Quetta’s Enduring Savagery: Ethnic Cleansing or Sectarian Violence?

Hazaras in Quetta protesting by refusing to bury their dead

Guest contributor, Farah Jan, a doctoral candidate in the Dept. of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, has written extensively on Pakistani politics and is currently conducting research on Chinese-Pakistani relations.

Since the start of 2013, more than 300 people have been killed in different attacks in Quetta – the provincial capital of Baluchistan, Pakistan’s largest province.  The targets of these attacks have been Pakistan’s Shiite Hazara minority.

The 2013 cycle of violence was set in motion by the January 10^th twin suicide blasts that left 117 dead with over 200 injured.   The detonation of an improvised explosive device on February 16^th,  led to 84 dead and more than 200 injured.  Besides these major bomb blasts, the Hazaras have been targeted almost on a daily basis, leaving  their neighborhoods and mosques vulnerable to ongoing violent attacks.

After the January 10^th attack, the embattled Hazara community was forced to protest in the most unorthodox manner when they refused to bury the victims of the January 10 massacre. Members of the Shia community staged a three-day sit-in on the very street where the attack took place and demanded the imposition of military rule for their protection and sacking of the democratically elected but ineffectual provincial government. The protest ended with a mass burial of the victims after the imposition of the Baluchistan's governor`s orders.

Following the February attacks, once again, in subzero conditions, the Hazaras have refused to bury their dead and staged a protest on the streets with 84 dead bodies.  The President of the Baluchistan Shia Conference, Syed Dawood Agha,  stated that this time “until our demands are met, we will continue our protest.”

The Hazara are demanding that the army conduct an operation against the terrorists that carry out such acts. The continued attacks on the Hazaras raise two issues- either the government of Pakistan and its armed forces are incompetent, or they are complicit with these organizations that are mercilessly killing an ethnic group based on its religious identity.

Quetta is home to an estimated 2.5 million people, of which 600,000 are Hazaras, who emigrated from Afghanistan to Quetta about 120 years ago in order to avoid harsh repression by the Afghan ruler Abdur Rahman.  About a century or shall I say five generations later, the same fate has followed the Hazaras in Pakistan, where they sought refuge from persecution on the basis of their distinct Mongolian features and Shia identity. 

An elderly man protesting with the body of his grandson who died in the February 16th attacks

The similarities between the 19th and 21st centuries are uncanny.   We can trace the attacks on the Hazaras back to the 19^th Century, when Afghanistan's ruler declared a jihad against the Hazara Shias for the same reasons, their distinct features and Shia identity. Analogously, in today’s Pakistan, the Taliban backed Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)has spearheaded this anti-Shia crusade, as a counter movement to the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran.

The question that needs to be asked is how should we characterize the situation in Quetta? Is it sectarian violence or ethnic cleansing? To call it sectarian violence would be an injustice to those who were savagely killed, to those who are forced to leave their homes, and of course to those who have endlessly suffered because of their distinguishing features and religious identity.

The reason the anti-Hazara violence should not be called sectarian is that that would indicate symmetrical levels of confrontation between two or more ideological groups.  In Quetta, the Hazaras (Shia minority) are targeted by the LeJ(a Sunni group) and the victims are either too weak or unable to confront the opposing group. Thus violence unleashed in this situation is asymmetrical and seeks to carry out a systematic elimination of Hazara men, women and children.

The plight of Hazaras reminds us of the Serbian led Croatian ethnic cleansing.  The UN resolution GA 47/121 refers to ethnic cleansing as a form of genocide; it is characterized as genocide when a group of people intends to “destroy, in whole or in part” another group of people by force. The purpose of ethnic cleansing is to remove the targeted ethnic community by hostile measures.  The LeJ’s sole tactic is killing (accompanied by large scale bloodshed) and the forced expulsion of the Hazara community from Quetta.

Ethnic cleansing is a crime under international law – it is a crime against humanity under the statutes of International Criminal Court (ICC). In the case of Pakistan, we see a cold-hearted and detached response by the federal government. Who then should be held accountable for these ruthless killings?

Should the terrorist organization Lashkar-e-Jhangvi– which brazenly takes full responsibility of each bomb blast targeting the Hazaras and all Shia, be held responsible. Or should the blame rest with the state, which is ruled by the Pakistan Peoples Party government of President Asif Ali Zardari, who despite multiple requests by the Hazara community for protection has failed to ensure their security.  Or should we hold the Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani, who by oath is responsible for the protection of ALL Pakistani citizens and has failed to defend them from the enemy within, and from external enemies as well?

The silent ethnic cleansing that the Hazaras have endured over a span of many years needs to stop. The Hazaras are as much Pakistanis as the Punjabis; Pashtuns, Baluchs or Sindhis. Those responsible for the security of Pakistan and its citizens cannot continue to ignore these daily atrocities.  Someone needs to be held responsible and punished.  Fir its part, the international community cannot remain a silent spectator to these massive human rights violations – in the end the price paid by the Hazaras and indeed Pakistan is too heavy to pay!

The crisis in Iraq: Gaming the political behavior of Nuri al-Maliki

Iraq is experiencing one of the most serious political crises since the overthrow of Saddam Husayn’s regime in 2003.   Since the national parliamentary elections in March, 2010, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki has made a series of decisions that, from an outsider’s perspective, seem self-defeating.  What motivates Maliki, and what does his behavior tell us about Iraq’s future political stability?  Is there still a possibility for a  transition to democracy

Because political decision-making in (Arab) Iraq is centered in his hands, does it make sense to apply a game-theoretic approach when trying to understand Maliki's behavior?   If so, what can such an approach tell us?

In gaming Maliki’s behavior, we need to take personality variables and structural constraints into account.  Much has been made of Maliki’s purported paranoid personality and the assertion that he sees a conspiracy under every rock and behind every tree.  This is a far too simplistic analysis.  Maliki may indeed be plagued by a paranoid political style, but his actions are directed at consolidating his power and marginalizing those whom he sees as a threat to that power.  In this sense, his political behavior is highly rational and goal oriented.

Structural constraints include "historical learning," namely Maliki's political socialization. The Iraqi prime minister, like other Iraqi leaders, realizes that only those who have projected an aura of power have been successful in maintaining political power and ruling Iraq since it became an independent state in 1921.  His personal history involved becoming a member of the Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiya) in the late 1960s.  When the party faced severe repression during the late 1970s, Maliki fled Iraq when he learned that he was about to be executed along with other Da'wa Party members by Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist regime.

The lesson Maliki learned from his political experiences under the Ba'th was to never trust anyone, except his closest colleagues in the Da'wa Party, and that any sign of weakness becomes an invitation to challenge existing political authority.  Maliki seems less driven by ego and narcissism than by a well defined sense of the political "rules of the game" which, for him, reflect a Hobbesian world, and are ignored at one's (extreme) peril.  For Maliki, Iraqi politics is the quintessential "zero-sum" game.

What are the power centers that Maliki must take into account when making political decisions? Which factors form the structural constraints on his behavior?  Which power centers does he view as most threatening? 

Maliki’s main concern is the rural Sunni Arabs of the so-called Sunni Arab Triangle.  Many of the tribal elements in this region benefited extensively from their ties with the ousted Ba’thist regime and are resentful that their privileged access to the state no longer exists.  Their resentment was reinforced when Maliki refused to keep his promise of providing positions in the armed forces, police and government bureaucracy for members of the “Awakening” movement (Sahwat al-‘Iraq), formed in 2006, after it defeated, along with US forces, al-Qa'ida in al-Anbar Province (Governorate) and in the so-called Sunni Arab Triangle.

Maliki’s fear of this group is evident from the arrest and harassment of Sahwa leaders but especially his highly provocative arrest of 10 members of Sunni Finance Minister Rafi al-Issawi’s security detail on December 18, 2012.  For Sunni Arabs, these arrests were totally unwarranted and indicative of Maliki’s increasingly sectarian policies.  The attack on Issawi, a highly respected Sunni politician known for his moderate political views, deeply shocked the Sunni community. Indeed, Maliki’s decision has led to highly destructive consequences, resulting in huge demonstrations in the Sunni Arab community against his government (see al-Hayat, Jan, 31, Feb. 3,4,12, 2013).  

Maliki views the Sunni Arabs as a “fifth column” for Sunni elements throughout the Arab world who are frightened by the idea of a Shiite political elite controlling Iraq.  Of particular concern is the funding of radical elements such as al-Qa’ida, and its umbrella organization, the Islamic State of Iraq, by Saudi Arabia and these organizations' supporters throughout the Arab Gulf states.  Maliki is currently involved in a systematic campaign not only to eliminate his Sunni political rivals but to remove all Sunnis associated with the former Ba’thist regime from Iraq’s security forces.

The fear of a Sunni fifth column which, in Maliki's mind, is controlled by former Ba’thists, helps explain why he has tied his fortunes so closely to Iran, where he lived between 1982 and 1990.  Support from Iran helps him offset Saudi Arabia and hostile elements in the Arab Gulf, as well as providing a balance to US influence in Iraq.  Maliki can be assured of Iran's intelligence and military support.  Thus the Islamic Republic has become one of the key pillars of support for his regime.

In terms of Maliki’s strategy, these “pull” factors must also be seen in terms of “push” factors.   Beyond the benefits close ties with Iran provide, any Iraqi ruler needs to pay obeisance to Iranian interests and influence in Iraq.  As its most powerful neighbor, Iran exerts significant political, economic and cultural influence in Iraq.

Many of Iraq’s Shiite politicians spent considerable time in Iran during the period of Ba’thist rule, especially after 1975 when suppression of the Islamic Call Party began in earnest.  The Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (formerly known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq or SCIRI) was actually under the leadership of Revolutionary Guards for 2 years after its founding in Iran in 1982.

A second power center is the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) which is under the control of the 2 dominant Kurdish parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan.  From one perspective, the Kurds and Shi’a would seem to be natural allies against the Sunni Arabs.  Both fear the larger Sunni Arab community both in and beyond Iraq.  Certainly Iraq’s Kurds experienced horrors under the Ba’th through the gassing of the town of Halabja and the horrific Anfal campaign which destroyed much of the Kurdish agricultural sector and led to many Kurdish deaths.

Why then did Maliki decide to open another “front” against the Kurds?  First, Maliki feels he needs to demonstrate that he is leader of Iraq and not just an Arab state in the south.  Second, while Maliki despised Saddam Husayn, he feels the need to follow what he sees as the only model that Iraqis respect, that of a qabaday – or “tough guy.”  As a former expatriate whose family experienced severe repression, Maliki understands that strength engenders respect.

Maliki is worried that, should the Kurds become too powerful through exploiting their oil resources, they may able to assert their power in the contested city of Kirkuk and other parts of the so-called “disputed areas”  south of the "Green Line" that separates Iraq's 3 Kurdish majority governorates from Arab populated areas. Because the Kurds have become increasingly close to Turkey due to the latter’s extensive investment in the KRG, Maliki also fears that he will potentially face a powerful alliance in the north that unites Turkey and the Kurds.

Maliki’s calculations regarding the KRG also involve Iran which does not want to see a powerful independent Kurdish state along its border.  Thus Maliki strengthens his ties with Iran through taking a tough line towards the KRG.  Just as the Kurdish leadership has sought to create tensions with the Arab south to distract its populace from focusing on the corruption, nepotism and  authoritarianism that characterizes the KRG, so Maliki can unite his base by mobilizing support not just against the Sunni Arabs, but against the Kurds as well.

Another threat to Maliki's power is the Sadrist Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sadri).  The Sadrists, who prior to 2008 based their strength in the Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi), until it was defeated by the Iraqi army with US support, hold 40 seats in the Iraqi parliament and constantly criticize Maliki for the lack of services his government provides to the poor and needy, and the  massive corruption that pervades government ministries.  

The Sadrists demonstrate the fallacy of viewing Iraq's political dynamics simply in sectarian terms.  The Sadrists represent a powerful threat to Maliki within the Shiite community and support the Iraqi parliament taking a vote of no confidence to force him to resign.  The Sadrists strongly support imposing term limits on political offices in the executive branch of government as well.  This would mean that Maliki would not be able to run again for prime minister in the 2014 national elections.

At this point, game theory begins to fall short in explaining Maliki's behavior.  Why, for example, has Maliki not chosen to play a "cooperative" rather than a "zero-sum" game?  Why not seek to form a grand coalition with the dominant secular party, al-Iraqiya, which garnered many Sunni Arab, Kurdish and secular Shiite votes, and won 91 seats in the 2010 parliamentary elections to Maliki's State of Law Coalition's 89?  Why not strike a deal with the Kurdish leadership on oil extraction and oil sales and invite the Kurdish list to join the government as well?

The problem with game theory is that it is very weak in explaining the impact of institutions, on the one hand, while often treating powerful political actors as agents who are free to make whatever decisions they deem best for their interests, on the other.  Maliki's position of power in decision-making is indeed the obverse of the weakness of Iraq's political institutions.  For example, even though the Iraqi parliament recently passed a law to limit the prime minister, vice presidents and speaker of the parliament to 2 terms, the Iraqi Supreme Court, which is under Maliki's control, will undoubtedly declare the law unconstitutional.

One might argue, therefore, that this fact only underscores the importance of a game-theoretic approach because Maliki does not have to bow to any meaningful institutional constraints.  However, while Iraq's political institutions are weak, other institutions - informal in nature - have become ever stronger since 2003.  These institutions can be subsumed under one concept - corruption.  The NGO Transparency International ranks Iraq 175 of 180 in its list of the world's most corrupt nations.

If Maliki were to choose to play a cooperative game and "divide the spoils" with al-Iraqiya, the Kurdish List and the Sadrists, he would threaten the extensive system of corruption that is becoming more institutionalized in Iraq's political system by the day.  Government ministries are divided up according to a calculus based on the votes that parties in Maliki's State of Law Coalition won in 2010.  Ministries, especially those which can provide extensive patronage, such as the ministries of defense, health, transportation and electricity, are highly prized and  less concerned with providing services than creating patronage networks and embezzling public funds.

Game theory tells us little about how Maliki's behavior is constrained by Iraq's being caught in the vise of a "Cold War" between Iran and Saudi Arabia.  It also cannot explain how the dynamics of how his decisions are structured by the need to sustain the extensive network of corruption that provides much of the political cement that holds together his government and consequently provides the basis of his political power.

Further, game theory - with its implicit bias towards elite behavior - has little to say conceptually or theoretically about "politics from below."  The massive demonstrations that Maliki has faced over the past month, including opposition from the most powerful Shiite political movement, the Sadrists, comprises a serious threat to his power and authority.  Already, Maliki has been forced to address one of the demands that has enraged the Sunni community, namely the imprisonment of women without charge, often simply because their husbands or male family members were seen as Maliki opponents.  Most of these women have now been released.

Game theory likewise has little to say about Iraq's political economy and its impact on Maliki's political decision-making.  Maliki may feel that his access to large amounts of revenues from the sale of oil (and to a much lesser degree natural gas) gives him the freedom to ignore the demands posed by the large scale demonstrations and parliamentary maneuvers that call for his resignation  as prime minister.  

But is Iraq truly a "rentier state"?  Can Maliki and his political elite ignore the demands of its citizenry?  Can it ignore the increasing instability that plagues Iraq?  If sectarian violence spreads due to his policies, pipelines could be destroyed and foreign oil companies might withdraw from Iraq.  Technical assistance and support needed to  modernize Iraq's aged oil industry might evaporate in an environment of increasing violence and political decay.

At the end of the day, leadership counts for much in Iraqi politics.  Making decisions that bring Iraqis together, rather than forcing marginalized sectors of the populace, such as the Sunni Arabs, to choose to demonstrate against the government, or even turn to violence, requires statesmanship, not the parochial calculus of a short-sighted "political boss."  Can Maliki exchange his cynical sectarianism for a more civic form of rule?  The answer is that such change is highly doubtful.  Thus Iraq's political crisis only seems destined to worsen.

Old Problems in Jordan’s “New Era”

A call for more women in  parliament

 Guest contributor, Andrew Spath, a doctoral candidate in the Political Science Dept., Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA, is a Fulbright Fellow currently conducting research in Jordan on leadership successions in the Arab world.

 “Plus ca change, plus c’est la meme chose.” The old French saying – “the more something changes, the more it stays the same” – reflects the realities of current Jordanian politics. Indeed, the Jordan’s political situation as I described it on this blog nearly two years ago still largely applies.

The two year reform initiative, part of a larger program since King Abdullah II took the throne, has been superseded by a campaign marketing the process and unrelenting criticism of its lack of results. So what, if anything, has changed? Why has Jordan, unlike many of its neighbors, eschewed more dynamic transformation? And what can we expect for Jordanian politics going forward?

King Abdullah inaugurated a new parliament this past Sunday, following the January 23rd elections billed as a “litmus test” on Jordan’s reform initiative to date. The new parliament is meant to begin “the era of parliamentary government” following various changes to the electoral process. A new oversight body presided over elections for the first time, the total number of seats was increased from 120 to 150, a new second ballot for national lists was added to inspire party creation, and the prime minister will not merely appointed by the monarch but selected “in consultation” with the legislature, and a few well-publicized prosecutions targeted candidates engaged in vote buying, and international monitoring groups accepted the invitation to observe the elections and found them to be generally transparent.

But transparent process – which itself is highly contested – is less satisfying to those demanding reform than substantive change. Underlying the structure of representation is an electoral law rejected as unfair by much of the population, leading to the boycott of the most viable opposition parties, most notably the Islamic Action Front. The current system of representation is not at all proportional, privileging areas traditionally most loyal to the monarchy and underrepresenting the urban centers of Amman, Irbid, and Zarqa where Palestinians and non-tribal populations predominate.

Combined, the boycott of the IAF and numerous leftist parties and the elections law that motivated their abstention resulted in a parliament that tilts strongly toward independent regime supporters, many familiar faces, and few opposition voices. Moreover, because the elections were such a focal point for the reform process, the many flaws associated with them are likewise the focus of continued criticism.

Some doubted the independence of the Independent Electoral Commission given that its leadership was appointed by the king. Four candidates charged with corruption beat their competition and are likely to take their seats. The consultation over prime minister selection is not institutionalized in the constitution, and Jordanians are wondering how much this consultation will differ from the previous practice of parliamentary confirmation of the king’s appointee.

As a consequence of general malaise over the elections and the unlikelihood that the new parliament being a strong avenue for reform, official rhetoric regarding the elections changed over time. What was originally the apex of the reform initiative became what outgoing Prime Minister Abdullah Ensour called “a stepping stone” to more serious reform going forward. This process is not unfamiliar for Jordanians who have seen a commitment to reformist rhetoric with little change in the structure of political power. (For a more thorough discussion of the politics surrounding the elections, see my recent piece for the Foreign Policy Research Institute.)

Of course, all of this discussion of elections focuses solely on the lower house of Jordan’s legislative politics. This funneling of attention has been a successful strategy for regime maintenance for more than two decades. Political activity is directed toward elections a process of electing representatives that have little governing power. The lower house is trumped by an upper house completely appointed by the monarch and dominated by former government officials and notables. Both houses are superseded by the executive direction of the king who maintains control over the key levers of power, including the prerogative to dissolve parliament that has been used often in recent years.

In general, the parliament meets infrequently and does not provide a credible check on executive power. It is as yet unknown whether the statements made by King Abdullah in his “discussion papers” about a greater governing role for the legislature will come to fruition. Ceding powers to elected governments inherently diminishes monarchical influence, but the strategy also allows the king to more credibly shift blame to prime ministers and their cabinets in a time of widespread disaffection.

Cabinet shuffling has become the norm of late as five different prime ministers have been in office since the start of 2011 and a sixth will be selected very soon. Some longevity in the position is the only way to legitimize the new “consensual” selection of the governing cabinet, and the only way that King Abdullah can convincingly claim that significant power rests outside of the palace. However, two important mechanisms of managing public dissent in the country – dismissal of prime ministers and dissolution of parliament to trigger new elections – conflict directly with this desired longevity.

As both party opposition and protest movements have promised to continue and even increase their activities, government decisionmaking on how to respond will prove even more difficult. The opposition remains discontented and there is much on the horizon likely to generate further turbulence. In the short-term, the cost of electricity is expected to increase under the new parliament as the government tries to pay its debts and satisfy the IMF on conditional loans. Like the increase in fuel prices in November, protests and strikes are likely to follow such a decision.

But these actions are not only responses to proximate policy decisions, but to the underlying problems with Jordan’s economic system like ever-increasing inequality and its readily apparent manifestations in social life, as well as its reliance on foreign aid from the United States and the Gulf countries. Corruption may be the most threatening of the more immediate demands against the regime. Protests feature anti-corruption slogans and signs targeting the both the system in general and the palace itself, and this grievance unifies the disparate parts of the opposition.

Instances of lavish spending and allegations of ill-gotten gains have been damaging to the public perception of the royal family, particularly when the general populace faces increasing economic hardship. A couple of high-level court cases are meant to assuage the popular demands against rampant corruption, most recently a case against the king’s uncle-by-marriage, Walid Kurdi. But opposition groups continue to call for a more systematic anti-corruption effort. These predominantly socio-economic issues unite the opposition, whether the Islamists or the leftists or the hirak,the decentralized and predominantly East Bank protest movement spread across Jordan’s towns and villages.

Beyond this, however, there are major differences among the regime detractors (something I describe briefly in a recent Fair Observer piece). Absent the general demand for regime change observed elsewhere in the region, there is no unifying focal point drawing opposition together against the regime. In fact, opposition groups have time and again professed that their demands fall within the structure of the current system and do not seek to replace it.

The grim reminders from Syria and Egypt that wholesale regime change can be an uncertain and dangerous undertaking further motivates self-censorship in activist behavior and provides little impetus for a full-scale revolutionary effort. In many ways, then, Jordan’s reform effort in response to “Arab Spring” is where it started. The same problems that brought people to the streets two years ago persist today. A familiar song is playing on repeat: adjustments to the electoral law, an election in which the only viable opposition boycotts or rejects the results, and a new parliament unlikely to produce anything substantially different from its predecessor.

Only time will tell if any real powers or decisions will reflect a “new era” of Jordanian politics. Judgments aside, little change in the system of power and a restrained and temperate opposition should make anyone skeptical. of any meaningful transformation of the Jordanian political system anytime soon.

The Syrian conflict: the case for negotiations

Guest contributor, Ghaidaa Hetou, is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA

Since the March 2011, demonstrators in the towns of Dar’a and Homs have voiced their longing for freedom, dignity, and justice.  Syrians throughout the country, who took to the streets to demand change, have also voiced their awareness of and support for the unity of Syrian society, despite its ethnic and religious diversity.  Hence the famous chant,  “One, one, one, the Syrian people are one”.  

The Syrian uprising, which initially took the form of peaceful demonstrations, has morphed over time into a crisis now resembling a civil war. Sectarianism seeped into the conflict as communities and citizens came to be targeted based on their ethnicity and religious sect.  In a country as ethnically and confessionally diverse as Syria, this is a recipe for social breakdown and political chaos.

As the conflict spread, the anti-regime opposition has been subjected to the full force of the Syrian army as it launched an all out assault on armed groups, using helicopter gunships, jet fighters, and ground to ground missiles.  In this ferocious attack,, innocent communities have not been spared the wrath of Bashar al-Asad’s Ba’thist regime. Two years of mutual destruction, fueled and prolonged by the interference of regional and international powers, have resulted in more that 60,000 dead, millions displaced internally, and thousands more forced to leave Syria and become refugees.  Many Syrian towns and villages are no longer recognizable. 

Neither side, whether the Islamist groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra,which dominant the armed opposition, or the Syrian military, is able to assert control and restore stability.  A prolonged war of attrition, even if it resulted in one side militarily defeating the other, would constitute a Pyrrhic victory and ultimately would not serve anyone’s political goals. In short, the Syrian conflict is a lose/lose situation; if the violence continues, the cost in lives and infrastructure will be far too great. 

Thus there is an urgent need for direct negotiations to begin between the al-Asad regime and the Syrian opposition to end the bloodshed, continued displacement of people from their homes and the senseless destruction of the country.

If there has been one benefit in the time that has passed since the opposition movement began in March 2011, it is a painful and incremental political maturing of the Syrian opposition.  It is  no exaggeration to say that hundred of thousands of Syrians have had to pay the price of the opposition movement’s political incompetence, fragmentation, and short sightedness.  

Deterring the opposition from seeking negotiations has been the delusional demands for American military intervention, expectations of direct arms supply from Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and the unwarranted hope that Russia, China and Iran would withdraw their support of the Syrian regime.  It is disgraceful, and a dishonor to the memories of those who have suffered and died , willingly or unwillingly, for the opposition to have prolonged the crisis when the writing is clearly on the wall, namely that a military victory will only lead to greater instability and perhaps even Syria's fragmentation, with all that implies for regional stability. 

There is a long-term logic for negotiations to begin between the Syrian government and the Syrian opposition with minimum preconditions.  With both sides agreeing to begin such discussions, perhaps outside Syria, an important precedent would be set, namely that solution-oriented discussions among situational adversaries is possible.  Not only are they possible, but they offer the only way for Syrians to coexist in a non-coercive environment, for democratic governance to be institutionalized for the benefit of larger and more diverse segments of society, and to begin an inclusive dialogue of national reconciliation.

The social, political, and economic fabric of Syria is interwoven by daily and ongoing multi-ethnic and religious exchanges, political, economic and cultural.  Disenfranchised communities in Idlib, Dar’a, Raqqa and Dayr al-Zur cannot flourish and benefit from future political reform and economic development if they are not integrated into and the benefactor of the diverse socio-economic reality that characterizes the rest of the country.  From the time you leave your apartment in downtown Damascus to get coffee, a croissant and a newspaper, you necessarily run into, talk to, ask for and receive goods and services from all sectors of Syria’s diverse religious and ethnic society.  The factory owner in Aleppo buys his material from, employs, and sells to most if not from all ethnic and religious groups in Syria.  Clearly, Syrians stand or fall together.

Any attempt to institutionalize democratic practices, rehabilitate communities across the country, and start the rebuilding process, must begin with a meaningful attempt at dialogue, negotiation and compromise between the two sides at the top, however distasteful the respective leaders find this prospect to be.  A glimmer of light may be evident in the recent offer of Shaykh Moaz al-Khatib, the highly respected leader of the National Coalition of Opposition Forces and the Syrian Revolution, to begin negotiations with the al-Asad regime.  Ultimately, only the Syrians can solve the current crisis - yes, through a negotiation process among Syrians themselves.