Afghanistan: Counterinsurgency or Social Reconstruction?

US and Western efforts in Afghanistan are based on a number of dubious assumptions. First, the Obama administration continues to think in terms of a military victory. The original idea of a draw down of US troops by the summer od 2011 has now changed as President Obama recently indicated that substantial numbers of American troops may remain in Afghanistan until as late as 2014. Meanwhile, President Hamid Karzai recently indicated that the US troop presence should be reduced as he seeks to find an accommodation with the Taliban. Unfortunately, the focus remains on the military, rather than on a larger societal perspective.

Second, the US and its NATO allies continue to think that the Hamid Karzai regime will be able to rule Afghanistan once the draw down of Western forces occurs. However, all Afghans know that the Karzai regime is highly corrupt and that it offers them little in the way of security and social services. Countless journalists have reported that consistent American efforts to pressure President Karzai to change his ways have been ineffective. Although Karzai invariably agrees to crack down on corruption, there has been no significant change in his behavior at all. To expect that the Afghan leader will develop a greater civic consciousness and seriously try to help his people is naive in the extreme.

Third, the US and its Western allies, but especially the US, continue to conceptualize Afghanistan's problems in term of political elites. Essentially, there are three sets of elites, those who are part of President Karzai's circle, the Taliban leadership, and local warlords who are not linked to either. None of these elites offer much hope for the future for the Afghan people and thus cannot be viewed as the basis for a long term solution to Afghanistan's problems.

President Karzai views the country as his own privy purse, the Taliban seek to impose once again an incredibly repressive regime on the country (which Afghans reject), and most local warlords combine the worst aspects of the central government and the Taliban. Indeed, one reason the Taliban was so successful in taking power in the mid-1990s was the popularity it gained by suppressing the warlords who had ruled after expulsion of Soviet forces in 1990. The warlords' arbitrary and repressive behavior, including stealing from the people, seizing their daughters, and imposing tariffs throughout the country that hampered commerce made them highly unpopular.

Fourth, the US and NATO view Afghanistan as a unitary state. Given the country's ethnic diversity and regional traditions, it makes much more sense to think of it in federal terms. Here Iraq has something to tell us about Afghanistan. Local provinces should have greater powers, especially in light of the limited services they receive from Kabul. This consideration also suggests why defeating the Taliban will not occur through Kabul but rather through the provinces.

Finally and most problematic, the US and the West continue to think of Afghanistan in short term policy goals. The time frame here spans 2-5 years at most. As I argue below, the problems of Afghanistan suggest the need for a much longer time frame. Developing policies according to the above mentioned assumptions suggests that the the US and NATO will lose in Afghanistan. But is there another approach?

The approach suggested here is built on two counter assumptions - assumptions related to a social reconstruction approach. First, defeating the Taliban must take place at the local level and largely bypass the Karzai regime. What I am suggesting here is the development of "regional security-development clusters." This entails finding local leadership that is willing to work with the international community, not just to provide security for the inhabitants but to help develop local agriculture and small scale artisan production and industry.

One step that has already been taken in that direction is the development of agricultural cooperatives in many areas of Afghanistan. One example is the successful triangulation between the Parwan Raisin Producer Association, which is located about an hour north of Kabul, Mercy Corps, a NGO located in Portland Oregon, and Fullwell Mill, a producer of organic and fair-trade foods located in Sunderland, UK. The US Agency for International Development has provided important funding to help the project succeed.

In return for participating in Mercy Corps.' training on how to grow organic raisins, local farmers now have a foreign outlet in Fullwell Mill which pays them excellent prices for their high quality Afghan raisins. While 35 farmers signed up to participate in the program when it began, 200 are now participating once the community saw that Fullwell Mill has kept its promises to purchase the cooperative's raisins at the attractive price they originally offered.

While the example of the raisin producer cooperative is a small one, it is indicative of the way in which the Taliban can be defeated in Afghanistan. Development here is based on a "bottom up" model. Rather than trying to create large costly projects designed in the West that do not fit with existing economic activity and customs, small scale projects such as the export model for Afghan raisins point to the manner in which Afghans can become economic stake holders and develop incentives to prevent the Taliban from winning adherents in their communities.

Once these communities prosper, and, more importantly, see a sustainable development model that will serve them well into the future, there will also be less problems with security. Afghans recruited to the police forces and army will now have an incentive to protect their communities because their families are enjoying ongoing economic benefits. Here we need to realize that the number of Afghans drawn to the Taliban because of its radical Islamist ideology is very small. Further, we need remember that few Afghans want to see the reimposition of the type of brutal Taliban rule that existed prior to the fall of 2001. Thus the Afghan populace is not inclined to support the Taliban if the correct mix of economic and security conditions are in place.

The Western counterinsurgency model does not adequately theorize the type of approach to thwarting Taliban efforts to seize control of Afghanistan because it still thinks too much in terms of military strategy and narrowly and short-term policy goals. The idea that foreign troops can wear the Taliban down and force them to the bargaining table does not address the long-term development problems faced by Afghanistan. Unless Afghans have the resources to provide for their families, there is no reason why the Taliban, and its highly lucrative opium production, will not reassert itself after a Western withdrawal from the country if Afghans have no other economic alternatives. Such an outcome would simply mean a return to the status quo ante with much Afghan, American and NATO blood having been spilled and huge amounts of monies spent to no benefit for Afghans or the West.

The second counter assumption challenges the idea that the US and NATO alone can prevent a Taliban victory in Afghanistan. When we see the large budget deficits being run by almost all Western countries, we need to realize that problems like the Taliban in Afghanistan have been to be addressed by a large international coalition. This means spreading the economic costs among a greater number of players. Saudia Arabia, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Brazil are all countries that could contribute funds and/or technical resources to help with the type of massive development effort required in Afghanistan (but one that need not be excessively costly if the focus remains developing already extant local production and resources).

What is needed in Afghanistan is a larger vision. This vision could be addressed by a series of international conferences in which democratic countries - all of whom face threats from radical extremists such as the Taliban and al-Qa'ida - work to develop an international response to the problems of failed states or quasi-failed states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, Yemen, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and many others.

"Winning" in Afghanistan does not mean the temporary defeat of the Taliban only to see it reemerge yet again to repress the Afghan people and provide a safe haven for organizations like al-Qa'ida. A Taliban victory in Afghanistan would be terribly destabilizing to Pakistan, which is experiencing separatist movements and its own Taliban threat. While military action is obviously important in preventing a Taliban victory, the Obama administration's should move beyond its focus on force levels to addressing the underlying causes of radical extremism in Afghanistan and elsewhere.

Defeating radical extremism is a long term project. The West needs to get used to that idea. Local populaces must be given hope in the future. Developing an international alliance of states with mutually shared goals and values, and, equally importantly, creating stakeholders among the local populations caught in the violent crossfire, is the only way to win this struggle.

Local Control and Democratization in Iraq

Iraq has experienced very difficult times recently. It is still without a government over 8 months since last March's parliamentary elections. Violence, while still contained, has increased throughout the country over the past several months. Especially disturbing is the random nature of many of the bombings in urban areas that are designed to disrupt efforts to return life to some form of normality. The purposeful killings of Christians on November 1, who were attending mass at Our Lady of Salvation (Sayyidat al-Najat) Syriac Catholic Church in Baghdad's Karrada district, is part of a systematic and brutal effort to prevent Iraq from creating a pluralistic and tolerant society.

While the nation's political elite continues to demonstrate its inability to address Iraq's pressing problems, Iraqis at the local level are using their new found power in the form of provincial legislatures to promote issues they consider important. In this posting, I want to discuss three initiatives taken by provincial councils and other legislative bodies. One calls for allowing provinces to establish offices in Iraqi diplomatic missions abroad. The second involves an attempt to fight an increase in electricity rates mandated by the Ministry of Electricity. And the third entails protests against federal oil and natural gas policy in two of Iraq's provinces.

One of these issues, which I mentioned in a previous posting, concerns the effort of the al-Najaf Provincial Council to force the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to allow the province to open offices representing its commercial, educational and tourist interests in Iraqi embassies abroad. After the al-Najaf Council voted to support this effort, claiming that provinces had the constitutional right to open offices in Iraq's diplomatic missions, the Babil Provincial Council followed suit with a vote of its own.

While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's office and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs have both objected to these efforts in arguing that they are not in fact allowed by the Iraqi Constitution, they point to an example of al-Najaf and Babil provinces using their new found legislative power to assert a local agenda, namely promoting their commercial and tourist interests. This is an important development since, in the Arab world, power flows from the center to the periphery, rarely the reverse.

Another example of the provincial councils using their power to try and offset that of the central government is the vote by the Karbala' Provincial Council to not accept proposed increases in electricity rates. Indeed, the local government has called upon Karbala's resident and those in administrative districts that make up the greater Karbala' region not to pay the increases.

Residents of Karbala' and the surrounding region argue that current electric supplies are sporadic and that they as consumers should not have to pay more for a service that is already in short supply. Further, local economists and businessmen argue that the increases would place an onerous burden on local industry and agriculture which are already having a difficult time competing in local and regional markets. As for the legitimate need for the Ministry of Electricity to invest in upgrading Iraq's outdated national electric grid, residents reply that the government could find ample funds if it would seriously confront the extensive administrative corruption that permeates the ranks of the state bureaucracy. Clearly, local residents are much more able to protest what they consider to be unjust actions of the central government when they are organized and have the support of local governmental institutions.

But perhaps the most impressive evidence that Iraqis in the provinces are taking their local power seriously is the vote by both the al-Anbar and the Basra provincial councils demanding that the central government consult them in the development of oil and natural gas resources in their respective provinces. Basra is the most energy rich province in Iraq while large amounts of natural gas have recently begun to be developed in al-Anbar Province. Both provinces have rejected Baghdad's unilateral actions in concluding contracts with foreign energy companies without including them in the bidding process and in the plans to develop the local oil and natural gas fields.

It is noteworthy that both Basra and al-Anbar provinces have invoked Article 112 of the Iraqi Constitution that requires that the federal government cooperate with local provinces in the development of any hydrocarbon resources. In Falluja, once the site of extensive violence and attacks against US forces (such as the killing and burning of 4 Blackwater private security guards in 2004), protests have been peaceful with demonstrators carrying placards in parades down the city's streets demanding that Iraq not sell the rights to its oil and natural gas to foreign energy consortia.

Whatever one thinks of the issues in these three cases, the use of local legislative institutions to challenge the central government's prerogatives is extremely limited in the Arab world. In Iraq, citizens elected local legislative councils throughout its Arab provinces in January 2009 and those councils are beginning to represent their constituents interests.

In the case of protests against the central government's oil and natural gas policy, we see how economic interests can cross-cut ethnoconfessional differences. al-Anbar Province is the quintessential Sunni Arab Province while Basra is predominantly Shi'ite. That these two provinces have come together around an issue that affects them both - namely the disposition of their respective hydrocarbon resources - demonstrates possible future areas of cooperation among Iraq's different ethnic groups and regions.

While Iraq continues to face enormous political, social and economic problems, not all the news is bad.

Lessons Learned from Iraq or Lessons Learned From Afghanistan?

Many analysts have discussed the “lessons learned” for Afghanistan based on the US’ experience in Iraq. Little has been done to analyze what might be learned for Iraq from the US experience in Afghanistan. Perhaps the first lesson is “never take anything for granted.” After its rout of the Taliban in 2001, the US felt it could largely ignore Afghanistan despite Bush administration’s promises of a “Marshal Plan for Afghanistan” and numerous pledges of economic and social reconstruction aid from a large number of Western countries. When the promised aid was not forthcoming, the results were disastrous. Exploiting the corruption of the current regime of Hamid Karzai, the Taliban have slowly been able to reestablish themselves as a military and political force in Afghanistan. This turn of events required the US and the West to, in effect, create a brand new policy, resulting in considerable loss of life, both Afghan and Western, and the expenditure of huge amounts of money. If the US and its Western allies had consolidated their gains following 2001, starting all over again would not have been necessary.

In Iraq, the Obama administration does not seem to have any comprehensive plan for consolidating what gains have already been made in Iraq. Certainly, Iraq is still experiencing a political gridlock and has yet to form a new government following the March 2010 elections. Corruption is endemic and social services are lacking in much of the country. Ethnic mistrust is still a part of the political and social landscape.

Nevertheless, Iraq has a rudimentary democracy. The March elections were fair by all accounts. There is a vigorous civil society at work. The Iraqi Communist Party recently challenged the inactivity of the Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) and was successful in obtain a court ruling forcing the chamber to begin to meet and conduct the business for which its members were elected last march. Provincial councils have begun to insert themselves into both local and national affairs. For example, the al-Najaf City Council recently voted that the province be allowed to open offices in Iraqi diplomatic missions around the world to promote its economic and touristic interest. This in tunr has caused a broad national debate about whether such offices are legal under Iraq’s constitution, another indicator of a growing national civic engagement.

In Iraq, as in many countries of the Middle East, youth constitute a large segment of the populace. The so-called “youth bulge” is evident in Iraq as well where 65% of the population is under the age of 25. Research that I have been conducting with Iraqi youth from ages 14 through 30 is indicative of how Iraq might potentially develop in the near future. On the one hand, the positive news is that the overwhelming number of youth I have been able to interview are not sectarian in orientation and intuitively understand, as do their elders, that sectarian politics is neither good for Iraq or the type of behavior that bodes well for their future (unless perhaps they are drawn into sectarian criminal organizations). On the other hand, much of what these youth see in the political realm does not convey positive ideas about politics, much less attract many to run for public office. If the type of nepotistic and corrupt elite based politics continues in Iraq, then my data indicate that many youth who have the skills may seek to leave the country and pursue careers abroad rather than in Iraq.

What do these developments in Iraq imply for Afghanistan? Iraq is at a crossroads. It lives in a “rough neighborhood.” With the exception of Turkey, none of its neighbors want to see a democratic, ethnically and religiously pluralistic, and politically stable nation-states consolidate itself in their midst. For Iran, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan and Syria, such a development is a disturbing prospect because of the reformist implications for their own political systems and societies.

Yet the Obama administration has not proposed any innovative policies that would help Iraq continue to consolidate the fragile gains it has made thus far politically, socially and economically. It has not, for example, developed a program that will replace its successful Provincial Reconstruction Teams, even if these were to be largely populated by Iraqis rather than Americans. To be sure, the Iraqis are a tenacious people whose progress since 2003 is remarkable in light of 35 years of highly repressive Ba'thist rule and numerous blunders on the part of the US occupation authority in 2003 and 2004, such as dissolving the Iraqi conscript army, cutting off funds to the state public sector, and pressuring the Iraqis to complete a new constitution in too short a time resulting in a flawed document.

The US should not interfere in Iraq’s internal affairs. However, Iraq continues to seek American technology and technical assistance. Iraqis want our help in the education, health care and the municipal services fields. The Iraqi higher education system desires collaboration with the West. The Iraqi government continues to send many of its university students to study in the United States. The US continues to play a key role in helping Iraq improve its court system and consolidate the rule of law.

In the international arena, the US has played an important role in helping Iraq seek debt forgiveness from loans and reparations that go back to the Gulf War of 1991. The US is one of Iraq’s key allies in major international financial institutions such as the IMF and World Bank. And let’s not forget the critical role that the US plays in Iraq’s efforts tor rebuild its security forces after 2003. The supplying of equipment and training is key to efforts to develop an army that can defend the country and police its long borders and local police forces that can assure citizens’ safety and security.

As with any friendship, this is always a quid pro quo. In exchange for its support, the US can ask of the Iraqi government that is begin to seriously confront corruption, that is follow the constitution and that it more vigorously implement the rule of law. Such behavior will further consolidate democracy and prevent the types of problems that we see with the highly corrupt and personalistic rule of Hamid Karzai in Kabul. Karzai’s behavior represents a perfect foil for the Taliban who can use his administration to justify their own efforts to seize power.

If the response to the arguments presented here is that the US is suffering a major fiscal crisis that has created huge budget deficits, perhaps the Obama administration should make Iraq part of its Stimulus Program. Numerous professionals who have lost their jobs in the US could find work in Iraq under the types of programs I am suggesting. This includes professionals, construction workers, teachers and academics, just to mention a few employment opportunities.

To offset its economic constraints, US policy in Iraq should increasingly assume an international dimension. Our oil rich allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait should be pressured to contribute funds to help develop Iraq. While a democratic Iraq might be threatening, a destabilized Iraq, in which the current Iranian regime, along with its Revolutionary Guards, extends its influence, is one of their worst nightmares.

The US needs to learn from Afghanistan that it ignores Iraq at its own peril.

What has Iraq's elite learned from the current political crisis?

The inability of Iraq's political elite to agree upon forming a new government does not bode well for the process of democratization following the highly successful March 2010 Council of Representatives (national parliament) elections. Still, the efforts of the major political actors and parties to form a new government has taught Iraq's politcial elite some important lessons .

First, it is clear ethnic and confessional identities alone carry relatively little weight in helping candidates achieve their goals. The best evidence of this is the intense competition that has been ongoing within the main Shi'i political parties, the State of Law Coalition, the Iraqi National Alliance and the Sadrist Trend. When Iran recently pressured Muqtada al-Sadr to throw the support of the his 40 seats the Sadrists won to al-Maliki, despite his hostility towards al-Maliki for suppressing his Mahdi Army militia in 2008, the other main party in the Iraqi National Alliance - the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI) - immediately began negotiations with al-Maliki's main competitor, Ayad Allawi, head of the secular al-Iraqiya List, which won the most seats in the March election. This development, along with al-Maliki subsequently distancing himself from Sadrist support after they demanded military and security portfolios in exchange for their support, clearly indicate that the unity that the Shi'i parties demonstrated in the December 2005 parliamentary elections through the United Iraqi Alliance was a temporary phenomenon and has now dissipated.

Second, the inability of ethnoconfessional groups to create cohesive alliances is actually beneficial for Iraq's political system It undermines the possibility of a confessional system on the Lebanon model from being established in Iraq. The inability of the large Shi'a parties to coalesce in a unified bloc has worked to inadvertently undermine sectarianism. At the time of this writing, ISCI's head, Ammar al-Hakim, is visiting the two most important Sunni states, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, where he is attempting to drum up support for Ayad Allawi's efforts to impose conditions on all the major political parties that will prevent any of them from being excluded from receiving major portfolios in any government that is formed (al-Hayat, Oct, 12). Thus al-Maliki's efforts to relegate al-Iraqiya to a marginal role in the next government seems doomed to fail. That al-Hakim, the leader of what once was Iraq;s most sectarian party, is now cooperating with Allawi, Iraq's most secular political leader, is clear evidence that the desire for power and influence is cross-cutting ethnoconfessional identities.

Even the Kurds, who have maintained a unified bloc, still have to cope with the new Gorran (Change) Movement which won 8 seats in the March elections and continues to challenge the authority of the two main parties nthat control the KRG, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Clearly, the KDP and PUK no longer exercise the power and influence in Baghdad that they did in 2005.

While their 57 seats give them the possibility of playing a kingmaker role in the formation of the national government, namely allowing an Arab coalition to reach the 163 votes needed to form a government, the Kurdish parties, like their Arab counterparts, also realize that they will need to become more creative than simply throwing their votes to any coalition that promises to meet their demands, such as holding a referendum on the disputed city of Kirkuk. As their power wanes on the national scene, they will need to develop closer ties to those Arab parties with whom they share broad interests that affect all of Iraq if they are not to become further marginalized in the future.

Third, one of the most striking aspects of the post-election maneuvering has been the rapid shift in alliances - sometimes from one day to the next - as the major political actors and parties try and calculate what moves will best enhance their ability to maximize their power in the new government. As parties shift their contacts from one party to another, we see that all the major players have entered into dialogue with each other at one point or another.

This process has demonstrated the importance of negotiations to all the political parties, something unheard of in Iraq since the parliamentary elections of the 1950s, prior to the toppling of the Hashimite monarchy in 1958. While these negotiations have not brought about a new government, they have demonstrated two things: that no one ethnoconfessional group can now or in the foreseeable future dominate Iraqi politics, and that developing an inclusive political coalition represent s the best path to power. In short, there are some pistive lessons to be learned from the current political stalemate in Iraq

The US and the International Community Should Support Gorran

One issue that has bedeviled US foreign policy in the Middle East is the support for authoritarian regimes. All too often, short term stability has trumped support for long term reforms, especially reforms that promote democratic governance. This process is occurring again in Iraqi Kurdistan where the Kurdish leadership is becoming increasingly authoritarian and repressive. Fortunately, there is a breath of fresh air in Iraqi Kurdistan in the form of the Gorran (Change) Movement. Before discussing Gorran's contribution to democracy, we need to understand the context in which it was established

As a strong ally, the US should continue to maintain close ties with the Kurds and the Regional Government (KRG) which rules Iraqi Kurdistan. However, by supporting the current Kurdish political elite which does not reflect the interests of the populace at large, the US is once again making a serious mistake. It is trading short term stability for potential instability in the long term as it becomes identified with a repressive and unpopular elite whose legitimacy is on the decline due to corruption, nepotism and authoritarian rule. In neighboring Iran, support for the repressive and highly unpopular Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi produced the Islamic Revolution of 1978-79 and the disastrous regime that continues to haunt the US and the Middle East to this day.

The two political,parties that control the KRG, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), claim that the Iraq's Kurds have enjoyed democratic freedoms under their rule since the region acquired semi-autonomous status following the Gulf War of January 1991. There was some progress towards democratization when the US imposed a "no-fly zone" after the war ended which allowed the KRG to break away from the Arab south. However, the KDP and PUK have dominated the political system, judiciary, the military and intelligence services and the economy, which has allowed for systematic abuses. As the dominant employer in the KRG, the KDP and PUK have been able to use the threat of dismissing Kurds from their jobs as an effective form of social control.

The reality is that the KRG government is becoming increasingly authoritarian. Attacks on the non-party press have intensified. Newspapers and journals that dare to criticize government corruption are subject to onerous lawsuits that impose heavy fines. At least two young journalists, Soran Mam Hama and Zardasht Osman have been killed for criticizing the KRG leadership.

The KRG has established an amalgam of courts, all of which are populated by judges sympathetic to the two major parties. Thus it is impossible to obtain a fair trial when political issues are involved. Many of the courts are extra-judicial because they were established by either the KDP or PUK and thus have no legal standing. In some instances, Ba'thist era criminal statutes laws are used to prosecute those who criticize the KRG such as the 1969 Iraqi penal code that allows prison terms for journalists
editors, writers, and publishers on defamation and other offenses.

It is within this context of corruption, nepotism and authoritarian rule that a new political movement has appeared on the Kurdish political scene. The Gorran (Change) Movement was formed in the spring of 2009 by a reform group within the PUK, led by one of the party's founding members, Nawshirwan Mustafa. Gorran has grown quickly, beyond the dissidents who joined Nawshiran Mustafa in leaving the PUK. It enjoys widespread support in Iraqi Kurdistan among intellectuals, professionals and the educated middle classes, but increasingly among the broad swath of the Kurdiosh populace that is suffering from lack of jobs and access to education and other public services. Gorran has also received strong support from the Kurdish Diaspora in Europe and the United States.

Gorran was most successful,in the July 2009 KRG parliamentary elections. Of the chamber's 100 elected seats (an additional 1o appointed seats are reserved by the KRG for minorities and are delegated by the KRG president), Gorran won 25 seats. With the 15 seats won by the Services and Reform List, a coalition of Islamist and socialist parties, 40 of the parliament's 110 members are now part of the opposition.

Although the KRG leadership has refused to respond to questions posed by the Gorran and other opposition members about the use of public funds, the July 2009 elections have encouraged more Kurds to question how the KRG is being run. More and more Kurds seem inclined to vote for Gorran, especially in the Suleimaniya area which traditionally has been the PUK voting strength. Even though much of Gorran's initial strength came from PUK dissidents, now support for the party has spread to Arbil, Kirkuk and other Kurdish majority regions and towns.

As Gorran has generated more support, the KDP and faltering PUK have ratcheted up their efforts to suppress the party. During the March 2010 parliamentary elections, members of the peshmerga - the KRG militia - and police and intelligence officers were warned that, if they were suspected of having voted for Gorran, they would be required to swear on a Qur'an that they did not so. If they were found to have lied, their wives would be forced to divorce them for dishonesty. Despite efforts such as these to intimidate voters, Gorran still managed to gain 8 seats in parliament.

While it is still unclear where Gorran is headed, clearly it speaks to the disaffection of large segments of the Kurdish community in Iraq. As Gorran calls for laws to protect the media, an independent judicial system, and oversight of huge government revenues derived from oil production, more and more Kurds see the party that might deliver them from the lack of jobs amidst plenty and create a political culture in whjich freedom of expression acquires rel meaning.

Will the US support this expression of the Kurd's desire for democracy, and put pressure on the KRG leadership to "walk the walk" and not just "talk the talk" of democracy? Or will it drop the ball, thereby becoming identified with suipportiung a stolid and repressive regime? The risks of the continued status quo are the possible rise of radicalism in the KRG alomh islamist lines. To assure that Iraq's Kurds live in a stable and truly democratic state, the US and other nations committed t democracy need to move from spectators on the sidelines to active participants in helping the Kurds acquire and exercise the rights that so many of us in the West take for granted

Eid al-Fitr, Sectarian Identities and Iraq's Political Elite

It is commonplace to argue that Iraq is an "artificial society" because its main ethnic groups, the Sunni Arabs, Shi'i Arabs and the Kurds can't get along. The logical implications of this model, one of a society rent by ethnic and confessional cleavages, is that political stability, much less democratization, are not in the realm of the possible.

If Iraq's ethnic groups can't get along, one has a hard time explaining two developments that occurred at the end of Ramadan in September. While not earthshaking events, they still provide a window on ethnoconfessional relations in Iraq and belie the argument of Iraq as a society suffering from "ancient hatreds," to use a term favored by some students of ethnic conflicts.

Large numbers of Arabs traveled from the south and north central regions of Iraq to celebrate the end of Ramadan in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the semi-autonomous region of three Kurdish provinces in north eastern Iraq. Reports in the Iraqi press and al-Hayat describe a situation in whch there were so many Arab visitors that it was virtually impossible to find a hotel. In the market (bazar), Arabic was heard everywhere and Kurdish merchants were enjoying brisk sales. If Kurds and Arabs really despised one another, why did so many Arabs feel that the best place to celebrate Eid al-Fitr would be in the KRG?

Obviously, security was one concern since the KRG is largely devoid of the violence that still plagues areas of Arab Iraq. However, what we are seeing is the return to historic patterns in which large numbers of Arabs visited the north on a regular basis.

In describing the flood of Arabs visiting the KRG during Eid al-Fitr, newspaper articles conducted interviews with tourism officials who speak of large projects designed to accommodate much higher levels of domestic and foreign tourism. If ever larger numbers of Arabs do visit the north, this will be one opportunity for Iraq's Arabs and Kurds to establish better relations which were cut off after the 1991 Gulf War.

Indeed, Arabs always traveled to the north during the hot summer months. The difference now is that the KRG is in charge of tourist accommodations, not the central government, which will provide more employment for Kurds and promote the development of more small enterprises. While there is extensive government corruption in the north (as there is in Baghdad), revenues from tourism will help the populace at large which is not benefiting as much as it should due to the KRG's political elite appropriating much of the region's oil revenues for themselves ad their retainers

In the south, it is notable that many Sunni and Shi'i clerics celebrated Eid al-Fitr together to celebrate the withdrawal of US combat forces from Iraq. This recalls the June 1920 Revolution when Sunnis and Shi'is prayed in each mosques and celebrated each others' religious rituals to protest the British occupation of Iraq. After the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in the ethnically mixed north central city of Samarra, a mosque particularly important to devout Shi'a because it is site where the 12th Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, went into occulatation in 874 CE, both Sunni and Shi'i clerics called upon their respective confessionalists to pray in the other sect's mosque as a demonstration of national and religious unity.

What these considerations point to is that the problems facing Iraq are not so much rooted in the populace at large but in its political elite. Much of this elite was not in Iraq during Ba'thist rule. Still weak and fragmented, many of its members constantly play the sectarian card. These sectarian entrepreneurs, who Iraqis historically have referred to as the tujjar al-siiyasa (merchants of politics) should not be confused with the Iraqi populace which demonstrated through the national parliament elections that were held this past March that they are fed up with sectarian appeals and want the government to focus on providing security and services instead.

Moving beyond Iraq's Impasse: Iran and the Return of Shiite Militias

Although there is definite movement towards finally forming a new Iraqi government, there are a number of disturbing developments as well. The return of Shiite militias as a force to be reckoned with in south central and southern Iraq is a disturbing new element in Iraq's current political impasses following the March 2010 Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) elections. Before turning to these militias, what led up to their reentry into the current political equation?

When Nuri al-Maliki became Iraqi Prime Minister in 2006, he was seen as weak and lacked popularity. That all changed in March 2008 when he ordered an offensive against the Mahdi Army (JAM) and other militias in Basra who were terrorizing the population. While many considered the offensive an ill-advised and dangerous gamble, the Iraqi Army, with US logistical and air support, successfully completed its mission. Subsequently, it entered Revolution (Sadr) City in Baghdad where it subdued the JAM before moving on to the border city of Amara, a critical entry point for weapons and drugs from Iran. In interviews in the Arabic press in the spring of 2008, formerly scornful Basrawis now had pictures of Maliki in their cell phones and referred to him as a strong leader.

Many Iraqis breathed a sigh of relief when the JAM was effectively eliminated as a major military force. This was especially true of middle class Shiites in Baghdad and elsewhere whose automobiles, homes and other property had been confiscated by the JAM in neighborhoods that it controlled (NY Times, July 27, 2008).

Not all Mahdi Army militiamen were willing to follow the lead of Muqtada al-Sadr who has focused on the electoral route to gaining power since 2008. The Sadrist Trend (al-tayyar al-sadri) won 40 seats in the March 2010 Chamber of Deputies (national parliament) elections. Due to the stalemate in forming a new government, the Sadrist bloc of seats is crucial to whoever tries to become the next Iraqi prime minister, whether Maliki, Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi, a vice-president from the Iraqi National Alliance or (the least likely) Iyad 'Allawi, head of al-'Iraqiya.

While the focus in the post-election gridlock has been on the struggle between the two main coalitions - the Iraqiya List, which won 91 seats, and Maliki's State of Law Coalition, which won 89 seats, al-Hayat reported in September that a deal was in the works in which Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi would become prime minister, Ayad 'Allawi would be given the presidency, and the Kurds would take over the position of speaker of the parliament.

Iran, which has developed a close relationship with Nuri al-Maliki, did not find this deal acceptable and has been, according to the Arab press, behind the reemergence of a number of Shi'i militias, all of which are either splinters of the Mahdi Army or have ties to Muqtada al-Sadr. While Maliki is anathema to Sadr for his 2008 attack on the JAM, and Sadr has steadfastly refused since March to support him for another term as prime minister, he apparently has now relented under Iranian pressure and concessions from al-Maliki. Those concessions will undoubtedly give Sadr access once again to ministries that will allow him to control the distribution of social benefits such as he did when part of the government in 2006. More disturbing are rumors that Sadr may be offered positions that have to do with national security and/or the military.

Beyond the pressure currently being exerted by Iran, Both Sadr and Maliki have strong incentives to come to terms. First, Sadr does not want to see armed groups that have splintered from the JAM gain power at his expense. These militias have engaged in violence with Iranian support. Two of them, the League of the People of Righteousness (asa'ib ahl al-haqq), and the Hizballah Brigades (kata'ib hizb allah) broke with Sadr after 2008 when he opted for a political strategy. Another group, the Promised Day Brigades (alawiat al-yawm al-maw'ud) has close ties to al-Sadr and seems to represent a new incarnation of the Mahdi Army.

Following the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, these militias became more active in Iraq's south central and southern regions, with the League engaged in operations in Dhi Qar, Misan and al-Basra provinces while Hizballah claimed responsibility for explosions in Karbala', al-Najaf and Baghdad. With the continued political crisis, and a smaller US military presence, these groups feel encouraged to try and exploit the growing power vacuum.

Second, al-Maliki knows that time is not on his side. Already strong support has developed for appointing 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi as prime minister due to al-Maliki's struggle with Iyad 'Allawi and the subsequent gridlock it produced. There is considerable resentment at Maliki's efforts to expand the power of the post of prime minister, such as creating military and intelligence units that only report to him. Removing Maliki from office would prevent him from further institutionalizing his power in ways that many politicians, even Shi'is in the Iraqi National Alliance, find disturbing.

What do these developments suggest? First, they show that Iraq's Shi'i political elite is by no means unified. Second, Iran seems to have been able, for the moment, to use its influence to forge a new government in Iraq. However, it is doubtful that it will be able to sustain this level of influence as Iraq's elite hydrocarbon industry continues to grow, political processes become more institutionalized and Iraq's political elite becomes more self-confidant.

Third, ongoing developments leave open the question of where the Sunni Arab community fits into the new political landscape that is taking shape. While Maliki proclaims that no victorious party (meaning al-'Iraqiya) will be excluded from the new government, Iyad 'Allawi insists that al-'Iraqiya will not join any government headed by Maliki.

Finally and more disturbing is the increased power and influence of Shi's militias that are JAM wannabes. They underscore the fact that Iraq's poor have not seen much benefit in economic developments and state benefits since 2003. Unless the new Iraqi government begins to get serious about poverty, employment, health care, education and municipal services for the poor and dispossessed, radical groups such League of the People of Righteousness, the Hizballah Brigades and the Promised Day Brigades will continue to proliferate and threaten Iraq's political stability and efforts at democratization. These cxonditions will continue to provide fertile soil for Iran's Revolutionary Guards and other disruptive foreign elements to detabilize Iraqi politics.