Tuesday, August 23, 2011

Libya is not Iraq


It is unfortunate that many Western commentators are making comparisons between Iraq after the US invasion of March 2003 and the overthrow of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya. What does tie Iraq and Libya together is the lessons that US foreign policy makers have learned from the mistakes of the Bush administration in Iraq. Eschewing a "top down" approach, the Obama administration has allowed the Libyan National Transitional Council(NTC)to take the lead in setting the agenda for the campaign to rid Libya of Qaddafi's rule and to map out the broad outlines of the post-Qaddafi era.

One of the main differences between the overthrew of Saddam in 2003 and the end of the Qaddafi regime was the manner in which the US approached the two countries. Both pre-invasion and post-Saddam policy in Iraq involved limited consultation with a small number of Iraqis. Even the main political actors that dominated Iraqi politics in 2003 and 2004 were handpicked by the Department of Defense and the White House.

In Libya, the main political actors have emerged from the struggle against the Qaddafi regime. Some may be suspect for once having once been part of that regime. But we do not hear any talk of the functional equivalent of "de-Ba'thification" in Libya, namely preventing anyone associated with the Qaddafi regime from participating in post-Qaddafi politics. Only those who were at the core of the ancien regime will have to face trials.

Another major difference between Iraq and Libya is that the Qaddafi regime has been overthrown by the Libyan people. True, NATO warplanes and logistical support have been crucial in that victory. Still, it has been the Libyan people, especially youth who make up 75% of the population under 30, who have made up the casualties in the struggle to rid Libya of its repressive dictator. Even if NATO had not been involved, it is highly likely that we would still have seen a protracted struggle such as that which is currently underway in Syria.

In Iraq, the US military that was completely responsible for ridding the country of the Ba'th. Iraqis had little or no sense of having contributed to the Ba'thist regime's downfall. The manner in which the Bush administration failed to control extensive looting in Baghdad in April 2003, including protecting the priceless artifacts of the Iraq Museum, created anger and distrust among Iraqis of US objectives in Iraq. It also undermined support for the Bush administration's professed goal of creating a democratic Iraq. Many Iraqis did not trust the Bush administration who they felt did not seem to have developed a well defined policy for post-Saddam Iraq.

In Libya, on the other hand, the US, NATO, the UN and the international community generally have used a light touch when dealing with rebel forces and their political arm, the NTC. Libyan rebels have been forced to make their own decisions and suffer the consequences when these decisions have not worked out, e.g., overstretching their supply lines when engaging Qaddafi's loyalist forces. They have not been able to blame anyone but themselves and in the process have undergone an important learning process.

As rebel forces have struggled to oust the Qaddafi regime, groups of fighters representing different regions, ideologies and tribes have had to cooperate and work together to develop joint military and political strategies. This is not to say that these differences have been overcome and won't reemerge in the new post-Qaddafi era. However, informal groups of rebel fighters have already been formed throughout the country and developed a certain level of trust as they have fought together against what were often better trained and equipped forces.

In Iraq, post-Saddam politics quickly fell under the control of exiles who had not lived in Iraq for many years, in some cases decades. These new leaders have been referred to by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael as "carpetbaggers." Indeed, many Iraqis were highly suspicious of these politicians who came to Iraq in March and April, 2003 with US forces and who had not suffered under Saddam as had the populace at large.

Unlike the political leadership that developed in Iraq after Saddam was toppled, the NTC and military leaders in Libya are much closer to the Libyan citizenry. Yes, some of them were part of Qaddafi's regime, and at least one, the NTC's military commander, Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, was assassinated for having served Qaddafi. Yet the majority of the new leadership has not only shown great courage, especially in the beginning of the struggle when it was not at all clear that Qaddafi would be defeated, and in their measured approach to the struggle. What has been particularly impressive in the NTC's focus on national reconciliation, and their mantra that Libyans not engage in revenge killings and treat their captives with respect.

In short, the old adage that democracy is not a gift that one nation can give to another but must be created by the people through a process of struggle, has played itself out in Libya, as it has in Egypt, Tunisia which are also engaged in the "Arab Spring." All the doubts that Western commentators have expressed about Libya being a "tribal society" in which all the institutions of civil society were destroyed by Qaddafi are arguments of those who doubt that Libya (or any of the countries of the Arab Middle East) can become truly democratic nation-states.

Iraq has made impressive strides towards democracy, even with the many mistakes made by the US occupation administration in 2003 and 2004. It held free and fair parliamentary and provincial legislative elections in 2005, 2009 and 2010. In the March 2010 elections, a secular nationalist coalition led by a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, won a majority of seats and garnered electoral support from all of Iraq's major ethnoconfessional groups. All observers agreed that the elections were fair and free.

Iraq boasts over 6000 registered civil society organizations. The press plays a vigorous role in criticizing the government for not providing needed social services, while the heads of the Shiite and Sunni communities, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samara'i respectively, constantly demand that the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki eliminate extensive corruption and nepotism within its ranks.

In many ways, it can be argued that Iraq has had faced an even more difficult road than Libya in its efforts to implement a democratic transition. Not only did it experience extensive sectarian based violence after 2003, but it has suffered from a fragmented and dysfunctional political elite that spends more time focusing on infighting than trying to work for the interests of the Iraqi people.

Unlike Iraq, Libya will most likely be able to avoid regional, tribal or sectarian based conflict, e.g., Arab against Berber. Libya's political elite seems much more cohesive than its Iraqi counterpart and more closely linked to the populace at large. The NTC and its successor government may use Libya's oil wealth for corrupt ends as have Iraq's Arab and Kurdish political elites. But there are many indications that the NTC benefits from a "civic core" within its ranks that will work to prevent widespread abuses of power such as we saw under the Qaddafi regime

Many would argue that Iraqis have a stronger sense of national identity than do Libyans. This may be true. However, the fact that Iraq, Libya and most of the countries of the Middle East are experiencing a "youth bulge," where a large percentage of the population refuses to adhere to the shibboleths of the past, loses sight of the fact that we are witnessing not just an Arab Spring but the birth of a new generation of political leadership throughout the Middle East.

In Libya, the new generation does not find that tribalism offers them much in the way of improving their lives. Tribalism was more effective for leaders like Saddam and Qaddafi who used it to create social and political cleavages that were intended to "divide and conquer" the populace. However, in the process, Saddam and Qaddafi atomized tribes, often killing their leaders if they refused to follow their dictates. The result was that the tribal system in both countries was undermined and has lost much of its social and political legitimacy.

Observers, Western Arab and others, have every right to be concerned about the form of the new political system that will emerge in Libya now that the Qaddafi regime has been toppled. But we need to avoid the temptation to trot out the old and tired stereotypes about "Islam," "tribalism" and l"lack of national identity" preventing a transition to democracy in the Arab world, so as to not encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Instead, the Obama administration, NATO, Turkey, Qatar and other friends of Libya's NTC should continue their policy of patient, wise and non-obtrusive counseling, supplemented by whatever technical expertise they can offer the new Libyan government. The Arab Spring will enjoy a much greater probability of success if it can count on consistent and long-term support from its allies, both inside and outside the Middle East.

This type of support - namely providing support for the new Libyan government's needs as it defines them - is the best way to avoid the mistakes of Iraq. For those who want to see Libya become a functioning democracy, it is also the most appropriate way to honor all the Libyans who have died so their their countrymen could be free.





Tuesday, August 16, 2011

Soap operas, elite politics and security in Iraq


On August 13th, the Iraqi parliament voted to ban the showing of the soap opera, al-Hasan and al-Husayn on Iraqi television channels. In a video recording of the session, the parliament speaker declared that the film is causing sectarian conflict (al-fitna) in the Muslim world. The film is being shown throughout the Arab world during the holy month of Ramadan. al-Hasan and al-Husayn continues a recent tradition of showing films on topics important to Islam during Ramadan. Such films have drawn large audiences and al-Hasan and al-Husayn is no exception.

The banning of the soap opera shows not only the continued salience of sectarian identities in the Arab world but the lack of effort on the part of political elites to confront the problem of national reconciliation. The problems that led to the banning of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in Iraq are linked to the larger realm of Arab elite politics. This form of elite politics, which refuses to take national reconciliation seriously, threatens the security of Iraq (and that of other Middle Eastern countries where this type of politics is all too often replicated).

As we saw this week, Iraq experienced a devastating series of attacks throughout the country, all of which had sectarian overtones. The groups that organized these attacks need to find recruits to carry out their deadly attacks. Only when all sectors of society feel that they are part of the political process will the recruits for such attacks dry up.

In Iraq's banning the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn, what are the political dynamics of the relationship between culture, politics and national security? In other words, what do the dynamics of banning a soap opera tell us about the politics of national reconciliation in Iraq? And what impact does this form of politics have on Iraq's security situation?

The topic of the assassination of Hasan and Husayn is extremely sensitive since it encompasses the origins of the schism between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Even before it aired, the title of the program was changed from al-Hasan, al-Husayn and Mu'awiya, to al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The omission of Mua'wiya is indicative of the sensitivity of the film's topic. Not only did Mu'awiya organize the attack on Hasan and Husayn's father, the caliph Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was himself murdered in 661 CE, but he was seen as complicit in the deaths of Hasan and Husayn.

The film seeks to edify Muslims about an important event in the history of Islam. Ramadan has become a particularly appropriate time to air lengthy films about complex historical topics because television viewing increases substantially as Muslims fast and spend much of their daytime fast at home.

Taking 3 years to complete, and produced in several Arab countries, the film is comprised of 30 one hour segments. A large number of prominent clerics, religious scholars and historians served as consultants to the producer, Muhammad al-Anzi, of the Kuwaiti Al-Maha Productions company. As al-Anzi has pointed out in several interviews, he tried to present a balanced account of the lives of the two imams, Hasan and Husayn.

The film has elicited criticism throughout the Arab world, including from al-Azhar, the preeminent religious institution in Sunni Islam. The Azhar's calling for the film not be shown based on Sunni Islam's prohibition of showing human representations of Muslim religious figures was underscored by the opposition from the head of the Sunni Religious Endowments (al-Awqaf) in Iraq, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samarra'i and the his counterpart, the head of Shi'i religious endowments, Salih al-Haydari. Likewise, through a representative who delivered the Friday prayer in Karbala', Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani indicated his opposition as well, claiming that the film was filled with factual errors and constituted a deviation from Islam.

However, as a commentator to an article on the controversy noted, the film only became political in Iraq once the parliament voted to ban it from all Iraq's television channels. The problem then is the unwillingness of politicians to tackle head on the sectarian divide that still afflicts Iraq and other Arab countries. Rather than open the historical record to scrutiny, political elites instead prefer to repress efforts to examine the past.

While many viewers in the Arab world have been drawn to watch al-Hasan and al-Husayn given the controversy surrounding it, many others indicate their interest in it stems from their lack of knowledge of the historical events that are depicted in the film and their desire to know more about them. Once again, we see the divide between elite and mass politics. By not allowing a healthy discussion of what led to the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, Arab countries are prevented from moving forward with the process of national reconciliation.

The lack of national reconciliation is a key factor that allows sectarian identities to persist. And the persistence of sectarianism is good news for Sunni Arab organizations like al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and their Shi'i counterparts. As long as historical grievances are not confronted, such organizations can find recruits, especially when the government provides limited services and is characterized by extensive corruption.

For political elites, serious efforts at national reconciliation represent a threat to their power base. Indeed, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has dismissed calls for national reconciliation in the past, emphasizing instead that a focus on the rule of law and the constitution is more important (al-Nahar, May 25, 2009).

Once reconciliation becomes part of a meaningful political process, all parts of the political spectrum must be given access to political participation. Once the political process is opened up, the ability of elites to maintain vertical forms of social and political identity are undermined. The cohesion of their political base is threatened. To achieve their narrow personal goals, it is more effective to play the sectarian card rather than pursue a politics of national inclusion.

In Iraq, the al-Maliki government's sectarian based politics has led to the exclusion of important sectors of the population, such as the tribal groups of al-Anbar Province. Many Anbaris who participated in the Sons of Iraq movement (Sahwat al-'Iraq) are understandably resentful that al-Maliki has not kept his promise to integrate them into the army, security forces or state bureaucracy. al-Maliki would like to exclude the Kurds but needs them to offset challenges from the al-Iraqiya list that won the 2010 national parliament elections and is led by his nemesis, Ayad 'Allawi

The pursuit of a sectarian based politics is compounded by political discrimination based on social class. al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition shows very little concern or compassion for poor Shi'a in Iraq (much less the poor of other ethnoconfessional groups). The party is based largely in the prosperous Shi'i merchant and professional middle classes who see the Shi'a poor as aligned with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Trend and thus threatening to their interests. This neglect provides an opening for radical elements such as the Sadrists and other sectarian militias, such as the "League of the Righteous" (Asa'ib al-Haqq)to recruit among the Shi'a poor.

Further, the failure of the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi political elite to confront sectarianism through an emphasis on national reconciliation has had a negative effect on Iraq's security forces. It is well known that units in the army profess loyalty to individual political parties and leaders rather than to a unified army command.

The failure of members of Iraq's Arab political elite to come to terms with their Kurdish counterparts means that the Iraqi army and the Kurdish pesh merga remain separate military forces. If the two forces could cooperate on national rather than local security, Iraq would be better positioned to assert control over its national territory. While pesh merga units have helped repress terrorist cells in Baghdad in the past, little has been done to integrate these units into the larger Iraqi army.

What the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn indicates is the potential power of historical memory. The past can be used to bring Iraqis (and other peoples in the Middle East) together if done in an open and honest manner as the screen writer, director and producer have attempted to do in the film, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The fact that the most recent Iraqi school textbooks have avoided all controversial topics and fail to confront the legacy of Saddam Husayn's brutality is indicative of the weak and ostrich-like approach of the political leadership in Iraq.

If the Iraqi government and the Obama administration think that Iraq's security problems can be solved through continued training of the Iraqi army and security forces alone, they need to rethink their assumptions. As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down." Structural changes are needed among Iraq's political elite if the horrific attacks of this week are to become a thing of the past and meaningful security for the Iraqi people is to be achieved.





Thursday, July 14, 2011

Will US Troops Remain in Iraq?


As the deadline nears for the Iraqi government to decide if a contingent of American troops will be allowed to remain in Iraq after the end of this year, the Obama administration has expressed mounting frustration that a decision has yet to be made. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s blunt language during his recent visit to Baghdad, which criticized Prime Minister al-Maliki’s indecision, reflected that frustration. However, no amount of American criticism or behind the scenes pressure can, by itself, alter the basic political dynamics that constrain Iraqi decision-making regarding US troops remaining in Iraq. Rather the al-Maliki government is going to have to make some difficult choices and make them soon.

One constraint is the profound sense of nationalism that characterizes the Iraqi people. At one level, the US should welcome this expression of nationalism because it underlines a sense of national unity that is belied by the usual focus in the West on Iraq as a nation-state rent by sectarian and ethnic divisions.

While the Kurds are much more amenable to US troops remaining in Iraq, neither Iraqi president Jalal Talabani nor Kurdish Regional Government president Masoud Barzani has been making a public case for retaining American troops after December 31, 2011. If US troop are to remain in Iraq, there will need to be justification by the Iraqi government as to how those troops serve its national interests.

A second constraint is more problematic from the US perspective. This reflects the problem created by the pressure being exerted on al-Maliki by his erstwhile ally, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend and former Mahdi Army (now partially reincarnated as the Army of the Promised Day - Jaysh al-Yawn al-Maw’ud).

The Sadrist Trend, which is represented in the Iraqi parliament by the “Liberals” (al-ahrar) reflects a fundamental problem of Iraqi society, namely the continued deterioration of the quality of life for large segments of the country’s poor and marginal social strata. The agrarian sector’s decline means that agriculture cannot support the rural population, thus producing a steady stream of migrants to urban areas. These migrants tend to be young and uneducated and highly susceptible to recruitment to militias and criminal organizations.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government, both under al-Maliki and former prime ministers, has done little to curb extensive state corruption. The lack of any serious effort to bring corruption under control has created an even more pernicious dynamic. It sends a message to cabinet minsters that they need not make an effort to improve government services. Corruption not only wastes huge amounts of public funds but produces a political culture in which holding a government office is viewed as a source of patronage, rather than an as institution whose raison d’ĂȘtre is to provide a public service. Corruption is also linked to nepotism because relatives and friends are given choice positions within government ministries.

These conditions result in poor and inadequate services and widespread cynicism among the populace at large. They create the “perfect storm” for populist and proto-authoritarian organizations such as the Sadrists who argue that they are the true embodiment of the common will, because only they take the public interest seriously.

In this respect, the Sadrists parallel movements in other parts of the Middle East where the government has abdicated its responsibilities towards its citizenry. Hizballah in Lebanon demonstrates many similarities with the Sadrist movement given the Lebanese government’s historical neglect of the Shiite dominated southern region of the country. Likewise, the PKK in south eastern Turkey and Hamas in the Gaza Strip would not have acquired popular support had the Turkish government and the PLO respectively been more attentive to the local populace’s needs.

A third constraint on American forces remaining in Iraq is the influence of negative “neighborhood effects.” As I have mentioned in previous postings, none of Iraq’s neighbors with the exception of Turkey, wants to see a democratic, pluralistic and tolerant political system develop in Iraq.

June 2011 was the worst month for US troop casualties in 2 years and almost all the deaths can be attributed to Shiite militias in the south who have been supplied with sophisticated arms by the Iranians. Clearly, Iran continues to put pressure on the US so as to hamper its ability to achieve its goals in Iraq, particularly through strengthening Shiite militias and encouraging them to attack US forces. By increasing tensions between American forces and these militias, focus continues to be placed on the presence of US forces in Iraq and the December 31 deadline for them to leave. These developments place more constraints on al-Maliki’s behavior.

According to the al-Hayat (July 5), the Iranians have let the US know through back channels that they would be willing to agree to some US troops remaining in Iraq if the US agrees not to pressure Hizballah concerning the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, not to topple Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria, and to pull back in its efforts to punish Iran for continuing to develop its nuclear energy program which the US sees as intended to produce nuclear weapons.

The US will not accept such conditions and agree to strike such a bargain with Iran. Therefore, we can expect Iran to continue encouraging Shiite militias to attack US forces and to instruct the Sadrist movement to insist that all US forces withdraw from Iraq. The al-Maliki government’s failure to suppress these militias and to arrest their leaders has created great resentment among US forces in Iraq and can only serve to drive a wedge between the US and Iraq.

There is a solution to the problems just outlined but it would require al-Maliki to change course politically. Adopting a statesman-like approach in which he explained to the Iraqi public why some US forces must remain in Iraq after December 31, al-Maliki would detail the need for these forces to complete the training of the Iraqi army, assist Iraq in building an air force that can monitor and control the country’s borders, and help Iraq’s national police force acquire the skills it needs to insure control of terrorist and criminal elements.

In this process, al-Maliki can expect the withdrawal of Sadrist members of parliament from his government in protest of his decision to allow some US forces to remain in Iraq. The resulting political deficit could be filled by having al-Maliki reach out to his arch-rival Ayad Allawi. Al-Maliki would need to create what he has been calling for ever since the March 2010 elections, namely a “national unity government.”

With the support of the Kurds, and Allawi, al-Maliki’s government would not fall. However, the Iraqi Prime Minister would need to make concessions to Allawi. This would include allowing Allawi to have an important say in the selection of the ministers of defense and interior, positions which still have not been filled since the March 2010 elections.

It would also entail giving meaningful powers to the position of Director of the new National Council for Strategic Policies which the US proposed be created after the March 2010 elections to break the logjam over who would become prime minister. The idea was that Allawi, while unable to become prime minister, would still receive a meaningful political position in the new Iraqi government. By heading the new National Council for Strategic Policies, Allawi would be able to temper the prime minister’s power by having control over defense and national security issues.

Will al-Maliki see the necessity of forcing the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq with Muqtada al-Sadr, other Shiite militias and their patron Iran? Or will he give in to current political pressures and cede political influence to theses groups that pose a major threat to Iraq’s democratic development and its ability to maintain Iraq’s autonomy from Iran?

What Iraq requires is bold leadership. Prime Minister al-Maliki needs to face down the Sadrists and nascent Shiite militias, make clear to Iran that Iraq will no longer tolerate meddling in its internal affairs, clean up the political mess in Baghdad by coming to terms with Ayad Allawi and his al-‘Iraqiya List, and then use this political foundation to attack the pressing social problems facing Iraq which are security, job creation and economic development, and the provision of government services.

Such bold action would allow Iraq to more forward. It would place the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq in its proper context, namely helping Iraq achieve its national agenda.

Sunday, June 5, 2011

What does Iraq's political crisis tell us about the Arab Spring?


How is Iraq confronting its own Arab Spring? What does Iraq’s current political crisis tell us about the possibilities of success for the Arab Spring? Much of what happening in Iraq today has important ramifications for the best candidates for a transition to democracy, Egypt and Tunisia. While all 3 countries are very different, Iraq's experience points to one of the main problems that emerges after the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. That problem is the inability of competing factions within the political elite to develop cohesive policies and adopt a civic as opposed to personalistic approach to politics.

Iraq celebrated the holding of successful parliamentary elections in March 2010. Iraq’s Higher Elections Commission and foreign observers agreed that the elections were fair and violence was almost non-existent. Voter turnout was 62.5% nationwide and as high as 70% in Iraq’s 3 northern Kurdish provinces.

In a rejection of what voters perceived as the parliament’s inefficacy in fighting corruption, over 60% of the sitting members of the parliament elected in 2005 were turned out of office. Further, a national coalition, al-Iraqiya, which rejected sectarian politics won 91 seats, the largest number of any political grouping. The fact that al-Iraqiya was led by a Shiite, former prime minister Ayad Allawi, and received significant votes from all 3 of Iraq’s main ethnic groups created great optimism about the future direction of Iraqi politics.

However, these expectations did not materialize. Sitting prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki refused to cede any power to Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition and instead worked to marginalize it by reaching out to the Iraqi National Alliance, which included the Sadrists and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, and the Kurdish Alliance. This maneuvering angered Allawi and al-Iraqiyia, especially the Coalition’s rural Sunni Arab supporters who felt that Maliki was trying to exclude them along sectarian lines.

It took until November 2010, over 7 months, before al-Maliki was able to form a new government that largely excluded al-Iraqiya. The Kurds stepped as king makers by brokering a compromise that allocated the prime minister’s position to al-Maliki, the position of speaker of parliament to al-Iraqiya, and the president of the newly created National Strategic Council, that was supposedly intended to coordinate national defense and security policy to Allawi. But the actual powers of the newly formed council were never clearly defined and Allawi refused to accept the position.

At the same time, Maliki has had to fight out attacks by his erstwhile coalition partner Muqtada al-Sadr upon whose parliament members he depends. Sadr has pounded away at the need for all US forces to be out of Iraq by the agreed date of December 31, 2011 as agreed by upon Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded between Iraq and the US in 2008.

While no one expects Sadr to actually be able to act on his threat to reactivate the Mahdi Army if US forces aren’t withdrawn, he recently organized a march of thousands of his supporters in Sadr City who were dressed in a quasi uniform (Shirts emblazoned with the Iraqi flag), as he keeps up relentless pressure on al-Maliki’s government.

Although nominally al-Maliki’s ally, Sadr continues to attack the government for the lack of and jobs and services, and for failing to fight corruption. Thus the Sadrists are trying to assume the mantle not only as the political force that will protect Iraq against Western domination, but also bring transparent government and one that delivers the type of social services that the populace craves.

If the inter-elite cleavages were not destructive enough of effective governance, increased tensions have developed between al-Maliki and local government, both provincial governors and provincial councils. Not a day seems to go by that the Iraqi and Arab press fail to report some form of conflict between the central government and the provinces. Invariably these problems are caused by decisions by taken by Baghdad that rides roughshod over local rights. These decisions include appointing and removing local officials, failing to provide the provinces with funds to which they’re entitled or making investment decisions that concern local oil and natural gas resources without consulting local officials (in violation of the constitution).

What Iraq points to is the legacy of authoritarian rule for democratic transitions in the Middle East. Saddam Husayn destroyed all political institutions and civil society during 35 years of Ba’thist rule. He also killed any members of the political elite who he thought might at some point challenge his rule, even his former childhood friend who he appointed as defense minister during the Iran-Iraq War, Adnan Khayrallah.

Most of the players in Iraq’s unstable political game fled the country and hence were expatriates during Ba’thist rule. None enjoy any significant level trust among the populace at large. Constant infighting - often over what appear to the Iraqi electorate as petty matters - has further undermined the elite's popularity. That was certainly evident from research I recently completed among Iraqi youth who consistently used pejorative terms to refer to Iraq’s political class.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Iraq is making economic progress. It plans to invest $150 billion in infrastructural development over the next 3 years, especially to rehabilitate oil and natural gas pipelines. Inflation rates have dropped from a high of over 20% in 2007 to an expected level of 6.2% in 2012. Oil export revenue has increased with the global rise in energy prices (Iraq earned about $7 billion in revenues from oil sales this past March). GDP growth is up from 1.5% in 2007 to a projected 10.9% in 2012.

But investing in the hydrocarbon sector does not produce many jobs. The revenues derived from the sale of oil and natural gas has not been translated into job creation or improved services. Indeed, 1 out of 6 Iraqis still lives below the poverty line on $2 per day, a situation that infuriates large segments of the populace.

Most analysts blame the recent uptick in violence in Iraq on the inability of the political elite in Baghdad to reach a national solution to the country’s political crisis. The lack of a political solution has recently seen an increase in attacks on prominent Iraqi political figures. There were unsuccessful assassination attempts on Atheel al-Nujayfi, the governor of Ninewa Province and an important figure in the Mosul-based al-Hadba' Party, and on al-Iraqiya's candidate for Defense Minister, Major-General Khalid al-Ubaydi.

The core component of a national solution to solving Iraq;s current crisis must center on giving all sectors of the elite a place at the political table. As long as al-Maliki refuses to do this, as evident in his continued reluctance to appoint al-Iraqiya members to the vacant positions of Defense and Interior ministers, resentment by those who feel excluded will persist and violence will be one of the results. How might such a national political solution come about? This is a topic to be explored in future postings.

Thursday, May 26, 2011

the Arab Spring: Markets, Wasatiya and Federalism


The New York Times carried two articles this past Sunday, May 22nd, that point to the problematic way in which the Arab Spring is understood in the West. On the front page, headlines pronounced, "Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions." The article warns that the spirit of national unity that characterized the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere now threatens to devolve into social and political cleavages based in religion, tribe and ethnicity.

This doom and gloom tenor of this article stands in sharp contrast to an article in the magazine section, "The Hot Money Cowboys of Iraq," which describes the entrepreneurial spirit of Iraq's new business class. As these entrepreneurs press forward with numerous projects, they have little time to worry about social and political cleavages, or "religion, clan sect and ethnicity," to use the words of the front page story.

As Namir al-Akabi, one of the wealthiest men of the new business class, put it, "Iraq is a rich, virgin country!" While others view Iraq as an ethnically fragmented society, Iraq's new business class sees it as a great opportunity for economic reconstruction and profit.

The sense of individual initiative that characterizes the businessmen in "Hot Money Cowboys" recalls my interviews with Iraqi businessmen during the period when ethnic strife was still prevalent throughout Iraq. Interviewing one of Iraq's wealthiest Kurdish businessmen in Arbil in 2007, I asked him whether he had any problem working with his Arab partner who was sitting across the table from us. Both he and his partner looked at me quizzically. "We are trying to make a profit," they replied, "and if we can create some jobs in the process, so much the better." For them, they didn't have time to worry about ethnic differences.

Clearly, not all Arab countries possess the oil and natural gas resources of Iraq. However, the entrepreneurial spirit that I encountered in Iraq, even during the height of ethnic conflict, is not confined to that country. A new spirit of individual initiative, responsibility and openness to new ideas is spreading throughout the Arab world, especially among the young. This indeed was one of the findings of my recent research with focus groups of Iraqi youth.

The new spirit of individual initiative is reflected in the values of openness, toleration and moderation, not just among entrepreneurs, but in the interpretation and practice of Islam. One manifestation of this is the spread of al-wasatiya. Derived from the Arabic wasat, or middle, it connotes moderation in the interpretation and application of Islamic doctrine. This approach is often juxtaposed to more rigid and doctrinaire forms of Salafism.

For many Muslim clerics, the focus on wasatiya represents a return to the core values of Islam, which rejects extremism in all its forms (Qur'an 68:25). To be situated between extremes (al-awsat)leads the believer to a virtuous and fruitful life. Wasatiya does not represent a concession to modernity and a watering down of Islam as a religion, but rather the foregrounding of its true message for all humanity, namely an emphasis on the coming together of all peoples of good will, regardless of religion.

The threat with which authoritarian regimes have viewed wasatiya was evident in the refusal of the Husni Mubarak regime to approve a license for the "Middle Party" (hizb al-wasat). Founded in 1995 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, this party stressed tolerance and inter-religious reconciliation (even including a Christian as one of its founding members).

Husni Mubarak's regime prevented the Middle Party (excellently analyzed by A.R. Norton in his, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of the Hizb al-Wasat"*)from becoming an official political party because it wanted to restrict the the "official opposition" to the more radical Muslim Brotherhood. Any time Western countries pressed Mubarak to liberalize and democratize Egypt, he could point to the Brotherhood and ask: "If we hold the elections you suggest, do you want the Islamists to take power?" If a more moderate Islamic alternative had existed, such as the Middle Party, Mubarak's ploy would have lost its power of persuasion. Thankfully, the Transition Military Council gave the Middle Party a license after Mubarak was ousted.

If the spirit of individual thought and judgment rings true to many Arab businessmen and youth, the concept of federalism supports this frame of mind. Federalism offers a palliative to the centralized authoritarianism that characterizes most Arab states. Such authoritarianism is the logical outcome of the corporatist "group think" that military and single party regimes have forced on their unwilling citizenry.

In Iraq, federalism has devolved power to the provinces where governors and provincial legislatures not only often offer better services to the citizenry than the central government, but also provide a set of check and balances against the abuse of power at the center(see my posting "Local Control and Democratization in Iraq," Nov. 8, 2010). The effort to exercise local control within a federal political structure has infuriated Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who has sought to centralize all power in his hands. Nevertheless, the federal political system represents one of the best hopes for building democracy in Iraq.

Federalism does not just apply to Iraq. In Yemen, it could be used to decentralize power and ameliorate much of the tension between the northern and southern portions of the country. As Dr. John Duke Anthony noted to me in a recent conversation, the concept of federalism is not alien to Arab political culture, despite arguments to the contrary. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)has existed as a federal state for over 40 years and tribes embody notions of federalism in their alliances (think of the Muntafiq, Shamar and other tribal confederations in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula).

Correspondents, Western, Arab or otherwise, have a responsibility to report on political conflict and to call our attention to potential looming crises. However, there is no society or human community in which the direction of social change is only going in a negative direction without that society or community likewise experiencing positive change as well. As I found while conducting research in Iraq during the 1980s, even under Saddam Husayn's brutal regime, Iraqis still found ways to resist (as I documented in Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq).

Let's hope that the media - press, television and social media - offer more perspectives on positive change in the Arab world. The spread of open markets, ideas such as al-wasatiya, and the institutionalization of federalism can help promote a more democratic Arab world. These develometns call out for more reporting.

The process of democratization in the Arab world is not a "spectator sport." Whether the Arab Spring is successful will depend on the extent to which social, political and economic forces - both in the Arab world and beyond it - give it their support.

*Augustus Richard Norton, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of Hizb al-Wasat," in Robert Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, 2005, 133-160.

Monday, May 23, 2011

The Pakistani Taliban’s Formulation of lex talionis


Guest author: Farah Jan

After the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the US navy seals on May 2nd, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) issued a statement in which they threatened to avenge Bin Laden by targeting Pakistan’s army, navy and air force, along with the US and NATO interests. The Latin word lex talionis, translates as, “the law of retaliation.” This principle finds its roots in Biblical times and refers to the precept of “an eye for an eye.” The TTP and other militant groups have affirmed the retaliation pledge, but with no end in sight.

As the ancient Greeks proclaimed prior to the start of Olympics, “let the games begin!,” so the TTP have issued a similar message in a sinister fashion for the Pakistani government and its armed forces. In the process, the TTP has unleashed its war machine using its most effective weapon, “the suicide bomber.”

During the last few weeks, we have seen numerous attacks, starting with the twin attacks on Frontier Constabulary headquarters on May 13th, that killed 98 paramilitary recruits and civilians, the assassination of Saudi consulate official on May 16th, the attack on U.S. officials on May 20th, killing a passerby, and now the most embarrassing attack on the Pakistani naval base in Karachi on May 22nd. The TTP has taken responsibility for these attacks, each time issuing a statement afterwards that, “this was revenge for martyrdom of Osama Bin Laden. It was the proof that we are still united and powerful.” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127)

The May 22nd attack on the PNS Mehran base demonstrates the coordination and strength of the TTP and other al-Qaeda influenced groups. The naval base attack raises serious concerns regarding the ability of militant groups to launch small-scale combat against the seventh largest army in the world.

Indeed, the militant groups are deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s major cities. Through their recent attacks, they threaten to weaken the security institutions of the state. Incapacitating the state, supposedly the sole institution that has the right to exercise the use of force within the boundaries of the territory over which it rules, threatens to render Pakistan a failed state. According to the Weberian definition, the state is a “human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Thus the state via its security apparatus and institutions successfully asserts this use of force within its territory, as well as defending this territory from external threats.

The state of Pakistan today is at a critical crossroad in determining its security and defense from internal and external perils. The ultimate end for non-state actors like the TTP, would be to reconfigure current state structures, and replace them with institutions that advance their extremist agenda. Their short-term objective is to cripple Pakistan’s security institutions, further leading it to collapse.

A failed or collapsed Pakistan would be a regional disaster for South Asia, particularly for the economic and political stability of both China and India. The effects of Pakistan’s failure are not limited to the region, but would have global repercussions. For the United States, Pakistan’s geo-strategic location is crucial. Policy makers in Washington are expecting a forceful response by the Pakistani army against the TTP’s attack on the Karachi naval base . At stake is the Pakistani state’s capacity to use legitimate force for its own self-defense.

Tuesday, May 10, 2011

Sectarian Identities and the Arab Spring


Will sectarian identities derail the Arab Spring? Many observers fear that, were Bashar al-Asad to fall from power in Syria, the outcome would not be a transition to democracy but an outbreak of confessionally based violence, pitting the country's constituent religious groups against one another. The continued clashes between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt likewise has led to fears that Mubarak's removal may represent a pyrrhic victory if religious based violence spreads. In Tunisia, threats against women by radical Islamists for not wearing "appropriate" Islamic dress has raised the specter of intervention by the army if these forces appear to be gaining too much power.

The problem of sectarianism continues to raise its ugly head in Iraq as well. Ethnically based violence persists, albeit at much lower levels than during the height of such strife between 2004 and 2007. The efforts of the Baghdad city council to ban alcohol earlier this year was seen as the beginning salvo in an effort to place constraints on, if not eventually close, Baghdad's famed social clubs and artist ateliers which are known not only for serving alcohol but for their avowedly secular cultural and political orientation and as venues where Iraqis from all ethnic and religious groups gather.

In an effort to better understand sectarianism in Iraq, I organized a special issue of the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. The topic of the special issue is "the question of sectarian identities in Iraq." In addition to editing the issue and writing a theoretical introduction, I asked nine top scholars on Iraq to contribute to the issue.

The contributors include Adeed Dawisha, Peter Sluglett,Abbas Kadhim, Reider Visser, Orit Bashkin, Dina Khoury, Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael, and Bassam Yousif. The topics range from British efforts to manipulate sectarian tensions for purposes of colonial control, the impact of 1920 Revolution on sectarian identities, the position of Iraq's Jewish community in relation to sectarianism, Shi'a attitudes towards creation of a separate confessionally base state, the impact of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars on sectarian identities, the impact of expatriate politicians who returned to Iraq in the wake of the 2003 US invasion on sectarian identities, and the political economy of post-2003 sectarian identities in Iraq.

These historically and contemporary based essays emphasize that the dynamics of sectarian identities in Iraq are very complex. Nevertheless, the essays convincingly demonstrate that sectarian identities are a function of crises and the manipulation of these crises by political elites who seek to promote their narrow political and economic interests. Such elites have been historically referred to by Iraqis as the "merchants of politics" (tujjar al-siyasa). I prefer to call them "sectarian entrepreneurs."

At the same time, the journal essays underscore that sectarian identities cannot be seem as simply "socially and politically constructed." In Iraq, as in any nation-state, there are many histories, some of them tolerant and some of them politically divisive.

The Shi'a and Kurds, as well as other ethnoconfessional groups, have experienced social and political marginalization if not violence during the course of Iraqi history. That historical memory is always available in times of crisis for sectarian entrepreneurs to exploit needs to be recognized. While sectarian identities are rarely if ever "primordial" - so-called "ancient hatreds" - there is always a broad tableau of historical events that can be mobilized if the political and socioeconomic conditions are right.

What those who analyze sectarian identities often forget is the obverse, namely that ethnic groups can cooperate to achieve impressive political results. Indeed, the research by James Fearon and David Laitin shows that in ethnically divers societies, cooperation not conflict is the norm. The Iraqi nationalist movement, that began in the late 19th century but came into its own after the 1920 Revolution until it was viciously suppressed by the first Ba'thist regime that seized power in February 1963, was characterized by cross-ethnic cooperation. As I document in my Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, all of Iraq's ethnic groups - Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Kurds, Christians, Jews, Turkmen and other ethnic groups participated in the nationalist struggle.

If we look at Egypt, we see that it too developed a nationalist movement that, like Iraq, included Muslims, Christians and Jews. Tolerance and cross-ethnic cooperation have been the rule in Iraq's modern history. Only during the UN sanctions of the 1990s did sectarian identities begin to spread in Iraq and only during the immediate post-2003 period did Iraq experience persistent sectarian violence.

And we need to remember that, in Iraq, ethnically based violence was facilitated by the ill-advised US decision to dissolve the conscript army and the national police in May 2003. If that decision had not been taken, it is highly unlikely that the Ba'thist and al-Qa'ida sponsored insurgencies would have gotten off the ground.

In a future posting, I will report on my findings with focus groups of Iraq youth between the ages between 14 and 30. The positive findings are that these youth are not supportive of sectarianism. Young people realize that sectarianism threatens their future. They know that. all too often, they are the ones who suffer from ethnically based violence.

To purchase the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studiesspecial issue on sectarian identities in Iraq go to:
http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/journals/view-Journal,id=144/view,page=1/