Saturday, March 9, 2013

The Religious Fatwa as a Political Weapon



Guest contributor, Ali Alhbabi, a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Department, Rutgers University, New  Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, is a graduate of the University of the United Arab Emirates, and a specialist in political Islam and contemporary Islamic thought.
 
For many years, Islamist movements have declared that Islam is the only solution to the problems facing Arab and Muslim majority  states.  Following the Arab Spring revolutions, Islamists have gained power in some states, including Egypt and Tunisia.  Democratic elections in these Arab spring states brought Islamists to power due to their organization prior to the Arab Spring and thus their greater ability to mobilize the masses.  Now that they have acquired power, the main challenge facing Islamists is:  how will they will deal with the opposition?

During the period of authoritarian rule, Islamist movements themselves constituted the opposition and suffered from violent repression by these state. For Islamists, religion is an essential part of their political and social project which is to lead the Arab  and Islamic world to a renaissance that will echo the glories of the early Arab-Islamic empires that flourished between the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 CE and the collapse of the Abbasid Empire in n1258 CE.

However, Islamists have increasingly used religion in negative and destructive ways to deal with the “other”. Following the popularization of social media, a strange phenomenon has developed: Islamist regimes  have begun to use the religious decree (fatwa; pl. fatawa) to attack the opposition (i.e., secular liberals and leftists) in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as other non-Muslim ethnic groups, such as Egypt's Coptic Christian community.  Such decrees can be circulated very rapidly via social media.

A fatwa is normally used by men of religion in Islam to make a religious determination on specifically earthly matters facing a society. Ulama (clerics) declare fatwa related to specific issues to guide Muslims' attitudes and behavior, without then breaking any religious taboos.  Issuing a fatwa is a form of authority that is designated for the Ulama because it is part of their religious duty to educate and lead the people.

Issuing a fatwa is restricted to the Ulama because they, by definition, are knowledgeable about religion. But this field of expertise, which is supposed to limited to religion has, not prevented some ulama from issuing political fatwas which often have dangerous implications. Islamist political systems tend to integrate religious and political authority.  As a result, it is difficult to distinguish between what is religious and what is political.

Many Ulama have moved into the realm of politics and political Islam and have issued fatwas which do not conform to traditional Islamic doctrine to justify the use of violence against those whom they consider to be their opponents.  In Egypt, for example, the Ulama issued a fatwa calling for killing anyone who opposes the ruling political system because he/she would thus be considered a Kharij, namely a person who disobeys the Imam – namely the president of Egypt. (See: http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2013/02/07/264970.html).

These fatwas are dangerous because they can be acted upon by anyone who is an ardent believer.  In addition to the physical danger posed by political fatwas, they represent an intellectual threat. The idea of distorting how the opposition is perceived in the minds of ordinary people by portraying them as enemies of religion who import foreign ideas and seek to westernize Muslim countries is very dangerous. The danger of political fatwas lies in denying that the opposition has an important role to play in any functioning democracy.

Being a political opponent of the ruling political party should not lead to political marginalization exclusion or even physical liquidation. Many religious fatwas have been issued calling upon people to be killed in the name of Islam, because they are opposed to an Islamist political system and the mixing of religion and politics.  Accusing opposition leaders of being liberal and secular, or even atheist, encourages people to act on the fatwa, with the incentive that their behavior will lead to a reward in the afterlife.     

In recent months we have witnessed fatwas openly calling for the use of violence against the opposition in the name of Islam. In Tunisia, a popular and highly respected lawyer, poet and politician, Shukri Belaid was assassinated because of his secular ideas.  Following the Belaid assassination, the first political assassination in over 30 years,video footage featured on several prominent websites revealed that some Tunisian Salafists have advocated for killing secularist opposition members, including Belaid  (See: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q5sQzHxQr7M)

In Egypt, many politically minded Ulama similarly use religious fatwas politically to justify killing protesters around Al-Ittihadiya presidential palace on the grounds that they were trying to overthrow the political system which is ruled by a democratically elected president. The transformation of political discourse in Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world that only exists within the context of Islamist beliefs and values will undermine the notion of cultural tolerance, political pluralism and acceptance of the other as a part of a post-authoritarian process of national reconciliation.

In reality, these fatwas that advocate violence contradict the essence of Islam. Killing is rejected by most religions and using religion to justify a violent act is a form of "invented religion" that reflects tendency of many Islamists to use religion in inappropriate ways to promote narrow political agendas. Moreover, the majority of the Ulama are firm in their belief that the Qur’an does not condone killing anyone who threatens the religion of Islam.

Therefore, political fatwas that justify using violence against the other rely on weak interpretations that contradict Islamic principles and Prophetic traditions. Islam stresses the norm of spreading peace among people and respecting the other regardless religion or color.  Nevertheless, fatwas that promote extremist political agendas are used politically by militant Islamists to justify the killing and exclusion of the opposition as a part of what they (conveniently) interpret a part of their religious duty.

Because of fatwas based on flawed interpretations of Islam, many core Islamic values are threatened, including tolerance, peaceful coexistence among religions, and recognition of the value of dialogue generated by opposing points of view. More importantly, Islamist political fatwas are creating deep divisions between Islamists and non-Islamists: Islamists are viewed as true Muslims and the non-Islamists or anti-Islamists as non-Muslims. This creation of this distinction in Islamic discourse is highly dangerous, particularly because it promotes hatred and sectarian divisions among people, especially in multi-ethnic and multi-religious countries, such as Egypt.
By declaring fatwas that are political in nature and condone the use of violence, Islamists believe that they are protecting their religion and the rule of political Islam. Moreover, they view the political use of fatwas as a way of legitimizing Islamists’ political positions and opinions. However, this reflects  a superficial understanding of the rules of Islamic jurisprudence. Political jurisprudence, al-fiqh al-siyassi, is different from any other type of Islamic jurisprudence because it requires Ulama who want to become involved in political matters to first possess a comprehensive knowledge of politics, as well as cultural, social and economic conditions.

Religious knowledge alone is not sufficient to explain the political phenomena I am describing from a religious point of view. It is the nature of political jurisprudence to be unstable and prone to change. However, other kinds of jurisprudence in Islam are more stable because they rely on basic pillars of Islam as they relate to worship.           

In the end, the Islamists’ use of fatwas as a political weapon constitutes a threat to the personal security of citizen in Muslim majority countries who are opposed to political Islam, namely the subordination of politics to a misinterpretation of Islam. Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia use their own television channels and social media as popular vehicles to disseminate fatwas designed  to achieve political ends, including attacking opposition force.  In Islam fatwas are meant to be used to alleviate difficulties in a believer's life, not to end it. 

Thursday, March 7, 2013

al-Jazerra's Hadith ath-Thawra: a Discussion of Arab League and US Policy in Syria

Today I was a guest on al-Jazeera's Hadith ath-Thawra together with Hesham Marawah, of the Syrian opposition's National Coalition in Istanbul, Faisal Abdelsattar, a pro-government spokesman in Beirut, and Dr. Fawaz Gerges, Director of the University of London's Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

 While the main topics of discussion were the Arab League's recent decision to legalize arming the Syrian opposition and the US' position on arming the Syrian insurgents, the main question to which the discussion constantly returned is the one everyone is asking. How can the killing be stopped and the conflict resolved?

In response to questions directed at me, I indicated the Obama administration is loathe to become directly involved in the Syrian conflict, one that increasingly is taking the form of a regional conflict with strong sectarian overtones.  The American experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, combined with the current US fiscal crisis, have created a powerful disincentives to the Obama administration committing material resources, let alone US troops, to the Syrian conflict.  Fears that American weapons could fall into the hands of radicals hostile to the US has only strengthened  its reluctance to adopt a policy of arming the Syrian opposition.

Everyone agreed with Dr. Gerges that the solution to the conflict must occur within an international framework that includes all the important actors.  However, we know that Russian and China have worked to thwart such an international effort.  Meanwhile, Mr. Abdelsater argued that the Arab League decision will only lead to more "armed terrorists" within Syria and do nothing to solve the crisis.  Mr. Marawah retorted that, unfortunately, President Bashar al-Asad only understands the language of violence.  While the violence is unfortunate, Asad refuses to agree to meaningful negotiations with the Syrian National Coalition, a point with which I agreed.

My argumemt was that the United States should take the lead in enforcing an "no-fly" zone over Syria (al-hisar al-jawi) that would prevent Syria's air force from continuing to mount air attacks on on civilian targets, which to date have killed thousands of innocent women, men and children.  An internationally imposed "no fly zone" would certianly be oppoosed by Russia and Syria but could be implemented using a variety of means.

First, the Arab league decision lends legitimacy to such an action since, while suspended, Syria is still technically part of the organization.  Now that the League has legalized supplying arms ot the Syrian opposition, a "no fly zone" takes on a new life.  If the League were to sanction a "no fly zone," then this would facilitate putting together a coalition of Arab and non-Arab nations to enforce it.

Second, Syria has already attacked towns along the Turkish border.  As a member of NATO, and according to the alliance's treaty, an attack on one state constitutes an attack on all members states.  Thus NATO could join with the Arab League in enforcing the "no fly zone."  Any Syrian aircraft, whether jet fighters or helicoptor gun ships, would be shot down were they to take to the air.

Third, the UN could play an important role in creating a "no fly zone" in Syria.  In a speech to the General Assembly on February 12, 2013, the UN Human Rights chief, Navi Pillay, said the Asad regime was guilty of human rights violations for its widespread attacks on the country's civilian population and that the members of the ruling Ba'thist regime should be remanded to the International Criminal Court for trial.

With the Security Council also having chastised the Asad regime for its indiscriminate attacks on Syrian towns and cities, there is also the possibility of seeking a vote in the General Assembly to support a "no fly zone." Even if Russia and China would veto such action in the Security Council, a favorable General Assembly vote would add further legitimacy to imposing a "no fly zone" on Syrian airspace.

Finally, the International criminal Court could gather evidence of human rights violations and begin trials in absentia of President al-Asad and other top officials in the Ba'thist regime.  This would lend further support to the imposition of a "no-fly zone."  If the regime of Saddam Husayn has taught us anything, it is that dictatorial regimes can no longer be allowed to kill massive numbers of their citizenry without any international sanctions.  This type of behavior can no longer be allowed in the 21st century.

A "no fly zone" would demonstrate to the Syria's Ba'thist regime that there is no military solution to the current crisis.  It would lead to a dramatic drop in the number of civilian casualties.  While it would not lead to the immediate collapse of the Asad regime, it would provide a major incentive for it to begin meaningful negotiations designed to lead to a solution to the crisis.  This would entail the the resignation of President Asad and the beginning of a process to bring about democratic elections and national reconciliation.

In addition to lessening the suffering of the Syrian people, negotiations between the Ba'thist regime and the Srian national Coalition would undermine the increasing strength of radical elements in the opposition movement.  These groups would lose much of their appeal.  Finally, the Obama administration would not be required to enter the fray with troops or provide heavy weapons.

Sunday, March 3, 2013

The Politics of Poverty Relief: Targeting Poor Kurds in Turkey



Kurds waiting for CCTs
 Guest contributor, Gokce Baykal, a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, and an adjunct faculty at New York University’s Department of Politics, is currently writing her dissertation, “Giving Money to the Poor: The Political Payoffs of Allocating Conditional Cash Transfers in Turkey: Making Clients or Citizens?”. She has conducted in-depth interviews with Roma and Kurdish people in Tekirdag and Diyarbakir who benefit from poverty alleviation programs.

“We have been waiting in a line since 6 a.m. to get our cocuk parasi (child money). I have no idea about the amount of money I will get or the amount of time I will have to wait. Tell (Prime Minister Recep Tayyib) Erdogan to fix this situation. You ask what  poverty is.  I’ll tell you. Poverty is waiting, waiting all your life,” said Ruken, 25, who has 4 children, forcing a smile on her face.

Ruken is one of the hundreds of poor Kurdish women who waited in front of Surici, the Diyarbakir Post Office in eastern Turkey, to benefit from Sartli Nakit Transferi (Conditional Cash Transfers or CCTs).   In exchange for meeting certain requirements, such as sending their children to school, paying monthly visits to health centers, the government makes regular payments to needy families. After the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi/Justice and Development Party) decided to use state funds to initiate the new CCT program, the number of population was initially targeted at around 1 million Turks.  By March 2009, the number had already reached over 3 million people.[i]

This enormous increase coincided with the sharp differences in the geographical distribution of these payments. The CCTs are distributed disproportionately in the eastern provinces, especially Turkey’s southeastern and eastern Anatolian regions, where the majority of population is Kurdish.  Figure 1 shows the allocation of CCTs according to regions between 2003-2009.

Fig. 1: The Allocation of Conditional Cash Transfers According to Regions (2003-2009 March)
 
Source: www.sosyalyardimlar.gov.tr  (Graph created by the author)

This disproportionate nature of the allocation of CCTs can be explained by the deteriorating economic conditions in Turkey’s Kurdish regions which are characterized by rising poverty and high unemployment rates. Indeed, according to a World Bank report, 39% percent of Turkey’s citizens who live on an income of a little over $2.00 per day are located in southeastern Anatolia.[2]

However, other regions suffer from poverty rates just as high as those with a majority Kurdish population.   According to Turkey’s State Planning Institution,  the poverty rate for the west Black Sea region (47.4%) is close to that of northeast Anatolia (%50.2), which is populated primarily by Kurds.   

Along with CCTs, the amount of social assistance allocated to Kurdish regions has significantly increased under AKP rule.  During the last local elections in 2009, one Kurdish city, Tunceli, made news headline.  Many newspapers published pictures of officials from the Tunceli Governor’s Office distributing new refrigerators, washing machines, desktop computers and furniture in poor neighborhoods. This phenomenon is not something new. Indeed ruling AKP government has been long accused by opposition parties and the media of using state funds to win votes.

The country’s Supreme Election Board (Yuksek Secim Kurulu-YSK) filed a criminal complaint against the AKP and foundations that give handouts to electorates to attract their votes. Following the election day, many Kurdish women who benefited from these programs remember receiving an SMS message from Prime Minister Erdogan thanking them for supporting AKP. 

Indeed, the AKP’s popularity among poor Kurdish women, especially that of its leader, Prime Minister Erdogan, is much higher compared to Kurdish men. One local volunteer working in the Gunisigi Store, a local government association, which donates second hand clothing to the needy, shared the observations she had during the elections. “If a woman wants to vote for AKP party, they want to cast their vote alone, I mean without their husband’s knowledge.  Many of them do so.” 

 


The caricature roughly translates as follows:
LEFT: You will vote in this cabin. Hope it reminds you something. RIGHT: ?!

Various poverty alleviation programs targeting the poor, such as microcredits and diverse “development” projects conducted by public-private cooperation, have grown at a rapid pace in the Kurdish majority regions. However, according to local NGOs and research “think tanks” working in the region, this “development” rhetoric, which emphasizes proje mezarligi (“significant projects”), and its policies, have only a limited impact in cities like Diyarbakir.   

Cities like Diyabakir, and other Kurdish towns, have been turned into a laboratory, where poor Kurdish people become the objects of social experiments embedded in the state’s mushrooming poverty relief programs in the region.  Actually, none of these social assistance programs addresses the root causes of poverty.  Rather they reduce poverty to simple economic terms, purposely ignoring the historical and political origins of the problem.   The state fails to acknowledge the historic injustices that Turkey’s Kurdish population has endured and the pervasive political, cultural and social discrimination that still exists.

The “poverty as an economic problem” discourse has contributed to the formulation of temporary solutions and that poverty can only be solved through economic means such as economic growth, job creation and through various “development” projects.  Attempting to treat endemic poverty through temporary solutions has a great potential to open the door to all sorts of political manipulation because it fails to meaningfully empower the people who these policies are supposed to help.

Because of the rise in the number of poverty relief programs, the AKP has enjoyed a gradual increase of support among the Kurds. According to survey conducted by KONDA, 47% of those who voted for Kurdish Party DEHAP in 2002 elections changed their voting preference to the AKP in the next general elections in 2007.[3]  Beyond the AKP’s  uneven distribution of social assistance programs and its mushrooming Islamic charity foundations, political reforms towards Kurds, which have been designated as the Kurdish Opening (Kürt Açılımi), and backed by negotiations for European Union membership, may also explain the oarty's shift.  

This proposed reformist approach for reducing tension between the Turkish government and Turkey’s Kurdish population includes allowing Kurdish language classes to be taught in schools, Kurdish language to be used in the broadcast media, and a partial amnesty for many members of the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan/Kurdistan Workers Party) who have surrendered and pledged to no longer take up arms against the state.  Some of these compromises by the AKP led government have even led to the opening of the first state-run Kurdish language TV channel, TRT 6.

However, this reform process came to a halt with the recent renewal of conflict between the Turkish military and PKK guerillas, which has resulted in a growing number of casualties on both sides, the arrest of Kurdish local mayors and journalists, trade unionists, human right defenders, and also of university students accused of being members of the KCK (Koma Civakên Kurdistan-Union of Communities in Kurdistan)[4]. At the beginning of October 2011 the number of those detained since April 2009 had reached 7,748 Kurds, of whom 3,895 suspects were placed in pre-trial detention.[5]

With political reforms now stagnating, and the Kurdish regions experiencing increased repression, public and/or charity funded social assistance programs targeting the poor have slowed or grown at an uneven pace.  Ethnic minorities and/or poor people are often treated as homogenous entities, with the state ignoring their internal social stratification and cultural differentiation which in turn leads to different political responses among these groups to these programs.

If we take local political and social processes and different identities such as religion into account, the politics of poverty can be more clearly understood.  Within the Kurdish community, each group experiences social welfare programs differently.   These programs have certainly had the most significant impact on the meaning of citizenship for the poor.

Interviews I conducted within two poor neighborhoods, Huzurevleri and Fatihpasa in Diyarbakir, both of which have large concentration of urban poor, confirm the uneven distribution of resources within the poorest sectors of  Kurdish society. The AKP receives most of its votes from the Huzurevleri district in Diyarbakir, where the party’s headquarters is located, and therefore this support seems to facilitate people’ access to material benefits distributed by the government.

In this district, it is common to hear comments like, “I love Erdogan like my father,” or “He is the father of the poor,” or, “By the way, he looks like my beloved uncle.” Remziye, like Ruken, who has seen some benefit from the state’s social assistance programs, confirms the government’s construction of welfare clientelism by saying, “I can’t deny the assistance AKP provides. Indeed I’m proud of being Kurdish but we can’t betray Erdogan.” She added without any hesitation “He is a devout Muslim and according to our religion, helping the poor is a good deed. God bless him!”

Remziye’s very sincere statements, and Ruken’s understanding of poverty, remind me of Auyero’s description of poor people’s experiences waiting in the welfare office as a site of “intense sociability amidst pervasive uncertainty”.  This vertical exchange between the poor and the state “persuades the destitute of the need to be patient, thus conveying the implicit state request to become compliant clients.”[6]

The “haunting specter of clientelism” argument is nothing new in Turkish politics. Especially during elections, news coverage has always been dominated by the accusations against political parties - especially governing party - allocating favors such as coal, food packages, clothing and appliances to poor people in exchange for support.

The AKP’s practices of providing social assistance targeting Turkey’s Kurdish minority reinforce and reproduce the caricature of the poor, which portrays them as naïve and easily pleased by those who provide material benefits.  It also underscores the ruling elites’s efforts to creating its own sociopolitical base and voting bloc among the Kurds which sets “good” Kurds vs. “bad” Kurds, where the former is pictured as poor devout Muslims, and more importantly decent and “loyal” citizens.



[1] Esenyel, Caner. 2010. The Cases on Implementation of Conditional Cash Transfers from Turkey and the World (Turkiye’de ve Dunyada Sartli Nakit Transferi Uygulamalari), Unpublished Social Assistance Expertise Thesis, submitted to General Directorate of Social Assistance and Solidarity, Ankara.
[2] World Bank. 2003. Turkey: Poverty and Coping After Crises. Report No. 24185. http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2003/08/20/000160016_20030820130639/Rendered/PDF/241850TR0SR.pdf  accessed on October 23, 2012.
[3] KONDA. 2007. Survey of Political Trends, Istanbul: Konda, reported in Yoruk, Erdem. 2012. “Welfare Provision as Political Containment: The Politics of Social Assistance and the Kurdish Conflict in Turkey,” Politics and Society, 40 (4):523.
[4] There are many rumors on what the KCK means. Cengiz Candar, who is a journalist working on Kurdish issue for at least three decades define the KCK as an “executive organ within which the parties and organizations, including the PKK and others that are associated with the PKK in other regions populated by Kurds (Iraq, Syria, Iran) are coordinated. It is found within  the democratic confederationalism principle of Abdullah Öcalan by re-organizing the PKK. The concept of democratic confederationalism developed by Öcalan is suggested both as an alternative to nation-state and as a model for the solution to problems in the Middle East.” http://bianet.org/bianet/siyaset/131077-iki-bucuk-yildir-gundemdeki-kck-nedir accessed on February 28, 2013.
[6] Auyero, Javier. 2011.“Patients of the State. An Ethnographic Account of Poor People's Waiting", Latin American Research Review, (46:1):5-29.