Moving beyond Iraq's Impasse: Iran and the Return of Shiite Militias

Although there is definite movement towards finally forming a new Iraqi government, there are a number of disturbing developments as well. The return of Shiite militias as a force to be reckoned with in south central and southern Iraq is a disturbing new element in Iraq's current political impasses following the March 2010 Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) elections. Before turning to these militias, what led up to their reentry into the current political equation?

When Nuri al-Maliki became Iraqi Prime Minister in 2006, he was seen as weak and lacked popularity. That all changed in March 2008 when he ordered an offensive against the Mahdi Army (JAM) and other militias in Basra who were terrorizing the population. While many considered the offensive an ill-advised and dangerous gamble, the Iraqi Army, with US logistical and air support, successfully completed its mission. Subsequently, it entered Revolution (Sadr) City in Baghdad where it subdued the JAM before moving on to the border city of Amara, a critical entry point for weapons and drugs from Iran. In interviews in the Arabic press in the spring of 2008, formerly scornful Basrawis now had pictures of Maliki in their cell phones and referred to him as a strong leader.

Many Iraqis breathed a sigh of relief when the JAM was effectively eliminated as a major military force. This was especially true of middle class Shiites in Baghdad and elsewhere whose automobiles, homes and other property had been confiscated by the JAM in neighborhoods that it controlled (NY Times, July 27, 2008).

Not all Mahdi Army militiamen were willing to follow the lead of Muqtada al-Sadr who has focused on the electoral route to gaining power since 2008. The Sadrist Trend (al-tayyar al-sadri) won 40 seats in the March 2010 Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) elections. Due to the stalemate in forming a new government, the Sadrist bloc of seats is crucial to whoever tries to become the next Iraqi prime minister, whether Maliki, Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, a vice-president from the Iraqi National Alliance or (the least likely) Iyad 'Allawi, head of al-'Iraqiya.

While the focus in the post-election gridlock has been on the struggle between the two main coalitions - the Iraqiya List, which won 91 seats, and Maliki's State of Law Coalition, which won 89 seats, al-Hayat reported in September that a deal was in the works in which Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi would become prime minister, Ayad 'Allawi would be given the presidency, and the Kurds would take over the position of speaker of the parliament.

Iran, which has developed a close relationship with Nuri al-Maliki, did not find this deal acceptable and has been, according to the Arab press, behind the reemergence of a number of Shi'i militias, all of which are either splinters of the Mahdi Army or have ties to Muqtada al-Sadr. While Maliki is anathema to Sadr for his 2008 attack on the JAM, and Sadr has steadfastly refused since March to support him for another term as prime minister, he apparently has now relented under Iranian pressure and concessions from al-Maliki. Those concessions will undoubtedly give Sadr access once again to ministries that will allow him to control the distribution of social benefits such as he did when part of the government in 2006. More disturbing are rumors that Sadr may be offered positions that have to do with national security and/or the military.

Beyond the pressure currently being exerted by Iran, Both Sadr and Maliki have strong incentives to come to terms. First, Sadr does not want to see armed groups that have splintered from the JAM gain power at his expense. These militias have engaged in violence with Iranian support. Two of them, the League of the People of Righteousness (asa'ib ahl al-haqq), and the Hizballah Brigades (kata'ib hizb allah) broke with Sadr after 2008 when he opted for a political strategy. Another group, the Promised Day Brigades (alawiat al-yawm al-maw'ud) has close ties to al-Sadr and seems to represent a new incarnation of the Mahdi Army.

Following the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, these militias became more active in Iraq's south central and southern regions, with the League engaged in operations in Dhi Qar, Misan and al-Basra provinces while Hizballah claimed responsibility for explosions in Karbala', al-Najaf and Baghdad. With the continued political crisis, and a smaller US military presence, these groups feel encouraged to try and exploit the growing power vacuum.

Second, al-Maliki knows that time is not on his side. Already strong support has developed for appointing 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi as prime minister due to al-Maliki's struggle with Iyad 'Allawi and the subsequent gridlock it produced. There is considerable resentment at Maliki's efforts to expand the power of the post of prime minister, such as creating military and intelligence units that only report to him. Removing Maliki from office would prevent him from further institutionalizing his power in ways that many politicians, even Shi'is in the Iraqi National Alliance, find disturbing.

What do these developments suggest? First, they show that Iraq's Shi'i political elite is by no means unified. Second, Iran seems to have been able, for the moment, to use its influence to forge a new government in Iraq. However, it is doubtful that it will be able to sustain this level of influence as Iraq's elite hydrocarbon industry continues to grow, political processes become more institutionalized and Iraq's political elite becomes more self-confidant.

Third, ongoing developments leave open the question of where the Sunni Arab community fits into the new political landscape that is taking shape. While Maliki proclaims that no victorious party (meaning al-'Iraqiya) will be excluded from the new government, Iyad 'Allawi insists that al-'Iraqiya will not join any government headed by Maliki.

Finally and more disturbing is the increased power and influence of Shi's militias that are JAM wannabes. They underscore the fact that Iraq's poor have not seen much benefit in economic developments and state benefits since 2003. Unless the new Iraqi government begins to get serious about poverty, employment, health care, education and municipal services for the poor and dispossessed, radical groups such League of the People of Righteousness, the Hizballah Brigades and the Promised Day Brigades will continue to proliferate and threaten Iraq's political stability and efforts at democratization. These cxonditions will continue to provide fertile soil for Iran's Revolutionary Guards and other disruptive foreign elements to detabilize Iraqi politics.

The "Ground Zero Mosque": a Teacheable Moment?

The New Middle East is a blog intended not only to offer analysis but to suggest solutions to the problems of the Middle East as well. In that spirit, I examine one of the latest issues to bedevil American politics and create much controversy and acrimony, the so-called “Ground-Zero Mosque.”

This posting makes two fundamental points. First, by not confronting the controversy, the US encourages distorted stereotypes that the US is engaged in a “war on Islam.” Second, this controversy offers the possibility to confront head on the misunderstandings that exist in the US about Islam and Americans of the Muslim faith. For Muslims outside the US, such an approach can clarify how Islam is treated in the US. In other words, the controversy surrounding the lower Manhattan Islamic center can become a “teachable moment.”

First, let’s clarify some issues. There is no “Ground-Zero Mosque.” The 13 floor Islamic Center that is proposed in lower Manhattan will be a multi-use building. It will include a conference center, auditorium, swimming pool and a prayer area. It will not be a mosque. Second, it is not at Ground Zero, but two blocks away. Third, the builders of the community center are within their constitutional rights to derive benefits from their property and to enjoy one of our most cherished protections, namely freedom of religion.

Apart from these facts, Park 51, the group that seeks to build the proposed Islamic community center, has been accused of being “insensitive” to the feelings of Americans who lost loved ones during the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center and non-Muslim Americans generally. Here the controversy takes on a particularly troubling tone. The assumption underlying the “insensitivity” argument is that the attack on the United States was an attack by Islam. In other words, because the attackers were Muslim, 9/11 represents, in a larger sense, an attack by Muslims on the US.

It is clear, from numerous eye witness accounts, that the leader of the 9/11 terrorists, Muhammad Atta, was someone who enjoyed spending time in bars, drinking and playing video games. This is hardly the behavior of someone whose motivations for attacking the World Trade Center were religious in nature. If his hostile act was motivated by religious feelings, one would think that he would have spent time engaged in reading holy texts and religious reflection. Instead, his behavior points to the fallacy of seeing the 9/11 attacks as linked to Islam. It underscores the manner in which some Middle Easterners have attempted to use Islam in extremist ways to create hostility towards the West. What is really at work is the attempt to legitimize terrorist acts that are political in nature, by tying them in a perverse way to religion.

Most radical Islamists have no more than a superficial understanding of Islam. This became clear to me many years ago when I first began analyzing radical Islamist movements while analyzing trial proceedings of members of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. When asked by a judge, himself thoroughly conversant in Islamic (as well as civil) law, as to why they had engaged in acts of violence, the accused tried to justify their atcs by invoking Islam. However, when the judge asked them to explain how what they did related to Islam, all they could provide was slogans. It was apparent that their efforts to justify their behavior in religious terms was not only superficial but wrong.

An American parallel to these extremist groups is the Ku Klux Klan. Just because the Klan has used the burning cross as its symbol, does not make it a Christian organization. This is also true of many other radical groups in the United States, such as the Posse Comitatus and the Aryan Nation. Efforts to evoke a bogus “tradition” to support their ideology and behavior is not supported by the historical record. Whether the Klan or al-Qa’ida, what we are really seeing is an “invented religion” that is not recognizable by the overwhelming majority of orthodox believers.

One of the most disturbing aspects of the Islamic community center controversy is how it plays out in Muslim majority countries throughout the world. Many of this countries are our close allies, such as Turkey, Indonesia (the world’s largest Muslim country), Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Arab Gulf states. How can the US win over public opinion in these countries when it appears to their citizens that restrictions exist on the ability of Muslims to practice their faith in the US? If political authorities were to prevent the Islamic community center from being built, this would enable anti-American elements to accuse the government of supporting “attacks on Islam” and working against the country’s national interests. This who seek to manipulate the controversy for political ends do not realize the damage they are doing to US foreign policy in the Middle East.

Many analysts argue that the controversy is all about the coming November congressional elections. While there is truth ins this assertion, the problem of Muslim minorities in Western countries is much larger one. It is clear that the US economic crisis and the changing demographics. Paralleling ethnic and racial conflict in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, much of the controversy today is based on fear. White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (like myself) are a declining ethnic demographic as we move to a majority Latino and East Asian society. We will not solve our economic woes and reverse the changing ethnic and religious makeup of the US through conflict. As the examples drawn from our earlier history show, only dialogue and education can create meaningful solutions.

How then can the controversy become a teachable moment? One way would be to create a presidential council on interfaith dialogue in the US. This would include clergy of all the major faiths in the US to meet on a regular basis and make recommendations to the President and Congress on how to promote religious tolerance and to confront problems that reflect religious tensions. Another efforts could entail a series of national town meetings - broadcast around the world - in which President Obama brings together clerics from major faiths to discuss the basic tenets of our country’s different religions, to emphasize the many ways in which they share values and beliefs, and how different religious groups are cooperating to solve economic, social and cultural problems throughout the country.

Many Americans have little understanding of Islam, which is understandable given the relative lack of study of Islam in our educational system. Many Americans think Islam is a political ideology. Others think it is a religion that has borrowed from Judaism and Christianity, the other great Abrahamic faiths, and thus is not a true religion at all. But even a superficial study of Islam indicates that it views itself as completing God’s prophetic message that began with Judaism and Christianity.

Throughout Muslim countries, one finds the names Musa (Moses), Aisa (Jesus), Ishaq (Isaac), Ibrahim (Abraham), Mariam (Mary) and Yusif (Joseph), reflecting that the prophets of Judaism and Christianity are also those of Islam. In the Qur’an, Christ has the power to make the dead living, a power not ascribed to the Prophet Muhammad, who is considered the last (seal) of God’s prophets. That the prophets of Judaism and Christianity are also considered prophets b y Islam explains why the Qur’an reads in many places like the Torah and the Bible. But unlike Christ, Muhammad was someone who was chosen, for reasons known only to God, to bring the final part of his prophetic message to mankind.

Islam is the fastest growing religion in the United States. Millions of Muslims contribute on a daily basis to making the United States a better country. To give an example, this past year, Hany Mawla, an American of Egyptian heritage, left his law firm to become the first Muslim (and youngest) Superior Court judge in the State of New Jersey. A graduate of Rutgers University’s Department of Political Science, where I had the pleasure to work with him, Judge Mawla was formerly the president of the State of New Jersey Arab-American Heritage Commission. Under his leadership the commission worked with other heritage commissions, such as State of New Jersey Holocaust and Amistad commissions, to develop educational curricula that help promote greater understanding between Islam, Judaism and Christianity and between Caucasians and African Americans in New Jersey.

In a larger context, the hostility towards Islam in certain quarters in their country continues a tradition extending back to the 19th century when the Irish Italians, East Europeans, Slavs, Jews and Chinese all found themselves facing discrimination after emigrating to the United States. The anti-immigrant activities of the American or "Know Nothing" Party and the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 were only the opening salvos of a "culture war" that has been going on up to the present. In the 1960 presidential election, John Kennedy, as a Roman Catholic, had to assure American voters that he would not follow orders from the Pope. At that time, Paul Blanchard' s book, American Freedom and Catholic Power, was still popular in many Protestant circles.

Islam has been part of the US' cultural fabric since the early days of the Republic. John Adams praised the Prophet Muhammad in his writings. The famous author, Washington Irving, wrote the best selling Mahomet and his Successors, in 1850, which followed his equally popular, Tales of the Alhambra, about the famous mosque in Muslim Spain. The first American mosque was built in Cedar Rapids, Iowa in 1934, even though Muslim communities existed well before that. As Islam becomes known to more non-Muslim Americans, we can expect that it will enter the cultural mainstream and that Muslims, from a variety of national backgrounds will, like other immigrant groups before them no longer be viewed in hostile terms.

The question at the end of the day is the following: wouldn’t the United States be better off as a society were it to try and tackle the misunderstanding and lack of knowledge surrounding Islam, rather than trying to politicize it? Islam is only going to grow as a religion in the United States. It is time to confront that fact rather than sweep it under the carpet.

Operation New Dawn: A Serious Policy Initiative
or a Codeword for Leaving Iraq ?

What can we expect from Operation New Dawn? Does this policy have any substance or is it just a cover for the United States’ withdrawal from Iraq? If the latter is the case, this is a great mistake because the stakes in Iraq are extremely high, not just for Iraqis and the US, but for the entire Middle East. If Iraq can continue to develop politically and economically, its current government crisis notwithstanding, its impact on a region where democracy is largely non-existent could be salutary indeed. While the contours of Operation New Dawn are still in formation, the tenor of President Obama’s speech on Iraq last evening certainly did not leave the impression that the US views Iraq as a critical component of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Despite continued violence and the inability of Iraq’s political elite to form a government following the March 2010 national parliament (Council of Representatives) elections, Iraq has nevertheless made considerable progress towards democracy. Free and transparent parliamentary elections were held in January and December 2005 and in March 2010. Arab provincial legislative elections in January 2009 and Kurdish Regional Government parliament elections in July 2009 brought many new legislators into the political process. Voter turnout has reached or exceeded 60% and has been as high as 70% in Iraq's Kurdish region. Voters have shown considerable maturity in voting for services instead of supporting sectarian parties. In the March 2010 national parliamentary elections, all political parties were forced to make cross-ethnic appeals and 62% of the sitting delegates lost their seats due to their perceived incompetence. Over 20% of the new delegates are under the age of 40, indicating that young Iraqis are interested in politics. In a March 2009 poll, 64% of Iraqis said that democracy is the best form of government. In Iraq’s Kurdish region, a new democratic movement, Gorran (Change), is challenging the entrenched, authoritarian political elite controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Clearly, democracy enjoys widespread support in Iraq.

Rather than helping Iraq consolidate these gains, the US is shifting its focus to Afghanistan, threatening the progress it has made to date. The disastrous consequences of Western inaction in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s defeat in late 2001 behoove the US not to make the same mistake again in Iraq. The West and the Afghani people are now paying the price for the international community's failure to deliver on the numerous promises of development aid that never materialized.

Now that Operation Iraqi Freedom has ended, US policy-makers assume that the US’s future role must be limited to military training and urging Iraq’s political elite to adopt a more civic approach to politics. This minimalist approach is deeply flawed. Rather than acting like nervous spectators, the Obama administration should adopt a bold international initiative that addresses the many problems that threaten to send Iraq back to the violent conflict of the pre-2008 period. Without such help, Iraq will find it difficult to continue to democratize.

At this critical juncture, the Obama administration’s international reconstruction initiative should include the European Union, our Arab oil-producing allies, and moderate Islamic states such as Indonesia and Malaysia to address Iraq’s myriad problems. A serious shortage of services has created deep resentment among Iraqis. Electricity levels have improved little since 2003. June riots in Basra and the south over the lack of electricity left at least two people dead. Medical care is sporadic and jobs are hard to find. Unemployment is especially high among Iraqi youth, who constitutes 65% of the population under the age of 25. Demand for education is high, but only the private system meets the needs of more affluent Iraqis.

Due to the Iran-Iraq War, the bloody uprising against Saddam Hussein following the 1991 Gulf War, and post-2003 sectarian violence, Iraq has a disproportionately large number of female headed households. Mothers are often forced to send their children to join criminal and even terrorist organizations because otherwise they face starvation. Former Awakening Movement members, who helped the US defeat al-Qaida in Iraq, may be returning to the insurgency because the jobs they were promised haven’t materialized.

This social and economic environment is tailor made for a revival of insurgent groups such as al-Qaida’s front organization, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq. Even if the US can create an efficient Iraqi army and police force, and cajole Iraq’s political elite to form a new government, none of this will matter if the populace cannot find jobs and obtain basic services. Extensive government corruption (Iraq is 175 of 180 countries on Transparency International’s list of most corrupt countries) pours more oil on the fire. As Iraq signs more contracts with foreign oil companies and oil revenues increase, popular resentment will only rise. The disconnect between the lifestyles of Iraq’s political class and the deprivation suffered by much of the populace at large creates the “perfect storm” for renewed violence and instability.

The US already has an effective model in place for helping Iraq address its social reconstruction needs in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Developed in embryo by US forces in Iraq, the PRTs were later formalized by General David Petreaus and former Ambassador Ryan Crocker to provide Iraqis with critical services. Where implemented, the Iraq PRT model has been enormously successful. Rather than following a top-down approach, the PRTs help Iraqis implement projects that they define. The result has not only been successful projects but the creation of strong ties between Americans and Iraqis who feel that they are being listened to and respected by the US.

Instead of reducing its scope as the Obama administration has proposed, the PRT model should be expanded. As part of an international effort, it could be funded in large part by our wealthy oil-producing allies. Saudi Arabia has every interest in a stable and prosperous Iraq so as to limit Iran’s influence there. (And Iraqis have consistently made clear that, while they seek good relations with Iran, they do not want the Islamic Republic to meddle in their internal affairs.) For the Arab Gulf monarchies that have large restive Shiite populations, good ties with Iraq, a majority Shiite country, can provide political benefits at home. And investing in social reconstruction can bring enormous future economic dividends to those who help Iraq now once its oil and natural gas industries are modernized and develop.

Rather than nervously biting our nails in the hope that Iraq will become politically stable, the US must be more proactive. A dramatic increase in technical support not only provides jobs for Americans but wins the gratitude of Iraqis, especially if they, not the US, continue to set the development agenda. If situated within an international effort, and funded by our allies, providing this technical support will not tax our overstretched budget. Failure is not an option in Iraq, especially with Iran, a would-be nuclear power, on its border. Iraq, like Afghanistan, is a long-term project and one that requires creativity to achieve success. If the US really takes democracy seriously in Iraq, it should heed the Arab proverb, “patience is the key to happiness.”

In reporting on Iraq, US newspapers continue to suffer from "group think."

In a recent communication, a British official, with intimate knowledge of Iraq, referred to those who refuse to see any progress towards democratization in the country as suffering from "group think." By this he meant that there are a large group of Westerners, in the media, academia and elsewhere, who refuse to admit that Iraq is moving forward politically. Indeed, there are those in the West who continue to view Iraq as merely a patchwork of ethnic and confessional groups who will never come together in a nation-state with a national purpose. Yet the recent elections point to the reassertion of an Iraqi nationalism that, while suppressed during the 1990s and between 2003 and 2007, has now reemerged as the dominant form of political culture.
The problem of "group think" is clearly evident in a number of articles published by the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and other US newspapers following the recent Iraqi elections. Under the byline, "Allawi's Victory in Iraq Sets up Period of Uncertainty," and "Court Decision before Election May Complicate Results," published on March 26 and 27, 2010 respectively, the New York Times, for example, focused almost entirely what might go wrong with Iraq now that elected officials, particularly Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, seek to form a new government.
In a more nuanced commentary, NY Times reporter Thom Shanker pointed out that there was an excellent turnout at 5000 polling places throughout the country and that Iraqi voters were not intimidated by efforts to prevent them from casting their votes. Thus it is important to note that there are notable exceptions to the reporting on the elections. But the more fundamental questions still remains. What is the dominant Western narrative of the elections and why does it focus almost exclusively on negative developments, whether actual or potential?
First, the elections are alleged to have been sectarian in nature. This is true to a certain extent. Nevertheless, no reporter seems to be able to explain how a Shiite candidate, Ayad Allawi, was able to generate large numbers of votes in majority populated Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. Even more to the point, Sunni Arabs only constitute 15-20% of the Iraqi population. Statistically, it would have been impossible for Allawi to have won a plurality of votes without considerable votes from Iraq's Shiite community. Indeed, the Iraqiya List's strong showing in Kirkuk suggests that it also drew upon Kurds, the majority population in the city, and Turkmens who comprise a significant percentage of its population as well.
Second, American reporters suggest a deadlock, now that neither Maliki nor Allawi achieved a decisive victory in the elections. While it is true that there will be a period of uncertainty as politicians try to position themselves to form the next government, this period will entail an enormous amount of negotiating and "horse trading," to use an American colloquialism. Few American reporters have commented on the manner in which the democratic process in Iraq has worked to undermine sectarian identities by forcing politicians from different ethnic and confessional groups, and from different sections of the country, to interact with one another and to develop negotiating skills. While familiarity often breeds contempt, it can also promote positive relationships, which has been the result in many instances in Iraq.
In that regard, the Iraqi parliament, which is usually seen as a dysfunctional institution, has worked to promote interactions among Iraq's constituent ethnic and confessional groups in a way that has never been possible since the modern Iraqi state was founded in 1921. Even during the parliament that existed under the Hashimite monarchy (1921-1958), access to seats was limited by the dominant political elites of the time. However, in the current parliament, a Sunni Arab Speaker, Ayad al-Samarra'i, has been very effective in forging coalitions to pass legislation and offset sectarian tensions in the chamber, thereby winning him much personal respect. Perhaps equally important, the Speaker has been able to demonstrate to all groups, both inside and outside the parliament, that negotiation can be a more effective way to achieve one's political ends than violence.
Continuing the parallel with the parliaments that existed under the Hashimite monarchy that was overthrown in 1958, current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki doe not have the power that the king and his agents had prior to 1958 to summarily dismiss the parliament if they did not find it to their liking. While Maliki can complain, as he has done, about the alleged unfairness of the recent vote, he cannot overturn the results.
Third, few reporters emphasize what all observes have noted, namely that the elections were fair and transparent. The Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the UN Special Representative, Ad Melkert, the Arab League's envoy, Muhammad Shalgham Al-Khamlishi, and US officials, all have underscored that the elections were characterized by only minor irregularities. The overall turnout of 62.4% which reached a high of over 70% in some Kurdish areas, was all the more impressive given the attempts of Islamist radicals and other insurgents to disrupt the elections through bombings and threats. Most important of all, these were elections in which no one knew the outcome, a true sign of a democratic elections.
Fourth, it is clear that the Iraqi public had a salutary impact on the elections in making clear that they want elected officials who can provide security and services, not empty rhetoric falsely clothed in the garb of "religion." Even the highly sectarian Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI) was forced not only to field female candidates (as required by the constitution), but offered posters in which women were unveiled and wearing makeup. While this observation is not terribly significant at one level, at another it indicates that the electoral preferences of the voting public are quite mature and that voters are no longer willing to support sectarian political parties. Indeed, one informal poll conducted prior to the elections indicated that only 3% of the likely voters polled said they were going to vote for candidates along sectarian lines.
Finally, the elections are remarkable when one considers the negative impact of Bush administration foreign policy between 2003 and 2007. The looting that US forces permitted in Baghdad in April 2003 destroyed much of Iraq's governmental infrastructure. The dissolving of the Iraqi conscript army in May 2003,the dismissal of the national police, and the firing of public sector workers, all provided thousands of men for Iraq's insurgency and sectarian militias. The elimination of agricultural subsidies in August 2003, which forced many farmers off the land as they were unable to compete with Iranian and Syrian agricultural imports, provided yet more men for the insurgency. And the Bush administration's establishment of the first ever government along explicitly ethnoconfessional lines, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), that ruled Iraq from July 2003 until June 2004, sent a message to all Iraq's political actors and groups that sectarian politics were the new order of the day.
Few Western analysts, whether in the media, in public policy circles, in think tanks or in academia have made the effort to question the prevailing "group think" about Iraq. This creates a situation where those who seek to provide assistance to Iraq are seen as "naive" and on a "fools errand." The reasoning then becomes the following: Why should governments or foundations fund and politically support NGOs that seek to assist Iraq when these organizations fail to understand that Iraq will never be able to move forward towards developing a strong civil society and a democratic polity. In other words, the excessive emphasis on the negative in much reporting and analysis of Iraqi politics serves to promote a self-fulfilling prophecy, namely that Iraq will never transcend sectarianism.
The stakes in Iraq are too high to allow defective analysis in the West to dominate the global discourse on Iraq. If Iraq can establish a stable and multiethnic democracy, then such progress will provide a model that the citizens of neighboring countries will want to emulate as well. Analysts should think more carefully when they write about Iraq about the potential consequences of their writing for its future well being.

In Iraq, it's the economy (and autocracy) stupid!

Photo of supporter of Change (Gorran)
List in streets of Sulaymaniya


Many of us remember the catchy phrase that James Carville coined during Bill Clinton's 1992 run for the US presidency: "It's the economy stupid!" As Clinton's main political adviser, Carville urged Clinton to focus on that which most concerned voters at the time, the terrible state of the US economy.
As analysts continue to focus on Iraq's ethnic divisions, they consistently fail to ask the very simple but important question: why do such divisions exist? Assuming that none of us believe in sociobiology, namely that Arabs and Kurds (and other Iraqi ethnic groups) emerge from the womb disliking or even hating each other, the core question of what drives ethnic divisions in Iraq needs to be raised. Unfortunately, it rarely is, in part because analysts continue to concentrate on elites, to the detriment of studying public opinion and non-elite political parties and civil society organizations.
The recent Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Assembly Elections, that were held on July 25th, demonstrated that most Kurds are less worried about Iraq's Arabs to the south than the lack of jobs in Iraq's 3 northern Kurdish provinces and the pervasive corruption and autocracy that characterizes the two parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), that have ruled the semi-autonomous KRG since the US imposed a "No-Fly Zone" in 1991.
Because analysts largely ignore the political economy of Iraqi Kurdistan (and that of the south as well), they have little to say about the underlying dynamics of Kurdish politics. While it is true that most members of the Change (Gorran) List, that did very well in the July 25 elections, are former PUK members, including its leader Nawshiran Mustafa, that does not explain why they won 50% (and possible more) of the vote in the city of Sulaymaniya. Overall the Change List won 25% of the KRG Assembly Election votes, and the Reform and Services List - a coalition of Islamist parties and the Kurdish Socialist Party - won about 10%. Winning 35% of the vote against the KRG, which has had a lock on politics in Iraqi Kurdistan, and which used its considerable reserves of oil wealth to try and swing the election its way, is highly impressive. Perhaps the results are even more impressive if reports that candidates who joined the Change List and held government posts, e,g, deanships and professorships in Kurdish universities (see niqash.org), were dismissed from their positions are in fact true.
All interviews indicate that Kurds are fed up with the corruption and authoritarian rule of the KRG, presided over by president and KDP leader, Masoud Barzani. Despite the fact that Masoud Barzani's father, Mullah Mustafa (d. 1975), still holds almost mythic status among older Kurds for his efforts to achieve an independent Kurdish state in the late 1940s and after, younger Kurds are more concerned with jobs and the ability to express themselves than with a history that none of them experienced. Certainly, the sentiments of voters prior to and after the elections underscore the desire for a more transparent government and using the oil wealth in KRG coffers for the Kurdish populace and not just the KDP-PUK elite.
Indeed, this was what I discovered when I visited the KRG. Few Kurds were concerned with Arab-Kurdish relations. In my research in the north I discovered that many young Arabs who have moved with their families to the north, as a result of sectarian violence in the south, have made friendships with young Kurds without any problems. A delegation of Iraqi youth that recently visited the US was comprised of many young Kurds who also indicated that they had no difficulty forming friendships with Arabs their own age when I spoke with them. While Kurdish-Arab relations do not seem high on the agenda of most Kurds, virtually all complained about corruption and lack of jobs. Indeed, I found many professionals, including lawyers and engineers, who were forced to take second jobs to support their families. With the proceeds from oil contracts known to be divided 3 ways, between the KRG, foreign investors and "other," Kurds completely understand the extent to which oil wealth is taken from the public purse for illegitimate ends. On the political side, Kurds implored me not to return to the US and speak of "Kurdish democracy," since they argued that civil society organizations require a government permit and that KRG officials are constantly looking over the shoulders of all members of such organizations to monitor their activities.
What will be the result of the Assembly Elections? First, with Change and Reform and Services lists having members in the KRG Assembly, the traditional KDP-PUK leadership will find it much more difficult to manipulate ethnic divisions, namely pitting Kurds against Arabs. Rather than being able shifting the focus from autocracy and corruption in the KRG to such issues as the contested city of Kirkuk and disputed areas along the KRG-southern border,the KRG leadership will be forced instead to confront, in the regional parliament, allegations of corruption and autocratic rule. President Masoud Barzani's ability to act as a "sectarian entrepreneur" will be dramatically diminished as the KRG will need to address, for the first time, widespread criticism coming from its own populace. This form of "checks and balances" is an incredibly healthy development in Kurdish politics.
What do the KRG Regional Assembly Elections imply for the future of Iraqi politics? If the traditional Kurdish leadership fails to coopt or suppress the new Change and Reform and Services lists, then there may be a greater opening for Kurdish-Arab cooperation in Iraq. In the January 30, 2009 Legislative Assembly Elections in the Arab south of Iraq, results paralleled much of what just occurred in the Kurdish north. Large numbers of Arab Iraqis voted against sectarian parties and cast their votes instead for parties that promised to deliver services and transparent governance. Provincial legislatures in the south likewise will provide critical "checks and balances" against Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad.
Because both these regional elections mirror what public opinion in Iraq has shown for some time, i.e., the desire for democratic governance (64% of Iraqis indicated that democracy is the best form of government in a March 2009 ABC/BBC/NHK poll), forward looking Iraqi political leaders and parties should move to develop cross-regional coalitions that bring Kurds and Arabs together who seek to rid both the KRG and the central government in Baghdad of the massive corruption that characterizes them both. Although he is still tied to the PUK, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Saleh, is an ideal interlocutor for developing this type of political coalition.
When the Iraqi Parliament recently investigated the Iraqi Minister of Trade (see my post, "During Saddam's time, we could only dream of seeing something like this"), he was forced to resign as a result of parliamentary hearings,and will be tried for misusing public funds. Using elected legislatures - obviously a core component of any functioning democracy - broad based coalitions can work together to bring better governance to Iraq and insure that its oil wealth is directed at the people's needs rather than go into the coffers of Kurdish and Arab elites. When studying Arab and Kurdish politics in Iraq, analysts would do well to remember James Carville's admonition, "It's the Economy Stupid!," to which we should add, "It's autocracy as well!."

Is Iraq Turning the Corner on Sectarian Politics?

One of the questions raised by the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities is whether Iraq has moved away from the sectarian violence that characterized the country at its high point between 2005 and 2007. Answers to the question are critical if Iraq is to make progress in achieving political stability, a prerequisite for engaging in a serious process of narrow reconciliation.
In a short article, “Reflections on Religion and Politics in Post-Bacthist Iraq,” (http://fas-polisci.rutgers,edu), I argued for a distinction between ethnic hostility and ethnic violence. All ethnically divided countries experince varying degress of ethnic tensions. But that deos not mean such tensions explode into violence.
An article in the June 25th edition of al-Hayat, “Khalid 'Atiya to al-Hayat: The Investigations are Just Electioneering Propaganda Whose Object is Ministers of a Particular Sect,” includes an interview with the First Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Khalid 'Atiya. The interview underscores that sectarian tensions still influence the work of Parliament Khalid 'Atiya complains that the efforts to summon cabinet ministers to appear before parliament to answer to changes of corruption and mismanagement in their ministries is politically motivated. With the Sunni Arab speaker of the Parliament a well-known for of Prime Minster Nuri al-Maliki, it is understandable that Deputy Speaker ‘Atiya might view these procedures as anti-Shi’a and hence sectarian in nature. The problem with such an interpretation is that the head of Parliament’s Anti-Corruption Committee is a Shi'i himself and a member of the al-Fadila Party whose power base is in the southern port city of Basra.
What is much more significant about this article is cAtiya’s focus on the need to reconstitute the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) which was the coalition of Shi'i political parties that dominated the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Since that time, the Sadrist Trend (Mahdi Army) and Fadila Party have left the Alliance and relations between the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and Maliki’s Da'wa Party have become strained. at this points to first and foremost is that the Shi'i community in Iraq is politically diverse. More importantly, it points to the temporary nature of the Shi'i coalition which reflected more the fear of a Ba'thist effort to regain power in 2005 and the need for solidarity in light of the fact that the Shi'a had never controlled the reigns of government before. This the turn to clerical support and the solidarity of the major Shi'i parties was more a response to uncertainty than ideological unity.
Even more interesting in the interview with Khalid 'Atiya was his argument that a reconstituted UIA would need to reflect the interests of the Shi'i community but would also have to open its doors to parties dominated by other ethnic groups. He specifically mentioned Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although these comments may be seen as an attempt to humor the reporter conducting the interview and to appeal to al-Hayat’s readership, the increasing need for Iraqi politicians to appeal to a large Iraqi national identity as opposed to a more narrow ethnoconfessional appeal points to the increasing difficulties sectarian force face in Iraq. The rejection of sectarianism was clear in the January 2009 Provincial Council elections, which Khalid 'Atiya blames in part for promoting the more assertive nature of the Parliament.
Despite the cynicism that may underlie Deputy Speaker 'Atiya’s comments, the symbolism of his position is important. It sends a message to political actors and voters alike that the emphasis in political mobilization should be on Iraqiness, and not on one’s ethnoconfessional background. The question then becomes why does Khalid c
'Atiya feel the need to move beyond sectarian appeals to a narrow Shi’i political base?
The answer lies both in Iraqi public opinion which, having seen the violence and corruption that sectarian political parties bring to the political process, reject such Politics. It also reflects the impact of a nascent democracy in Iraq. While next year’s parliamentary elections may yield some very problematic outcomes, such as giving Nuri al-Maliki a mandate to impose an increasingly authoritarian rule on Iraq, Khalid 'Atiya and all the other deputies in parliament have to worry about their political longevity. As the Provincial legislative elections demonstrated, voters often “throw the rascals out.” In a democracy, broad based appeals that seek to form working coalitions trump narrow based appeals that reduces the number of potential supporters among the electorate.
It is small steps, such as those indicated in the interview with First deputy Speaker Khalid 'Atiya that may point to a more stable, tolerant and democratic Iraq

"During Saddam's time, we could only dream of seeing something like this"

The quote above by a young Iraqi refers to the televised questioning of Iraqi Trade Minister, Abd al-Falah al-Sudany, in the Iraqi Parliament this past Saturday and Sunday, on charges of corruption. This event represents by any standard an important step forward in promoting democracy in Iraq. Having the questioning televised throughout the country not only allowed millions of Iraqis to see their government in action, but points to the power of the media in promoting democracy in post-2003 Iraq.

Transparency International has labeled Iraq as one of the most corrupt states in the world, ranking it 178 of 180 on its country list. Iraqis have long been fed up with government ministers who view their ministries' budgets as extensions of their own private purse. Resentment and anger at government corruption has been intensified by the lack of state services available to the Iraqi citizenry, such as electricity, health care, police protection, education, and garbage removal.

Thus to make Minister of Trade al-Sudany submit to hours of televised questioning by the Iraqi Parliament's Integrity Committee Chair, Sabah al-Sa'idi, a member of the Fadila Party, whose power base is in the southern port city of Basra, was eye opening and exhilarating for many Iraqis. Parliament member, Bassam Sharif, also a member of Fadila, indicated to reporters that 100 representatives had signed a no confidence vote in the Trade Minister, far more than the 50 required for such a vote. A vote on this measure in Parliament is expected next Sunday.

The main charge against the Trade Minister, who is a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling al-Da'wa (Islamic Call) Party, was his taking of millions of dollars from the national food ration program upon which many Iraqi depend for sustenance. Minister al-Sudany also had to answer to charges that two of his brothers received a $40 kickback for each ton of sugar that was distributed by the Trade Ministry.

Perhaps most ominous for the system of institutionalized corruption that has developed since 2003 is the Parliament's request that the ministers of oil, electricity and transportation also appear for questioning. Thus a message has been sent that there are limits to corrupt behavior on the part of government officials.

What this action shows is the benefits of a system of governance built on checks and balances. The newly assertive Parliament, keen to be reelected during the next parliamentary elections that will take place sometime between December 2009 and February 2010, needs to demonstrate to the Iraqi public that its members are serving its needs. Even if the motivations behind the parliamentary hearings are cynical, the fact that they are addressing one of the most important problems facing Iraq, namely corruption, indicates the benefits of democracy.

These actions in the Iraqi Parliament demonstrate the power of the media. Few analysts in the West have focused on the vigorous Iraqi press and communications media that has developed since 2003. Myriad Iraqi blogs have also disseminated enormous amounts of information to the Iraqi public. Clearly, the distribution of information is key to a well functioning democracy.

And let's not forget the "neighbohood effects" of the televised questioning of the Iraqi Trade Minister. al-Jazeera and other Arabic television channels will certainly broadcast them elsewhere in the Arab world. As with the January 2009 Provincial Legislature elections, seeing Iraqis engage in democratic practices will no doubt have a highly subversive impact on the authoritarian Arab states that surround Iraq.

The televised hearing also point to the shortcomings of viewing Iraq only through an ethnic and confessional lens (see my posting "10 Conceptual Sins in the Study of Middle East Politics"). Corruption has little to do with ethnic or religious differences. Both Minister al-Sudany and Integrity Committee Chief al-Sa'idi are Shi'is. Rather the issue of corruption calls upon everyone concerned with Iraq's development to pay more attention to political economy. No ethnic group or religion has a monopoly on virtue. Corruption in political office knows no ethnic or religious bounds. In many ways, the continued obsession in the West with viewing Iraq through an "ethnoconfessional" lens draws attention away from Iraq's real problems.

Nevertheless, the fact that a sitting minister was grilled by Parliament on charges of corruption for the first time in the political history of modern Iraq, a history that extends back to the state's founding in 1921, represents a major step forward in the process of democratization in Iraq. I suspect it will not be the last.

N.B.: In this posting, I benefited greatly from, "Iraqis react to public grilling of government minister: Some Iraqis said they saw the televised questioning of Trade Minister Abdul Falah al Sudany as the birth of a real democracy," by Jack Dolan, Sahar Issa and Laith Hammoudi, Miami Herald, May 20, 2009