Sunday, November 29, 2020

A New Biden Foreign Policy in Iraq: Towards What End سياسة خارجية جديدة لبايدن في العراق: إلى أي نهاية؟

Then US Vice President Biden meets Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki
Having won the 2020 presidential elections, President-Elect Joe Biden has been quick to declare to the world that “America is back.”  Biden’s promise to end the Trump administration’s “America First” policy – in reality a hodgepodge of unstructured, contradictory and often reckless decisions – has pleased the US’s traditional allies, particularly those in Western Europe.  But what exactly does it mean to say that “America is back”?  And what are the implications for US foreign policy in Iraq? 

The MENA region is facing a number of dangerous crises, all of which directly or indirectly affect Iraq.  The most dangerous problem is the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. If “America is back” means the US will return to the Obama administration policies, the phrase has no meaning.  The MENA region has changed significantly in the last 4 years and the Biden administration needs to stake out new policies which reflect these changes.  To help Iraq, the most pressing issue facing the US is developing a new policy towards Iran. 

 

The idea that Iran will develop operational nuclear weapons anytime in the near future is highly unlikely.  Clearly, the United States and Israel have demonstrated the capability to impede that development.  However, Iran is engaged in enriching weapons grade uranium. Cyberattacks and assassinations of Iran’s nuclear program do not constitute a long-term strategy for thwarting Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons.  

 

As long as Iran continues to pursue a policy what could eventually allow it to acquire nuclear weapons, the MENA region faces the possibility of a nuclear arms race.  As one of the world’s most unstable regions, this prospect should cause us all to take pause.  Saudi Arabia and Turkey, 2 other candidates for developing nuclear weapons, would not allow Iran to possess a nuclear capability without developing them as well.  A Saudi-Egypt-UAE consortium could begin its own program, combining the technical skills and funding needed to make it a potential success.  Turkey would face more difficulties to fund a nuclear program but could probably develop a bomb.  

 

Should Iran develop nuclear weapons, even if its delivery capacity is lacking, Israel would no doubt be tempted to mount a preemptive strike.  Thus, the Biden administration has multiple incentives to reactivate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action adopted in October 2015. (JCPOA).  Neither the United States, the European Union or the United Nations can allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons which put the Middle East on a dangerous path leading a to regional war.  

 

If the Biden administration seeks to revive the JCPOA, it will encounter strong pushback from conservative Republicans in the US Senate and foreign policy hawks, like John Bolton, who argue military action is the only policy option towards the Islamic Republic.  In this context, the US should make clear to Iran that part of any deal which removes international sanctions is a commitment by Iran not only to end steps towards developing nuclear weapons but commit to a number of other policies.   

 

At the top of that list should be Iran’s commitment to dissolve its proxy militias in Iraq. Iran’s economic and political influence extends into almost all aspects of Iraqi society.  One of the main incentives for Iran’s efforts to control Iraq is economic.  Iraq provides an important market for many Iranian goods and vehicle for circumventing some of the sanctions it currently faces.  

 

Iraq also constitutes an important conduit for weapons and Iranian troops which support the genocidal Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad. The current Iraqi government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is in no position to interdict funds and supplies that flow across its borders.  On the evening of his assassination by a US drone this past January 3rd, Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC)  commander, Qassem Suleimani, had just flown from Tehran to Damascus and was on a stopover in Baghdad on his return to Iran to consult with Abu Mahdi Muhandis, the leaders of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (al-hashad al-sha’bi), who died in the drone attack as well.  The ease with which Suleimani was able to travel, dictate military orders, and make sure Iran’s wishes were being followed in Syria and Iraq underscores Tehran’s control of the two nation-states. 

 

One of the unintended outcomes of the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was not the containment of one of the three so-called “Axis of Evil” powers, but rather to have installed Iran as the major power in Iraq.  After the Obama administration failed to support Ayad Allawi, who won Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary elections, and allowed Nuri al-Maliki to begin a second term as prime minister, al-Maliki’s intensely sectarian policies completely alienated much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population.  As I detail elsewhere, these policies were directly responsible for Mosul’s fall to the Da’ish in June 2014.

The Political Obstacles to the Defeat of the (so-called) Islamic State 

 

That Iran has been able to create a state within and state in Iraq is thus an outcomes of 2 fatal US decisions – Bush’s appointment of al-Maliki as Iraqi prime minister in 2006, over the objections of his advisors, and Obama failure to push Iraq to follow the dictates of its voters in 2010 by allowing Ayad Allawi to become the country’s leader – and the establishment of the Popular Mobilizations Units following the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in June 2014. 

 

Joe Biden has a problematic reputation in Iraq.  On social media, it was clear in the runup to this month’s US presidential election that many Iraqis were worried that Biden might still adhere to his earlier position that Iraq should be divided along ethnic and confessional lines, a position which most Iraqis, including many Kurds in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), vigorously oppose.  Biden’s earlier position was strongly influenced by former US ambassador, Peter Galbraith, who, together with his wife, maintained financial ties to a Norwegian oil company, DNO, for which he served as a lobbyist.  Galbraith saw an independent Kurdistan as beneficial to the company’s ability to exploit the KRG’s oil wealth as well as promote his family’s financial interests. 

Ex-Diplomat Who Advised the Kurds Gets Millions in Oil Deal

 

To offset the doubts Iraqis have about Biden, one policy he could immediately put into effect is to provide Iraq’s beleaguered health care system with medicine and physicians.  Once a vaccine is available, the Biden administration should offer to provide it to Iraq as well. To assure that any medical assistance does not fall into the hands of the corrupt elements linked to Muqtada Sadr’s political party, which controls the Ministry of Health, the US should offer to build temporary hospitals on Iraqi military bases which are controlled by Iraq's Counter Terrorism Forces, commanded by Lt. General ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa’adi, who is known for his honesty and patriotism. 

 

The US is fortunate in that there is widespread rejection among Iraqis - Arabs and Kurds - of Iran’s interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs and that its proxy militias are above the law and only answer to Tehran.  That many peaceful youth protestors, who have been active in the October revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) since October 2019, have been wounded, killed and kidnapped by members of these militias, as well as members of the Ministry of Interior’s security forces which are likewise loyal to Iran, has only added to the anger of Iraq’s populace. 

The Killing of Qassem Suleimani and Iraq's October Revolution: What Western Press Analysts Aren't Telling You but What You Need to Know

 

Thus, an effort to conclude a deal in which Iran receives sanctions relief in return for adhering to the JCPOA and dissolving its militias in Iraq would reduce the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the MENA region. It would also allow Iraq to begin the process of diversifying its economy which at present is highly dependent on oil sales which account for 90% of its foreign revenues.  A new consortium of Western financial agencies has committed to helping Iraq engage in the diversification process which will be facilitated by reducing militia control of much of Iraq’s national economy. 

 

While a US deal with Iran as just outlined would still allow many corrupt political actors, such as Nuri al-Maliki, to retain considerable power, these sectarian entrepreneurs would find their economic and political power reduced because financial support from the Tehran regime would sharply decline.  Further, if Iran can achieve relief from the crippling international sanctions, then its incentive to continue supporting the PMUs, and risk further antagonizing the Iraqi populace, would be reduced. Already, many Iraqis boycott imported goods from Iran. 

 

Apart from pressuring Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto authoritarian ruler, to end the imprisonment of Saudi political dissidents, the Biden administration should actively encourage more investment by the Kingdom in Iraq.  Having formed the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council’s Economic, Trade, Investment and Relief Committee, Prime Minister al-Kadhimi has made clear his desire for increased trade and Saudi investment.  Assisting Iraq’s agricultural sector makes economic sense since it offers Saudi Arabia with an additional source of food imports.  The recent opening of the Arar border crossing with Saudi Arabia is an important step in developing closer economic ties. 

 

As for the argument that Iran will work to prevent Saudi investments in Iraq, especially in al-Muthanna, its poorest province in the country's south, the US-Iran deal on reducing sanctions should require Iran to commit to not impeding such investments.  Indeed, a stronger Iraqi economy will offer Iran increased opportunities to sell its food, industrial and other products in Iraq. 

 

The Trump administration has reduced the number of US troops in Iraq and Northeast Syria to train local forces to fight a resurgent Da’ish.  Rather than simply send more troops, the Biden administration should seek to establish a truly international military training force in Iraq whose mission is to help Iraq defeat the Da’ish terrorist group.   

 

The US should be only one of many partners, thus lessening its footprint in training and logistical support for Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Forces.  The force could be organized by NATO and include Arab partners, such as Jordan. A joint command structure would ensure that the Iraqi military is involved in all decisions, whether training or operational. 

 

Finally, the US should offer fellowships to Iraqi students to conduct graduate study in the US.  One of Nuri al-Maliki’s few positive contributions while Prime Minister was to offer 10,000 fellowships for Iraqi students to study abroad.  Rutgers University, where I teach, is proud to have graduated more than 125 Iraqi Ph.Ds. in a wide variety of disciplines who are now teaching in prominent universities throughout Iraq. 

 

“America is back” is important if it means that the United States will once again take its international role seriously.  However, the Biden administration won’t be successful unless it adopts new policies which are in line with local partners such as Iraq.  The probability of success will depend on the extent to which US officials listen to leaders of the nation-states it seeks to help.  The time for a “top-down” and “one size fits all” approach to US foreign policy is long past.  Respect and mutual understanding should be the “buzz words” which should inform the US relations with its international partners.