Are we seiing the end of traditional sectarian politics in Iraq?

Iraqi politics in Iraq has been undergoing some dramatic changes. These changes have become clear as a result of the efforts to introduce a vote of no-confidence in Nuri al-Maliki's government in the Iraqi parliament. While new fault lines have developed, sectarianism in its traditional configuration seems to be on the decline. What are the new political patterns and do they imply any radical departure from politics as usual in Iraq?

On the one hand, the effort to oust Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has generated significant support, including that of Masoud Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), all the parliamentary members of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the Sadrist Trend and its parliamentary delegates, led by Muqtada al-Sadr and the al-Iraqiya Coalition.  The effort to oust Maliki has once again created a united front after al-Iraqiya split into three factions: Ayad Allawi ‘s core supporters, the “White Iraqiya,” which included parliament speaker Usama al-Nujayfi and refused to boycott parliament and Maliki's cabinet, and the “Free Iraqiya."

Opposing efforts to oust Maliki are an equally powerful coalition of forces, including Iraqi president Jalal Talabani, and tribal leaders, such as the paramount shaykh of the Dulaym, and the leaders of tribes around Mosul and Kirkuk. What is particularly interesting is the open conflict between Talabni and the party he nominally heads, the PUK (see al-Hayat, June 9). Tribal leaders fear that Maliki’s fall would open the way for the Kurds to assert themselves in the disputed areas along the so-called Green Line that separates the KRG from the north-central regions which are populated by Arabs and Turkmen.  The paramount shaykh of the Dulaym has argued that Maliki brought stability to Iraq after suppressing the Mahdi Army in 2008 and thus deserves to remain as prime minister.  These tribal leaders want a strong man in Baghdad who will protect their interests.

What is most interesting is the new coalition of political forces which has emerged.  Acknowledging that he has come under tremendous pressure to desist for supporting efforts to topple Maliki, Sadr nevertheless has remained resolute in his opposition to the Iraqi prime minister.  Sadr’s main concern is the spreading influence of the League of the Righteous People (Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq) Sadr was incensed to learn that his forces were accused of giving support to Bashar al-Asad’s Ba’thist regime in neighboring Syria.  According to al-Sadr, these forces were actually members of the League of the Righteous People who were acting under orders from Iran.  The Sadrist Trend’s criticism of the Syrian regime and implicit backing away from its close ties to Iran, which seems more interested in the League, which is acting as its local proxy in Iraq, is a significant development if it persists.

That Sadr is now allied with what was once his arch-enemy, Ayad Allawi, is also quite remarkable given Allawi’s support of the 2004 attack by US forces on the Mahdi Army in al-Najaf when he was prime minister.  That Allawi and the Kurds have joined when it was the Kurds who played the role of kingmakers after the 2010 parliamentary elections which prevented Allawi from becoming prime minister is equally remarkable.  The alliance of Kurds with the Sunni dominated al-Iraqiya is also significant given the suspicions the Kurds maintain of Sunni tirbal elements who they often say as supported of the former Ba'thist regime

Do these new alliances mean the end of traditional patterns of sectarian politics in Iraq?  While it is hard to come to any hard and fast conclusions at this point, they do point to the fluidity of political cleavages and the impact of exogenous factors, especially Iran, on Iraq's changing political landscape.  Clearly, the current political divisions do not reflect the conceptual prism through which most Western analysts seek to impose on Iraq, namely a rigid divide between Sunnis, Shiites and Kurds. 

It is important to remember that Saddam Husayn worked closely with the KRG leadership during the UN sanctions of the 1990s to smuggle oil out of Iraq int Turkey and Iran.  This relationship developed after the Ba’thist regime’s genocidal Anfal campaign against the Kurds in the 1980s which resulted in thousands of deaths and the destruction of 175 Kurdish villages.

Barzani had no compunction about inviting Saddam’s army to enter the KRG to help him stave off defeat by the rival PUK in 1996 during the Kurdish civil war.  In return Barzani turned over opposition elements living in Arbil to Saddam’s intelligence services.  Of course, all anti-Saddam elements were summarily killed.

It is important to remember that in 2003 Muqtada al-Sadr stated that only those who were born in Iraq were entitled to make policy statements about Iraqi politics.  This was clearly an attack on Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani who was born in Iran, a call for Iran to not interfere in Iraqi politics, and an argument that Arab Shiite clerics should dominate the main Shiite religious institution, the al-Hawza al-‘Ilmiya.  Yet al-Sadr later went to Qum to enhance his religious credentials and developed close ties to the regime in Teheran.

When it comes to politics, power will trump ethnic and confessional considerations in all instances.  Whether the changing political alliances in Iraq will present an opening for democratic forces among youth, professionals, the educated middle classes and the upstart Gorran (Change) Party is doubtful.  The forces behind building civil society and promoting democracy in Iraq still are not well organized when compared to Iraq’s dominant and rapacious political elites.

Nevertheless, what the effort to oust Maliki demonstrates is that power is too diffuse and fragmented in Iraq to allow a dictator on the model of Saddam Husayn to reappear on the Iraqi political stage..  While few Iraqis are pleased with the state of politics today, at least the possibilities of protest and political organization are available to Iraqi citizens in a manner that would have been brutally suppressed under the Ba'thist regime.

Could deposing Maliki be a step towards democracy in Iraq?

Current efforts to introduce a vote of no-confidence in the Iraqi parliament which would bring down Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government has raised many questions.  Should he be removed? Is there a suitable replacement?  If there is a change in government, would that be a step towards promoting national reconciliation or would it create more ethnic and confessional tensions?

Perhaps the most intriguing question is whether Maliki's removal would constitute a step towards democracy in Iraq?  A second equally important question is whether in the distribution and exercise of political power in Iraq as structured by its ethnoconfessional makeup may be a positive rather than a negative factor the country's political dynamics.

The dispute over Maliki's rule, which has continued since the March 2010 parliamentary elections which were won by the la-Iraqiya Coalition (91 seats to 89 for Maliki's State of Law Coalition), is a result of the Iraqi leader's heavy handed policies.  These policies have involved Maliki's efforts to eliminate as many checks and balances in the Iraqi political system as possible.   A number of security organizations have been created that report directly to the prime minister's office. In effect, Maliki now controls Iraq's security system.

Maliki has undermined the autonomy of the judiciary, harassed oppositional political parties and civil society organizations, taken over control of the central bank, and placed the Independent High Election Commission under his control.  In a recent interview with Niqash (May 30), the head of the Election Commission, Faraj al-Haydari, asserted that Iraq was on the road to dictatorship.  Haydari himself has been forced to appear in court on trumped up fraud charges and to post $12000 bail.

The perception that Maliki is trying to recreate dictatorial rule in Iraq has been fueling efforts to oust him.  Certainly he overplayed his hand.  His most egregious error was to underestimate the power of the Sadrist Trend.  The Sadrists have no love lost for Maliki given his suppression of their former militia, the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), in 2008.  In an effort to undermine the Sadrists power, Maliki began supporting a rival militia, the League of the Righteous People (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq) led by Qais Khazali, a former Mahdi Army commander.

Maliki's other mistake was to alienate the Kurdish leadership.  Rather than try and negotiate an agreement on the exploration and sale of oil in the KRG, Maliki has been very belligerent towards Kurdish efforts to sign contracts wealth foreign oil companies and upgrade the oil infrastructure within the KRG.  His recent trip to Kirkuk, amid extraordinary security measures given the conflict that affects the ethnically mixed city, rubbed alt in the KRG wounds.

While in Kirkuk, Malikli remarked to al-Hayat that the city represented a "Microcosm" of Iraq's ethnic diversity.  Superficially, this remark sounded conciliatory.  However, the real message was that Kirkuk would never be allowed to come under Kurdish control, effectively saying the Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution, which calls for a referendum on Kirkuk, will never be implemented

The tragedy for Maliki is that he could have followed a very different trajectory after 2010.  He could have included Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya Coalition which would have ameliorated much of the lack of trust in the Suinni Arab community over whether Maliki was sincere about giving them a place at the political table.

Maliki could have attempted to use Iraq's oil wealth to create a massive jobs program.  This would have dramatically increased popular support for him and underlined the support for militias like Asa'ib al-Haqq and the Sadrists.  Instead, Malikli has tolerated the spread of corruption in his ministries, further alienating the Iraqi public.  He could have created a number of high profile meetings with the KRG and include the parliament in mediation efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution to the problem of oil wealth and its distribution.

Maliki looked like he could have his way when he was able to coopt a number of Sunni Arab politicians such as parliament speaker Usama al-Nujayfi.  However, those al-Iraqiya members who broke with Ayad Allawi and his attempts to boycott the parliament in response to Maliki's refusal to cede any power to the coalition was always opportunistic.  The so-called "White Iraqiya" bloc has now joined the efforts to remove Maliki whose State of Law Coalition has called for al-Nujayfi's removal based on his "no longer being a neutral party" (al-Hayat, June 2).

Despite the fears of new sectarian conflict as an al-Hayat article of June 3rd tries to argue, I would argue that the current crisis presents new opportunities for democratization in Iraq.  In the early decades of the 20th century, the concept of democracy understood as popular control of representatives in their daily law making activities was challenged by a group of elite theorists, Gaetano Mosca, Robert Michels (who developed the famous "iron law of oligarchy"), Vilfredo Pareto and Charles Beard (who is known for his famous The Economic Interpretation of the Constitution).

Many social scientists conclude that Tocquevillian notions of democracy - namely that citizens had direct control over their representatives through elections, and lobbying for specific policies was a myth.  In response, the famous American political economist, Joseph Schumpeter developed the "theory of democratic elitism."  Schumpeter and others argued that, even if citizens did not control their elected representatives on a daily basis, they still retained the right to remove elites on a periodic basis through elections.  Thus elites were forced to compete for votes in anticipation of elections, preserving what we might call a "minimalist" definition of democracy.

The theory of democratic elitism applies to democracies which still have not developed a strong civil society where citizens can use extra-governmental organizations to gain greater control over the political process.  Still, Iraq demonstrates that the possible withdrawal of confidence from Nuri al-Maliki's government, through democratic procedures, indicates that no one elite can dominate Iraqi politics.  Power in post-Ba'thist Iraq is much more diffuse, as Maliki is discovering to his great chagrin.  There are multiple players in the new Iraq and they are not going allow a new dictatorship to replace that which existed under the ancien regime.

al-Hayat's concerns about renewed sectarian conflict notwithstanding, we see that the diffusion of power among Iraq's three main ethnic groups may actually serve the cause of democracy.  With no one able to dominate the system, political elite are going to be required to go to the public on regular occasions and compete for their support in parliamentary elections.

If Maliki is removed and the specter of a new dictatorship is removed,n the next strep in Iraqi politics will be the mobilization of the populace at large to begin to use new political movements and civil society organizations to exercise more control over elected leaders, such as bringing the country's massive corruption under control.  Certainly, the Integrity Committee in the Iraqi Parliament which has been trying to address this issue can us more popular support.

Already in the Kurdish Gorran (Change) Movement, the Iraqi blogosphere, and organizations which have emerged to protest government policies on a regular basis - not just corruption, but the failure to provide needed social services in an economy awash with oil revenues - we see the potential of the second stage of democratization in Iraq.  For the moment, the inability of any one political elite to reimpose authoritarian rule means that the "theory of democratic elitism" is alive and well in Iraq.  It represents an imperfect form of democracy, but at least a bulwark against the reemergence of a new Saddam Husayn

The deepening crisis of sectarianism in Iraq

How does the continuing spread of sectarianism threaten Iraq’s political stability?  No longer are Iraqis talking about implementing a democratic transition.  Instead, they are increasingly resigned to their inability to challenge Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s inexorable march towards imposing a new authoritarian regime on Iraq.  A key component of that effort is the manipulation of sectarian identities.

Having coopted members of two of the main opposition parties, the al-Iraqiya coalition and the Badr Organization, Maliki has effectively precluded any effort to pass a vote of no confidence in the Iraqi parliament.  Gradually opposition parties feel that they will need to wait until the next scheduled elections in 2014 to rid themselves of the heavy handed prime minister.  However, will elections be rigged by that point in such a way that Maliki (like Russian leader Vladimir Putin) will be able to remain in power indefinitely?

The excellent online Iraqi news source, Niqash (May 3), reports that the governments of Iran and the United States have entered into a tacit agreement to support Maliki and keep him in power. Whether this is an overstatement of US and Iranian policy is hard to say.  What is clear is that the Obama administration has had very little to say publicly about some of the disturbing decisions recently taken by the Maliki regime.

Maliki continues to push the sectarian envelope.  The most recent result of these policies is a diplomatic crisis with Turkey which threatens to grow out of hand.  Infuriated by comments in mid-April by Turkish prime minister, Recip Tayyib Erdogan, that Maliki’s “self-centered” policies had increased political tensions among Iraq’s three main ethnic groups, the Iraqi leader branded Turkey a “hostile state” which is unjustly interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs. He likewise accused it of seeking to impose its “hegemony” on the entire Middle East.

Never one to avoid exploiting a good crisis, Malik has turned his spat with Turkey into an attack on the Kurds and the KRG leadership as well.  If he was angry with Erdogan’s criticism, Maliki was equally upset by remarks by KRG President, Masoud Barzani, who accused Maliki of institutionalizing a new dictatorship which threatens “the unity of Iraq.” 

These problems come on the heel of Turkey and the KRG giving refuge to Iraqi Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashimi, who Maliki accuses of running death squads in Iraq in 2005 and 2006 (accusations which have been known for several years but only now are being acted upon).  Hashimi is under court indictment in Iraq and supposed to stand trial in Baghdad (al-Hayat, May 1),  This week Interpol issued a “Red Card” which effectively places Hashimi on its most wanted list of fugitive criminals.

In his fight with Erdogan  and Barzani, Maliki has sought to blame Iraq’s economic problems on the KRG and Turkey.  According to Maliki and his close ally and former oil minister, Husayn al-Shahristani, the KRG is “stealing” large amounts of Iraq’s wealth by secretly exporting oil from the north and failing to send the proceeds to Baghdad for national distribution.  Thus the KRG is breaking the law (see al-Hayat, Apr. 30).

Maliki has encouraged his allies among the provincial governors in Iraq's majority Shiite provinces in the south to denounce both the Kurds and Turkey.  al-Najaf governor, Adnan al-Zurfi, has organized a conference of governors to censure Erdogan for his comments but, more importantly, to organize a boycott of Turkish products being sold in Iraq.  Indeed, large numbers of Shiite tribes in the south have already committed to this boycott.  While the proposed boycott is economically inconsequential for Turkey, the use of the KRG and Turkey as scapegoats for problems which Maliki refuses to address further erodes hopes of national reconciliation.  He further alienates the Kurds and, by extension, the Sunni Arab community as the crisis is increasingly viewed as one pitting Iraq’s Shiites against the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. 

That the Maliki regime tolerates massive corruption and nepotism and has failed to supply Iraqis with needed services is lost in the larger political calculus which is only about the prime minister deepening his authoritarian control.  Recently, Maliki used the courts to strip the independent corruption commission of its ability to issue reports and had its function transferred to the Interior Ministry which, of course, he heads (see al-Hayat, Apr. 10).

As Maliki systematically eliminates the power of all independent organizations that could challenge his authority, the Kurds become a convenient whipping post to deflect attention away from his own destructive policies.  Supposedly, the Kurds explain why economic and social conditions are so bad in southern Iraq.  If only the KRG would turn over the oil wealth that is owed to the central government, then the conditions of the Shi’a populace would improve.

As Husayn Jamal al-Din, head of the Iraqi Democratic Trend (al-Tayyar al-Dimuqrati al-Iraqi) in al-Najaf pointed out to al-Hayat (Apr. 30), Iraqis in the south have never lived under a true democratic government and have little understanding of the term.   Instead, they increasingly are coming to associate “democracy” with the personal venality of individual politicians. In other words, Maliki’s sectarian policies are undermining the development of a democratic political culture in Iraq.

Maliki’s sectarian policies obviously have important regional implications.  His cozying up to the Islamic Republic of Iran is deeply worrying to Turkey which fears a spread of sectarian violence pitting Shiite and Sunni radicals in Syria and Iraq.  Lurking in the background and further stoking sectarian tensions is the ongoing “Cold War” between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

These political developments should not be seen as pitting  “good guys” against  “bad guys” (and indeed it’s notable how few if any women politicians appear in this narrative).  Turkey is itself pursuing an increasingly authoritarian form of governance under the Justice and Development Party (AKP) led by Recip Tayyib Erdogan.  Everyone knows that the KRG is not reporting accurate figures to the central government on the amount of oil it’s extracting and selling from oil fields in the north.

The real problem is the deterioration of the political situation inside Iraq as evidenced by the increased harshness of political rhetoric, Kurdish threats to secede from Iraq and declare an independent state, and the spread of violence throughout Iraq’s Arab provinces. Maliki’s sectarian policies only throw more (no pun intended) oil on the fire

One key question that Iraq’s increasing crisis situation raises is: where is the United States and what is it doing to use its influence to bring pressure to bear on Maliki to desist from his destructive policies?

Reclaiming the Past: Using Memory and Education to Fight Intolerance and Radicalism among the Youth of the Middle East

What impact will youth have on the future of the Middle East? Most countries of the region are experiencing a"youth bulge" which means that 65-70% of the population is under the age of 30.

Youth have played a central role in the Arab Spring which has resulted in the removal of four of the Arab World's repressive autocrats. Yet youth also serve as government thugs, such as the so-called Shabiha in Syria, provide the cadres for sectarian militias, such as the Mahdi Army in Iraq, and form the core of a wide variety of criminal organizations. Clearly youth are in the forefront of both positive and negative change in the region. What can be done to have positive change triumph over negative behavior?

One way to address this problem is to call upon a historical memory of tolerance and political pluralism which characterized many of the nationalist movements in the Middle East. We should never romanticize the past and, as the title of Thomas Wolfe's 1938 novel, You Can't Go Home Again, informs us, the past can never be recreated. However, the past can become a source of inspiration for new forms of political culture and behavior. Why has the past been so repressed in the Middle East and why do youth know so little about the histories of their countries?

One of the most pressing problems facing youth in the Middle East today is lack of education, particularly education which stresses historical and critical learning. Unless they are part of the small upper class, most youth in the Middle East receive a sub-standard education or no education at all. While many youth do learn basic skills, few learn about the history of their country or the region through a curriculum which is not politicized.

In Saudi Arabia, the secondary school curriculum present a uni-dimensional and Manichean understanding of the world. Under the guise of an "Islamic" education, youth are instead indoctrinated into subservience to the Saudi monarchy and suspicion of the West and its secular culture and values.

In Iraq under Saddam Husayn, a Pan-Arabism was emphasized which privileged the Ba'thist regime and invoked hostility towards the Persians who ruled the neighboring Islamic Republic of Iran. In the Ba'thist worldview, Persians had always been envious of Iraq's civilizational achievements stretching back to ancient Mesopotamia. Iraqi students were presented with a distorted history in which Persians purportedly have sustained a hatred of Arabs which spans all time.

In Syria, the state's problems are said to derive from Zionism and Western neo-colonialism. As the regime of Bashar al-Asad has become ever more repressive, tolerance of any alternative political perspectives apart from those approved by the state has disappeared and dissent has been violently suppressed.

Despite the vigor of Egypt's Arab Spring, the military dominated government has recently taken to blaming the country's problems on Western interference. This led to the detention of 40 democracy activists in January of this year which was designed to further stir up xenophobic feelings. Increasingly the country' severe economic problems have been ignored by setting Islamists against secularists and creating conspiracy theories.

The lack of education and the efforts of political elites to stir up xenophobic feelings and use a strategy of national victimization has a detrimental impact on youth. For those who come from educated families, where they have learned more nuanced views of the countries in which they live, repressive state behavior can often promote a desire to emigrate, with the loss of needed human development resources. For youth from poorer families who have limited access to education, lack of education combined with intolerant behavior on the part of the state can lead to hostility to other segments of society who become associated with having created the nation's problems.

Looking at the past, before the rise of military backed dictatorships, such as those which came to power in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen and Algeria, the Middle East experienced a "liberal era" between the two world wars. During this period, powerful nationalist movements arose to challenge British and French colonial domination of the Middle East.

In Egypt, this movement was led by Muslims and Coptic Christians. It included Jews and other minorities. It emphasized national unity rather than sectarianism. It is true that there was also the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in 1928, and Young Egypt (Misr al-Fatat) which demonstrated support for fascism as it gained strength in the 1930s. But these organizations were nationalist as well and never acquired the power of the mainstream nationalist movement. Prior to the military coup of 19532 which ended the Egyptian monarchy, the Brotherhood did not manifest the sectarianism which some Salafists promote in contemporary Egypt.

As I describe in Challenging Colonialism: Bank Misr and Egyptian Industrialization, 1920-1941, Muhammad Tala't Harb, foudner of the Bank Misr and the Misr group of companies, was an extremely devout Muslim. Among his writings was a book attacking Qasim Amin's book calling for the abolition of the veil (hijab). Yet Harb counted Christians and Jews among his closest friends and invited them to his Friday evening salon in the Cairo district of al-Abbasiya.

For most Egyptians today, Tala't Harb is no more than a statue in a square in downtown Cairo (where his date of birth is incorrectly inscribed on the statue's plaque). Few know that he was honored as Egypt's economic leader (za'im Misr al-iqtisadi), and fewer still know how much respect he had for religious tolerance.

In Iraq, the nationalist movement was likewise extremely powerful. As I note in my book, Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Egypt, the Iraqi nationalist movement was known for its cross-ethnic cooperation, the associational behavior and vigorous press that it promoted, and its emphasis on the arts and culture as forms of non-violent resistance. What was striking about the nationalist movement was its inclusive character which included Shiite and Sunni Muslims, Kurds, Christians, Jews and all of Iraq's many minority groups.

Certainly, there was violence during the nationalist protest against the Hashimite monarchy and their British overlords (1921-1958). Yet there was also an incredible cultural and educational environment that was stimulated by the Iraqi nationalist movement. With the publication of the journal Sumer, and the expansion of the Iraq Museum, Iraqis were able to connect not just with their Arab-Islamic past - epitomized by the early centuries of the Abbasid Empire and its own ecumenical approach to learning and foreign cultures - but with ancient Mesopotamia as well.

Few Iraqi students (as underscored by my own ongoing research with Iraqi youth) know much about Hammurabi's code, Iraq's introduction of the first known language, Cuneiform, that Iraq had the world's first parliament, and likewise the first example of a parliament exercising control over the power of the state's sovereign.

As Iraq's recent decision to connect the country to a major Internet hub demonstrates, the possibility of disseminating information is not the issue (as it was under Saddam's Ba'thist regime when owning a typewriter without a government license was a capital offense). The problem is the lack of an educational infrastructure that will provide youth with a new way of understanding the past and, by extension, the present and future of the nation-states in which they live.

NGOs and civil society organizations, UN agencies and agencies of states which are interested in meaningful democracy promotion need to address this lacunae among the region's youth, a historical amnesia combined with the lack of being taught critical thinking skills. Creating websites that address the issues raised above, both within and outside the Arab world, could mark the beginning of addressing this problem.

The "Emo" killings and the role of the state in Iraq

The expression "the fish rots from the head down" tells us much about the problems Iraq currently faces, especially the task of creating a more tolerant and democratic political culture. While Western analysts continue to obsess over political Islam and what other cultural "essence" may be the cause for the Middle East's political instability and violence, the answer to the region's problem may be much more simple. This becomes clear when we consider the recent killings of Iraqi youth who are known as subscribing to "Emo" (from "emotional"), a form of Western "punk" culture.

The problem in Iraq, as elsewhere in the Middle East is the state, not Islam or some free-floating sectarianism that inheres in the region's inhabitants. Iraq's problems are most certainly not the result of a a small and apolitical sub-culture, namely the "Emos," despite a Ministry of Interior memo posted on its website on February 13, 2012 (see above image) which implicitly justified the use of violence against so-called "Emo" youth.

In the memo, the "Emo" were described as "devil worshipers." According to Colonel Mushtaq Talib al-Muhammadawi, the Ministry's Morality Police would go into every school in Baghdad and "eliminate" them. Such rhetoric was an incitement to violence, as were statements by a number of clerics and organizations associated with Muqtada al-Sadr's movement that "Emos" were a "plague" on Iraqi society. The Ministry's memo was subsequently removed following extensive criticism from clerics, civil society organizations and human rights organizations both inside and outside Iraq, and al-Sadr backtracked on his earlier comments, saying the "Emos" should be eliminated through the law..

Nevertheless, the recent killings of Iraqi youth point to the problems created by the state throughout the Middle East. In Egypt, Anwar al-Sadat released Muslim Brothers and radical Islamists in 1971 to attack secular and leftist supporters of the former regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser as he attempted to consolidate his power.

The Iranian regime uses is semi-volunteer militia, the Basij, to arrest youth who do not dress and behave according to its definition of Islamic norms as well as to attack its opponents, such as the civilian demonstrators who protested disputed presidential elections in June 2009. In Syria, the Bashar al-Asad's Ba'thist regime uses a shadowy group of thugs known as al-shabiha ("ghosts") to attack and kill pro-democracy demonstrators. During the Tahrir Square uprising in Egypt, thugs known as al-baltigayya (al-baltijiya) - literally from the Turkish for "axe carrier" - beat up protestors with state approval.

The problems in Iraq are not a problem of Western culture penetrating Iraq but part of a larger regional efforts to suppress cultural pluralism and social difference that originates with political authority. This effort is part of those who I have referred to in the past as "sectarian entrepreneurs" to create a new political culture of authoritarianism which seeks to thwart efforts by the region's youth and democracy activists generally to draw the Middle East out of its "democracy deficit."

At least one organization has suggested that the number of Iraqi youth who have been killed in recent months ranges from 90-100. The attacks have been particularly brutal, with youth murdered by being stoned and having their skulls crushed with cement blocks, with the bodies often deposited in garbage dumpsters. However, this attack is really an extension of attacks which began on Iraq's gay population which were publicized in 2009. The attacks on "Emo" youth is symptomatic of a larger attack on social and cultural difference in Iraq. A vulnerable segment of the Iraqi populace - youth who are attracted to Western culture and lifestyles - becomes a diversion from the real problems facing Iraq.

The attacks on Iraqi youth include not just "Emo" youth but a larger subsection of the Iraqi populace, namely gay people. These groups have been lumped under the same category of "Satanist" youth. Such rhetoric has prompted groups like the Sadrists and its militia, the "Promised Day Brigades," to call for their "elimination," even though leader Muqtada al-Sadr has subsequently called for this process to "take place under the law."

However, who and what is the law today in Iraq? How can the rule of law be said to prevail when Iraq's main law enforcement agency was itself responsible for inciting violence against those who choose to pursue a different lifestyle. The situation becomes even worse when we consider that the so-called "Morals Police" received permission to enter Baghdad schools to root out "Emo" culture.

Having spoken with Iraqis about the killings, some say the concern with "Emo" youth is that many Iraqis do not understand the culture they represent. Media assertions that the "Emo" are actually "blood suckers" (massasay dima') has made many Iraqis uncomfortable. The long spiked hair, tight clothing, pierced earrings and the make-up that "Emo" youth often wear have drawn parallels with vampires, as was evident in an al-Sumaria television program broadcast on March 2nd of this year.

Worse still, "Emo" youth has become associated with an even more ostracized segment of Iraqi society, namely gays. As science informs us, sexual preference is biologically transmitted, not an individual choice. In other words, people do not choose their sexual preference. However, gays in Iraq, as in many other societies, are being told to make a choice - change their sexuality, or face dire consequences.

To his great credit, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has come out against the killings which, through Abd al-Rahim al-Rikabi, his Baghdad representative, he called “terrorist attacks.” Many clerics, such as Muhammad al-Yaqubi, have said that the remedy to this unpopular youth culture can only be through education, and not through violence.

However, there have been recent reports that the killings will stop during the forthcoming Arab Summit in Baghdad only to begin again after it ends. If these reports are true, they certainly implicate security agencies in the killings as what other force would be able to stop the killings according to a politically defined time frame?

But education is not the current Iraqi state's goal. Rather than focus on more dangerous issues facing Iraqi youth, such as high rates of drug usage, lack of education and high rates of unemployment, Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki remained quiet in the face of Ministry of Information incitements to violence against young people whose only crime is their form of dress. He has said nothing in response to sectarian groups who have railed against a culture which is asserted to be alien to Iraqi society.

Iraq experienced 35 years of brutal Ba'thist rule under Saddam Husayn, suffered under two devastating Gulf Wars, and then under the UN sanctions regime imposed on Iraq in the 199os, the most destructive ever imposed on a modern state. All this turmoil was followed by the intense sectarian based violence that followed the US invasion of 2003. A country brutalized by dictatorship, war and economic deprivation, Iraq needs political leadership that emphasizes national reconciliation and devotes its oil wealth to confronting its extensive social problems, not in tolerating violence against youth who only seek freedom of cultural expression.

No democracy can flourish in a society which practices intolerance and seeks to suppress social and cultural difference. Why isn't the Ministry of Interior's so-called Morality Police seeking out criminal organizations which sell drugs or attempting to root out pervasive government corruption?

Let's stop blaming Islamism, tribalism and other cultural "isms" for a more basic problem - a political elite which seeks to manipulate fears and social anxieties to create a new authoritarian political culture, one that attempts to force Iraqis to conform to a new sectarianism. It's time for the Iraqi parliament, media and powerful political figures - not just Iraqi cleric and human rights organizations - to both condemn the killings of "Emos" and gays and to open a national dialogue in Iraq on how to promote tolerance and cultural pluralism.

Making Sense of the Arab Spring 7: Syria and the "Shiite Crescent"

Of all the countries engulfed by the Arab Spring, Syria is the most difficult to predict as to who will win the current struggle between the regime of Bashar al-Asad and its opponents. A number of Western commentators have begun to question the viability of opposition efforts to bring a democratic system to Syria. Their uncertainty stems in large measure from the sectarian overtones of the current struggle. As talk of sectarianism has increasingly taken center stage, these commentators have trotted out the old canard of the "Shiite Crescent." But is there realy as "Shiite Crescent" and is it valid to analyze Syria through the prism of this concept?

To begin with, there is no Shiite crescent (al-hilal al-shi'i), but rather a Shiite parabola (al-mu'tarij al-shi'i). If we follow the purported confluence of the so-called crescent and move from Iran to Lebanon, we actually see that the line moves south from Iran into southern Iraq before moving north into Syria and then south again into Lebanon.

More to the point, there is no congruity of Shi'a populations in the countries which supposedly comprise the Shiite crescent since moving north from southern Iraq in north-western Iraq and eastern Syria we pass through Sunni Arab populations. In Syria itself, the Alawites populate different regions but especially the north west of the country. In the south of Syria, we find a majority Sunni population. And when the crescent moves into Lebanon, it passes through many different ethnic and religious communities before it reaches the main concentration of Shi'a who live in the south of the country.

The Shiite Crescent's origins date to a 2004 warning by Jordan's King Abdallah. Despite his subsequent assertion that his remark referred to political alignments and not sectarian identities, the term has come to provide a convenient platitude with which to analyze the politics of the Arab Mashriq.

No one would deny the salience of sectarian identities in Arab politics, as a recent collection of essays which I edited makes clear. Nevertheless, this type of analysis once again diverts the political discourse of the Arab Spring away from the desire of large segments of the citizenry of the Arab world and the larger Middle East for democracy.

It is true that the Ba'thist regime in Syria is dominated by Alawites, an offshoot of Shiism, which is a legacy of French colonial rule. But many Alawite officials are horrified by the violence of the al-Asad regime and would leave their posts if it were not for the pervasive security apparatus and fear of the repercussions for their families. While it is difficult to specify exact numbers, the opposition forces include many Alawites who are not part of the privileged elites surrounding the al-Asad family.

Weeed remeber that the most powerful social base of the al-Asad regime is int he Syrian busienss community, whcih is domiated bu Sunni Arabs and to a lesser extent Christians. This social basse refelctes the liberalziation policies which the al-Aad regime has been following since the 190s and the conscious decision to create stronger ties between the regime and the Sunni Arab merchant class in Damascus and Aleppo.

Many Syrians are resentful of the presence of Iranian Revolutionary Guard units in Syria. Indeed, some Iranians have been captured by opposition forces. Similar to Iraq, where all Iraqis, including members of the Shi'a community, have expressed their rejection of Iranian interference in their internal affairs, so too do Syrians - Alawites, Sunni Arabs, Christians and Kurds - likewise reject allowing Iran to acquire significant control over their military, security service and political affairs.

The concern that Westerners have about the sectarian dimensions of the Syrian conflict stem a number of developments, including comments by al-Qa'ida affiliated groups, such as the Islamic State in Iraq, that they are joining the effort to overthrow the al-Asad regime. But why should the self-aggrandizing comments of a group such as al-Qa'ida which has been weakened by Usama Bin Ladin's death, and the Islamic State of Iraq, which has already been overwhelmingly rejected by Iraqis and which can only assert itself through sporadic bombings, give pause to Arab and Western supporters of Syria's Arab Spring.

While there have been reports of sectarian killings among opposition forces in Syria, we do not know the extent of these killings, or whether they were sponsored by the al-Asad. Certainly, the al-Asad regime has played the sectarian card in an effort to discredit the opposition and to stir up fear among members of the Alawite, Christian and Kurdish minorities that a Sunni dominated government would marginalize them all, thus offering a worse outcome than the al-Asad regime remaining in power.

The focus non all those who seek to bring democracy and social justice to Syria needs to be on creating representative political institutions, an independent judiciary, and free and fair elections, ending corruption and tacklling Syria's massive economic problems, especially unemployment.

Sectarianism is not genetically inscribed in the Syrian people. Give them economic opportunity and a government which cares about their well-being, and all references to the Shiite Crescent will disappear into thin air.

A consistent theme among Western journalists and academics when reform movement appear is whether they will: a) be taken over by anti-Western Islamist forces; or b) whether the movement in question will degenerate into sectarian or tribal conflict, thereby producing instability which is likewise antithetical to Western interests in the Middle East. Inevitably, the response is to call for a powerful leader sympathetic to the West to intervene to reimpose order.

After a period of more than 50 years, when the Middle East is at its most unstable point ever, it is time to resist the temptation to find a new dictator who will supposedly control the Islamists and impose stability at the force of a gun. When will the West learn the lesson that there is no other answer to the Middle East's problems than a transition to democracy, a democracy which focuses not just on procedural elements but one which offers social justice to the peoples of the region.

The road to democracy in the Middle East will be extermely difficult, but it trumps all the alternatives.

Curtailing freedom of expression in Iraq

While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's advisers insist that the political disputes which continue to rage in Iraq are simply "the normal growing pains" of a nascent democracy, actions speak louder than words, as the memo by the National Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq below attests.

Maliki is trying to centralize power in his hands, creating what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way call in their recent volume of the same name "competitive authoritarianism." Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarian regimes as "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents." The core characteristics of such regimes are that "competition is real but unfair." In other words, democracy exists in name only.

Levitsky and Way fail to include any Middle Eastern states in their analysis. However, in Iraq, Maliki's State of Law Coalition is working hard to establish a political system that accords with the notion of "competitive authoritarianism." Maliki has successfully excluded the Sunni dominated al-'Iraqiya Coalition from power and is attempting to marginalize the 2 parties - the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - which control the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) which are themselves highly authoritarian. Patronage, corruption and nepotism are the core characteristics of Iraqi politics today. The Maliki government increasingly manipulates these processes to its advantage. The result is a consistent underpinning of the ability of competing parties to wield any meaningful political influence.

Iraq's National Association for the Defense of Human Rights has published a series of directives issued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service which are designed to curb freedom of expression in Iraq. Despite knowledge of these directives, no other agency in the Maliki government has condemned them, including the Ministry of Human Rights. The memo by the Association below is yet another indicator of the ongoing efforts to curtail what citizens in any democracy have come to assume is a basic constitutional right, namely freedom of expression.

الجمعية الوطنية للدفاع عن حقوق الانسان في العراق

National Association for the Defense

of Human Rights in Iraq

---

Freedom of Expression is Indispensable

for Building Democracy
A number of news agencies, websites and Iraqi newspapers have published a document issued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Directive No. 3061, dated 20 February 2012) that requested pursuing activities organized by youths to commemorate the first anniversary of protest demonstrations that took place in Baghdad on 25^th February 2011.

The Intelligence Service directives issued the following orders:

1 – To follow-up movements.

2 – To inform officials about these movements.
3 – To record names.

4 – The purpose is to pursue these people by the relevant authorities.
5 – To take intensified security measures and provide precautionary arrangements in accordance with the law.

These directives have caused deep concern among all those who uphold democracy and the right to exercise the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, including the freedom of expression in accordance with Article 38 of the Constitution which stipulates that “the state guarantees, without prejudice to public order and morality, 1- the freedom of expression of opinion by all means .. 2 - (....) 3 - Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.”

These directives, issued by a government body, are therefore not only an administrative violation but rather constitute several irregularities. First; it is a blatant violation of the Constitution. Second; it is a harmful measure directed against democracy which is the basis of the political process. Third; it is a violation of human rights that guarantee the freedom of expression in accordance with the law.

Our Association has been following up this issue since the publication of these Intelligence Service directives. It has come to the conclusion that the relevant authorities that issued these directives have not denied it. We have also checked the website of the Ministry of Human Rights but could not find any comment, statement or clarification about this blatant violation. The Ministry should have condemned this violation and demanded that the relevant authorities rescind it and abide by the principles of human rights and the section on freedoms in the Constitution.

While considering these directives of the Intelligence Service to be a grave violation of the Constitution and the right to demonstrate, we note that the demands to be raised by youth belonging to the Iraqi Communist Party in the demonstration, as referred to in these directives, do not violate the laws or the Constitution. As a matter of fact, many officials have publicly given support to these demands, such as: 1 - Providing job opportunities, 2 – Putting an end to political differences. Our Association, which defends the rights enshrined in the Constitution and the UN Charter, is therefore astonished that these rights are made a pretext for security measures which are actually of political nature. Those who are in charge of the executive bodies were presumably themselves victims of human rights violations, and if this is so, how can they relish the practice of violations that are prohibited constitutionally after the fall of the dictatorial regime?!

Our Association calls upon those who issued the above-mentioned directives to announce publicly that they are abolished, as well as apologizing for issuing them. We also call upon all the authorities that implement laws to undertake a systematic study of the Constitution and abide professionally by the rights of Iraqi citizens as stipulated by the Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

National Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq

Baghdad - 28 February 2012

العنوان: شارع السعدون ــ عمارة مكية ــ ط3 ــ قرب المسرح الوطني

Email: iraqhumanrights@yahoo.de