Sunday, January 30, 2022

Democracy, Terrorism and the Climate Emergency in the Middle East

Iraqi farmers survey their parched land

Most analysis of the contemporary Middle East has focused on the instability in the region.  Iran’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, the civil war in Yemen, the resurgence of the Islamic State in northeastern Syria and Iraq, and the persistent authoritarianism and corruption which characterized most MENA region regimes has dominated attention.  However, why is there no discussion of the climate crisis facing the region – the proverbial “gorilla in the room”? 


What are the consequences of climate change which have already impacted the MENA region? How will the region be affected by the persistence of corrupt and authoritarian rule? How will the climate emergency affect the ability of terrorist groups like the Da'ish to expand their power and influence in the MENA region?


Rising temperatures 

Some of the most dramatic developments will be the inability of the peoples of the Middle East to inhabit or travel in certain areas of the region. Mecca is a case in point.  By the end of the century, temperatures will be so high that the hajj will no longer be possible.  In the Gulf region, temperatures will exceed 60 degrees Celsius by mid-century preventing residents from going outdoors during the afternoon given lethal heat 

 

Droughts and water shortages 

As droughts continue in the MENA region, water shortages are increasing.  In Iraq, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers have experienced serious declines in water.  In Iraq, it is estimated that 30 million people are threatened by the water crisis.  Already, many crops in Iraq have not been harvested because the drought has been accompanied by he intensification of rising temperatures.  In short, much agriculture in Iraq and other parts of the region may no longer be viable, unless new methods of cultivation are developed. 

 

Over the past two decades, Iraq has lost 50% of its agricultural capacity die to salinization which has contaminated arable land.  Little effort has been devoted to swayer management and training farmers in skills to conserve and more effectively utilize water for irrigation. Extensive state corruption and the hiring of unqualified bureaucrats in many ministries has hampered efforts to enact new agricultural and environmental policies. 

Iraq’s climate conundrum: Oil reliance versus vanishing water

 

The provinces of Basra, Dhi Qar and Maysan have seen a 90% decline in population as residents have left the region due to the degradation of agriculture resulting from water shortages and declining quality of water.  As farmers have migrated out of the region, there are less farmers left to cultivate the land resulting in less food production. 

 

Iraq’s southern port city, al-Basra, which faces a severe environmental crisis, provides one of many examples of the access to water.  The Shatt al-‘Arab River, which is the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, 120 miles north of al-Basra, is polluted and thus cannot provide drinking water to the city. This pollution isn’t new but rather extends back to the 1991 Gulf War when numerous ships were sunk in the Shatt al-‘Arab. 

 

At the same time, the decreased water flow of the Tigris and Euphrates has facilitated salt water from the Persian Gulf moving up the Shatt al-‘Arab, further impeding use of the river’s water to meet the city’s needs.  The water table in the area around the city has sunk and the chemical contamination index is 100%.  To the degree that well water is available it is unsafe to drink or even use for bathing.    

 

Egypt’s water shortages have reached a level which has been designated as facing “water scarcity.”  However, access to adequate water in Egypt has now brought the country close to “absolute water scarcity.”  Egypt derives 90% of its water from areas beyond its borders and 95% from the Nile River.  Thus, Egypt is one of the most water dependent countries on the planet. 

 

At the moment, Egypt is facing a challenge from Ethiopia’s construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which is meant to increase the country’s electricity supply through the hydropower produced by the dam.  For Egypt, however, the dam is viewed as potentially an existential threat.   


With the Mediterranean Sea’s rising waters, which are pushing into the Nile River 2 tributaries which enter the sea, and contaminating arable land with salt, any decline in the Nile’s flow would further exacerbate these problems.  Only 3% of Egypt’s land is arable, while 30% of its population depend on agriculture.  Severe water shortages would have a devastating effect on the country.  It is ironic that the 2 MENA region countries – Iraq and Egypt - where world civilization began are facing the possibility that their agricultural sectors could, by 2050, collapse 

Dual Threat: Water Scarcity and Rising Sea Levels in Egypt.  

 

Negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia have not led to a resolution of the dispute.  Egypt has called upon Ethiopia not to fill the lake behind the dam but, despite American and foreign assistance with negotiations, Ethiopia has so far refused Egypt’s demand, producing a threat of military intervention by Egypt.  With Ethiopia preoccupied with a grinding civil war, the government of Prime Minister Abi Ahmed lie with that conflict, not with reaching an accord on the Nile water flow with Egypt.  

 

Civil strife 

Already, we have seen another serious of the impact of the climate crisis which is an increase in civil strife.  Many Westerners and even Arabs believe that the Syrian civil war was based in radical Islamism.  The actual cause was the impact of a serious drought along the upper Euphrates River which forced the residents of 175 villages to leave them because they lacked enough water to sustain themselves.  As these Syrians moved westward seeking access to government services in large urban areas, that assistance wasn’t forthcoming.


Demonstrations ensued, which morphed into calls for democratic change in Syria, which led to a brutal crackdown by the al-Asad regime.  Once the demonstrations spread to other areas of the country, Bashar al-Asad released imprisoned terrorists in an effort to change the narrative of the opposition to his regime from demands for democratic change, to one based on radical Islamist terrorism versus the continued power of a secular nationalist regime. 

 

The climate crisis along the Euphrates River which caused the population to leave eastern Syria and laid the groundwork of the horrific civil war which subsequently ensued.  Half of Syria’s population has been displaced by the civil war.  Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed and thousands have become refugees, either moving to Lebanon or other Arab countries, or trying to migrate to Europe and other Western countries.    

Iranian farmers and supporters protest water scarcity Isfahan

The Syrian civil war isn’t an isolated phenomenon.  There are many other sources of MENA region civil strife caused by the intensification of the climate crisis.  In Iran, 97% of the population suffers from water shortages. The diverting of water by the Iranian regime from Khuzestan Province in the southeast, 
which is inhabited by ethnic Arabs, to farmers of Persian ethnicity in Iran’s central plateau, led to widespread demonstrations in July 2021. Farmers in Khuzestan were deeply angered by being deprived of their traditional sources of water. Several demonstrators were killed by security forces. 

Violence Escalates in Water-Shortage Protests in Iran's Khuzestan

 

In Isfahan, farmers, supported by tens of thousands of supporters, protested the dry bed of the city’s Zayanderound River.  Instead of water being allowed in the riverbed, it has been diverted though underground pipes to provide the residents of the Shi’a religious city of Qum and industrial complexes in Yazd Province.  After allowing the demonstration for a few days, the Tehran regime finally cracked down on the protesting farmers who were forced to disperse. 

Iran Forcefully Clamps Down on Protests Against Growing Water Shortage


It is interesting to note that references were made in the report of the Khuzestan demonstrations that “water mafias” had been involved in stealing water from its sources, thus depriving citizens of it.  In other words, as the water crisis in the Middle East grows, we can expect criminal elements to try and benefit from shortages for their material gain.  Thus, the climate crisis will further undermine the region’s stability.   

 

Solutions 

Despite an abundance of sun, and large amounts of vacant land, MENA region countries have yet to mobilize the power of the sun.  One of the few countries which has developed solar energy is Morocco which has the distinction of having built the world’s largest solar power complex in Quarzazate. Four solar power plants produce electricity fo 1;3 million people in an area of 3000 hectares, larger than the city of Paris, in the desert.  

 

Solar panels line the Atlas Mountains facing south where large tubes of synthetic oil heated turbines during the daytime hours. The panels adjust their direction throughout the day to obtain the maximum benefit from the sun’s energy.  Recently, Morocco has used molten salt which it heats in tubes next to the solar panels.  The saltwater is heated to such a temperature that it continues to provide solar energy for 3 hours after the sun has set. 

KFW - Renewable energy: Solar power from the desert

 

Morocco’s incentive to develop solar power is its lack of fossil fuels.  To avoid the possibility of rising oil and natural gas prices, it seeks to reach a 52% threshold of renewable energy by 2030.  Its plans include a goal of developing an excess of solar energy so that it will be able to export some of it to Europe. 

https://www.globalcitizen.org/en/content/morocco-solar-farm-power-big-as-paris/ 

 

Egypt recently decided to open bids on a huge area of land in the south near the border with Sudan.  This solar plant is intended to be the largest in the MENA region.  Will this plant be constructed in a timely and financially sound manner? The Egyptian military controls 30-40% of Egypt’s budget and may interfere in the project.  In 2011, when a group of youth tried to form Karm Solar – a solar energy firm – the military denied the fledgling company access to the national electric grid.  Karm Solar is now a profitable company but, among the corrupt members of elite, profits always trump civic nationalism. 

www.karmsolar.com  

 

In an effort to tackle its chronic electricity shortage problem and reduce dependence on Iran for electrical energy, Iraq has likewise commissioned the development of solar power plants. In March 2021, Iraq contracted with TotalEnergies for a 1 GW solar power plant, and in August 2021, it signed an agreement with PowerChina, which is state-owned and located in Dubai, to develop 2 solar power plants. In October 2021, it signed a contract for 5 plants with the UAE, which are to be built in Dhi Qar Province in the south, in Ramadi in central Iraq, in Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, and in Amara in 

the country’s southeast.  

Iraq, UAE Contract to Build 5 Solar Power Stations

 

Regional Water Authorities 

An important step in confronting MENA region water shortages would be to establish regional water authority commissions.  In light of the problems mentioned above, one such authority could include Iraq, Iran, Turkey and Syria.  All 4 countries riverine systems are interdependent, i.e., the Tigris, Euphrates, and Zab rivers and their tributaries. 

 

One of the main problems for water has been the focus on national water priorities.  While this may have made sense 50 years ago, it no longer is a viable strategy.  Turkey is in the strongest negotiating position since it controls the headquarters of the Euphrates River where it has constructed several dams.  These dams have deprived Syria and Iraq of needed water for agricultural irrigation.  Likewise,Iran has constructed dams on the Zab which delivers water to Iraq, diminishing water flows into the Tigris River. 

Cheekha Dar (Kurdish: Black Tent) - Iraq's highest mountain
Iraq possesses a mountainous terrain in the KRG where snow accumulates during the winter months.  Iraqi Kurdistan – the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) – controls an important source of water in terms of runoff from the Zagros and Qandil mountain ranges.  If runoff from the mountains could be captured in larger quantities, Iraq could use that water for mother parts of the country and even offer Turkey water to compensate for what it would lose should it be willing to release water from its dams on the Euphrates. 
Iraq's Highest Mountains


Iran could likewise benefit from this water policy.  If it obtained more water from the Zagros range, it too could use this resource for its agriculture and feel less pressure to dam the Zab and its tributaries, thus having a less adverse effect on the Tigris. 

https://vimeo.com/401658148  

 

Democracy and terrorism 

Many suggestions can be made as to how the Middle East region should confront the region’s growing climate emergency.  However, the persistence of corrupt authoritarian regimes in the region has worked to impede needed reforms, much less bold innovative policies.  Thus, democracy promotion in the MENA region is not just a choice, bit a necessity.  Corrupt rulers are concerned about their pocketbooks, not their citizens’’ well-being. 

 

Movements like the October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) in Iraq, and the youth movements in Iraqi Kurdistan (the KRG), the Sudan, Algeria and Lebanon require more international support. Only through removing corrupt ruling elites, can the MENA region move forward in diversifying its oil economies, replacing fossil fuels with renewable energy, such as Morocco is doing, and develop strategies to assure water and food security. 

 

The Middle East’s failure to democratize promises not just climate-induced catastrophes but fertile ground for terrorist organizations, such as the Islamic State (Da’ish) and al-Qa’ida to reemerge as major threats to the region.  The most immediate impact of the climate emergency has been the migration of peoples who are adversely affected by it, the Syrian civil war being just one example.  The climate crisis in Darfur, with struggle over shrinking agricultural land, is another case in point, especially since former Sudanese president, Omar al-Bashir, exploited the divisions among local tribes for his personal benefit.


It is critical that the Biden administration, the European Union and the United Nations put more pressure on regimes in the MENA region, such as the al-Sisi regime in Egypt, the MBS regime in Saudi Arabia, and the Erdogan regime in Turkey, to end their repressive policies.  At the end of the day, the Climate Emergency will spare no country in the Global North or Global South. 

 

Friday, December 31, 2021

The 2021 MENA Region Dictator of the Year Award جائزة دكتاتور العام في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا لعام 2021

As 2021 draws to a close, it is clear that authoritarian rule will continue to dominate most of the countries of the MENA region. Given the durability of authoritarian rule in the region, it seems appropriate to recognize those dictators who have been able to cling to power with an award.  Thus, The New Middle East begins a tradition of ending each year with the MENA Region Dictator’s Award. 

What criteria should be used when bestowing this award?  Obviously, the degree of repression that a dictator brings to bear on the population he rules is a paramount criterion (and let us not forget that authoritarianism is a strictly male phenomenon in the MENA region).  This repression should not only be evaluated contemporaneously but diachronically as well.  Namely, how long has the dictator been able to sustain his repression? 


A second criterion is the extent to which the dictator is not only able to repress his countrymen but exercise a negative impact on MENA region areas beyond the nation he rules. To what extent has his dictatorial rule helped spread authoritarianism, and its accompanying repression, beyond his country’s borders? 

 

A third criterion is the special gifts that a dictator brings to his form and style of repressive rule. What is it about the dictator that makes his rule unique?  In other words, what creativity has the dictator exhibited in keeping the nation he rules under his control? In what ways has his actions enhanced the intimidation of the populace so that they don’t challenge his rule? 

 

A fourth criterion is the degree to which the dictator has been able to use corruption and nepotism to strengthen his rule.  A shrewd dictator realizes that force and intimidation are in themselves not an adequate basis for long-term rule.  The ability to steal from the public purse and use this theft for political ends is a key component of any true dictator’s playbook. 

Finally, to what extent has the dictator been able to recruit and mobilize support from nations outside the MENA region?  Clearly, most dictators in the region have been able to use foreign military, financial and diplomatic support to consolidate their rule.  Thus, a successful dictator must be able to enlist foreign benefactors in exchange for providing them with services.  Such services can include military bases, intelligence sharing, privileged investment opportunities and the use of the country for military maneuvers. 


One of the problems in making the 2021 MENA Region Dictator’s Award is the great number of repressive rules from which to choose.  To avoid discriminating between dictators, The New Middle East has decided to make the award to 5 dictators.  In first place is Syria’s Bashar al-Asad.  Second place goes to Iran’s Ebrahim Raisi.  The third-place winner is Egypt’s ‘Abd l-Fattah al-Sisi.  Following in fourth place is Saudi Arabia’s Muhammad bin Salman while fifth place is awarded to Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan. 

How then were the awards decided?  In the case of the first-place winner, Bashar al-Asad is one of the few leaders in the Middle East or elsewhere to oversee the destruction of his country and its descent into chaos and anarchy and still maintain his power and that of his family and hangers on.  Hundreds of thousands of Syrians have been killed since the Arab Spring Uprisings began in 2011 and it is estimated that half of Syria’s population has been dislocated. 


One of Bashar’s shrewdest strategic moves was to release terrorist from prison once the Syrian populace began its demands for democracy.  As he knew, these former prisoners took up arms against the regime allowing it to portray the Syrian conflict as one of radical Islamist terrorism against regional stability, rather than democracy against authoritarianism.  This move was important in mobilizing Arab and international support for Bashar’s regime, and also critical to sustaining the loyalty of the Syrian Army and state security services. 

Ebrahim Raisi is infamously known in Iran as “the hanging judge.”  In 1988, he was one of 4 members of a regime committee which sent thousands of Iranian dissidents to the gallows.  Of course, he has never had to pay the price for his role in these massive executions which rise to the level of crimes against humanity. 


Raisi spent several years inn control of one of the many state “foundations” (bonyad) which are repositories for Iran’s oil wealth.  The corrupt clerical elite draws upon these funds with no accountability.  Thus, while the Iranian economy suffers from international economic sanctions related to its nuclear weapons program and efforts to destabilize Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen and the Arab Gulf, Raisi and the Iranian political elite want for nothing and enjoy comfortable lives. 

 

Although only elected president last August, Raisi has been a core actor in the so-called Islamic Republic since the toppling of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in late 1978 and early 1979. A consistent hardliner, he has blood on his hands not just from the “hanging campaign” of 1988, but the repression of dissent in Iran, the killing of protestors who have contested elections, e.g., in 2009, and enticing dissidents to return from abroad after which they have been tried, imprisoned and even executed. 

Iran still seeks to erase the ‘1988 prison massacre’ from memories, 25 years on


Raisi has adopted a hard line on reinstating the JCPOA, the international agreement to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons. While it was a grave mistake for Donald Trump to withdraw the US from the agreement, Raisi's hard line on reinstating the accord threatens to create a MENA region nuclear arms race if the negotiations fail. If Iran subsequently develops such weapons, it might prompt Israel to attack Iran, unleashing serious regional and international instability.

Number three on our list is Egyptian President cAbd al-Fattah al-Sisi.  In June 2013, the Egyptian Army overthrew the only democratically elected president, Muhammad Mursi, since the Egyptian July 22nd 1952, Revolution (coup d’etat). Mursi was a feckless Islamist who tried to strengthen the position of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a policy rejected by the majority of Egypt’s population. Still, the Army did not seek a new election but rather imposed a new repressive regime. 


Since taking power, the al-Sisi regime has imposed the most oppressive rule since the army seized power in 1952.  With no access to Egypt’s notorious jails and so-called “security camps,” Egyptian and foreign journalists have great difficulty in obtaining information on the hundreds of human rights and civil society activists, as well as journalist and other critics of the regime. 


However, an insight into the brutality of al-Sisi regime came with the killing of Giulio Regeni in Cairo in February 2016.  Regeni was an Italian doctoral student from Cambridge University who was conducting research on Egypt’s labor movement. His mutilated body was discovered in a ditch in poor Cairo neighborhood. Regeni had obviously been tortured.  Indeed, his parents indicated they could not recognize his body when it was returned to his home in Italy. 

Regeni murder: Trial of Egyptians for Italian student's murder suspended


Regeni’s murder caused outrage in Italy and elsewhere.  It led the Italian government to recall its ambassador to Egypt.  However, the al-Sisi regime refused to cooperate with Italian investigators and the crime remains unsolved.  If we think about Regeni’s torture and murder by Egyptian secret police for the sole crime of studying Egypt’s working class, then we realize what the fate is of Egyptians who are arrested and thrown into Egypt’s jails. 


The al-Sisi regime excels in corruption and nepotism which benefits him and his clique        

(al-shilla). The Egyptian Army controls an estimated 30% of the state budget.  It produces many non-military goods such as bottled water and pasta sauce as well as collecting funds from services such as collecting tolls on Egypt’s highways. Not surprisingly, it is illegal in Egypt to publish the military’s budget. 

In many Western circles, Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman ibn Sa'ud, has been hailed as a reformer.  As they say, however, you can’t tell a book by its cover. MBS has introduced many social changes in Saudi society, even as he has suppressed dissent.  For example, he imprisoned a young Saudi woman, Loujain al-Hathloul, who advocated for the right of women to be able to drive automobiles for 3 years.  Even though MBS had already announced that women would have this right, she was imprisoned and subject to torture and sexual harassment and forbidden to be in contact with her. 


After convincing his father, King Salman, to cede the reins of power to him, MBS arrested a large number of princes, including the prominent progressive, Prince al-Walid bin Talal, and locked them up in the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in Riyadh. He accused them of corruption and failing to pay taxes.  It is alleged that some princes were hung by their arms to force them to pay up. 

 

Shortly after fleecing the princes of hundreds of millions of dollars, MBS bough a yacht for $452 million and a painting supposedly by Leonardo da Vinci for $450 million while cutting social spending in the Kingdom.  (For details on MBS’ purchase of Leonardo’s Salvator Mundi, which is of dubious provenance, see the film, The Lost Leonardo - https://www.sonyclassics.com/film/thelostleonardo  


Of course, one of the key criteria in awarding MBS a 2021 MENA Region Dictator of the Year Award is his killing ofWashington Post columnist and Saudi dissident, Jamal Khashoggi, in 2018. But MBS went farther than just murdering Khashoogi. He had the columnist's body dismembered, earning him the moniker of MBS (Mr. Buzz Saw).


Meanwhile, MBS decision to enter the civil war in Yemen has led to thousands of causalities due to the indiscriminate bombing of Yemeni targets.  It is estimated that 25% of the casualties caused by Saudi air attacks have been Yemeni civilians, increasing the misery of the populace of the poorest nation in the Arab world. 

The final award goes to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan After beginning his rule as Prime Minister in 2002, Erdogan returned to power in 2008 and has, since then, become increasingly autocratic. Intolerant of dissent, like all dictators, Erdogan has jailed hundreds of journalists, earning his regime the dubious honor of having the largest number of journalists imprisoned per capita of any country in the world. 


The Turkish president has removed secular Turks from educational posts in secondary schools and universities and replaced them with loyal Islamists from his Justice and development Party (AKP).  Thus, he has tried to restructure the educational system to indoctrinate Turkish youth into the AKP's politicized Islamist ideology.


Erdoğan's damage is not limited to Turkey. He has promoted sectarianism and great instability in Eastern Turkey and north eastern Syria where he has used mercenaries - some with ties to the former Islamic State - to attack one of the main opposition groups to terrorists in eastern Syria, the Syrian Democratic Forces, solely because they are comprised of Syrian (Rojava) Kurds.

Turkey’s Transnational Repression: Abduction, Rendition and Forcible Return of Erdoğan Critics


Meanwhile, Erdoğan is the only one of the dictators who seems to be digging his own grave. The Turkish economy has suffered from speculative growth and the Turkish Lira has suffered as result. Many loans used for construction were inn US dollars. As the Lira has lost value, paying back these loans becomes increasingly difficult. The current rate of inflation may be as high as 60%, but Erdoğan refuses to raise interest rates. As the economy deteriorates, the Turkish president's popularity is plummeting, even among his AKP supporters.

Cashing In Grandma’s Gold Coins, a Turkish Family Struggles to Get By


Where do these dictators leave the MENA region in 2022?  None is tackling the economic crises facing their societies. Even in Saudi Arabia where there is an estimated 25% poverty rate, social services subsidies are being cut.  None of these authoritarians is confronting the existential threat poised by the Climate Emergency.


As temperatures in the region rise and drought and water shortages become more severe, no policies for addressing these problems are being formulated.  Syria's Arab Spring Uprising was caused by the collapse of the agrarian economy due to lack of water along the Euphrates River.  The residents of 170 villages were forced to leave their homes and migrate westward, seeking state assistance in the process.  When these demands went unanswered, calls for democracy began and Syria 's destruction ensued.


Thus, the prospects for 2022 are bleak. The lack of democratic leadership in the region and the massive state corruption accompanying authoritarian rule will continue to cause the MENA region's youth - its best hope for the future - to seek to migrate abroad in search of a better future than they can expect to find in the nations in which they presently reside.


Of course, all these repressive dictators benefit from foreign support, particularly the United States or Russia.  While there is little chance that Putin will withdraw Russia's support of Bashar al-Asad's regime or the dictatorship in Tehran, the Biden administration should reconsider more arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Egypt and publicly call out the ongoing human rights abuses in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Turkey.


Contra the argument of Senator Rand Paul, long-tern support for dictatorial rule will come home to bite the US and undermine ny pretension it has to arguing that it supports democracy globally.






Monday, November 29, 2021

Old Wine in New Bottles: The Myth of the "New" Taliban and Strength of its Islamic Emirate

When the Taliban effortlessly occupied Kabul this past August 15th, it appeared as if they would finally be in control of Afghanistan after a 20-year conflict with the United States and its NATO allies.  Combined with the collapse of the Western sponsored Afghan government and the chaotic withdrawal of the final contingent of US troops, the Taliban seemed poised to finally establish their Islamic Emirate. 

 

After 3 months of Taliban rule, the situation in Afghanistan appears quite different.  International aid, which has supported the country, has all but dried up.  Meanwhile, the Afghans are facing a bleak winter with 95% of the population expected to face food shortages, some of which will be very severe. Government employees have either been paid sporadically or not at all. With 80% of Afghanistan’s electricity imported from Iran and Tajikistan and the Taliban unable to pay for it, the economy faces a potential dire energy shortage. 

 

A key Taliban selling point has been that, unlike the US and its Western allies, and the former Afghan government, it could offer the Afghan populace a secure environment devoid of conflict.   As we have seen, a more radical Taliban splinter faction known as ISIS-K (the Islamic State – Khorasan Emirate) has mounted a number of attacks on. mosques, a hospital and Taliban troops.  Most ISIS-K members are former Taliban who feel the movement has lost its radical edge.  

 

Where is Afghanistan at present under Taliban rule?  What happened to undermine the movement’s optimism when it first seized power?  Where is the country heading under its new leaders?  And what happened to the so-called “new” Taliban which, after taking power, assured the Afghan people and the international community that it had changed and would institute an inclusive form of rule and not return to the repressive gender politics which it pursued when in power between 1996 and 2001? 

 

Bluntly put, Taliban rule thus far has been a disaster with nothing “new” to distinguish it from its older incarnation.  Public executions and floggings may have disappeared.  However, little else indicates that the Taliban will be able to rule Afghanistan in anything other than a repressive and exclusionary manner. 


Ideology trumps reality 

Despite potentially having access to $9 billion in currency reserves held in US banks, the Taliban has chosen to severely limit government positions to the Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara minorities, thus breaking it promise to form an inclusive government.  Even where members of minorities have been appointed, their positions are politically marginal because they lack any meaningful power. 

 

Gender politics has regressed to the same status it had under former Taliban rule. Women are only allowed to attend school through the sixth grade and can no longer be taught by male instructors.  Women have been largely excluded from their former government employment.  Female judges are in hiding in fear of their lives.  When Afghan women peacefully demonstrated against the new Taliban government demanding their rights to education and government employment, they were met with violence. Thus, how has the so-called “new,” more “inclusive” Taliban changed since 2001? 

 

The truth is that Taliban rule has little to do with Islam and everything to do with imposing a highly repressive and misogynistic ideology on Afghanistan.  The exclusively male and overwhelmingly Pashtun movement is driven by tribal norms parading as “Islam.”  In the view of its members, women should not be empowered through education. Instead, they should remain in the home and not participate in the public sphere, except for a few areas of employment where they are needed, e.g., as teachers of young girls and nurses who attend to women patients. 


Radical versus more radical ideology 

For the minority of Taliban officials who support a more open form of rule, even if to only gain access to foreign aid, they face a quandary.  If the Taliban relaxes its policies on women and access to education, and opens the society to Western culture, such as through social media, it opens the government to even more attacks by ISIS-K that it has foresworn its ideology.  With Taliban already switching their allegiance to ISIS-K, the government can ill afford to lose more of its traditional support. 

 

Thus, the Taliban is reaping the backlash of its more than 2 decades of inculcating in its members, the evils of Western culture and Westernization.  It is now almost impossible for the current Taliban political elite to back pedal and adopt more moderate views, especially when faced by a radical insurgency which views it as treasonous.  Add to this problem the financial catastrophe facing Afghanistan, and we see a set of rulers with few policy options to address the serious challenges which have arisen since the Taliban seized power. 

 

No help from its neighbors – the Islamic Republic of Pakistan or the Islamic Republic of Iran 

For the 20 years since the Taliban was deposed by the United States, neighboring Pakistan has provided a safe haven for its fighters.  Indeed, many Pakistanis have lauded the Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.  However, talk is cheap and Pakistan is experiencing a major financial crisis caused by global inflation die to the Covid-19 pandemic, including a sharp rise in energy costs. 


Not only is Pakistan suffering from serious inflation, but the ruling political coalition, headed by Prime Minister Imran Khan is threatened with collapse.  Thus, there are no circumstances now or in the foreseeable future in which Pakistan will be able to come to the financial rescue of the Taliban. 


To the West, Iran has expressed its support for the Taliban victory.  However, the Tehran regime is still suspicious that many Taliban harbor hostility towards the country’s Shici Hazara minority.  Indeed, ISIS-K has called for the extermination of all Shica in Afghanistan. 


Iran, like Pakistan, is suffering economically.  International sanctions imposed by the West have dealt a serious blow to its ability to supply the Iranian populace with a wide variety of commodities and services.  Thus, no financial help can be expected to be forthcoming from the Islamic Republic of Iran as well.  


Saturday, October 23, 2021

Iraq's Parliamentary Elections: A First Step Towards a True Democracy in Iraq?

The engineer candidate - Reem 'Abd al-Khaliq 'Abd al-Hadi
On October 3rd, Iraq held parliamentary elections.  Although the results were not officially announced until October 17th, many analysts, both Iraqi and foreign, were quick to decry the results.  In particular, they pointed to the Shi’a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr’s party to win an estimated 73 seats in Iraq’s 329 member parliament and the elections’ low turnout rate, between 38 and 41%.  However, were the elections really the failure that many analysts would have us believe? 

The role of youth in the struggle for global democracy has yet to receive the analytic attention it deserves.  Youth democracy promotion movements from Hong Kong to Chile have shaken the political order in all regions of the world.  In 2011, the Middle East experienced the Arab Spring, largely led by youth.  While suppressed, more sophisticated and successful youth democracy promotion movements have recently been organized in Algeria, Sudan, Lebanon, and Iraq.  


Unlike the Arab Spring uprisings, these movements have framed their demands in a more coherent manner by calling for an end to state corruption and nepotism, universal political participation, improved social services, gender equality and an end to sectarianism.  What role are youth playing in promoting democracy, especially under regimes characterized by extensive corruption and criminality such as Iraq? Eric Davis comments on the Iraqi elections on al-Siyaaq Television  

 

Since it began in October 2019, Iraq’s youth-led October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) has had a number of successes in its efforts to fight the massive corruption which engulfs the Iraqi state and to curtail the power of pro-Iranian militias.  Ongoing protests forced the resignation of Iraq’s prime minister, ‘Adil ‘Abd al-Mahdi, who was known for his corruption, in November 2019.  Subsequently, Iraqi youth prevented the appointment of two other candidates, neither of whom was supportive of democracy, proposed by the ruling elite.  Finally, during the spring of 2020, a new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who was sympathetic to the protestors’ demands, took office.  


After the new prime minister took office, the supporters of the October Revolution were able to force Iraq’s Council of Deputies (parliament) to enact a new voting law, based on single member districts where the candidate with the majority of votes wins a parliamentary seat.  Thus, the October Revolution was able to eliminate the party list or “quota” system, which insured that a small group of parties would continue to dominate Iraq’s Council of Deputies.  The new electoral law was critical in making it possible for a number of reformers and supporters of Thawrat Tishreen to win seats in the new Iraqi parliament.  

 

After the Islamic State seized one-third of Iraq’s territory in 2014, including Mosul, its second largest city, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the head of the world’s Shica who resides in al-Najaf inIraq, called on all Iraqis to mobilize to defeat the Islamic State forces which were moving towards Iraq’s capital, Baghdad.  Existing militias, formed after Saddam was toppled in 2003, and myriad new ones, were formed. Iran supported these militias which, together with US and Iranian forces, finally defeated the terrorist organization in March 2019. 

 

After the destruction of the Islamic State’s “Caliphate,” Iraq’s militias refused to put down their arms.  Since 2014, they have become an armed force which is as powerful as the Iraqi Army.  Through the efforts of pro-Iranian Iraqi political parties, many militia members have joined the Ministry of Interior’s security forces.  The militias, most of which are loyal to Iran, have morphed into crime syndicates.  They control large parts of Iraq’s economy and engage in the smuggling of oil, automobiles and consumer durables, extortion, extracting bribes in the distribution of government contracts, and the trafficking of arms.  

 

Iraq’s ruling elite, especially its powerful pro-Iranian wing, has been loathe to make concessions to the demands of youth who support the October Revolution.  In Iraq, youth comprise 70% of the population under 30, as in many MENA region countries.  Over 600 demonstrators have been killed by government security forces, primary by those of the Ministry of Interior, and over 24,000 wounded, kidnapped, and tortured.  


Despite the violent repression, the October Revolution protests have remained peaceful.  Because their demands reflect the preferences of the large majority of Iraqis, especially an end to corruption, the improvement of social services, and ending Iran’s political and economic power in Iraq, they are supported by a large segment of the population. 


Many eligible voters boycotted the recent parliamentary elections which were held this past October 3rd.  Many Iraqis, who oppose government corruption and Iranian influence in Iraq’s internal affairs, thought that Iran’s militias would rig the elections so that their candidates would win. Nevertheless, to the delight of most Iraqis, candidates affiliated with Iraq’s militia movement (al-Hashad al-Shacbi) fared poorly in the elections and lost seats in parliament.  


On the other hand, reformers and supporters of the October Revolution, many of whom represented newly formed political parties, performed well in the elections.  If they jin with independents who were elected, including a segment of the 97 women who were elected, of which 57 weren't elected through the dominant parties, they could control over 40 seats.


Despite efforts by pro-Iranian militias to characterize the election results as fraudulent, and part of an international conspiracy against them, the elections results have been certified by Iraq’s Election Commission. Iran is deeply concerned that the elections may indicate it is losing its grip on Iraq's polticidal system. This concern explains the vicious campaign the militias have mounted against the head of the United Nations Aid Mission in Iraq (UNAMI) which it accuses of having manipulated the election results as part of a foreign conspiracy against Iran 

 

The relative success of the October Revolution calls attention to the historical memory of Iraq’s powerful nationalist movement which pre-dated Saddam Husayn’s Bacthist regime (1968-2003).  This nationalist movement included all sectors of Iraq’s diverse ethno-confessional society, including Shica and Sunni Arabs, Jews, Christians, Kurds, Turkmen, Yazidis and other ethnic and religious groups.  


I show that many of the youth who organized and are leading the October revolution carry on a tradition of their elders who socialized them into the ecumenical and inclusive discourse of what I call “Iraqist nationalism” (as opposed to Pan-Arabism which the majority of Iraqis rejected). I develop this theme in my study, Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq. 


Many Iraqis support the October Revolution not only due to its democratic and anti-corruption message, but due to its reestablishing a strong of Iraqi nationalism as well.  This “Iraqist nationalism,” i.e., an Iraq-centered nationalism, was transmitted through urban extended family networks during Bacthist rule as youth were informed that Saddam’s authoritarian and exclusivist regime, expressed in efforts to indoctrinate youth in the education system and youth groups, ran counter to Iraq’s traditional political culture. 


This inclusive political culture, which was transmitted through “home schooling,”  was codified during the June through October 1920 Revolution against British control of Iraq (known as the “Great Iraqi Revolution,” of al-Thawra al-cIraqiya al-Kubra) which involved the participation of all Iraq’s confessional groups – Muslims, Jewish and Christian, and ethnic groups. 


The Iraqi case fails to support the conceptual frame of an “Arab democracy deficit.”  In its promotion of social democracy, namely a political system which cares for the less fortunate in society, its support for gender equality (as seen in the large number of women who play prominent roles in the October Revolution), and its rejection of sectarianism, Iraq’s youth have mobilized significant support for democracy. They also have created a focus on corruption and the new to use Iraq’s oil wealth to improve social services and create more jobs for Iraq’s large youth demographic. 


Compared to the lack of success in other Arab countries, such as the recent democratic backsliding in Tunisia, initially viewed as the only Arab Spring success story, the Iraqi case calls for examining whether democracy without material support, which establishes the bases for hope in the future, is a viable scenario in developing countries. The Iraqi case, where elections have been conducted since 2005, demonstrates the potential weakness of kleptocratic regimes when massive corruption marginalizes large segments of the citizenry in a setting of purported democratic governance.   


Despite the massive corruption, it noteworthy that Iraq has conducted fair and free elections for a decade and a half.  It is true that there were efforts to affect the elections through bribery and even threats.  However. overall it is remarkable that thousands of Iraqi have proposed themselves as candidates for the country's parliament anf numerous political parties have been formed.  Although Iraq has nowhere near gender equality in any aspect of civil society and the public sphere, women have played an active role in politics, as candidates, as members of parliament and as voters.


Compared to many other countries, especially those in the Arab world, this uninterrupted holding of democartic elections is a record of which Iraqis can be proud.  That Iraq has developed a powerful youth democracy movement which emphasizes the right of citizens, and particularly the most needy members of society, to receive properly government funded and administered social services, is anti-sectarian, supports gender equality ,and seeks to end government corruption and nepotism, is a remarkable development in itself   

 

How Iraqi youth developed their ideas of democracy which, through much of the street art the October Revolution has produced (examples are included in my presentation), was an extensive understanding of history.  This comprehension includes the contributions of Iraq’s ancient civilizations, e.g., the first use of the term “freedom” as understood in modern usage, the first parliament, the first language and the first legal code by Hammurabi (which incorporates concern for the less fortunate of society), as well as the contributions of Iraq’s powerful 20th century nationalist movement.  In my future research, I seek to develop a better understanding of the democratic youth movement in Iraq.

Saturday, September 11, 2021

The Terrorist Attacks of 9/11: What Have We Learned?

The September 11, 2001 National Memorial, New York City
The solemn commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the 9/11 terrorist attacks this weekend highlight once again a key question.  What did the United States learn from the attacks?  What steps have been taken not only to prevent future terrorist attacks but to address the root causes of the attack?  As the US debacle in Afghanistan makes clear, what the United States has actually learned from 9/11 is not at all clear. 

One of the postive  US accomplishments has been to develop a security nexus which, to date, has prevented another 9/11 type attack from occurring.  Apart from the attack by a Saudi army officer training at the US last year which killed 3 American servicemen,  there have been no attacks in which the perpetrator has identified with al-Qa'ida or the so-called Islamic State.

To date, one of the core policies in the struggle against terrorist and violent extremist groups has been to focus on ever more sophisticated weapons systems.  Some of these systems make sense but others seem more designed to generate profits for large defense contractors than to enable the US to confront the threat of terrorism.

The last time the US fought a protected conventional conflict was the Korean War of the early 1950s.  The likelihood of the US becoming involved in a conventional war, say with China or Russia, is highly unlikely.  The threat to day is less from a country's military might, albeit important, but from cyber warfare and the use of weapons sales and economic assistance.  Think for example, of China's enormous Belt & Road initiative which is financing countless infrastructure projects, primarily in less developed countries (LDCs), and Russian arms sales, e.g., the S4600 anti-aircraft missile system which it sold to Turkey, a NATO member.

During the Obama administration, there was a significant increase in the sue of drones.  Although they disrupted the Taliban, al-Qa'ida and al-Shabab, they also caused considerable civilian casualties.  In Afghanistan, drone attacks which killed and wounded civilians were effective tools to recruit more fighters to join the Taliban.  The "hellfire," the latest version of the drone which uses shrapnel rather than explosives to kill targets, may reduce civilian casualties but eliminating leaders of terrorist groups, while  will not destroy the ideology that led them to become violent extremists in the first place

What is the US' secret weapon?  The answer is human resources. As was clear from the 20 year war in Afghanistan, policies were developed which showed little or no understanding of Afghan culture and society (as I argue in my post,  A Tale of Two Cultures - the US Debacle in Afghanistan).  What is needed is a massive education campaign by the Federal Government to provide culture and language studies for students, beginning at the secondary school level.  

In secondary schools, language study continues to be a weakness in the global studies curriculum.  Because knowledge of a foreign language is the gateway to the culture of the people who speak it, language should not be seen as an "add on" and less critical than STEM courses.  Because the United States is unique as a ethnically and religiously diverse society, teachers who are native or "heritage" speakers of languages other than English should be recruited to obtain degrees in education so they can begin teachers in the nation's public school system.

The Critical Language studies program at the US Department of State, which provides scholarships for studying languages from regions where instability prevails, should be expanded.  Many students in the social studies and humanities face difficult employment opportunities and career choices in the current Covid-19 economy.  Now would seem an ideal time to recruit young scholars to new careers in the State Department and US intelligence agencies where they can study foreign cultures and languages to help policy-makers make more informed and thus better decisions about US foreign policy moving forward.  

How would the Biden administration cover the costs of this large-scale education program? This investment in the nation's human resources in the global struggle against terrorism and extremism should be considered a "weapons system" on its own merits.  The United States does not need additional aircraft carriers, stealth bombers and other highly expensive weapons systems.  Rather it needs a military with a wide variety of new skills which can allow it to fight terrorism in asymmetric conflicts and engage in cyber warfare.  

What the US alo needs is a new generation of diplomats and intelligence analysts who will be able to develop creative ideas which can be used to combat extremism.  The US is uniquely positioned to work with recent immigrants from a wide variety of countries where extremism has taken hold.  Think, for example, of the large Afghan-American population which includes many of the most skilled professionals and educators from Afghanistan, not to speak of many Afghans in the US who have worked closely with the US military and international NGOs.

If the Biden administration were to take this educational mission seriously, it would provide an example for US allies in Europe and elsewhere to follow suit.  A more educated and culturally sophisticated generation of young analysts could also work with Muslim communities in their respective societies who reject extremism and the effort terrorists have made to appropriate Islam (just as Christians have rejected efforts of white nationalists to appropriate Christian doctrine).

In the struggle against terrorism, and in the spirit of truly commemorating the victims of the 9/11 attacks, the US and democratic nation-states globally need to start thinking in new ways to bring the scourge of violent extremism to an end.