Corruption, Corona Virus, Collapse: How Can the Iraqi People Survive the Demise of the Green Zone Elite?الفساد ، فيروس كورونا ، الانهيار: كيف يمكن للعراق أن ينجو من زوال النخبة في المنطقة الخضراء؟

"Corruption is devouring Iraq"

Is Iraq’s political class on the brink of collapse?  Three crises have combined to create the greatest threat to Baghdad’s Green Zone elite since the Bush administration put it in power after toppling Saddam Husayn in 2003. What does this “perfect storm” of crises suggest about the immediate future of Iraqi politics? What implications does it have for other nation-states who suffer the same problems as Iraq?

The possible fragmentation and collapse of Iraq's political class raises a key question. How should the Iraqi people respond to this problem?  What options do they have? Using the example of Iraq's October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) which, organized by Iraqi youth, has mobilized tens of thousands of Iraqi in Baghdad and the cities and towns of the south, I suggest Iraqis build on the local networks which have been developed to ride out the existing period of political, social and economic instability.

Since 2005, when a new political class began to crystallize after 2 national parliamentary elections in January and December 2005, Iraq has suffered from extensive corruption and nepotism. Despite the initial enthusiasm of Iraqis for democracy, seen in public opinion polls and voter turnout which reached 60% in early national elections, there has been a secular decline in the trust Iraqis place in their political leaders and political institutions.  With the low turnout in the May 2018 national elections, estimated at 44% but probably much lower, the level of discontent with the Green Zone elite reached a new low

"14,000 cases of corruption opened and $450 billion in losses"

Corrupt governance has become institutionalized in Iraq. It is no exaggeration that what I refer to as “sectarian entrepreneurs” have seized control of the state, including its executive branch and legislature and civil bureaucracy.  Transparency International’s statistics summarize the situation well: Iraq is ranked 162 of 180 nations in the NGO’s 2019 Corruption Perception Index (compared to Iran which is ranked 146/180 and Saudi Arabia which is ranked 51/180).
Iraq's ranking on Transparency International's 2019 Perception of Corruption Index I

Details of the negative impact of corruption on Iraq society

Corruption has prevented Iraq from making all but minimal progress since 2005 in improving social services, diversifying the economy, increasing the number of jobs available to youth entering the job market, improving primary and secondary school education, strengthening the health care system, generating jobs for women, or addressing the problems of lack of potable water and reliable electricity in many parts of the country.  Instead, Iraq’s political class have been content to live off the “fat of the land,” namely exploit Iraq’s oil wealth which constitute 95-97% of Iraq’s foreign revenue stream.

By 2019, Iraqis’ patience with the crooked and isolated Green Zone elite had run out.  The blatant nature of corrupt governance was a fundamental driver behind the peaceful uprising led by Iraq youth which began in early October 2019 which has come to be known as the “October Revolution” (Thawrat Tishreen).

Iraq's national hero -  Lt. General ^CAbd al-Wahhab al-Sa^Cdi

The tipping point for the uprising was, in part, anger at the firing of Lt. General ^CAbd al-Wahhab al-Sa^Cdi, who became a national hero after defeating the Da^cish terrorist's "Caliphate" in Mosul and north central Iraq in 2017, from his position as a high ranking officer in Iraq’s elite Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS).  It also reflected Iraqi youth’s anger at the lack of jobs, poor and non-existent social services and, above all, the widespread corruption within the Iraqi government.

Iraqis express their anger at Iran's Khamenei and the late Qasem Sulimani

Quickly, however, the youth uprising became a demand for fundamental political and social reforms.  The cry for social democracy - meaning free and fair elections, government transparency and accountability, and the improvement of Iraqis' standard of living - rallied thousands of Iraqi youth, and millions more older Iraqis, who supported these calls for change.  Among the demands were direct election of Iraq’s president and the formation of single member electoral districts to end the power of “political parties” (actually small cliques of power brokers) from dominating Iraq’s Council of Deputies (parliament) and government.

A major demand of the October Revolution is ending Iran’s control over Iraq’s political process, especially through proxy militias, such as Kata‘ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and al-Nujaba’, which provide the Tehran regime with hard currency and other financial services (in addition to engaging in other illicit activities, including human trafficking and organ trafficking).  The number of Iraqi youth who have been killed by militia members, and militia members who have been given positions in the Ministry of Interior (known as al-damaj), is close to 1000, while the number wounded which has reached 25,000.  Leaders of the uprising have been kidnapped and torturing in Baghdad and throughout other cities and towns where demonstrations have taken place. 

Cartoon calling for the ouster of Iran from Iraq and Lebanon

This violent response, which was orchestrated by Quds Force general, Qasem Suleimani, and former Kata’ib Hizballah leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, both of whom were killed by a US drone strike on January 3, 2020, indicates the degree to which Iran views the October Revolution’s demand for democracy as a major, if not  existential, threat.  However, the corona virus pandemic has made it much more difficult for Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq to operate and coordinate their activities, much less engage in cross border economic activity, given the size and impact of the pandemic in Iran and now in Iraq.

Procedures in Baghdad to attempt to control the Covid-19 pandemic

Still active this March, before the Covid-19 pandemic hit Iraq, the October Revolution has shaken Iraq’s political class.  In late November, 2019, it forced the resignation of Prime Minister ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi.  Although ^cAbd al-Mahdi, a weak leader who largely followed Iranian dictates, has remained as caretaker prime minister, as of this writing, the political class hasn’t been able to agree upon a replacement.  Because the youth protestors enjoy widespread support among the Iraqi populace, the political class has been forced to take the uprising seriously. Indeed, Adnan al-Zurfi, the prime minister designate, has indicated that the two issues which of are of greatest concern are the Covid-19 pandemic and the October Revolution demonstrations.

In the Iraqi press, the term “the street” has come to mean that the Green Zone elite must take into account the reaction of the supporters of the October Revolution when proposing a new candidate to replace ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi as prime minister. This has led to a split within the Green Zone elite between those who seek a candidate who will at least introduce some important reforms to the political system, and those, largely drawn from supporters of Iran and its proxy militias, who adamantly oppose any political reforms at all.

The second shock to Iraq’s political class was the outbreak of the corona virus (Covid-19) pandemic in China in late 2019.  When the Chinese economy shut down as the disease spread beyond the city of Wuhan, global demand for oil declined.  By the end of March, the price of oil had dropped well below $30/bbl., erasing 50% of Iraq’s income from foreign oil sales.

If Covid-19 produced an external shock in the form of rapidly declining oil prices, the Iraqi state wasn’t prepared for the internal shock of a severe national health crisis. Whatever the correct figure, which ranges from 2.5% to 5.5% of Iraq’s annual budget which is spent on the health, Iraq’s health care infrastructure is unable to treat the large number of patients who are expected to contract the Covid-19 corona virus. Indeed, President Barham Salih warned Iraqis to practice “social distancing,” indicating that Iraq’s health care system isn’t capable to handling the crisis.

Pres. Barham Salih urges Iraqis to stay at home because the health care system is too weak to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic

Due to corruption, many hospitals and health care clinics fail to receive adequate or proper amounts of medicine and medical equipment from the state.  Rather than reaching public medical facilities, government procured medicines and supplies are frequently sold in the private market.  Patients often need to pay bribes to receive proper treatment in Iraqi hospitals.  Despite a rise in oil prices prior to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, when the Minister of Health recently requested $5 million to support the fight against the corona virus, he learned that no funds were available.

Because populist leaders and clerics, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, refuse to warn their followers of the need to socially isolate themselves and instead allow large gatherings at religious shrines, the Covid-19 pandemic is destined to harm those segments of the Iraqi populace which are least able to fight it, namely the poor and marginalized sectors of  society.

The third crisis is the collapse of the global oil market.  Adding to the dramatic drop in industrial production worldwide, Saudi Arabia and Russia began a war over oil prices after Vladimir Putin refused to follow OPEC’s decision in March to cut oil prices.  Saudi Arabia responded by increasing its output and offering selected buyers discounted prices.  Because Putin has transformed the Russian economy to dependence on oil, this new flood of crude led to a drop in prices which, on March 30, were at $20/barrel.  To realize what damage this collapse of the oil market is causing to the Iraqi economy, we need remember that Iraq earns between 95 and 97% of its foreign revenues from oil sales.

What is to be done?  First, let’s consider the mutually reinforcing impact of corruption, the corona virus, and the collapse of oil prices on the Green Zone elite.  Since 2005, corruption and nepotism have become institutionalized components of Iraq’s political process. That means that the various political cliques (referred to officially as “political parties”) and their leaders have come to expect a certain proportion of the economic pie each year.  The “take” of each party was not arrived at without struggle and is recalibrated as the political fortunes of different political cliques and their leaders rise and fall.

The period since the October Revolution uprising has already demonstrated the fragility of the relations among the competing cliques within the Green Zone elite.  Once the youth protestors forced the resignation of ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi following the killing, wounding, kidnapping and torture of large number of peaceful youth protestors, the internal weakness of Iraq's political class was clear for all to see.

Speaker of Iraq's Council of Deputies, Muhammad al-Halbusi

The Green Zone elite, which an Iraqi friend and colleague likens to Naguib Mahfouz’s “haraafeesh” (الحرافيش), is an amalgam of competing interests whose focus is limited to their short-term interests in accumulating as much wealth, political power and status as the can, through manipulating laws and regulations or via illicit activities, e.g., the Speaker of Parliament waiving customs duties for Iraqi merchants who import cigarettes in exchange for bribes.  

What the Green Zone elite has demonstrated is its complete lack of any vision for Iraq’s future.  They are not only isolated and fragmented but have shown no interests in proposing and implementing new public initiatives which would address and offer solutions to Iraq’s many infrastructural shortcomings.  In effect, they have sat in their offices collecting salaries, benefitting from many perks, such as subsidized housing in Baghdad, fleets of cars, and drivers and numerous assistants to meet their every needs.

To date, little attention has been paid to what the Covid-19 pandemic and global oil market collapse will have on the inner workings of the Green Zone elite. The “division of the spoils” among competing groups in Iraq’s political class wasn’t arrived at without struggle. Further, who benefits from corruption and nepotism is not a static process. In other worlds, who gets what, when, where and how is constantly being renegotiated as the strengths and fortunes of cliques within the political class rise and fall.

Irans' Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and Iraqi militia leaders

What the current crisis suggests is that the already weak fabric of Iraq’s political class could very well be shredded by the internal conflict which is developing over distributing an ever dwindling amount of material resources. Oil revenues are tanking, cross-border trade with Iran has become much more difficult, the fear of holding face to face meetings to try and sustain corrupt and illicit activities, and travel within Iraq all create obstacles which the Green Zone elite has never had to tackle.

Further, anger is evident in the possible shortage of food products and the fees and taxes the government has imposed on bakeries and other essential small businesses. We have already seen such anger in al-Nasiriya where local residents fear bakeries may be forced to close due to stifling government financial regulations.

Nasrawis ask why Iraqis who suffered during the March 1991 uprising (Intifadat Sha^cban) against Saddam Husayn, many of whom sought refuge from Saddam’s forces in. Saudi Arabian camps near the northern town of Rafha’ near the Iraqi-Saudi border, still receive salaries to this day when many live outside Iraq and many poor Iraqis receive no government support at all.

Iraqis in Dhi Qra Province protest against government taxes and fees on bakeries and local businesses

Given the decline of the Green Zone elite, as a result of declining financial resources, trying to juggle the pressures from the Iraqi populace as the Covid-19 pandemic spreads, and medicine and food shortages extend to all parts of the country, and the pressures from Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq, what are the opportunities for democratic forces in Iraq to benefit from this situation?

Until the youth supporters of the October Revolution, who were demonstrating  in Baghdad and cities and towns throughout southern Iraq were forced to suspend their activities, they established strong networks, not only among the youth of many cities and towns, but among local residents who believe in their cause.  Now is the time to transform these networks into an organized political movement which can be ready to compete in the next national elections.

As long as this movement is based on local ties and supporters, but linked together across cities and towns, it can be successful.  Using social media, the goals and strategies for meeting these goals, can be discussed and debated through social media. Candidates for local and national offices can be chosen and efforts can be made to force officers in security forces in cities and towns who have killed or wounded Iraqi youth protestors to resign their positions.  Security force personnel who are sympathetic to the democratic platform of the October Revolution can take their places.  Local municipal councils and provincial governors can assist in this process.

October Revolution protestors in Baghdad's Liberation Square

It is a great a credit to the October Revolution that the peaceful youth protestors have categorically refused to respond to the brutal attacks on them by Ministry of Interior forces and the pro-Iranian militias, including those of the so-called “Blue Hats” of Muqtada al-Sadr Saraya al-Sallam.   The attacks only seem to have made the youth more determined to achieve their goals of democratic reform

Organization is the key concept in assuring the success of the October Revolution.  In addition to developing a powerful network which unites Iraqis who want to take their country back and establish a meaningful social democracy, the youth supporters of the October Revolution should continue giving assistance, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, to the poor, sick and needy in the areas where they have been protesting.  Such action demonstrates to the Iraqi people that the October Revolution is not just talk but meaningful action which makes such talk a reality.

The Covid-19 is a global tragedy in which no nation will be spared. However, postive social change can emerge from the pandemic. One of the most important aspects of this change is the decentralization of power away from authoritarian elites.  In Iraq, this means establishing a much stronger political presence in the cities and towns of its governorates, in addition to the residential quarters of Baghdad.

With the help of the youth who have organized the October Revolution, a new spirit of civic engagement can be promoted and institutionalized through groups coming together in each block of urban quarters.  Such groups can work to socialize more youth into the values of the October Revolution: social democracy, religious and cultural tolerance, gender equality, the rule of law, human rights, and an end to corruption and nepotism in Iraq's government, both in the Federal Government in Baghdad and in the Kurdish regional Government in Erbil.

Once the Covid-19 pandemic has ended, Iraqis could discover they have developed a new foundation for creating a true democracy in Iraq and bringing the corrupt governance which has brought their country to the brink of destruction to an end.