوجه الشعب الفلسطيني بكامله لطرد المستوطنين وهدم الجدار العازل وإعادة السيطرة على كل شبر من الأراضي المحتلة وعدم إسقاط الحق التاريخي للاجئين الفلسطينيين في ديارهم الأصلية.

فعرض قضية الاعتراف أمام الجمعية العامة في شهر أيلول (سبتمبر) يجب أن يتزامن مع مظاهرات سلمية شاملة ومتواصلة لا تضعف ولا تكل ولا تمل ولا تنهزم ولا تتراخى ولاتتراجع ولا تتوقف تحت أي ظرف من الظروف. يجب إنطلاق المظاهرات العارمة يوم مناقشة الموضوع أمام الجمعية العامة من رام الله والقدس وكل مدن وقرى وبلدات الضفة والقطاع وعمان وبيروت والقاهرة والخرطوم وتونس والجزائر والرباط وإسطنبول وجاكرتا وإسلام أباد وباريس ولندن ومدريد وأثينا ونيويورك. عندها ستصبح الدولة الفلسطينة المستقلة أدنى إلى التحقيق من هذه المناورات التي نخشى أن يكون الهدف منها تسجيل انتصارات معنوية فقط. فالدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة تصنعها إرادة الجماهير المناضلة المصممة على تحقيق الانتصار لا المفاوضات العبثية ولا المناورات المكشوفة ولا المقذوفات البدائية التي تطلق من غزة لأغراض حزبية ونادرا ما تؤذي أحدا. وكما استطاعت الشعوب العربية أن تطيح برؤوس ثلاثة من كبار الطغاة والحبل على الجرار فحري بشعب الانتفاضتين والكفاح الطويل المرير وقوافل الشهداء ورائد العلم والإبداع أن يخرج إلى الشوراع في كافة أنحاء العالم بطريقة حضارية سلمية منظمة واعية ليفرض على العالم قيام دولته المستقلة في الواقع لا في العالم الافتراضي. دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة مترابطة تتحكم في حدودها ومواردها وتمارس سيادتها على كل شبر من أراضيها معافاة من سرطان الاستطيان وجدار الفصل العنصري. دولة تكون حاضنة وطنية للشعب الفلسطيني كله ومجسدة لآماله وحقه في العودة وتقرير المصير فعلا كما نص على ذلك قرار الجمعية العامة 3236 (1974). وأقترح على السلطة الفلسطينية ومفاوضيها أن يراجعوا هذا القرار المهم للتعرف على رزمة حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني التي أقرتها الأمم المتحدة إن كانوا نسوا أو تناسوا تلك الحقوق.

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*أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك