جائزة نوبل للربيع العربي ممثلا في المرأة اليمنية

The article below, "The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Arab Spring is represented by a Yemeni Woman: Tawwakul Karman," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, and appeared in the Jerusalem newspaper, al-Quds,

ثلاثة هم الفائزون بجائزة نوبل للسلام: المرأة اليمنية المناضلة المجسدة في شخص السيدة توكل عبد السلام كرمان وباقة النساء المناضلات من

حولها في صفوف الثورة اليمنية من أمثال أروى عبده عثمان وسامية وفاطمة الأغبري وبشرى المقطري ونادرة عبد القدوس وهدى العطاس وناديا الكوكباني وسارة جمال وهند وآمنة النصيري ونبيلة الزبير وأسوان عثمان ومنى لقمان وسعاد عطا وأروى أحمد عون ، وأمل الباشا ومها البريهي وأروى الخطابي ووفاء الأكحلي، والفائز الثاني هو الربيع العربي ممثلا في ثورة اليمن العظيمة التي حافظت على سلميتها رغم استفزازات النظام الدموي المتآكل، والفائز الثالث هو المرأة العربية المناضلة بشكل عام من جميلة بوحيرد إلى الشهيدة ليلي السرميني ابنة ال 45 ربيعا والتي سقطت يوم الرابع من هذا الشهر برصاص القتلة من أتباع النظام الدموي في سوريا في بلدة تلبيسة قرب حمص أمام عيون الكاميرا ومن بعدها أمام عيون العالم.

توكل عبد السلام كرمان إمرأة تجسد أمة ناهضة تتململ بعد غياب طويل صنعه أعداء الأمة ووكلاؤهم المحليون وهي على وشك أن تكسر الأغلال وتطيح بالطغاة واحدا بعد الآخر. أمة ستضع الآن تاجا من الغار على جبين توكل الطاهر الشريف ابنة اليمن السعيد الواعد بإنجاب المزيد من المناضلات. لقد شرفت توكل كل الرجال والنساء والشباب والشابات العرب من الغلابى والمضطهدين والعاطلين عن العمل والباحثين عن لقمة عيش وجرعة كرامة والذين قرروا أن يثوروا ضد العملاء والخانعين والقتلة والمجرمين والفاسدين وأجهزة البلطجة والبلاطجة والشبيحة ودوائر المخابرات والقناصة والمرتزقة.

تكريم توكل اليوم من السيد ألفرد نوبل اعتراف بدور المرأة العربية الجديدة التي تصنع فجرا ومستقبلا لأمتها وتشق طريقا وعرة بين أكوام الخراب التي خلفها هؤلاء الطغاة في شرق البلاد وغربها، شمالها وجنوبها. وجائزة نوبل هذه صفعة حامية على جبين النظام الكالح الجاف القبيح الذي يوجه رصاصه لصدور أبناء اليمن الغر الميامين ولم يكتف بأكثر من 33 سنة حكم، خرب فيها البلاد وأذل العباد ونهب الثروات وفرق الناس إلى تجمعات قبلية وعرقية ودينية كي يسهل مهمة القبض على خناق الوطن، ثم أدخل أطياف الشعب اليمني في حروب داخلية وساوم على سيادة البلد حيث أعطى صكا لدول خارجية لملاحقة أبناء اليمن وقتلهم على أرض اليمن.

هذه الجائزة تكريم لكل نساء اليمن اللواتي صرخن في وجه الطاغية الأمي: إرحل إرحل. هذه الجائزة هدية لفتيات ميدان التحرير من الشهيدة سالي زهران إلى إسراء عبد الفتاح، المرشحة العربية الأخرى لنفس الجائزة، وأسماء محفوظ وأمينة الطنطاوية وزميلهن وائل غنيم المرشح الآخر لنيل الجائزة والآلاف الذين حولوا ميدان التحرير إلى موقع لميلاد مصر الجديدة المناضلة العائدة إلى أمتها بعد سنين الاغتراب . هذه الجائزة أيضا لك يا راضية نصرواي ولك يا لينا بن مهنا ، المرشحتين التونسيتين لنفس الجائزة، ولزميلاتكما المناضلات في الثورة التونسية العظيمة ولابن سيدي بوزيد الشهيد محمد بو العزيزي ونساء ورجال تونس الذي تسلحوا بأطواق الياسمين وأسقطواعصابة بن علي و ليلى والطرابلسي.

وهذه الجائزة لمناضلات الثورة الليبية من إيمان العبيدي وإسراء بن محمود وهدى أبو زيد إلى عائشة قدور وفاطمة بريدان وأمل بشير، وكل الشباب والشابات الذين طاردوا الطاغية وأولاده من بيت لبيت ومن شارع لشارع ومن زنقة لزنقة فولى هاربا كالجرذ يفتش عن دهليز أو جحر يختبئ فيه مع أوهامه التي يبدو أنه ما زال متمسكا بها.

وهذه الجائزة باقة من الورد تقدم للفتيات السوريات اللواتي يتحدين الرصاص والتعذيب والموت ويناضلن، كل واحدة بطريقتها، لوقف تقدم الجيش والمخابرات والشبيحة والأمن السري والعلني من المناضلة مي كساب إلى الحقوقية رزان زيتون إلى الشهيدة ليلى السرميني. إنها جائزة للشباب الذين يتحدون الموت ويخرجون في الليل والنهار رافعين شعارا واحدا تلتف حوله كل فئات الشعب: سوريا بدها حرية.

وهذه الجائزة اعتراف بالمرأة العربية المناضلة من عهود الاستعمار إلى عهود الطغاة من صفية زغلول في مصر إلى سناء المحيدلي في لبنان ومن دلال المغربي وليلى خالد في فلسطين، إلى جميلة بوحيرد في الجزائر. إنها هدية للمناضلات اللواتي عبدن الطريق نحو الثورة المباركة. من هدى شعراوي ونوال السعداوي إلى توجان الفيصل ولويزة حنون وأسيرات الحرية في سجون الاحتلال: غفران زامل وسنا عامر ودعاء الجيوسي ومريم أبو دقة وجيهان دحادحة وفاطمة الزق وصونا الراعي وغيرهن.

هذه الجائزة إقرار بأن المرأة العربية لم يعد دورها مقصورا على المطبخ وغرفة الولادة. لقد ساهم الربيع العربي في إعادة تأهيل المرأة لأخذ دورها الحقيقي في التنمية والبناء والنهضة والتطور والتقدم، كما ساهمت المرأة أيضا في صقل الربيع العربي وإعلاء الجانب الإنساني والاجتماعي والحضاري منه. لقد خرجت إلى الشارع لتشارك الزوج والأب والإبن والأخ والمعلم والموظف والتاجر والعالم والمبرمج والسائق في نسج خيوط فجر يكاد أن ينبلج من بقايا ليل يكاد أن يمّحي.

نتمنى أن تحرك هذه الجائزة العروق في بقية الشعوب العربية التي ما زالت تقرفص على السياج بانتظار انقشاع غبار االثورات في اليمن وسوريا. ونريد لهذه الجائزة أن تضخ عزيمة مضاعفة في نساء هذا الوطن لينزعن الصورة النمطية التي تصور المرأة العربية خانعة ساكنة طائعة وطيّعة ومهيضة الجناح التي كرسها المجتمع الذكوري والفكر المتمترس في مجاهل التاريخ الذي فصّـلوه على مقاس كراسيهم.

نتمنى لجائزة توكل أن تخترق الحدود الموصدة على ملايين النساء في بلدان مجاورة، محرومات حتى من حق قيادة السيارة أو المشي أو السفر بدون محرم حيث اختصرت الأنظمة المتخلفة والمسلحة بالفتاوى دور النساء على أن يكن كومة لحم فقط مغطاة بالسواد دون وجه أو أنف أو عينين أو عقل.

تحية للسيدة المناضلة توكل وتحية مماثلة لزوجها الفاضل محمد إسماعيل الذي وقف مساندا ومشجعا ولولاهذه العقلية المنفتحة والمتفتحة لما كنا نحتفل هذا اليوم بفوز توكل بهذه الجائزة الكبرى. تحية للشعب اليمني العظيم وهو يكتب الفصول الأخيرة في نهاية حكم هذا الطاغية الأبله الذي يصر أن يبقى هو وأولاده في السلطة حتى ولو على جثث الآلاف.

دعونا نفرح هذا اليوم مع الشعب اليمني ومع مناضلاته الماجدات. دعونا نفرح ليوم واحد على الأقل لهذا الانجاز الكبير قبل أن نستأنف المسيرات السلمية وحمل الشهداء إلى موائلهم الأخيرة في صباح الغد في تعز وحمص وسرت وصنعاء ودير الزور وبلد الوليد، حيث يصر هؤلاء الطغاة أن "يأخذوا حصتهم من دمنا قبل أن ينصرفوا"، أما نحن فلنا ما ليس يرضيهم "لنا المستقبل، ولنا في أرضنا ما نعمل"

عبد الحميد صيام*

* أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

القانون الدولي والاعتراف بالدول.. خلفية من أجل فلسطين

عبد الحميد صيام

This article, "International Law and its Acceptance by the International Community: the Case of Palestine," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, for the Jerusalem paper, al-Quds, September 22, 2011

تستعد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية للتقدم للأمم المتحدة بطلب الاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية مستقلة على حدود عام 1967 في شهر أيلول الحالي موعد انعقاد دورة الجمعية العامة السادسة والستين التي يرئسها الممثل الدائم لقطر السيد ناصر عبد العزيز النصر.

ورغم الضغوطات والتهديدات الأمريكية الإسرائيلية التي تمارس على القيادة الرسمية وخاصة التلويح بوقف المساعدات المالية إلا أن الأخيرة ما زالت مصرة على التقدم بمثل هذا الطلب لمجلس الأمن وفي حالة استخدام الولايات المتحدة لحق النقض سيتم تحويل الطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بعد تفعيل قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام" الذي يخول الجمعية العامة بمناقشة الموضوع بسبب فشل مجلس الأمن ويكون للقرار المعتمد بغالبية الثلثين سلطة القانون ويصبح شرعيا لا غبار عليه مثل سلسة القرارات التي اتخذتها الجمعية العامة في معالجة أزمة السويس عام 1956 بعد أن فشل مجلس الأمن في التعامل مع العدوان الثلاثي بسبب الفيتوين الفرنسي والبريطاني.

سيكون لهذا القرار في حالة نجاحه قوة قانونية ومعنوية وسياسية هائلة فتصبح دولة فلسطين كيانا معترفا به دوليا. صحيح أن أجزاء من أراضي هذه الدولة واقع تحت إحتلال بلد أجنبي (إسرائيل) لكن دولة فلسطين المستقلة والمعترف بها ستعمل ضمن القانون الدولي لإنهاء الاحتلال بالمفاوضات بين بلدين مستقلين متكافئين ومن حق كل طرف أن يدفع باتجاه تحقيق الحد الأقصى من طموحاته وإذا ما حدث وتم الاتفاق على كافة المسائل الخلافية فسيتم حينئذ إبرام معاهدة سلام شاملة بين دولتين بضمانة المجتمع الدولي الممثل في الأمم المتحدة وفي حالة تعنت إسرائيل في الرضوخ لمتطلبات الاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية تستطيع هذه الدولة جرجرة إسرائيل إلى محكمة العدل الدولية وتستطيع كذلك التقدم بشكوى رسمية إلى محكمة الجنايات الدولية بعد انضمامها لعضوية المحكمة لملاحقة محرمي الحرب الإسرائيليين. إستخدام الولايات المتحدة للفيتو في مجلس الأمن سيسبب إحراجا شديدا لإدارة أوباما التي ما فتئت تتحدث عن قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة وعندما جاءت اللحظة الحاسمة لترجمة ما وعدت به تلك الإدارة ها هي تقف وحيدة أمام العالم لوأد تلك الخطوة مما سيزيد من عزلتها أمام المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك حلفاؤها الأوروبيون وسيعلم العالم كله أن الولايات المتحدة فقط هي من يقف حجر عثرة في طريق إنشاء الدولة الفلسطينية. الخوف كل الخوف أن تكون السلطة الفلسطينية غير مستعدة للتعامل مع نتائج هذا القرار وتعود الأمور إلى سابقها وتعتبر القرار انتصارا معنويا "وكفي المؤمنين شر القتال" وتصبح تلك الدولة حبرا على ورق والقرار الجديد يضاف إلى عشرات بل مئات القرارات التي داست عليها إسرائيل أمام المجتمع الدولي دون رادع أو حساب أو حياء بسبب الدعم الأمريكي لتلك الدولة المارقة. وأريد أن أناقش هنا شروط قيام الدول والوضع القانوني الذي يحول كيانا ما إلى دولة رسمية على قدم المساواة أسوة بمائة وثلاث وتسعين دولة.

الدولة وشروط قيامها

استنادا إلى نتائج مؤتمر وستفاليا (ألمانيا اليوم) للسلام عام 1648 بين الدول والكيانات والإمارات الأوروبية المتنازعة، تم الاتفاق على أن هناك ثلاثة شروط لقيام الدولة ذات السيادة وهي: وجود شعب بشكل دائم ومستمر، في رقعة جغرافية محددة ، وحكومة تمارس سيادة على الأرض والشعب. وقد أضيف شرط رابع عام 1933 في معاهدة مونتفيديو بالأوروغواي وهو إعتراف دولي بتلك الدولة بحيث تستطيع الدخول في معاهدات واتفاقيات ثنائية أو متعددة الأطراف مع أية دولة تختار.

منذ تأسيس الأمم المتحدة عام 1945 تم الالتزام بالشروط الأربعة والعمل بها عند ضم أعضاء جدد للأمم المتحدة بشرط موافقة مجلس الأمن الذي يرفع توصية للجمعية العامة والتي بدورها تصوت على العضوية بأغلبية الثلثين. فمثلا تتوفر الشروط الثلاثة الأولى في "تايوان" لكنها ليست دولة معترفا بها بسبب وقوف الصين بالمرصاد لاستخدام الفيتو فيما لو تقدمت بطلب الإعتراف الدولي من مجلس الأمن. بورتو ريكو فيها حكومة منتخبة تمارس سيادة ناقصة على شعب في رقعة جغرافية محددة لأن السيادة العليا في يد الولايات المتحدة وهي لا تستطيع إقامة علاقات مستقلة دون رضى واشنطن ولذلك هي ليست دولة. حكومة كردستان العراق تمارس سيادة في رقعة جغرافية محددة وعلى شعب متجانس ومستقر لكنها ليست دولة لأن المعادلة الإقليمية قادرة على منع الاعتراف الدولي بها حتى لو أعلنت عن قيامها. وجمهورية قبرص التركية تتوافر فيها الشروط الثلاثة إلا الاعتراف الدولي حتى لو اعترفت بها تركيا. وإقليم كوسوفو يعاني من نفس المأزق حتى لو اعترفت به معظم دول أوروبا والولايات المتحدة إلا أن الإقليم ما زال لا يتمتع بالاعتراف الدولي القانوني رغم تمتعه بما يسمى في القانون "الاعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع" لأن الفيتو الروسي قادر على وأد المحاولة في المهد أو مقايضة الاعتراف بكوسوفو باعتراف دولي بجمهوريتي أبخازيا وأوسيتا الجنوبية في جمهورية جورجيا وهو أمر شبه مستحيل على الأقل الآن. أما أفغانستان تحت حكم حركة طالبان (1996-2001) فكانت دولة رغم أن هناك ثلاث دول فقط كانت تعترف بها هي السعودية والإمارات وباكستان. أما بقية دول المجموعة الدولية فكانت لا تعترف بحكومة أفغانستان لا بدولة أفغانستان. والعكس صحيح، فإن إعتراف عدد كبير بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية لا يعني إعترافا بدولة فلسطين لعدم توفر شرط قيام الدولة. فاعتراف الجامعة العربية ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي ومجموعة دول عدم الانحياز لا بفلسطين كدولة بل بكيانية منظمة التحرير كممثل لشعب فلسطين الذي يناضل من أجل قيام الدولة. وللتذكير فقط فإن رسالة الاعتراف التي بعثها إسحاق رابين، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل آنذاك، للمرحوم ياسر عرفات، رئيس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، في 9 أيلول عام 1993 تمهيدا لاتفاقية أوسلو المشؤومة نصت بالحرف الواحد على إعتراف إسرائيل بمنظمة التحرير "بصفتها الممثل الشرعي (فقط دون كلمة وحيد) للشعب الفلسطيني"، بينما نصت رسالة ياسر عرفات "بالاعتراف بحق دولة إسرائيل في العيش بسلام وأمن" وشتان بين الاعترافين، فالأول اعترف بسلطة شرعية والثاني بدولة. إذن من المهم أن نفرق بين الاعتراف بالدولة والاعتراف بالحكومة وكذلك بين الإعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع (تايوان) والدولة من الناحية القانونية (193 دولة من توفالو بآلافها العشرة إلى الصين الشعبية بملايينها الألف والثلاثمئة).

فالاعتراف الدولي بأية دولة شرط أساسي ويجب أن تقره الجمعية العامة بأغلبية الثلثين بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن كما حدث مؤخرا مع جمهورية جنوب السودان. إسرائيل مثلا، إعطيت شرعية ضمن قرار التقسيم 181 الصادر عن الجمعية العامة بتاريخ 29 تشرين الثاني 1947 الذي منح نفس الشرعية لقيام دولة عربية وأعلن ديفد بن غوريون قيام الدولة عشية الرابع عشر من أيار 1948 لكن الإعتراف بها لم يتم إلا بعد قيام مجلس الأمن بالتصويت على قرار الإعتراف رقم 69 بتاريخ 4 آذار1949 الذي أوصى الجمعية العامة بالإعتراف بإسرائيل. بتاريخ 11 أيار 1949 اعتمدت الجمعية العامة القرار 273 والذي شرعن وجود دولة ذات سيادة اسمها إسرائيل وصفها بأنها "دولة محبة للسلام تقبل التزاماتها المنصوص عليها في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وهي قادرة وراغبة في تنفيذ تلك الإلتزامات". وكم كانت رؤية الجمعية العامة ضالة ومنحازة عندما وصفت ذلك الكيان بانه دولة محبة للسلام وملتزمة بنصوص الميثاق.

أما سحب الإعتراف بحكومة دولة ما فهو أمر جائز في القانون الدولي ونود هنا أن نذكر بأن الجمعية العامة طردت من عضويتها حكومة الفصل العتصري بجنوب إفريقيا عام 1974 لكن ذلك لا يعني سحب الاعتراف بالدولة بل سحب الإعتراف بالحكومة العنصرية وعندما انهارت الحكومة العنصرية عادت الحكومة المنتخبة لتملأ المقعد الخالي في قاعة الجمعية العامة في 23 حزيران 1994 .

إذن آلية الإعتراف الطبيعية لا تصل إلى الجمعية العامة إلا بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن. ومن هنا نعود إلى المربع الأول ونقول إن الولايات المتحدة قادة على إجهاظ فكرة الاعتراف بدولة فلسطين قبل إكتمال شروط الولادة وتكون الجمعية العامة التي ستعقد جلسة طارئة خاصة تحت سلطة قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام"هي المخولة شرعيا بمناقشة هذا الطلب واعتماده بأغلبية الثلثين.

شروط قيام دولة فلسطين من الناحية القانونية

وعلى فرض أن الجمعية العامة إعتمدت القرار فالسؤال الآن هل شروط قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة ذات سيادة كاملة أسوة ببقية الدول متوفرة حاليا؟ هل هناك رقعة جغرافية محددة ذات حدود مرسمة يسكنها شعب واحد متجانس ذو ذاكرة جماعية واحدة وفيها حكومة قادرة على ممارسة السيادة على كافة أبناء الشعب في تلك الرقعة الجغرافية المحددة؟ الإجابة ليست صعبة على هذه الأسئلة فالرقعة الجغرافية غير واضحة المعالم وممزقة وغير متصلة ليس فقط بين جناحي الوطن في الضفة وغزة بل وفي كانتونات الضفة وخاصة في منطقة القدس. كما أن الشعب في تلك المناطق مقطع إلى أجزاء كل جزء تحكمه قوانين مناقضة ومخالفة للقوانين التي تخضع لها المناطق الأخرى، فليس سكان القدس الشرقية كسكان غزة ولا المجموعتان كثالثتهما في الضفة. بالإضافة إلى أن هناك استبعادا لغالبية الشعب الفلسطيني في المنفى والذي يشكل الغالبية من المجموع الكلي للشعب الفلسطيني. والأخطر من ذلك وجود مجموعات سكانية طارئة لا تنتمي للشعب الفلسطيني داخل نفس الرقعة الجغرافية وتخضع لمنظومة قوانين مناقضة تماما لقوانين الدولة الفلسطينية. وبالتالي سيكون هناك مجموعتان من السكان في رقعة جغرافية واحدة تحكم كل مجموعة منظومة قوانين مختلفة بل ومتناقضة، وهذا يخل بمبدأ سيادة السلطة المركزية التي ستجد نفسها غير قادرة على إنفاذ أي قانون في مناطق المستوطنين الصهاينة، ومن المؤكد أنهم سيشكلون تحديا لهيبتها وسلطتها مرتكزين على حائط الإسناد القوي المتمثل في دولة إسرائيل.

إذن فالشروط الثلاثة غير متوفرة لا الشعب ولا الأرض ولا السلطة القادرة على ممارسة السيادة على الإثنين. أما عن القدرة على عقد الاتفاقيات بعد توفر الاعتراف الدولي فليس لهذا البند إلا قيمة معنوية إذ إن الكيان المنبثق عن هذا الاعتراف غير قادر على استقبال ضيف يحل زائرا على السلطة نفسها التي لا تسيطر على حدود ومعابر تلك الدولة ولا مجالها الجوي ولا شريطها الساحلي ولا الحركة من وإلى الدولة.

ترجمة القرار إلى واقع على الأرض

نخلص إلى نتيجة أن التقدم بطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بالاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية حتى ولو نجح بغالبية الثلثين (129 دولة على الأقل) لا يعدو عن كونه انتصارا معنويا لا يمكن ترجمته على أرض الواقع حتى لو أعلن الفلسطينيون قيام دولتهم كما فعلوا في 15 تشرين الثاني عام 1988. لكن القرار يمكن أن يكون سندا قانونيا لشن حملة قانونية لطرد الاحتلال بالمقاومة السلمية المتواصلة وتوجه الشعب الفلسطيني بكامله لطرد المستوطنين وهدم الجدار العازل وإعادة السيطرة على كل شبر من الأراضي المحتلة وعدم إسقاط الحق التاريخي للاجئين الفلسطينيين في ديارهم الأصلية.

فعرض قضية الاعتراف أمام الجمعية العامة في شهر أيلول (سبتمبر) يجب أن يتزامن مع مظاهرات سلمية شاملة ومتواصلة لا تضعف ولا تكل ولا تمل ولا تنهزم ولا تتراخى ولاتتراجع ولا تتوقف تحت أي ظرف من الظروف. يجب إنطلاق المظاهرات العارمة يوم مناقشة الموضوع أمام الجمعية العامة من رام الله والقدس وكل مدن وقرى وبلدات الضفة والقطاع وعمان وبيروت والقاهرة والخرطوم وتونس والجزائر والرباط وإسطنبول وجاكرتا وإسلام أباد وباريس ولندن ومدريد وأثينا ونيويورك. عندها ستصبح الدولة الفلسطينة المستقلة أدنى إلى التحقيق من هذه المناورات التي نخشى أن يكون الهدف منها تسجيل انتصارات معنوية فقط. فالدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة تصنعها إرادة الجماهير المناضلة المصممة على تحقيق الانتصار لا المفاوضات العبثية ولا المناورات المكشوفة ولا المقذوفات البدائية التي تطلق من غزة لأغراض حزبية ونادرا ما تؤذي أحدا. وكما استطاعت الشعوب العربية أن تطيح برؤوس ثلاثة من كبار الطغاة والحبل على الجرار فحري بشعب الانتفاضتين والكفاح الطويل المرير وقوافل الشهداء ورائد العلم والإبداع أن يخرج إلى الشوراع في كافة أنحاء العالم بطريقة حضارية سلمية منظمة واعية ليفرض على العالم قيام دولته المستقلة في الواقع لا في العالم الافتراضي. دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة مترابطة تتحكم في حدودها ومواردها وتمارس سيادتها على كل شبر من أراضيها معافاة من سرطان الاستطيان وجدار الفصل العنصري. دولة تكون حاضنة وطنية للشعب الفلسطيني كله ومجسدة لآماله وحقه في العودة وتقرير المصير فعلا كما نص على ذلك قرار الجمعية العامة 3236 (1974). وأقترح على السلطة الفلسطينية ومفاوضيها أن يراجعوا هذا القرار المهم للتعرف على رزمة حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني التي أقرتها الأمم المتحدة إن كانوا نسوا أو تناسوا تلك الحقوق.

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*أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq

The end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the United States and Iraq signed in December 2008 calls for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still unclear whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant change. What will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic importance both in the Middle East, and to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts at democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of U.S. troops?

U.S. policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual interest to both countries, all of which are interrelated. Their focal points include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion, economic growth and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of tensions that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba'thist regime. An effective U.S. foreign policy will require treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.

The following article was published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It can be read in its entirety by clicking here.

Syria’s Arab Spring: Phase Two of the Crisis

Guest writer Ghaidaa Hetou has conducted extensive research in Syria during the past year. She is currently writing her PhD dissertation on alliance behavior in Syrian foreign policy and the determinants of Syrian foreign policy making between 1970 and 2010.

It has been six months since protests erupted in Syria. The current political sluggishness in Syria, where calm has not been completely restored by the government, nor have the protests gained traction in major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, has ushered in the next phase in the ongoing crisis.

During the first six months, various opposition groups have insisted on the peaceful nature of the protests. However, violent clashes that have occurred in Jisr al-Shughur, Homs, Hama and other towns. In addition, the declarations of the armed Syrian opposition committee have marred the efforts of thousands of Syrians who have continued to peacefully brave the wrath of the totalitarian apparatus of Bashar al-Asad's Ba’thist regime.

The conflicting efforts of protesters and armed rebels mirror the ideological competition among the various opposition groups. From the secular left to the religious conservatives, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the contrasting political agendas of the Syrian opposition are impeding its ability to develop a united front. It has now become the norm for these various opposition groups to send their delegates to Washington, Europe and Moscow to meet separately with government representatives. A number of Syrian opposition conferences - in Turkey, Qatar, France and Germany - have tried to narrow the gap between the opposition group’s conflicting ideological agendas, but with little success.

On the domestic front, two minority groups in Syria, the Kurds and Christians, have adopted a position of neutrality towards the uprising. Their position has been reinforced, especially after recent chants of some demonstrators of “" عربية, عربية “"عمر, عمر” and “ المسيحي على بيروت أو للتابوت”, the first saying that this is solely an “Arab movement,” the second using the slogan of “Omar” in an effort to underscore the Sunni nature of the movement, and the last chant stating that the Christians have two choices, either to leave Syria for Beirut or in a casket. These chants prevail among groups that are calling for armed confrontation. In a demographically diverse society, social movements can easily, in an effort to garner popularity, alienate minority groups who might have otherwise tipped the scale in their favor.

What has ushered in the next phase in Syria’s crisis is precisely the country’s stagnant situation, with neither the government nor the opposition able to achieve their objectives. It is clearly a time of reassessment of means and ends by both sides in the conflict. Recent statements by opposition figures, like Ammar al-Qurabi in Moscow, indicate that they are ready for a “conditional dialogue with the regime.” From its part, the Syrian government has recently encouraged its allies, especially Moscow and Iran, to host these negotiations. Dr. Nabil al-Arabi, head of the Arab League, visited Damascus today to hand the Syrian president an Arab endorsed proposal containing 13 provisions to end the crises.

Due to lack of a unified opposition, any perceived attempt by one opposition group to negotiate with the government is sidetracked by another group, accusing it of treason and short selling Syrian sacrifices to date. Unfortunately, the stagnant situation, characterized by protests, bloody crackdowns and confrontations, will continue, until a number of opposition groups are able to consolidate their positions and form a majority in order to coordinate and legitimize their strategies.

The dust that has been stirred up by the sudden political awakening in Syria is settling. The euphoria that the protestors created by breaking the wall of fear and silence is being replaced, among many Syrians, by a frantic search for a political outlet, reflecting decades of frustration. The political upheaval that was silenced in 1962 has reawakened with the same political fury that prevailed in the 1950s in Syria, namely the struggle between conservatives and progressives, large urban areas and their suburbs, and between more prosperous cities and smaller towns that are outside the economic mainstream. This struggle manifests itself in a dispute over political identities and loyalties, which are all symptoms of a painful and ongoing process of state formation and the slow evolution of what it means to be a “citizen” in post-colonial Middle East.

Nevertheless, one thing is absolutely clear. Syria is on the road to transition and there is no possibility of a return to the status quo ante.

The Tea Party and the Middle East

As President Barack Obama's approval ratings decline, pushed ever downward by a global and domestic recession that shows little sign of abating, the prospects of a Republican in the White House in 2012 loom ever larger. It is not at all out of the question that, if a Republican is elected, she or he will have strong ties to the Tea Party.

Thus far, little attention has been given to the implications of a Tea Party dominated White House for US foreign policy, especially in one of the world's most volatile regions, the Middle East. What would be the consequences of a Tea Party administration for US policy and interests in that region?

As others have already been noted, there are (at least) two trends in the Tea Party movement regarding US foreign policy. One, a neo-isolationism advocated by the supporters of Ron Paul (but perhaps by those of Rick Perry as well), reflects the isolationism that characterized much of US history prior to World War II.

The other, which argues for the decisive use of force against our enemies in the region, calls for strong support for Israel and relying on it to fight terrorism in the Middle East and to help restrain Iran. This policy is considered especially important for the US and the international community's efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At least two candidates with close ties to the Tea Party, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Santorum, fall into this camp.

The problem with the Tea Party is that it has no policy for reconciling declining American economic power - both in absolute and relative terms (especially in relation to China) - with sustaining US global influence. The US has faced severe constraints in fighting two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US were forced to militarily engage Iran, especially if it were to attack Israel, as well as simultaneously confront an outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula, an unlikely but possible scenario, the US would be hard pressed to mount the forces necessary to meet such as a challenge.

Tea Party advocates either call for US withdrawal from much of the world to improve the budget deficit or the use of military force to intimidate our enemies. Both of these perspectives fail to appreciate the implications of our economic crisis for US "hard power" (the use of military force). They also fail to comprehend the opportunities for enhancing US policy in the area of "soft power" (public diplomacy, technical and educational support, and direct engagement of our adversaries where appropriate).

Tea Party supporters make an important point when they argue that US government spending has outstripped its ability to pay for this spending. Clearly the US economy is experiencing serious economic difficulties caused largely by the mortgage lending debacle that came to a head in 2008.

But do the US' financial problems imply the need for an isolationist strategy? Likewise, is there an alternative to the second policy prescription, namely a reliance on force as the primary element of our foreign policy in the Middle East? Is there not a third way that could achieve our objectives in the Middle East but without "breaking the bank"?

As the "Arab Spring" has shown, there is considerable convergence between Arab and US political interests in the Middle East. The warmth of the Libyan people towards the US over the past 6 months, especially now that the Libyan dictator, Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi has been overthrown, is just one indicator of those interests. It suggests that, even in a country that has been under repressive authoritarian rule, citizens can both quickly embrace democracy and reject decades of anti-American and and anti-Western rhetoric and propaganda.

Rather than making an effort to better understand the political, cultural and economic dynamics that currently engulf the Middle East, Tea Party candidates have, to date, opted instead for a simplistic approach to US foreign policy. Either we need to withdraw into "fortress America" or hit our enemies hard when they challenge our interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. The problem is that neither of these approaches will work, Indeed, they both pose a serious threat to the US' national interests in the region.

What, then, are the dynamics that Tea Partiers have failed to grasp? First, the Middle East is ripe for serious and positive change. It has a "youth bulge" which means that a large percentage of the region's youth, 70%, is under the age of 30. As my current research with Iraqi and other youth in the region indicates, many of these youth admire American popular culture and values, especially our values of freedom of expression and creative freedom.

Although most youth in the Middle East have not had the benefit of a social science education, either in secondary schools or at the university level, many intuitively understand that there is a strong relationship between individual freedoms and personal success. They also realize that the countries where individual freedoms reign are precisely those countries that enjoy prosperity and political stability - key factors for these youth if they are to have any hope in the future.

Second, Tea Partiers fail to see the need to reach out to other cultures which they often assume are hostile to American values. Many Tea Partiers have wrapped themselves in a mythical American Golden Age during which the United States was supposedly close to being a perfect society.

While the US did make tremendous progress throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries to become the world's industrial and military superpower, such thinking forgets that such growth had its dark side - the political and economic marginalization of women and African Americans, labor strife, the Great Depression, two world wars and the struggle against communism. This is not to direct criticism at the US, but simply to point out that selective readings of history do not produce good domestic or foreign policy.

The US should be proud of its values and accomplishments. The desire of so much of the world's population to emigrate to the US is a striking reminder of that. However, we are now a global society in which "Golden Age" politics, in whatever form, no longer has a place. Inter-cultural understanding is not a matter of being "politically correct." Rather, it is absolutely necessary that our political leaders make a serious effort to understand the cultures of the Middle East and engage its peoples so that they can make the most effective decisions as they affect US interests in the region.

While Israel is a strong and trusted ally, the idea that we can rely on Israel alone to pursue American interests in the Middle East is naive. To link US support for Israel to Christian Biblical injunctions is no substitute for a rational foreign policy, nor is it in the interest of Israel, much less the peoples of the Middle East. As the most prominent Tea Party candidate to view the Middle East through the prism of the Bible, Michelle Bachman's advocacy of a foreign policy based on her interpretations of Biblical texts is a strong example of why our Founding Fathers sought to keep religion out of politics.

In the Christian world, the idea that God has bestowed His (Her?)grace on a particular group of people brought us the the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the 100 Years War, and many other examples of religious intolerance. Voltaire noted the absurdity of the notion of a "Chosen People" in Candide when he described the (Christian) Bulgars and the (Muslim) Ottoman Turks praying to God for victory over their enemy as the sun began to rise over the battlefield on which they would fight later that day.

The US has lost many allies in the Middle East in recent years. Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, and Libya (yes Qaddafi supplied the US with intelligence after agreeing to end his WMD program in 2006) are the most prominent examples. Likewise, Israel finds itself more isolated than ever in the Middle East.

With the election of an Islamist government in 2002, Israel no longer has a close ally in Turkey. Following Husni Mubarak's ouster in Egypt, ties with that country have deteriorated as well. Turkey's recent recall of its ambassador from Israel and the conflict with Egypt over containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip are only the most recent examples of Israel's deteriorating relations with its former allies.

If the Tea Partiers sincerely want to reduce the deficit, enhance our influence in the Middle East, and help strengthen Israel, our closest ally in the region, they need to eschew basing foreign policy on Biblical injunctions, and prescribing withdrawal, or an exclusive use of force as the main tools in the US' foreign policy arsenal. The NATO success in Libya is probably not going to be replicated elsewhere in the region anytime soon (although US and EU cooperation in squeezing Syria economically may end up ousting the Ba'thist regime of Bashar al-Asad as well).

Using American technical expertise in the Middle East, much as it has been done by developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, should become the model for encouraging economic growth and development, along with improvements in education, health care, housing and agriculture. Such assistance, especially if it is based on local needs (rather than prescribed by the West), can help to develop close ties with the countries of the Middle East. There is a reason why developed countries do not engage in wars or experience serious political instability - the citizens of these countries have very little incentive to engage in such activity, especially when they have hope in the future.

Offering US technical assistance (a great way to put unemployed American professionals to work overseas), offering Middle Easterners scholarships to study at American universities, and engaging the peoples of the Middle East, especially youth, whether thorough social media and/or exchange programs, would cost much less than military engagement and building new weapons systems that were appropriate for an earlier era of wars among nation-states, but now are much less effective in fighting terrorism and "asymmetric war."

Engaging the youth who have been the main force behind the Arab Spring will demonstrate that our rhetoric of supporting democracy has teeth. Many Middle Eastern youth realize that autocrats such as Qaddafi used anti-Zionism as a propaganda tool to distract attention from domestic repression and lack of government services. If the US can move forward the creation of Palestinian state, living side by side in peace with Israel, along with engaging the peoples of the region, much of the region's anti-American rhetoric and radicalism will dissipate.

As we approach the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001, all those who aspire to the US presidency owe it to the American people to offer them well thought through foreign policy alternatives. We need to develop a smart foreign policy in the Middle East which views the peoples of the region as potential allies, not as inherently hostile to our interests and way of life. With the stakes so high in the Middle East, and with the economic challenges facing the US, empty rhetoric is clearly unpatriotic.

Libya is not Iraq

It is unfortunate that many Western commentators are making comparisons between Iraq after the US invasion of March 2003 and the overthrow of Mu'ammar Qaddafi's regime in Libya. What does tie Iraq and Libya together is the lessons that US foreign policy makers have learned from the mistakes of the Bush administration in Iraq. Eschewing a "top down" approach, the Obama administration has allowed the Libyan National Transitional Council(NTC)to take the lead in setting the agenda for the campaign to rid Libya of Qaddafi's rule and to map out the broad outlines of the post-Qaddafi era.

One of the main differences between the overthrew of Saddam in 2003 and the end of the Qaddafi regime was the manner in which the US approached the two countries. Both pre-invasion and post-Saddam policy in Iraq involved limited consultation with a small number of Iraqis. Even the main political actors that dominated Iraqi politics in 2003 and 2004 were handpicked by the Department of Defense and the White House.

In Libya, the main political actors have emerged from the struggle against the Qaddafi regime. Some may be suspect for once having once been part of that regime. But we do not hear any talk of the functional equivalent of "de-Ba'thification" in Libya, namely preventing anyone associated with the Qaddafi regime from participating in post-Qaddafi politics. Only those who were at the core of the ancien regime will have to face trials.

Another major difference between Iraq and Libya is that the Qaddafi regime has been overthrown by the Libyan people. True, NATO warplanes and logistical support have been crucial in that victory. Still, it has been the Libyan people, especially youth who make up 75% of the population under 30, who have made up the casualties in the struggle to rid Libya of its repressive dictator. Even if NATO had not been involved, it is highly likely that we would still have seen a protracted struggle such as that which is currently underway in Syria.

In Iraq, the US military that was completely responsible for ridding the country of the Ba'th. Iraqis had little or no sense of having contributed to the Ba'thist regime's downfall. The manner in which the Bush administration failed to control extensive looting in Baghdad in April 2003, including protecting the priceless artifacts of the Iraq Museum, created anger and distrust among Iraqis of US objectives in Iraq. It also undermined support for the Bush administration's professed goal of creating a democratic Iraq. Many Iraqis did not trust the Bush administration who they felt did not seem to have developed a well defined policy for post-Saddam Iraq.

In Libya, on the other hand, the US, NATO, the UN and the international community generally have used a light touch when dealing with rebel forces and their political arm, the NTC. Libyan rebels have been forced to make their own decisions and suffer the consequences when these decisions have not worked out, e.g., overstretching their supply lines when engaging Qaddafi's loyalist forces. They have not been able to blame anyone but themselves and in the process have undergone an important learning process.

As rebel forces have struggled to oust the Qaddafi regime, groups of fighters representing different regions, ideologies and tribes have had to cooperate and work together to develop joint military and political strategies. This is not to say that these differences have been overcome and won't reemerge in the new post-Qaddafi era. However, informal groups of rebel fighters have already been formed throughout the country and developed a certain level of trust as they have fought together against what were often better trained and equipped forces.

In Iraq, post-Saddam politics quickly fell under the control of exiles who had not lived in Iraq for many years, in some cases decades. These new leaders have been referred to by Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael as "carpetbaggers." Indeed, many Iraqis were highly suspicious of these politicians who came to Iraq in March and April, 2003 with US forces and who had not suffered under Saddam as had the populace at large.

Unlike the political leadership that developed in Iraq after Saddam was toppled, the NTC and military leaders in Libya are much closer to the Libyan citizenry. Yes, some of them were part of Qaddafi's regime, and at least one, the NTC's military commander, Gen. Abdel Fattah Younes, was assassinated for having served Qaddafi. Yet the majority of the new leadership has not only shown great courage, especially in the beginning of the struggle when it was not at all clear that Qaddafi would be defeated, and in their measured approach to the struggle. What has been particularly impressive in the NTC's focus on national reconciliation, and their mantra that Libyans not engage in revenge killings and treat their captives with respect.

In short, the old adage that democracy is not a gift that one nation can give to another but must be created by the people through a process of struggle, has played itself out in Libya, as it has in Egypt, Tunisia which are also engaged in the "Arab Spring." All the doubts that Western commentators have expressed about Libya being a "tribal society" in which all the institutions of civil society were destroyed by Qaddafi are arguments of those who doubt that Libya (or any of the countries of the Arab Middle East) can become truly democratic nation-states.

Iraq has made impressive strides towards democracy, even with the many mistakes made by the US occupation administration in 2003 and 2004. It held free and fair parliamentary and provincial legislative elections in 2005, 2009 and 2010. In the March 2010 elections, a secular nationalist coalition led by a Shiite, Ayad Allawi, won a majority of seats and garnered electoral support from all of Iraq's major ethnoconfessional groups. All observers agreed that the elections were fair and free.

Iraq boasts over 6000 registered civil society organizations. The press plays a vigorous role in criticizing the government for not providing needed social services, while the heads of the Shiite and Sunni communities, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and Shaykh Ahmad Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samara'i respectively, constantly demand that the government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki eliminate extensive corruption and nepotism within its ranks.

In many ways, it can be argued that Iraq has had faced an even more difficult road than Libya in its efforts to implement a democratic transition. Not only did it experience extensive sectarian based violence after 2003, but it has suffered from a fragmented and dysfunctional political elite that spends more time focusing on infighting than trying to work for the interests of the Iraqi people.

Unlike Iraq, Libya will most likely be able to avoid regional, tribal or sectarian based conflict, e.g., Arab against Berber. Libya's political elite seems much more cohesive than its Iraqi counterpart and more closely linked to the populace at large. The NTC and its successor government may use Libya's oil wealth for corrupt ends as have Iraq's Arab and Kurdish political elites. But there are many indications that the NTC benefits from a "civic core" within its ranks that will work to prevent widespread abuses of power such as we saw under the Qaddafi regime

Many would argue that Iraqis have a stronger sense of national identity than do Libyans. This may be true. However, the fact that Iraq, Libya and most of the countries of the Middle East are experiencing a "youth bulge," where a large percentage of the population refuses to adhere to the shibboleths of the past, loses sight of the fact that we are witnessing not just an Arab Spring but the birth of a new generation of political leadership throughout the Middle East.

In Libya, the new generation does not find that tribalism offers them much in the way of improving their lives. Tribalism was more effective for leaders like Saddam and Qaddafi who used it to create social and political cleavages that were intended to "divide and conquer" the populace. However, in the process, Saddam and Qaddafi atomized tribes, often killing their leaders if they refused to follow their dictates. The result was that the tribal system in both countries was undermined and has lost much of its social and political legitimacy.

Observers, Western Arab and others, have every right to be concerned about the form of the new political system that will emerge in Libya now that the Qaddafi regime has been toppled. But we need to avoid the temptation to trot out the old and tired stereotypes about "Islam," "tribalism" and l"lack of national identity" preventing a transition to democracy in the Arab world, so as to not encourage a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Instead, the Obama administration, NATO, Turkey, Qatar and other friends of Libya's NTC should continue their policy of patient, wise and non-obtrusive counseling, supplemented by whatever technical expertise they can offer the new Libyan government. The Arab Spring will enjoy a much greater probability of success if it can count on consistent and long-term support from its allies, both inside and outside the Middle East.

This type of support - namely providing support for the new Libyan government's needs as it defines them - is the best way to avoid the mistakes of Iraq. For those who want to see Libya become a functioning democracy, it is also the most appropriate way to honor all the Libyans who have died so their their countrymen could be free.

Soap operas, elite politics and security in Iraq

On August 13th, the Iraqi parliament voted to ban the showing of the soap opera, al-Hasan and al-Husayn on Iraqi television channels. In a video recording of the session, the parliament speaker declared that the film is causing sectarian conflict (al-fitna) in the Muslim world. The film is being shown throughout the Arab world during the holy month of Ramadan. al-Hasan and al-Husayn continues a recent tradition of showing films on topics important to Islam during Ramadan. Such films have drawn large audiences and al-Hasan and al-Husayn is no exception.

The banning of the soap opera shows not only the continued salience of sectarian identities in the Arab world but the lack of effort on the part of political elites to confront the problem of national reconciliation. The problems that led to the banning of al-Hasan and al-Husayn in Iraq are linked to the larger realm of Arab elite politics. This form of elite politics, which refuses to take national reconciliation seriously, threatens the security of Iraq (and that of other Middle Eastern countries where this type of politics is all too often replicated).

As we saw this week, Iraq experienced a devastating series of attacks throughout the country, all of which had sectarian overtones. The groups that organized these attacks need to find recruits to carry out their deadly attacks. Only when all sectors of society feel that they are part of the political process will the recruits for such attacks dry up.

In Iraq's banning the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn, what are the political dynamics of the relationship between culture, politics and national security? In other words, what do the dynamics of banning a soap opera tell us about the politics of national reconciliation in Iraq? And what impact does this form of politics have on Iraq's security situation?

The topic of the assassination of Hasan and Husayn is extremely sensitive since it encompasses the origins of the schism between Sunni and Shiite Islam. Even before it aired, the title of the program was changed from al-Hasan, al-Husayn and Mu'awiya, to al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The omission of Mua'wiya is indicative of the sensitivity of the film's topic. Not only did Mu'awiya organize the attack on Hasan and Husayn's father, the caliph Imam 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, who was himself murdered in 661 CE, but he was seen as complicit in the deaths of Hasan and Husayn.

The film seeks to edify Muslims about an important event in the history of Islam. Ramadan has become a particularly appropriate time to air lengthy films about complex historical topics because television viewing increases substantially as Muslims fast and spend much of their daytime fast at home.

Taking 3 years to complete, and produced in several Arab countries, the film is comprised of 30 one hour segments. A large number of prominent clerics, religious scholars and historians served as consultants to the producer, Muhammad al-Anzi, of the Kuwaiti Al-Maha Productions company. As al-Anzi has pointed out in several interviews, he tried to present a balanced account of the lives of the two imams, Hasan and Husayn.

The film has elicited criticism throughout the Arab world, including from al-Azhar, the preeminent religious institution in Sunni Islam. The Azhar's calling for the film not be shown based on Sunni Islam's prohibition of showing human representations of Muslim religious figures was underscored by the opposition from the head of the Sunni Religious Endowments (al-Awqaf) in Iraq, Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghaffur al-Samarra'i and the his counterpart, the head of Shi'i religious endowments, Salih al-Haydari. Likewise, through a representative who delivered the Friday prayer in Karbala', Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani indicated his opposition as well, claiming that the film was filled with factual errors and constituted a deviation from Islam.

However, as a commentator to an article on the controversy noted, the film only became political in Iraq once the parliament voted to ban it from all Iraq's television channels. The problem then is the unwillingness of politicians to tackle head on the sectarian divide that still afflicts Iraq and other Arab countries. Rather than open the historical record to scrutiny, political elites instead prefer to repress efforts to examine the past.

While many viewers in the Arab world have been drawn to watch al-Hasan and al-Husayn given the controversy surrounding it, many others indicate their interest in it stems from their lack of knowledge of the historical events that are depicted in the film and their desire to know more about them. Once again, we see the divide between elite and mass politics. By not allowing a healthy discussion of what led to the schism between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, Arab countries are prevented from moving forward with the process of national reconciliation.

The lack of national reconciliation is a key factor that allows sectarian identities to persist. And the persistence of sectarianism is good news for Sunni Arab organizations like al-Qa'ida in Iraq, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq, and their Shi'i counterparts. As long as historical grievances are not confronted, such organizations can find recruits, especially when the government provides limited services and is characterized by extensive corruption.

For political elites, serious efforts at national reconciliation represent a threat to their power base. Indeed, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has dismissed calls for national reconciliation in the past, emphasizing instead that a focus on the rule of law and the constitution is more important (al-Nahar, May 25, 2009).

Once reconciliation becomes part of a meaningful political process, all parts of the political spectrum must be given access to political participation. Once the political process is opened up, the ability of elites to maintain vertical forms of social and political identity are undermined. The cohesion of their political base is threatened. To achieve their narrow personal goals, it is more effective to play the sectarian card rather than pursue a politics of national inclusion.

In Iraq, the al-Maliki government's sectarian based politics has led to the exclusion of important sectors of the population, such as the tribal groups of al-Anbar Province. Many Anbaris who participated in the Sons of Iraq movement (Sahwat al-'Iraq) are understandably resentful that al-Maliki has not kept his promise to integrate them into the army, security forces or state bureaucracy. al-Maliki would like to exclude the Kurds but needs them to offset challenges from the al-Iraqiya list that won the 2010 national parliament elections and is led by his nemesis, Ayad 'Allawi

The pursuit of a sectarian based politics is compounded by political discrimination based on social class. al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition shows very little concern or compassion for poor Shi'a in Iraq (much less the poor of other ethnoconfessional groups). The party is based largely in the prosperous Shi'i merchant and professional middle classes who see the Shi'a poor as aligned with Muqtada al-Sadr's Sadrist Trend and thus threatening to their interests. This neglect provides an opening for radical elements such as the Sadrists and other sectarian militias, such as the "League of the Righteous" (Asa'ib al-Haqq)to recruit among the Shi'a poor.

Further, the failure of the al-Maliki government and the Iraqi political elite to confront sectarianism through an emphasis on national reconciliation has had a negative effect on Iraq's security forces. It is well known that units in the army profess loyalty to individual political parties and leaders rather than to a unified army command.

The failure of members of Iraq's Arab political elite to come to terms with their Kurdish counterparts means that the Iraqi army and the Kurdish pesh merga remain separate military forces. If the two forces could cooperate on national rather than local security, Iraq would be better positioned to assert control over its national territory. While pesh merga units have helped repress terrorist cells in Baghdad in the past, little has been done to integrate these units into the larger Iraqi army.

What the film al-Hasan and al-Husayn indicates is the potential power of historical memory. The past can be used to bring Iraqis (and other peoples in the Middle East) together if done in an open and honest manner as the screen writer, director and producer have attempted to do in the film, al-Hasan and al-Husayn. The fact that the most recent Iraqi school textbooks have avoided all controversial topics and fail to confront the legacy of Saddam Husayn's brutality is indicative of the weak and ostrich-like approach of the political leadership in Iraq.

If the Iraqi government and the Obama administration think that Iraq's security problems can be solved through continued training of the Iraqi army and security forces alone, they need to rethink their assumptions. As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down." Structural changes are needed among Iraq's political elite if the horrific attacks of this week are to become a thing of the past and meaningful security for the Iraqi people is to be achieved.