Iraq’s Ja’fari (Shiite) Personal Status Law: a Threat to Women and National Unity

Most Iraqi observers agree that the proposed Ja’fari Personal Status Law that was initiated by the Basra based al-Fadila (Virtue) Party was a political maneuver designed to unify Shi’i voters in last month’s parliamentary elections.  But is the law merely a temporary manifestation of domestic politics or does it represent something deeper and more sinister in Iraq’s political development since 2003?

The proposed law, that was approved by Minister of Justice, Hasan al-Shammari, former head of Fadila, and the Council of Ministers, and then sent to parliament for a vote, is highly regressive. It allows girls as young as the age of 9 to be given in marriage (are 9 year olds mentally and physically capable of marriage?).

The law legitimizes marital rape, reduces women’s inheritance rights, removes a woman’s right to initiate divorce proceedings in almost all cases while allowing the husband complete discretion in filling for divorce.  In short, the law gives husbands and male relatives almost absolute control over the behavior of wives and female relatives.

 

(For an excellent article - one of many in this issue - that gives complete details of the proposed law, see the article by the attorney, Dr. Faiza Babakhan, “al-Ahwal al-shakhsiya wufuq al-fiqh al-ja’fari….fi-l-mizan, Narjis, 64 (April 2014): 32-34). 

The proposed Ja’fari Personal Status Law establishes a new legal system within the framework of the Shi’i religious authority (al-marja’iya) in the shrine city of al-Najaf in south central Iraq.  To be created outside the framework of the Iraqi constitution, this new “court system” is intended to adjudicate issues related to the law should it pass.

The law is an insult to the memory and teachings of the 5^th Shi’i Imam of the Twelver School, Ja’far ibn Muhammad al-Sadiq (al-Sadiq means the truthful one). It demonstrates the ignorance of Minister al-Shammari (who also insults the dignity of his famous tribe – the Shammar), and makes clear that the law has no basis is Shi’i historical teachings. 

Ja’far al-Sadiq was highly learned, contributed greatly to the sciences and philosophy, has been an inspiration for many Sunni scholars, and is beloved by the Sunnis of the Naqshibandiya Sufi Order.  After his wife died, Ja’far al-Sadiq purchased a slave, Hamida Khatun, taught her to be an Islamic scholar and then married her.  

Hamida Khatun bore him two sons, one of whom is another beloved Imam, Musa al-Kadhim.  She is worshiped by many Shi’i women for her learning and wisdom.  Is this the historical context and does this provide historical justification for a law that, by any standard, can be considered a violation of human rights?

Iraq is known for having one of if the most progressive personal status laws (Law 188 of 1959) in terms of women’s rights in the Middle East, only superseded perhaps by Tunisia.  While Iraqi women have never enjoyed full gender equality, Law 188, passed under the regime of Gen. 'Abd al-Karim Qasim following the overthrow of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958, has nevertheless stimulated many women to seek degrees in higher education enter the professions and engage in politics (e.g., the first Iraqi women cabinet member, Naziha al-Dulaymi, was appointed in 1959).

During the 1970s and 1980s, women entered the workforce and professions in large numbers.  When I first visited in Baghdad in May and June of 1980, the majority of the city’s physicians were women.  Saddam wanted to break the power of the male head of household, which he saw as a threat to Ba’thist efforts to create a totalitarian state, and he needed workers to industrialize the country.  Sexual harassment laws, to prevent women from being harassed in the workplace, were passed during the 1970s, well before they became policy in the US.

With the repressive UN sanctions regime of the 1990s that destroyed Iraq’s  national economy and education system, that which had been given was now taken away.  Saddam abrogated women’s rights, confining most to the home, reinstated patriarchal control over women (such as denying women the right to travel without the permission of a husband or male relative), and undermined their access to education.

The roots of the current problem can be found in the legacy of Ba’thist rule.. The state’s encouragement of patriarchal authority during the 1990s was a response to Iraq’s defeat in the 1991 Gulf War and the collapse of the Iraqi dinar and hence government salaries – the main source of income for a large percentage of Iraqi males, especially urban dwellers.

“Giving” men more authority and control over their wives, daughters and female relatives became a form of social psychological compensation.  The Ba’thist regime sought to offset the threat perceived by males resulting from their financial insecurity, and the consequent feelings of a loss of control over their lives and predictability that that loss implied, by giving them increased power over women’s lives. 

Saddam’s policies contributed to an increase in violence against Arab women during the 1990s as respect for women, especially among the less educated classes, declined.  While the Ba’thist regime received an award from UNESCO in 1988 for dramatically increasing the rate of literacy among Iraqi women, women raised during the 1990s are often semi-literate or illiterate.  

An indicator of the depth of negative attitudes towards Iraqi women was apparent immediately after the toppling of Saddam and the Ba’th.  The Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), appointed by the US occupation authority, and comprised almost exclusively of men, sought to repeal Law 188 in the fall of 2003. 

Only mass demonstrations organized by women’s groups, the Iraqi Communist Party, and the Iraqi blogosphere that developed rapidly after April 2003, forced Coalition Provisional Authority administrator, L. Paul Bremer, to intercede and force the IGC to withdraw Law 137 designed to nullify the 1959 personal status law.  As Iraqi women told me at the time, while Iraq’s new cadre of post-Ba’thist (male) politicians could agree on virtually nothing else, they could all agree on suppressing the rights of women.

With the extensive period of violence that has engulfed Iraq since Saddam ordered the Iraqi army to invade Iran in September 1980, including the 8 year war that ensued, the Gulf War, the 1991 Intifada, and the sectarian violence of 2003 to 2008, the ratio of males to females has been greatly skewed in favor of women.  A colleague at the Iraqi research center, Bayt al-Hikma, told me that women constitute well more than 60% of Iraq’s population.

Women, many of whom are poor and single heads of households, and who often lack education given the lack of access to schools during the 1990s, are an easy target for male politicians, especially those I term sectarian entrepreneurs (tujjar al-ta’ifiya).  Which brings me to the current proposed Ja’fari Personal Status Law.

The proposed law has less to do with suppressing Iraqi women than with increasing the power of sectarian politicians, in this instance those who control Shi’i political parties.  In the short term, the law was designed to mobilize the base of al-Fadila and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da’wa) and State of Law Coalition.  The publicity around the law was intended to discourage Shi’a voters from voting across ethnic lines in last month’s parliamentary elections.

The much more sinister side of this law is to promote a new type of identity politics, one based on sectarian rather than an Iraqi national identity.  If this law were to pass, it would certainly encourage Sunni sectarians to introduce a personal status law for their own community.  

In the process, this perspective would contribute to the efforts of sectarian entrepreneurs to create political cleavages based on vertical identities (bina’ al-hawiyat ala al-usus al-‘umudiya), rather than cleavages based on horizontal identities (bina’ al-hawiyat ‘ala al-usus al-ufuqiya).  Put differently, the law is designed to promote, especially among Iraqi Shi’i males, a political culture based on sectarian rather than a cross-ethnic national identity.  

In this regard we should remember that the political preferences expressed by Iraqi voters in the 2010 elections resulted in the victory of a cross-ethnic coalition, al-‘Iraqiya,  that was led by a Shi’i, Ayad Allawi and attracted not only Sunni Arab votes, but large numbers of secular Shi’a and Kurds as well.  Prior to 1963, when the first Ba’thist regime destroyed the Iraqi nationalist movement, cross-ethic cooperation in political life was the norm in Iraq.

The second goal of the Ja’fari personal Status Law parallels Saddam’s policy of the 1990s, namely to create among Iraqi males (in this case Shi’a) a false sense of power and authority..  When recently attending a conference in the al-Najaf area of Iraq, numerous Iraqi professors and intellectuals expressed their concern (and disgust) with the fact that a country so rich in hydrocarbon wealth – oil and natural gas – still had a poverty rate of between 20 and 30% of the populace.

A third goal of the Ja’fari personal status law (perhaps less conscious in the minds of al-Fadila and its allies who thought up the law) are feelings of fear and anger towards the former Ba’thist regime that many Shi’a see as dominated by Sunni Arab sectarians.  The thought of the return of the Ba’th or, worse yet, Sunni Arab radical “Islamists” (in quotations because most of these so-called Islamist know little or nothing about Islamic doctrine) who hate the Shi’a and consider them kuffar, represents a legacy of the ancient regime. 

A fourth goal was more short-term in nature.  Because Iran had doubts as to whether supporting Maliki was the most effective policy given his lack of popularity, the proposed law was meant to curry favor with Iraq’s powerful neighbor to the east.  Hopefully, that would have encouraged Iran to support Maliki's State of Law Coalition which is supported by the Fadila Party.

One of Saddam’s most destructive legacies is to have succeeded in promoting sectarianism during the 1990s as part of his “divide and conquer” strategy to remain in power.  Many Shi’a resent the discrimination they encountered during the 1990s and what they feel to be the lack of concern that Sunnis tribes, the base of Saddam’s regime, especially those in the traditional so-called Sunni Arab Triangle, who refused to empathize with their plight.

During a trip that I just concluded to attend another conference in Iraq, Iraqi political scientists and economists argued that 80% of Iraq’s annual budget is absorbed by corruption and other malfeasance with only 20% devoted to government service such as public health, housing, electricity and education.  Promoting sectarian identities (such as white landowners in the post-Civil War south in the US) is a time-honored tactic to distract the marginalized in society and prevent them from developing a correct understanding the actual causes of their poverty and misfortunes. 

Sectarian politics may constitute an efficient strategy in the short term by attracting more votes, but in long term it will poison Iraqi politics.  No one denies the danger posed by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) in al-Anbar Province.  However, this terrorist movement was given an enormous political boost by Maliki’s sectarian policies towards Iraq’s rural Sunni Arab community in western and north central Iraq.

As many Iraqi judges and lawyers have noted, the proposed law is in violation of many international treaties and codicils that Iraq has signed relating to the status of women and children.  It also creates a legal system outside of and in contradiction to the Iraqi constitution of 2005.  It marginalizes Shi’i women and thus undermines Iraq’s ability to develop at all levels – economically, socially culturally and politically – with 60% or more of the Shi’a basically confined to the private sphere.

There are Iraqi Shi’i males who argue that we should not worry because this law is only a “political maneuver” that will never become law.  This argument is on the same order of the wishful and disingenuous thinking of Egyptian ambassador to the US, Nabil Fahmy.

Fahmy argues that we should not worry about the hundreds of Muslim Brothers who have been condemned to death for killing a single police officer and for other indeterminate crimes in trials that lasted less than a day because they will never be put to death.  This is the same type of thinking of the many Germans who argued in the early 1930s that no one should worry about Adolf Hitler and the Nazi Party because they were a bunch of crackpots who would never come to power. 

During International Women’s Day this past February, many Iraqi women dressed in black and demonstrated against the proposed Ja’fari Personal Status Law.  They carried many signs, such as “Keep your deviant behavior (al-shudhudh) away from our children,” and, “A woman should neither be bought nor sold.” In the photographs that I have seen, there were many men among the demonstrators.

Even if the proposed law dies in parliament – after having already been referred to that body by the Council of Ministers – tremendous damage has already been done.  Shi’i men, especially those who are poor and lack education - a not insignificant percentage of Iraq’s Shi’i population -  have been encouraged to take the idea that women’s rights should be repressed seriously.

 

Certainly this proposed law will lead to more violence against women by promoting suspicion of their morals and trustworthiness (otherwise why the need for the law?)  It can also be used to justify discrimination against women in the workplace.  Many women are already single heads of households and lack the necessary skills to enter the workplace. This law would make their economic status even worse.

What is needed is support from Iraqi men and clerics in condemning the proposed Ja’fari Personal Status Law and joining women’s organizations in demonstrations meant to prevent parliament from passing it.  This will not only help prevent the adoption of the law, but contribute to democratization in Iraq by promoting the norms of tolerance and pluralism that are essential to a democratic political culture.  

The introduction of Ja'fari Personal Status Law constitutes a "teachable moment."  Iraqi women should use it to b uild a national network of powerful organizations that, working with progressive men, can protect and further the rights of women.  A great slogan for such a movement would be: "There can be no democracy when over 60% of the population are excluded from public life."

The Iraqi elections: 10 reasons why Nuri al-Maliki will win the battle but ultimately lose the war

Most analysts believe that Nuri al-Maliki will win a third term as prime minister in this week's parliamentary elections.  How did Maliki rise from relative obscurity to become Iraq's most powerful political actor?  What can his rise to power tell us about the direction in which Iraqi politics is heading? 

Maliki emerged from relative obscurity in 2006 and was chosen as prime minister for a number of reasons, perhaps the most important of which was the inefficacy of his predecessor, Ibrahim al-Ja'fari.  In this post, I view Maliki less as an individual politician than as symptomatic of the destructive course of Iraqi politics, especially since 2010.

Below I list 10 strategies Maliki has used to consolidate his power.  In a future post, I will analyze in greater detail the "sectarian authoritarian" game that Maliki and his elite have chosen to play, as opposed to the "civic democratic" game" that Iraq requires from its political leaders if it is to develop political stability, meaningful democracy, and economic prosperity.  Here I argue that Maliki's victory in the 2014 elections will actually bring about his downfall.

Strategy 1: Creating an image of a "strong man" (al-qabaday)

When Maliki became prime minister in 2006, he had no significant power base.  He was perceived as weak leader.  That all changed when Maliki, with minimal or no coordination with US forces, launched an attack on the Mahdi Army (JAM) in the southern port of Basra in March 2008.

Although Iraqi forces required US air support, Maliki's successful campaign earned him widespread accolades . Residents of Basra were especially grateful to see and end to the violence, crime and terror to which the city had been subjected by the JAM, other militias and crime syndicates.  Indeed, I remember reading in the Iraqi press at the time of merchants, who had formerly had no respect for the prime minister, now boasting of having his photograph in their cell phone display.

Maliki followed his suppression of the JAM in Basra, and subsequently in Baghdad's Sadr (Revolution) City, and the border town of Amara, with military brinksmanship against the Kurds.  He sent Iraqi army units into areas that the Kurdish leadership sought to incorporate into the KRG, such as Kirkuk and Khanaqin.  In the latter instance, the Iraqi army and the Pesh Merga almost came to blows.

Both these moves showed Maliki to be a shrewd politician.  In one instance he eliminated a powerful militia in the form of the JAM, while in the second he sent a message to the Kurdish leadership that it would pay a price should it attempt to seize disputed land along the so-called Green Line dividing the KRG from Arab Iraq.  In the process, Maliki also won the support of Sunni Arab tribes and tribal leaders south of the Green Line who feared losing their lands to the KRG.

Strategy 2:  Undermine the viability of cross-ethic alliances in favor of sectarian coalitions

Maliki's calculus has been to establish a power base in the conservative, professional and religious Shi'i middle classes.  Following Saddam's pattern of including a few token Shi'a in his regime, e.g., Sadun al-Hamadi, and Naim Haddad, Maliki has appointed his own token Sunnis, e.g., Acting Defense Minister, Sadun al-Dulaymi.  Despite the negative rhetoric between Maliki and the KRG leadership, the Kurds have become his de facto ally because they prevent Sunni Arabs and secular forces from effectively challenging his rule.

After losing the 2010 parliamentary elections to the al-Iraqiya Coalition, led by Ayad Allawi, 91 to 89 seats, Maliki has worked vigorously to undermine cross-ethic/cross-confessional alliances, the actual political preference of the majority of Iraqis.  Maliki was shocked that his State of Law lost to a coalition - al-Iraqiya - led by a Shiite, but one that attracted many votes not just from Sunni Arabs but from secular Shiites and even Kurds, e.g., in Kirkuk.

It was during the post-2010 elections that Maliki's sectarian policies really began to manifest themselves.  Maliki outmaneuvered both Allawi and al-Iraqiya, knowing that he would encounter little opposition from the Obama administration that wanted to rid itself of the Iraq conflict.  Maliki formed an alliance with the Kurds, who did not want a government with a strong Sunni Arab presence, and argued that the State of Law's 89 seats combined with the Kurds 57 seats, trumped al-Iraqiya's 91 seats, a constitutionally dubious argument and political maneuver.

Meanwhile, Maliki agreed to a US proposal to give Ayad Allawi a position in the government as head of a new National Council for Security Affairs and the right to choose the ministers of defense and interior.  However, no sooner had he agreed to this deal at the Arbil summit arranged by KRG president, Masoud Barzani, in November 2010 to end the leadership dispute between Maliki and Allawi, then he reneged on the agreement leaving Allawi thoroughly marginalized.

Strategy 3:  Eliminate all countervailing sources of power and authority
 
Having seen the judicial system fail to overturn the election results after he challenged them in court in the spring of 2010, Maliki quickly moved to eliminate any government agency that could challenge his rule.  He removed the autonomy of the High Independent Electoral Commission, put the Rafidain Bank (Iraq's central bank) under his control, and began pressuring the judiciary to adjudicate cases in ways that supported his policies.

Of course, Maliki could not afford to ignore the military and security force which he began to restructure to his liking and along sectarian lines.  Promises to integrate 80,000 members of the "Awakening" forces (Sahwat al-'Iraq) were not kept.  Instead, Maliki made sure that critical units were headed by officers loyal you him.  In light of the continued security problems in Baghdad and elsewhere, it is not surprising that there have been many complaints that competent security officers have been let go in favor of those who support Maliki.

Strategy 4: Sideline the Iraqi parliament, and discredit powerful Sunni Arab leaders

Maliki has ignored the Iraqi parliament.  Often unable to arrive at a quorum because not enough delegates are in attendance, the parliament has struggled to provide a check on the power of the prime minister.  Rather than open his cabinet and other high level appointment to parliament's scrutiny, under their mandated right of "advise and consent," Maliki has made numerous acting appointments, e.g., the defense minister and head of the Rafidain Bank, as a means of circumventing the parliament.

Maliki has also attacked powerful Sunni Arab leaders who were unwilling to cow-tow to his authority.  Two of the most prominent Sunni Arab politicians are former Iraqi vice president Tariq al-Hashimi and former finance minister Rafi' al-Issawi, both of whom were accused of sponsoring terrorism - a highly dubious accusation, especially in the case of the popular al-Issawi who most politicians consider a moderate.  In the case of al-Hashimi, Maliki was able to have the courts sentence him to death in absentia, even though his body guards, who purportedly supplied evidence against him, claim that they were tortured

Maliki realizes that the position of Speaker of the Parliament is potentially a very powerful one.  He has not been able to marginalize the current speaker, Usama al-Nujayfi - one of the few politicians Maliki must consider in his calculations as to how to wield and consolidate power.  Maliki has tried co-opting al-Nujayfi and was successful for a time when the speaker split with Ayad Allawi to form the so-called "White Iraqiya."  But al-Nujayfi, whose base is in the Sunni Arab community, remains a "wide card" who will continue to be one of the few political actors able to challenge Maliki.

Strategy 5: Keep constant pressure on the Kurdish leadership on oil wealth

Maliki is aware that the KRG possesses a powerful economic weapon in its local oil and natural gas reserves.  One of the fears shared by Iraq's Arab political elite is that the KRG will leverage its hydrocarbon wealth to establish an independent state, one closely allied with Turkey.

Thus Maliki's government - often in statements by Minister of Oil, Husayn al-Sharastani - constantly accuses the Kurds of attempting to use the revenues derived from oil production for the KRG's parochial interests, rather than those of Iraq as a whole.  KRG efforts to develop its oil resources and export them through Turkey are characterized as an attempt to "steal" Iraq's oil wealth.

By continuing to raise issues about the KRG's oil exploration and production, Maliki hopes to scare foreign investors in thinking that they will be excluded from more lucrative contracts in Iraq's southern oilfields if they do business with the KRG.  He also hopes to restrain Turkey's support for the KRG because Turkey seeks to have access to the Arab and not just Kurdish Iraqi market.

Strategy 6: Institutionalize the sectarian "spoils" system (nizam al-muhassat)

Because there are no overarching political parties in Iraq - ones that are broadly based - Maliki has used a "to the victor goes the spoils" system to reward coalition partners.  Thus ministries and their budgets are allocated to different Shi'i political cliques (al-shillal), based on their power and support for his government.

In this model, the focus is not on the Iraqi government providing services to the public, but according to a definition of politics as "who gets what, when, where and how," to paraphrase the late Harold Lasswell.  By institutionalizing this system of governance, Maliki not only promotes sectarianism, but spurs on the already extensive corruption that plagues the Iraqi state.

Strategy 7: Marginalize the poor Shi'a thereby eliminating their power to challenge him

After the Mahdi Army was suppressed in 2008, Muqtada al-Sadr mounted an even more effective challenge to Maliki by winning a sizable bloc of seats in the Iraqi parliament.  His bloc - the "Ahrar" - became a platform through which al-Sadr and his followers have consistently been able to attack Maliki for failing to provide government services and to suppress the pervasive corruption within the Iraqi state.

To disrupt the Sadrist campaign against him, Maliki turned to an unlikely ally, the so-called League of the Righteous People (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq), led by a former JAM commander, Shaykh Qais al-Khazali, who split with Muqtada al-Sadr.  With the JAM largely disbanded, the League has military superiority over the Sadrists, with whom it has fought on numerous occasions.

Its policy is to establish itself  as the "true" representative of the Shi'a poor, and defending Iraq's Shi'a against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) and other radical Sunni Islamist groups.  Recently, the League began offering candidates for parliamentary seats as well, all the while seeking to replace the Sadrists as the champions of the Shi'a downtrodden.  In the process, the League has won the praise of Maliki who sees it as dividing the Shi'a poor by eroding the power of the Sadrists.

Strategy 8: Maintain ties with Iran and seek non-American arms supplies to hold the US in check 

To reduce pressure from the US to introduce economic and political reforms, Maliki retains close ties with Iran.  Ironically, the nation-state that the US most wanted to marginalize with its 2003 invasion of Iraq was Iran, one of the 3 members of the "Axis of Evil."  If the US exerts too much pressure, Maliki can always promote policies that counter US regional interests, e.g., facilitating Iran's ability to deliver arms and materiel to Bashar al-Asad's Ba'thist regime in Syria.

Maliki recently turned to Russia to purchase helicopters to fight ISIS and al-Qa'ida forces in al-Anbar Province.  At the same time, the parliamentary Security and Defense Committee was conveniently complaining about the US delay in delivering modern armaments to Iraq.  It called on Maliki to find other sources of arms.  In this context, Maliki has mobilized a campaign to keep the US silent in light of his efforts to construct a neo-authoritarian regime based in sectarian identities.

Strategy 9:  Blame (Sunni) Saudi Arabia for terrorism in Iraq to promote Shi'i sectarianism

Maliki continues to issue declarations blaming Saudi Arabia, and by extension the Arab Gulf states, for sponsoring terrorist groups in Iraq.  While there is little doubt that individual wealthy donors in the Gulf have contributed funds to radical Sunni Islamist groups fighting in Syria and Iraq, Maliki's charge that the sectarian violence that Iraq is experiencing is the responsibility of the KSA and its Gulf allies is unwarranted.

A more pernicious goal underlying the constant accusations against the Saudi and Arab Gulf states is to promote a divide between the Shi'a and Sunni Arabs in Iraq.  Just like Saddam Husayn's so-called  al-Qadisiya Campaign during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, when the Iraqi leader focused on the purported age-old hatred of the Persians (Iran) for the Arabs, so Maliki is trying to create the obverse.

Implicitly he is turning al-Qadisiya on its head by arguing that Sunni Muslims despise the Shi'a.  This campaign is intended to shift Iraqi social and political preferences for cross-ethnic and cross-confessional interactions - seen, for example, in the traditionally high rate of Sunni-Shi'i intermarriage - from horizontally (inter-ethnic/confessional) to vertically based identities (intra- ethnic/confessional).  In the process, Maliki is, along with his supporters in the political elite, seeking to realign Iraqi politics along sectarian lines.

Strategy 10:  Support domestic policies that encourage sectarian identities

During the fall of 2013, the Basra based Virtue Party (Hizb al-Fadila) introduced a new personal status law that would apply to Iraq's Shi'i population.  Called the Qanun al-Ahwal al-Shakhsiya al-Ja'fari, this law radically restricts the rights of Iraqi women.  Although al-Fadila was at one point opposed to Maliki, e.g., during the parliamentary hearings in 2009 charging the Minister of Trade, Abd al-Falah al-Sudani, and other State of Law ministers with corruption, it is now aligned with Maliki.

Despite an outcry from women and secular Iraqis, especially because Iraq currently possesses one of the most progressive personal status laws in the Middle East, Maliki has not opposed the new law.  The proposed personal status law would lower the age at which a woman could be forced to marry from 18 to 9, legitimize marital rape and restrict a Shi'i woman's ability to travel without a husband or male relative.
   
The reason that Maliki has not opposed the law is political, rather than being concerned with the status of women.  It is part of a strategy to undermine cross-ethnic and cross-confessional cooperation by fostering vertically rather than horizontally based identities.  If the Shi'a pass their own personal status law, then the Sunni Arabs will probably follow suit, creating the type of confessional system found in Lebanon.  If Maliki and his fellow sectarian entrepreneurs (tujjar al-siyasa) are successful, it will make secular coalitions that cross ethnic and confessional lines all that more difficult to mobilize in the future.

Winning the battle but losing the war

Maliki has followed a politically shrewd strategy to increase his power and influence.  As noted above, he will probably, after a lengthy struggle, win a third term as prime minister.  However, his victory will be a Pyrrhic one and there will be a steep price to pay.

First, Maliki has alienated almost all of Iraq's political factions - Sunni Arabs, the Kurds, the Sadrists and even parts of the conservative Shi'i middle classes, e.g., the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council.  In light of the hostility he has evoked through his policies and behavior, little in the way of improving social services, let alone confronting nepotism and corruption within the state bureaucracy, will occur.

Second, the security situation will continue to deteriorate.  Iraqi forces have been unable to secure Baghdad and have made little headway in suppressing ISIS insurgents in al-Anbar Province.  Commenting on the ineptitude of Iraqi security forces, an Iraqi observer noted that no high ranking officers were lost during the 8 years of the Iran-Iraq War while a number, including at least one general, have already been killed in only a short time in al-Anbar (see al-Hayat, Apr. 18).  His point was to underscore the lack of competence of Iraq's military and security forces.

Third, Maliki will find that, Iraq's massive hydrocarbon wealth, oil and natural gas, notwithstanding, foreign investors will be increasingly loathe to invest in (Arab) Iraq's energy sector, given the increased political instability and deteriorating security situation.  As Grand Ayatollah Ali -al-Sistani recently noted, in criticizing Maliki's new budget for the coming fiscal year, economic growth is entirely predicated on hydrocarbon wealth to the exclusion of all other sectors of the economy.

Finally, if the already unacceptable high rate of poverty increases, due to the lack of any social policy designed to attack unemployment and provide job training, and Maliki continues to alienate large numbers of Sunni Arabs by accusing them of supporting terrorism, he could find himself facing major threats to the north and as well to the south. Unable to provide security in the Iraqi capital, he may find himself increasingly a Hamid Karzai type ruler, largely isolated and confined to Baghdad's Green Zone.

The "fish rots from the head down."  Maliki has made his bed and now he will have to lie in it.

Making Sense of the Arab Spring 6: The End of Islamism?

Predicting political change has not been one of political scientists' strong points.  Few foresaw the collapse of the Soviet Union and communism or the Oslo Accords between Israel and the PLO that led to the famous handshake between Yitzhak Rabin and Yasir Arafat on the White House lawn in 1993.  Virtually no one predicted the Arab Spring.  However, once the Arab uprisings began, there was a wide consensus among Western analysts and policy-makers that Islamists would be the beneficiaries (see my "Who's Afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood?," Feb. 13, 2011; http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2011/02/whos-afraid-of-muslim-brotherhood.html).  In their view, the ouster of Arab autocrats would realize their worst fears - the spread of Islamic rule throughout the Arab world.

In their political projections, Western analysts were spurred on by the self-serving comments of  dictators such as Yemen's Ali Abdallah Salih who stated that , "The Arab Spring was born dead. It came in the shadow of hard circumstances in the Middle East, and it became a weapon in the hands of the Islamic movements."

Why, contrary to Western predictions, has Islamism not profited from the Arab Spring?  Why has the fear that Islamists would dominate the region not been realized?  Why, after almost 35 years, has there still been only one successful "Islamic revolution" in the Middle East, one that faces considerable opposition from the Iranian people?  Why do Western analysts keep getting it wrong?

One of the most striking developments following the ouster of Egyptian president Husni Mubarak in Egypt was the rise and precipitous fall of the Muslim Brotherhood.   After being elected president in June 2012, Muhammad Mursi, one of the most prominent Muslim Brotherhood leaders, was deposed in June 2013 following massive demonstrations demanding his ouster.  At present, the Muslim Brotherhood has been designated a terrorist organization by the Egyptian government and largely forced underground.  Mursi is on trial for treason.  

The loss of power and influence by this venerable 85 year old organization has been breathtaking, especially considering its impact on a wide variety of Islamist movements and parties throughout the Arab world.  This influence extends to the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the Jordanian Islamic Action Front, the Islah Party in Yemen, the al-Nahda Party in Tunisia, the Iraqi Islamic Party and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, just to name a few.

Yet it is not just the Muslim Brotherhood that has fallen on hard times.  In Tunisia, the al-Nahda (Renaissance) Party scored a solid electoral victory in October 2011, winning 40% of parliamentary seats.  Like the Brotherhood, it was also forced from office.  While al-Nahda decided to withdraw from power when they saw how unpopular they had become, their rise and fall points yet again to the simplistic model that many analysts have imposed on the state of Arab politics.  As I argue below, the popularity of Islamist parties has not been based on some abstract notion of religion or a function of increased religiosity of Muslim citizens of Arab states.

In Libya, great fear was expressed that Islamists would pick up the political pieces in the wake of the overthrow of the Qaddafi regime in August 2011.  Islamists did not do particularly well in the June 2012 parliamentary elections.  The National Forces Alliance, a liberal-secular bloc headed by Mahmud Jibril, won 47% of the vote to the Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party 10% of the vote.

In the broader Libyan political context, power continues to reside with the tribal militias that played a critical role in ousting Muammar al-Qaddafi, with Islamists largely confined to the sidelines.  When the radical Ansar al-Shari'a movement claimed responsibility for the killing of US Ambassador Christopher Smith and 3 American embassy guards in September 2012, residents of Benghazi subsequently burned the organization's headquarters and forced its members to go into hiding.

As security has  deteriorated in Libya with tribal militias refusing to give up their arms and submit to central government authority, intra-Islamist violence has escalated.  Increasingly radical Islamists have been targeting moderate Islamists, i.e., those who advocate elections and constitutional governance.  In the coastal town of Derna, long known for its Islamist orientation, radical elements have been assassinating members of the local Muslim Brotherhood's Justice and Construction Party who support a transition to democracy.

In Yemen, where strongman Ali Abdallah Salih was finally ousted in February 2012, rule was transferred to his former vice president, Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi. Pursuing a comprehensive strategy of national reconciliation and advocating a federal structure for Yemen to accommodate regional and tribal divisions, Hadi has won a grudging amount of popularity.  While still popular in some quarters, many Yemenis look upon the local Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, al-Islah (Reform) Party, with suspicion given its cooperation with former dictator Ali Abdallah Salih.  This perception has only received greater credibility as Salih has tried to regain some of his former power through working with al-Islah.

In Iraq, the al-Da'wa Islamiya Party is Iraq's oldest Islamist party.  However, one would be hard pressed to find Islamism among its current policies, apart from a sectarianism that targets not only Sunni Arabs and Kurds, but secular and liberal Shi'a as well.  Indeed, aware of Iraqis pragmatic approach to politics, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has subsumed the Da'wa Party under the umbrella of his State of Law Coalition that suggests a focus on law and order rather than a concern with Islamist symbolism.

Why then has Islamism been such a failure?  Can it not be argued that Islamism is actually on the rise if we look to the growth of the al-Qa'ida affiliate, the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, the subordination of the secular Syrian opposition to Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham, the activity of al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (North Africa) in Mali and Algeria, and the continued attacks on the Yemeni military and police by al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula?

The problem with this argument is that the radical groups just mentioned alienate the very populations that they purport to represent once these people fall under their so-called Islamic "amirates" (principalities). Preventing young men from watching soccer games in coffee houses, cutting off the fingers of men caught smoking, forbidding women from leaving their homes without a male relative, and stealing from merchants and others in the name of "Islam," has led to a decline in the popularity of such groups.

Further, radical Islamists see moderate Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood and its affiliates as little better than Western "apostates."  As we have recently seen in Syria, radical Islamists - in this case the ISIS and the Nusra Front - spend more time fighting each other than the Ba'thist regime of Bashar al-Asad.  What Western analysts often fail to realize is the extent to which criminal activity is a core component of the daily activities of radical Islamist groups - to pay their fighters, to buy weapons and to take control of lucrative activities, such as oil smuggling in Syria.

These criminal activities come at a cost because they are achieved at the expense of the local populace.  Syrians, Iraqis and others resent the loss of their possessions. They come to see that the imposition of what radical Islamist groups call "Sharia law" as actually no more than a "make it up as they go" policy under the guise of religion that is in really designed to legitimate theft and brutality.

The Islamism discussed in this post is not the "invented tradition" of radicals who, while technically proficient in bomb making and skilled in weapons procurement and criminal activities, often have only the vaguest understanding of Islam.  Usually déclassé, and not having had the opportunity to attend school, they are often unable to read, much less study Islamic texts.

Islamism in the present context is the supposed alternative to authoritarian rule offered by parties such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the Tunisian al-Nahda and the Yemeni al-Islah.   Having languished in opposition for years, many Arabs thought these parties would bring a new approach to politics that included a focus on economic development, fighting corruption and reigning in the hated secret police and regime thugs.

Secularists did not have the advantages of Islamist parties that were given the status of the "loyal opposition" by authoritarian regimes such as that of Egyptian president, Husni Mubarak.  Allowing the Brothers limited power in Egypt served as a foil whereby Mubarak could consistently deflect calls for democratization by posing the question: "Do you really want the Muslim Brotherhood to take power?"  Secular forces that initiated the Arab Spring also did not have the organizational structure of the Islamist organizations that benefited from the important institution of the mosque and the Friday prayers.

Islamists also benefited from preferential treatment in relation to the secular and liberal parties which authoritarian regimes viewed as a greater threat to their rule.  In Egypt, liberal and leftist parties were denied licenses to operate. And when the reformist Center Party (Hizb al-Wasat) split from the Muslim Brotherhood in 1996, the Brotherhood worked with the Mubarak regime to prevent it from obtaining a license to operate.

In this context, we should not forget that it was Anwar al-Sadat who released Muslim Brothers from prison after the death of Gamal Abd al-Nasir in September 1970.  Sadat wanted the Brotherhood to perform the dirty work of smashing the pro-Soviet wing of the Nasirist Arab Socialist Union which opposed his rule.  Thus Islamism was legitimized by the state beginning in the early 1970s.

The political tableau presented here is much more complex than the Muslim Brotherhood's simplistic neologism, "Islam is the solution" (Islam al-hall), or the implicit prognostication of many Western analysts that "Islam is inevitable."   In the wake of the unrest of the past 3 years, the Arab world continues to be characterized by widespread ideological fluidity, even confusion, and political indeterminacy.

When asked why they now oppose Mursi and the Brotherhood, Egyptians bitterly complain that he did not address pressing problems while he was president, such as the improving the economy, attacking corruption, and reforming the brutal security police.  Instead, they argue Mursi sought to Islamize Egyptian society and suppress free speech.  What is most striking is the vitriol of deeply religious Egyptians who assert that no Muslim Brother is to be trusted with political power.

Active for 85 years, the Muslim Brotherhood lost almost all its power and influence in less than 12 months.  In an ironic turn of events, given the Brotherhood's opposition to the Center Party, the Salafi Party of Light (Hizb al-Nur) has cooperated with the military junta that deposed Muhammad Mursi and now receives special treatment from the state for its opposition to the Brotherhood.  Plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose - the  more things change, the more they stay the same.

The most effective leaders in the Arab Spring have been the Tunisian secular leadership and the Yemeni leadership of President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi.  In the first instance, Tunisia's leaders have avoided the temptation of lording their victory over their Islamist rivals in the al-Nahda Party and have sought to work with moderate Islamists.  For his part, President Hadi has sought to gradually ease Salih supporters out of the officer corps, reorganize Yemen according to a federal system, and publicly promote a  policy of national reconciliation.  In both cases, political pluralism and respect for diversity have at least achieved a foothold

Democratic transitions in the Arab world will need to conform to three criteria if they are to be successful.  First, they will need to insure personal freedoms, especially freedom of expression, human rights and the rule of law.  Second, they will need to address social justice issues, such as jobs, housing, health care ans education.  Finally, they will need to promote political and cultural pluralism, namely respect for the Other.  Can a democratic Islamism conform to these criteria?  That is a critical but as yet unanswered question in the wake of the Arab uprisings.

In  my next post, I examine the upcoming elections in Iraq, followed by a post in which I argue that the most successful effort at  a democratic transition in the wake of the Arab uprisings will  most likely be that of Tunisia.

The University of Kufa conference on "Religious Pluralism and Tolerance in the Dialogue of Civilizations"

Recently I had the privilege to attend a conference, “Religious Pluralism and Tolerance in the Dialogue of Civilizations” (al-Ta’addudiya al-Diniya wa-l-Tasamuh fi Ufuq al-Hadarat), that was sponsored by the University of Kufa and the Institute for Intellectual Studies in al-Najaf Governorate.  What was the purpose of the conference and what did it accomplish?

I have attended many conferences in the Middle East but this one was truly unique.  First, it sought to address in a very direct way the problem of sectarianism that has become a social and political disease in much of the Middle East.  Secondly, it brought together members of a wide variety of religions, confessions and ethnic groups to discuss the threat that sectarianism and the violence that it produces poses not just to the Middle East but the global community as a whole. Third, it asked speakers to present not only analytic but normative papers, namely those that offered solutions to the problems they raised in their presentations.

Dr. Akeel Abd Yasssin

The conference, which is part of an effort of the University of Kufa to bring a UNESCO Chair in Inter-Faith Dialogue to the university, assembled a truly impressive group of participants.  The conference was organized under the leadership of the President of the University of Kufa, Dr. Akeel Abd Yassin.  It was also sponsored by the Institute for Intellectual Studies in al-Najaf, directed by Sayyid Ammar Abu Rgheif. 

The conference invited clerics from a wide variety of confessional backgrounds and countries.  Shiite, Sunni and Christian clerics from Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and academics from Iraq, Northern Ireland, Iran and the United States contributed to the conference’s ecumenical quality.  Prince Hasan of Jordan made a presentation to the Opening Session via videoconferencing of which the conference organizers were very proud. 

The Grand Hall of the University of Kufa modeled after the Grand Mosque of Kufa

Sunni participants, such as Dr. Abd al-Sittar al-Jumaily, president of Samarra University, Shaykh Abdullateef al-Humayyim from al-Anbar, Dr. Farhan al-Tamimi, Professor of Comparative Religions and one of his graduate students from Tikrit University, and a colleague, Dr. Faris Kamal Omar Nadhmi from Salahiddin University in Arbil, also attended the conference, demonstrating its inclusive character.  All too often Western analysts reduce Iraqi society to an amalgam  of Sunnis, Shi’a and Kurds, who supposedly dislike and cannot get along with one another.   This Western bias was belied by the behavior of Shiites and Sunnis interacting in a relaxed and constructive manner that I witnessed at the conference and in al-Najaf - a pattern of behavior  that I have witnessed in many trips to Iraq going back to my first visit in May and June of 1980.

The conference’s Opening Session al-Najaf’s Place of Culture (Qasr al-Thaqafa) was attended by over 1000 guests.  The opening session as followed by a full day of panels in which speakers laid out arguments detailing that sectarianism and sectarian violence contradict the core tenets of all 3 of the world’s Abrahamic religions.  

What was most stunning about the conference was its ecumenical spirit.  Many different viewpoints were expressed on matters relating religion and public life.  Spirited debates not only took place during the conference sessions but at the luncheons and dinners that followed, where vigorous discussion continued.  The success of the conference cannot just be measured by the number and quality of the speakers, but by the fact that, in a country which the West often views through the conceptual prism of sectarianism, Iraqis and foreigners of widely divergent perspectives could come together and engage in an open dialogue without hostility or vituperation.

Before making my (Arabic) presentation in the afternoon session on the first day, I unfolded a large white T-shirt with the words “IRAQ MUSEUM” written on it.  I had hardly opened the shirt when the entire audience burst into applause, aware that this was part of the international effort to save the heritage of the Iraq Museum that was looted during the US invasion in 2003.  Indeed the shirt was distributed at a candlelight vigil, organized by the Rutgers University Department of Art History, at which I had been asked to speak in the spring of 2008 on the 5^th anniversary of the looting of the Iraq Museum.

I then gave my presentation, “Pluralism or Sectarianism?  Building a Tolerant Political Culture through Religion and Historical Memory in the New Iraq  (al-Ta^caddudiya aw al-Ta’ifiya?  ^cAmaliyat Bina’ al-Thaqafa al-Siyasiya al-Mutasamiha ^cala Usul al-Din wa-l-Dhakira al-Tarikhiya fi-i-^cIraq al-Jadid).     

Among other points, I argued for the need to rewrite Iraqi school textbooks to give a true representation of pre-Ba’thist Iraq. Iraqi youth – 70% of the population under the age of 30 – need to better comprehend that the current sectarian violence in Iraq is not the result of a set of “ancient hatreds” that set Iraqi apart, but the result of a state, both in Baghdad and Arbil, that has failed to meet its civic responsibilities and, as a result, allowed sectarian entrepreneurs (tujjar al-siyasa) to fill the economic, social and political  vacuum created the lack of social services and a leadership that emphasizes inclusiveness.

Beyond the conference, there were many developments at which to marvel at the University of Kufa.  The architecture of the main administration building, that houses President Akeel Abd Yassin’s office and many classrooms, is modeled on the Grand Mosque of Kufa.  Everywhere one looks, construction is taking place, either in expanding the university's existing faculties or building new ones.  

Conference participants at the Imam Ali Shrine

Among the faculty with whom I had the pleasure to meet, including Dr. Abbas Alaboudy, Dean of the Faculty of Dentistry, Dr. Hassan Hadi Ali, Director of the Postgraduate Office and Senior Lecturer in the Faculty of Chemical Pharmaceutical Sciences, and Dr. Sabah Sahib al-Aread, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, among others, I sensed a real urgency to promote the University of Kufa. 

Indeed, every professor I met possessed a strong sense of mission in viewing the building the University of Kufa as part of the process of creating a new democratic and tolerant Iraq.  Those faculty educated in the West are not afraid to borrow what it has to offer.  Thus I felt that President Akeel Yassin and his faculty represent a model for an increasingly globalized world – educators who are proud of and secure in their past (al-turath al-‘Iraqi), but keen to learn from societies and cultures beyond Iraq’s borders.  

What is particularly striking about the faculty at the University of Kufa is the number of young professors who are already producing impressive scholarly works.  As an example, I could cite a book length study, American Strategy towards Iran following the Events of September 11, 2001 (al-Istratagiyat al-Amirikiya tujaha Iran ba’d Ahdath Aylul ‘Amm 2001), by Dr. Baha’ Adnan al-Sa’bari, that was published by the Hammurabi Center for Research and Strategic Studies in Baghdad (2012).  

When I visited Iraq during the 1980s, many Iraqis spoke excellent English and many had been educated abroad, often in the US or the UK.   With the impact of the UN sanctions of the 1900s that devastated Iraq's educational system, Iraqi intellectuals, especially younger ones, are working to learn English and other foreign languages. Having held talks with President Akeel Yassin and his staff, we hope that Rutgers University will be able to offer English classes via videoconferencing and that Rutgers students may be able to study Arabic at the University of Kufa.

Part of my trip in south-central Iraq was spent in al-Najaf.  Visiting the shrine of Imam Ali was a very

Drs. Gerry McKenna, Faris Nadhni and Roy Mottahedeh inside the Imam Ali Shrine

moving experience.  Marveling at the beautiful glass work on the ceiling of the Imam Ali Shrine, a Sunni friend pointed out that all the delicate inlay had been done by Sunni artisans from al-Anbar Province, some of whom he knew.  He noted that the area around Abu Ghayb in eaastern Anbar Province is known for glasswork and, of course, the guardians of the Shrine wanted the best possible decoration provided for it.  When I asked if artisans coming from al-Anbar to al-Najaf created any issues, my friend looked at me quizzically – why should it, he asked?

Inside the shrine, I was joined by Professor Roy Mottahedeh of Harvard University, one of world’s most prominent historians of Islam, Dr. Gerry McKenna, former Vice-Chancellor and President of the University of Ulster, who is known for the educational reforms he introduced in Northern Ireland, Dr. Hassan Nadhem, who is Academic Adviser to Dr. Akeel Yassin, Editor-in- Chief of the Kufa Review and Professor of Islamic Studies at the Islamic College for Advanced Studies, and Dr. Faris Kamal Omar Nadhmi, Professor of Psychology at Salahiddin University and author of a number of important studies on the social psychology of marginalized groups in Iraq and on political Islam. 

A number of other conference participants joined us, including a graduate student in history  from Tikrit University.  He, like Shiite members of the conference group, kissed the latticework on the Imam Ali Shrine and the walls.  When I asked him if he had been to the Shrine before, he said that he had, reinforcing the many stories that I have heard from Shiite colleagues from south-central Iraq that many Sunnis visit Shiite shrines there each year.

While in al-Najaf, we ate at the Holy Shrine Guesthouse (Diyafat al-‘Ataba al-Sharifa) that serves two meals daily and feeds 3000 people in the city each day.  Conference participants were invited to eat there and enjoyed delicious nourishing meals.  This was an impressive example of efforts to address social justice needs in al-Najaf which has a long history throughout the 20^th century of Shi’i clerics actively participating in the Iraqi nationalist movement and fighting for this issue.

Shrine of Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu'i

A group of conference members had the honor to be invited to the home of Sayyid Jawad al-Khu’i, grandson of Grand Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim al-Khu’i (1899-1992), the immediate predecessor of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.

During our discussion of the conference theme on pluralism

Sayyid Jawad al-Khu'i

(al-ta’addudiya), Sayyid Jawad noted that the headquarters of the al-Najaf branch of the Iraqi Communist Party was located just down the street from his house on al-Muthaaan St. in the Hayy al-Sa’d district.  He indicated that this was another example of how the citizens of al-Najaf live together and respect divergent points of view.  Indeed, after leaving Sayyid Jawad’s house, we saw the bright red lights of the Iraqi Communist Party headquarters.

Ayatollah Muhammad Bahr al-'Ulum

A number of us also visited the new Ma’had al-‘Alamayn that was establish by another distinguished Najafi clerical family, that of Ayatollah Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum, and his son Dr. Ibrahim Bahr al-‘Ulum, Iraq’s former Minister of Oil.  This institute specializes in training its students in law and political science and is a new private institution of higher learning.

As Ayatollah Muhammad and Dr. Ibrahim showed us around the Institute, we met a number of students who explained the nature of their research for either a MA or Ph.D degree.  Many of the topics related to us speak to Iraq’s future needs, such as those of adequate water for irrigation and agricultural purposes, and developing a federal political system that meets the needs of all Iraq’s citizens. 

Dr. Ibrahim informed us that 55% of the students are drawn
from al-Najaf Governorate, but that there are many students from Sunni provinces and from Iraq's Kurdish majority provinces (in the KRG).  During examinations for MA and Ph.D examinations, we learned that all examination committees must be comprised of Sunni as well as Shiite faculty members.

Dr. Ibrahim Bahr al-'Ulum

While in al-Najaf, Dr. Hassan Nadhem took a number of us, including conference speaker, Dr., Abdul Aziz Sachedina, one of the most prominent scholars of Shiism and currently a professor at George Mason University, to the home of Dr. Muhammad Sa’id al-Turayhi, the Editor-in-Chief of the journal al-Mawsam, and sometime professor at Leiden University.

Dr. al-Turayhi showed us the manner in which he has renovated his beautiful home along the Euphrates River that has been in his family’s possession for over 130 years.  We also were joined by his daughter Zeinab who is an accomplished human rights lawyer.  We were all pleased to receive copies of Dr. al-Turayhi’s latest writings, including Massihiyun wa Shi'a: Jadal al-Lawhut wa Muqarabat al-Tarikh wa-l-Mithilugiya (Christians and Shi’a: The Dialectics of Theology and Approaches History and Mythology), and vol. 102 of al-Mawsam, on the rule of General ‘Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), entitled Jumhuriyat al-Za’im (The Leader’s Republic). 

No academic can resist a trip to the book market and, for me, al-Najaf was no exception.  Dr Sabah Aread, the Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science, was kind enough to take me to the al-Huwayyish district where we walked through narrow alleyways that remined me of an earlier sojourn in book shopping in Cairo many years ago.  

When we arrived at Mustafa Bookstore (Makatabat Mustafa), Dr. Sabah introduced me to Abu Layth, the owner.  The bookstore was filled with so many books, that we would have spent most of the afternoon if our schedule had not prohibited it.  When I asked Ustadh Abu Layth for any new books on Iraqi politics and society, he pulled out a copy of the Arabic translation of my Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, not knowing that I was the author.  It was a pleasant surprise to learn that the Arabic translation, published by Maher Kayyali's Arab Institure for Research and Publishing, was selling briskly in Iraq.  I purchased so many books that I had all I could do to transport them back to the United States.

Dr. Hassan Nadhem introducing my talk at the Iraqi Writers Union

My lecture focused on the theme of, “Iraq after 2003: What is the Vision of the Future State and Can it be Implemented?” (Iraq ba’d ma 2003: Hall min Ruw’iya ‘Amm li-l-Dawla wa Kayfa al-Sabil li Bulughiha?).  I argued that Iraq needs to develop a strong foundation for democracy built on a historical memory of tolerance and cultural diversity.  I argued for an education system that emphasizes respect for the past but an openness to critical thinking and borrowing from other cultures to enrich the struggle to develop an indigenous democratic political culture.

My trip to al-Najaf al-Ashraf was a wonderful experience. Ayatollah Muhammad Bahr al-‘Ulum recently sent word through my friend and colleague, Dr. Hassan Nadhem, that he still can see the white T-shirt that I displayed before my lecture in the afternoon session of the first day of the conference.  That was a particularly warm reminder that the spirit of pluralism and tolerance still flourishes in al-Najaf al-Ashraf.  

It will be a fitting end to the conference on Religious Pluralism and Tolerance in the Dialogue of Civilizations if the University of Kufa does in fact receive a UNESCO Chair in Inter-Faith Studies.  Let's hope that receiving that chair becomes a reality.