Operation New Dawn: A Serious Policy Initiative
or a Codeword for Leaving Iraq ?

What can we expect from Operation New Dawn? Does this policy have any substance or is it just a cover for the United States’ withdrawal from Iraq? If the latter is the case, this is a great mistake because the stakes in Iraq are extremely high, not just for Iraqis and the US, but for the entire Middle East. If Iraq can continue to develop politically and economically, its current government crisis notwithstanding, its impact on a region where democracy is largely non-existent could be salutary indeed. While the contours of Operation New Dawn are still in formation, the tenor of President Obama’s speech on Iraq last evening certainly did not leave the impression that the US views Iraq as a critical component of American foreign policy in the Middle East.

Despite continued violence and the inability of Iraq’s political elite to form a government following the March 2010 national parliament (Council of Representatives) elections, Iraq has nevertheless made considerable progress towards democracy. Free and transparent parliamentary elections were held in January and December 2005 and in March 2010. Arab provincial legislative elections in January 2009 and Kurdish Regional Government parliament elections in July 2009 brought many new legislators into the political process. Voter turnout has reached or exceeded 60% and has been as high as 70% in Iraq's Kurdish region. Voters have shown considerable maturity in voting for services instead of supporting sectarian parties. In the March 2010 national parliamentary elections, all political parties were forced to make cross-ethnic appeals and 62% of the sitting delegates lost their seats due to their perceived incompetence. Over 20% of the new delegates are under the age of 40, indicating that young Iraqis are interested in politics. In a March 2009 poll, 64% of Iraqis said that democracy is the best form of government. In Iraq’s Kurdish region, a new democratic movement, Gorran (Change), is challenging the entrenched, authoritarian political elite controlled by the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Clearly, democracy enjoys widespread support in Iraq.

Rather than helping Iraq consolidate these gains, the US is shifting its focus to Afghanistan, threatening the progress it has made to date. The disastrous consequences of Western inaction in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s defeat in late 2001 behoove the US not to make the same mistake again in Iraq. The West and the Afghani people are now paying the price for the international community's failure to deliver on the numerous promises of development aid that never materialized.

Now that Operation Iraqi Freedom has ended, US policy-makers assume that the US’s future role must be limited to military training and urging Iraq’s political elite to adopt a more civic approach to politics. This minimalist approach is deeply flawed. Rather than acting like nervous spectators, the Obama administration should adopt a bold international initiative that addresses the many problems that threaten to send Iraq back to the violent conflict of the pre-2008 period. Without such help, Iraq will find it difficult to continue to democratize.

At this critical juncture, the Obama administration’s international reconstruction initiative should include the European Union, our Arab oil-producing allies, and moderate Islamic states such as Indonesia and Malaysia to address Iraq’s myriad problems. A serious shortage of services has created deep resentment among Iraqis. Electricity levels have improved little since 2003. June riots in Basra and the south over the lack of electricity left at least two people dead. Medical care is sporadic and jobs are hard to find. Unemployment is especially high among Iraqi youth, who constitutes 65% of the population under the age of 25. Demand for education is high, but only the private system meets the needs of more affluent Iraqis.

Due to the Iran-Iraq War, the bloody uprising against Saddam Hussein following the 1991 Gulf War, and post-2003 sectarian violence, Iraq has a disproportionately large number of female headed households. Mothers are often forced to send their children to join criminal and even terrorist organizations because otherwise they face starvation. Former Awakening Movement members, who helped the US defeat al-Qaida in Iraq, may be returning to the insurgency because the jobs they were promised haven’t materialized.

This social and economic environment is tailor made for a revival of insurgent groups such as al-Qaida’s front organization, the so-called Islamic State of Iraq. Even if the US can create an efficient Iraqi army and police force, and cajole Iraq’s political elite to form a new government, none of this will matter if the populace cannot find jobs and obtain basic services. Extensive government corruption (Iraq is 175 of 180 countries on Transparency International’s list of most corrupt countries) pours more oil on the fire. As Iraq signs more contracts with foreign oil companies and oil revenues increase, popular resentment will only rise. The disconnect between the lifestyles of Iraq’s political class and the deprivation suffered by much of the populace at large creates the “perfect storm” for renewed violence and instability.

The US already has an effective model in place for helping Iraq address its social reconstruction needs in the form of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Developed in embryo by US forces in Iraq, the PRTs were later formalized by General David Petreaus and former Ambassador Ryan Crocker to provide Iraqis with critical services. Where implemented, the Iraq PRT model has been enormously successful. Rather than following a top-down approach, the PRTs help Iraqis implement projects that they define. The result has not only been successful projects but the creation of strong ties between Americans and Iraqis who feel that they are being listened to and respected by the US.

Instead of reducing its scope as the Obama administration has proposed, the PRT model should be expanded. As part of an international effort, it could be funded in large part by our wealthy oil-producing allies. Saudi Arabia has every interest in a stable and prosperous Iraq so as to limit Iran’s influence there. (And Iraqis have consistently made clear that, while they seek good relations with Iran, they do not want the Islamic Republic to meddle in their internal affairs.) For the Arab Gulf monarchies that have large restive Shiite populations, good ties with Iraq, a majority Shiite country, can provide political benefits at home. And investing in social reconstruction can bring enormous future economic dividends to those who help Iraq now once its oil and natural gas industries are modernized and develop.

Rather than nervously biting our nails in the hope that Iraq will become politically stable, the US must be more proactive. A dramatic increase in technical support not only provides jobs for Americans but wins the gratitude of Iraqis, especially if they, not the US, continue to set the development agenda. If situated within an international effort, and funded by our allies, providing this technical support will not tax our overstretched budget. Failure is not an option in Iraq, especially with Iran, a would-be nuclear power, on its border. Iraq, like Afghanistan, is a long-term project and one that requires creativity to achieve success. If the US really takes democracy seriously in Iraq, it should heed the Arab proverb, “patience is the key to happiness.”

In reporting on Iraq, US newspapers continue to suffer from "group think."

In a recent communication, a British official, with intimate knowledge of Iraq, referred to those who refuse to see any progress towards democratization in the country as suffering from "group think." By this he meant that there are a large group of Westerners, in the media, academia and elsewhere, who refuse to admit that Iraq is moving forward politically. Indeed, there are those in the West who continue to view Iraq as merely a patchwork of ethnic and confessional groups who will never come together in a nation-state with a national purpose. Yet the recent elections point to the reassertion of an Iraqi nationalism that, while suppressed during the 1990s and between 2003 and 2007, has now reemerged as the dominant form of political culture.
The problem of "group think" is clearly evident in a number of articles published by the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, and other US newspapers following the recent Iraqi elections. Under the byline, "Allawi's Victory in Iraq Sets up Period of Uncertainty," and "Court Decision before Election May Complicate Results," published on March 26 and 27, 2010 respectively, the New York Times, for example, focused almost entirely what might go wrong with Iraq now that elected officials, particularly Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, and former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, seek to form a new government.
In a more nuanced commentary, NY Times reporter Thom Shanker pointed out that there was an excellent turnout at 5000 polling places throughout the country and that Iraqi voters were not intimidated by efforts to prevent them from casting their votes. Thus it is important to note that there are notable exceptions to the reporting on the elections. But the more fundamental questions still remains. What is the dominant Western narrative of the elections and why does it focus almost exclusively on negative developments, whether actual or potential?
First, the elections are alleged to have been sectarian in nature. This is true to a certain extent. Nevertheless, no reporter seems to be able to explain how a Shiite candidate, Ayad Allawi, was able to generate large numbers of votes in majority populated Sunni Arab areas of Iraq. Even more to the point, Sunni Arabs only constitute 15-20% of the Iraqi population. Statistically, it would have been impossible for Allawi to have won a plurality of votes without considerable votes from Iraq's Shiite community. Indeed, the Iraqiya List's strong showing in Kirkuk suggests that it also drew upon Kurds, the majority population in the city, and Turkmens who comprise a significant percentage of its population as well.
Second, American reporters suggest a deadlock, now that neither Maliki nor Allawi achieved a decisive victory in the elections. While it is true that there will be a period of uncertainty as politicians try to position themselves to form the next government, this period will entail an enormous amount of negotiating and "horse trading," to use an American colloquialism. Few American reporters have commented on the manner in which the democratic process in Iraq has worked to undermine sectarian identities by forcing politicians from different ethnic and confessional groups, and from different sections of the country, to interact with one another and to develop negotiating skills. While familiarity often breeds contempt, it can also promote positive relationships, which has been the result in many instances in Iraq.
In that regard, the Iraqi parliament, which is usually seen as a dysfunctional institution, has worked to promote interactions among Iraq's constituent ethnic and confessional groups in a way that has never been possible since the modern Iraqi state was founded in 1921. Even during the parliament that existed under the Hashimite monarchy (1921-1958), access to seats was limited by the dominant political elites of the time. However, in the current parliament, a Sunni Arab Speaker, Ayad al-Samarra'i, has been very effective in forging coalitions to pass legislation and offset sectarian tensions in the chamber, thereby winning him much personal respect. Perhaps equally important, the Speaker has been able to demonstrate to all groups, both inside and outside the parliament, that negotiation can be a more effective way to achieve one's political ends than violence.
Continuing the parallel with the parliaments that existed under the Hashimite monarchy that was overthrown in 1958, current Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki doe not have the power that the king and his agents had prior to 1958 to summarily dismiss the parliament if they did not find it to their liking. While Maliki can complain, as he has done, about the alleged unfairness of the recent vote, he cannot overturn the results.
Third, few reporters emphasize what all observes have noted, namely that the elections were fair and transparent. The Iraqi High Electoral Commission (IHEC), the UN Special Representative, Ad Melkert, the Arab League's envoy, Muhammad Shalgham Al-Khamlishi, and US officials, all have underscored that the elections were characterized by only minor irregularities. The overall turnout of 62.4% which reached a high of over 70% in some Kurdish areas, was all the more impressive given the attempts of Islamist radicals and other insurgents to disrupt the elections through bombings and threats. Most important of all, these were elections in which no one knew the outcome, a true sign of a democratic elections.
Fourth, it is clear that the Iraqi public had a salutary impact on the elections in making clear that they want elected officials who can provide security and services, not empty rhetoric falsely clothed in the garb of "religion." Even the highly sectarian Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (ISCI) was forced not only to field female candidates (as required by the constitution), but offered posters in which women were unveiled and wearing makeup. While this observation is not terribly significant at one level, at another it indicates that the electoral preferences of the voting public are quite mature and that voters are no longer willing to support sectarian political parties. Indeed, one informal poll conducted prior to the elections indicated that only 3% of the likely voters polled said they were going to vote for candidates along sectarian lines.
Finally, the elections are remarkable when one considers the negative impact of Bush administration foreign policy between 2003 and 2007. The looting that US forces permitted in Baghdad in April 2003 destroyed much of Iraq's governmental infrastructure. The dissolving of the Iraqi conscript army in May 2003,the dismissal of the national police, and the firing of public sector workers, all provided thousands of men for Iraq's insurgency and sectarian militias. The elimination of agricultural subsidies in August 2003, which forced many farmers off the land as they were unable to compete with Iranian and Syrian agricultural imports, provided yet more men for the insurgency. And the Bush administration's establishment of the first ever government along explicitly ethnoconfessional lines, the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), that ruled Iraq from July 2003 until June 2004, sent a message to all Iraq's political actors and groups that sectarian politics were the new order of the day.
Few Western analysts, whether in the media, in public policy circles, in think tanks or in academia have made the effort to question the prevailing "group think" about Iraq. This creates a situation where those who seek to provide assistance to Iraq are seen as "naive" and on a "fools errand." The reasoning then becomes the following: Why should governments or foundations fund and politically support NGOs that seek to assist Iraq when these organizations fail to understand that Iraq will never be able to move forward towards developing a strong civil society and a democratic polity. In other words, the excessive emphasis on the negative in much reporting and analysis of Iraqi politics serves to promote a self-fulfilling prophecy, namely that Iraq will never transcend sectarianism.
The stakes in Iraq are too high to allow defective analysis in the West to dominate the global discourse on Iraq. If Iraq can establish a stable and multiethnic democracy, then such progress will provide a model that the citizens of neighboring countries will want to emulate as well. Analysts should think more carefully when they write about Iraq about the potential consequences of their writing for its future well being.

In Iraq, it's the economy (and autocracy) stupid!

Photo of supporter of Change (Gorran)
List in streets of Sulaymaniya


Many of us remember the catchy phrase that James Carville coined during Bill Clinton's 1992 run for the US presidency: "It's the economy stupid!" As Clinton's main political adviser, Carville urged Clinton to focus on that which most concerned voters at the time, the terrible state of the US economy.
As analysts continue to focus on Iraq's ethnic divisions, they consistently fail to ask the very simple but important question: why do such divisions exist? Assuming that none of us believe in sociobiology, namely that Arabs and Kurds (and other Iraqi ethnic groups) emerge from the womb disliking or even hating each other, the core question of what drives ethnic divisions in Iraq needs to be raised. Unfortunately, it rarely is, in part because analysts continue to concentrate on elites, to the detriment of studying public opinion and non-elite political parties and civil society organizations.
The recent Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) Assembly Elections, that were held on July 25th, demonstrated that most Kurds are less worried about Iraq's Arabs to the south than the lack of jobs in Iraq's 3 northern Kurdish provinces and the pervasive corruption and autocracy that characterizes the two parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), that have ruled the semi-autonomous KRG since the US imposed a "No-Fly Zone" in 1991.
Because analysts largely ignore the political economy of Iraqi Kurdistan (and that of the south as well), they have little to say about the underlying dynamics of Kurdish politics. While it is true that most members of the Change (Gorran) List, that did very well in the July 25 elections, are former PUK members, including its leader Nawshiran Mustafa, that does not explain why they won 50% (and possible more) of the vote in the city of Sulaymaniya. Overall the Change List won 25% of the KRG Assembly Election votes, and the Reform and Services List - a coalition of Islamist parties and the Kurdish Socialist Party - won about 10%. Winning 35% of the vote against the KRG, which has had a lock on politics in Iraqi Kurdistan, and which used its considerable reserves of oil wealth to try and swing the election its way, is highly impressive. Perhaps the results are even more impressive if reports that candidates who joined the Change List and held government posts, e,g, deanships and professorships in Kurdish universities (see niqash.org), were dismissed from their positions are in fact true.
All interviews indicate that Kurds are fed up with the corruption and authoritarian rule of the KRG, presided over by president and KDP leader, Masoud Barzani. Despite the fact that Masoud Barzani's father, Mullah Mustafa (d. 1975), still holds almost mythic status among older Kurds for his efforts to achieve an independent Kurdish state in the late 1940s and after, younger Kurds are more concerned with jobs and the ability to express themselves than with a history that none of them experienced. Certainly, the sentiments of voters prior to and after the elections underscore the desire for a more transparent government and using the oil wealth in KRG coffers for the Kurdish populace and not just the KDP-PUK elite.
Indeed, this was what I discovered when I visited the KRG. Few Kurds were concerned with Arab-Kurdish relations. In my research in the north I discovered that many young Arabs who have moved with their families to the north, as a result of sectarian violence in the south, have made friendships with young Kurds without any problems. A delegation of Iraqi youth that recently visited the US was comprised of many young Kurds who also indicated that they had no difficulty forming friendships with Arabs their own age when I spoke with them. While Kurdish-Arab relations do not seem high on the agenda of most Kurds, virtually all complained about corruption and lack of jobs. Indeed, I found many professionals, including lawyers and engineers, who were forced to take second jobs to support their families. With the proceeds from oil contracts known to be divided 3 ways, between the KRG, foreign investors and "other," Kurds completely understand the extent to which oil wealth is taken from the public purse for illegitimate ends. On the political side, Kurds implored me not to return to the US and speak of "Kurdish democracy," since they argued that civil society organizations require a government permit and that KRG officials are constantly looking over the shoulders of all members of such organizations to monitor their activities.
What will be the result of the Assembly Elections? First, with Change and Reform and Services lists having members in the KRG Assembly, the traditional KDP-PUK leadership will find it much more difficult to manipulate ethnic divisions, namely pitting Kurds against Arabs. Rather than being able shifting the focus from autocracy and corruption in the KRG to such issues as the contested city of Kirkuk and disputed areas along the KRG-southern border,the KRG leadership will be forced instead to confront, in the regional parliament, allegations of corruption and autocratic rule. President Masoud Barzani's ability to act as a "sectarian entrepreneur" will be dramatically diminished as the KRG will need to address, for the first time, widespread criticism coming from its own populace. This form of "checks and balances" is an incredibly healthy development in Kurdish politics.
What do the KRG Regional Assembly Elections imply for the future of Iraqi politics? If the traditional Kurdish leadership fails to coopt or suppress the new Change and Reform and Services lists, then there may be a greater opening for Kurdish-Arab cooperation in Iraq. In the January 30, 2009 Legislative Assembly Elections in the Arab south of Iraq, results paralleled much of what just occurred in the Kurdish north. Large numbers of Arab Iraqis voted against sectarian parties and cast their votes instead for parties that promised to deliver services and transparent governance. Provincial legislatures in the south likewise will provide critical "checks and balances" against Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government in Baghdad.
Because both these regional elections mirror what public opinion in Iraq has shown for some time, i.e., the desire for democratic governance (64% of Iraqis indicated that democracy is the best form of government in a March 2009 ABC/BBC/NHK poll), forward looking Iraqi political leaders and parties should move to develop cross-regional coalitions that bring Kurds and Arabs together who seek to rid both the KRG and the central government in Baghdad of the massive corruption that characterizes them both. Although he is still tied to the PUK, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, Barham Saleh, is an ideal interlocutor for developing this type of political coalition.
When the Iraqi Parliament recently investigated the Iraqi Minister of Trade (see my post, "During Saddam's time, we could only dream of seeing something like this"), he was forced to resign as a result of parliamentary hearings,and will be tried for misusing public funds. Using elected legislatures - obviously a core component of any functioning democracy - broad based coalitions can work together to bring better governance to Iraq and insure that its oil wealth is directed at the people's needs rather than go into the coffers of Kurdish and Arab elites. When studying Arab and Kurdish politics in Iraq, analysts would do well to remember James Carville's admonition, "It's the Economy Stupid!," to which we should add, "It's autocracy as well!."

Is Iraq Turning the Corner on Sectarian Politics?

One of the questions raised by the withdrawal of US troops from Iraqi cities is whether Iraq has moved away from the sectarian violence that characterized the country at its high point between 2005 and 2007. Answers to the question are critical if Iraq is to make progress in achieving political stability, a prerequisite for engaging in a serious process of narrow reconciliation.
In a short article, “Reflections on Religion and Politics in Post-Bacthist Iraq,” (http://fas-polisci.rutgers,edu), I argued for a distinction between ethnic hostility and ethnic violence. All ethnically divided countries experince varying degress of ethnic tensions. But that deos not mean such tensions explode into violence.
An article in the June 25th edition of al-Hayat, “Khalid 'Atiya to al-Hayat: The Investigations are Just Electioneering Propaganda Whose Object is Ministers of a Particular Sect,” includes an interview with the First Deputy Speaker of the Iraqi Parliament, Khalid 'Atiya. The interview underscores that sectarian tensions still influence the work of Parliament Khalid 'Atiya complains that the efforts to summon cabinet ministers to appear before parliament to answer to changes of corruption and mismanagement in their ministries is politically motivated. With the Sunni Arab speaker of the Parliament a well-known for of Prime Minster Nuri al-Maliki, it is understandable that Deputy Speaker ‘Atiya might view these procedures as anti-Shi’a and hence sectarian in nature. The problem with such an interpretation is that the head of Parliament’s Anti-Corruption Committee is a Shi'i himself and a member of the al-Fadila Party whose power base is in the southern port city of Basra.
What is much more significant about this article is cAtiya’s focus on the need to reconstitute the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) which was the coalition of Shi'i political parties that dominated the December 2005 parliamentary elections. Since that time, the Sadrist Trend (Mahdi Army) and Fadila Party have left the Alliance and relations between the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and Maliki’s Da'wa Party have become strained. at this points to first and foremost is that the Shi'i community in Iraq is politically diverse. More importantly, it points to the temporary nature of the Shi'i coalition which reflected more the fear of a Ba'thist effort to regain power in 2005 and the need for solidarity in light of the fact that the Shi'a had never controlled the reigns of government before. This the turn to clerical support and the solidarity of the major Shi'i parties was more a response to uncertainty than ideological unity.
Even more interesting in the interview with Khalid 'Atiya was his argument that a reconstituted UIA would need to reflect the interests of the Shi'i community but would also have to open its doors to parties dominated by other ethnic groups. He specifically mentioned Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although these comments may be seen as an attempt to humor the reporter conducting the interview and to appeal to al-Hayat’s readership, the increasing need for Iraqi politicians to appeal to a large Iraqi national identity as opposed to a more narrow ethnoconfessional appeal points to the increasing difficulties sectarian force face in Iraq. The rejection of sectarianism was clear in the January 2009 Provincial Council elections, which Khalid 'Atiya blames in part for promoting the more assertive nature of the Parliament.
Despite the cynicism that may underlie Deputy Speaker 'Atiya’s comments, the symbolism of his position is important. It sends a message to political actors and voters alike that the emphasis in political mobilization should be on Iraqiness, and not on one’s ethnoconfessional background. The question then becomes why does Khalid c
'Atiya feel the need to move beyond sectarian appeals to a narrow Shi’i political base?
The answer lies both in Iraqi public opinion which, having seen the violence and corruption that sectarian political parties bring to the political process, reject such Politics. It also reflects the impact of a nascent democracy in Iraq. While next year’s parliamentary elections may yield some very problematic outcomes, such as giving Nuri al-Maliki a mandate to impose an increasingly authoritarian rule on Iraq, Khalid 'Atiya and all the other deputies in parliament have to worry about their political longevity. As the Provincial legislative elections demonstrated, voters often “throw the rascals out.” In a democracy, broad based appeals that seek to form working coalitions trump narrow based appeals that reduces the number of potential supporters among the electorate.
It is small steps, such as those indicated in the interview with First deputy Speaker Khalid 'Atiya that may point to a more stable, tolerant and democratic Iraq

"During Saddam's time, we could only dream of seeing something like this"

The quote above by a young Iraqi refers to the televised questioning of Iraqi Trade Minister, Abd al-Falah al-Sudany, in the Iraqi Parliament this past Saturday and Sunday, on charges of corruption. This event represents by any standard an important step forward in promoting democracy in Iraq. Having the questioning televised throughout the country not only allowed millions of Iraqis to see their government in action, but points to the power of the media in promoting democracy in post-2003 Iraq.

Transparency International has labeled Iraq as one of the most corrupt states in the world, ranking it 178 of 180 on its country list. Iraqis have long been fed up with government ministers who view their ministries' budgets as extensions of their own private purse. Resentment and anger at government corruption has been intensified by the lack of state services available to the Iraqi citizenry, such as electricity, health care, police protection, education, and garbage removal.

Thus to make Minister of Trade al-Sudany submit to hours of televised questioning by the Iraqi Parliament's Integrity Committee Chair, Sabah al-Sa'idi, a member of the Fadila Party, whose power base is in the southern port city of Basra, was eye opening and exhilarating for many Iraqis. Parliament member, Bassam Sharif, also a member of Fadila, indicated to reporters that 100 representatives had signed a no confidence vote in the Trade Minister, far more than the 50 required for such a vote. A vote on this measure in Parliament is expected next Sunday.

The main charge against the Trade Minister, who is a member of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's ruling al-Da'wa (Islamic Call) Party, was his taking of millions of dollars from the national food ration program upon which many Iraqi depend for sustenance. Minister al-Sudany also had to answer to charges that two of his brothers received a $40 kickback for each ton of sugar that was distributed by the Trade Ministry.

Perhaps most ominous for the system of institutionalized corruption that has developed since 2003 is the Parliament's request that the ministers of oil, electricity and transportation also appear for questioning. Thus a message has been sent that there are limits to corrupt behavior on the part of government officials.

What this action shows is the benefits of a system of governance built on checks and balances. The newly assertive Parliament, keen to be reelected during the next parliamentary elections that will take place sometime between December 2009 and February 2010, needs to demonstrate to the Iraqi public that its members are serving its needs. Even if the motivations behind the parliamentary hearings are cynical, the fact that they are addressing one of the most important problems facing Iraq, namely corruption, indicates the benefits of democracy.

These actions in the Iraqi Parliament demonstrate the power of the media. Few analysts in the West have focused on the vigorous Iraqi press and communications media that has developed since 2003. Myriad Iraqi blogs have also disseminated enormous amounts of information to the Iraqi public. Clearly, the distribution of information is key to a well functioning democracy.

And let's not forget the "neighbohood effects" of the televised questioning of the Iraqi Trade Minister. al-Jazeera and other Arabic television channels will certainly broadcast them elsewhere in the Arab world. As with the January 2009 Provincial Legislature elections, seeing Iraqis engage in democratic practices will no doubt have a highly subversive impact on the authoritarian Arab states that surround Iraq.

The televised hearing also point to the shortcomings of viewing Iraq only through an ethnic and confessional lens (see my posting "10 Conceptual Sins in the Study of Middle East Politics"). Corruption has little to do with ethnic or religious differences. Both Minister al-Sudany and Integrity Committee Chief al-Sa'idi are Shi'is. Rather the issue of corruption calls upon everyone concerned with Iraq's development to pay more attention to political economy. No ethnic group or religion has a monopoly on virtue. Corruption in political office knows no ethnic or religious bounds. In many ways, the continued obsession in the West with viewing Iraq through an "ethnoconfessional" lens draws attention away from Iraq's real problems.

Nevertheless, the fact that a sitting minister was grilled by Parliament on charges of corruption for the first time in the political history of modern Iraq, a history that extends back to the state's founding in 1921, represents a major step forward in the process of democratization in Iraq. I suspect it will not be the last.

N.B.: In this posting, I benefited greatly from, "Iraqis react to public grilling of government minister: Some Iraqis said they saw the televised questioning of Trade Minister Abdul Falah al Sudany as the birth of a real democracy," by Jack Dolan, Sahar Issa and Laith Hammoudi, Miami Herald, May 20, 2009

Understanding Iraq Through the Taxi Cab

"It has often been said, on those rare occasions when the brutal climate eased up a bit, that a beautiful day is wasted on Iraq." With these words, New York Times correspondent Rod Nordland begins his article, "Iraq's False Spring," on the front page of the Sunday New York Times, "Week in Review" section, for April 26 ("Iraq's False Spring").

A photograph of a young Iraqi watering beautiful flowers on a large field in a Baghdad park is set above the article. But the contrast between the photograph, on the one hand, and the pink coloring of the words "False" in the title, and the general negativity of much of the article is striking. Obviously the author and the editors at the Times sought to contrast the "illusion" of progress in Iraq as seen through the blossoming of beautiful flowers, with the "reality" of the situation on the ground as described by correspondent Nordland.

But the more important question is how does Mr. Nordland arrive at the negative assessments of Iraq that question whether any of the changes, such as the decline in violence, will in fact be durable? Clearly, the taxicab is one of his main sources in arriving at his assessments. Thus we learn that Mr. Norland has returned to Iraq after "an absence of six months." Riding in his taxicab from Baghdad International Airport elicits this comment: "Driving along the airport highway once was a trembling quarter-hour on a road that defied taming. Now it’s getting landscaping. Neighborhoods like Jihad alongside it once treated the highway like a carnival duck shoot. Now they’re pacified behind anti-sniper walls painted in bold diagonal stripes: yellow, orange, white, pale blue, purple, pink and green."

Other scenes from the taxicab window inform us that the Council of Ministers' compound has murals that offer scenes that "range from Sumerian through Greco-Roman to abstract Arabic." Correspondent Nordland also points to the famous water fountain by Iraqi sculptor and artist, Khalid al-Rahhal (b. 1926) that sits in front of the Rashid Hotel, and the efforts to revive al-Zawra Park, "once best known for its sorry zoo and its suicide bomb craters," but now hosting the "first Baghdad Flower Show." Mr. Norland goes on, "No doubt there are many better flower shows, but this one stunned with its incongruity. Flowers were almost as rare as beautiful days before, and as wasted on Iraq."

So what is the reader of the April 26 Sunday Times to take away from Rod Norland's article? Where are his references to some of the reasons violence has declined in Iraq and now Iraqis can pay more attention to beautifying Baghdad and other areas of the country, including organizing flower shows? The reader wouldn't have a clue because like much of the reporting on Iraq since 2003, change is never explained, usually because journalists haven't done the hard work of learning the intricacies of Iraqi society.

Where, for example, is his discussion of the Iraqi Peace Network (IPN), an official NGO with 60 chapters that developed out of the Nahwa al-Salaam ("Towards Peace") project. The IPN includes young and old, tribesmen farmers and urban professionals, men and women and secular and religious Iraqis, i.e., Iraqi from all walks of life? Why is there no emphasis on the Iraqi business sector? The Iraqi Chamber of Commerce and Industry (IACCI) has been involved in developing middle level commercial and industrial projects since the fall of Saddam Husayn's regime, even during the worst of the sectarian based violence from 2004 until 2007. These projects have often brought together businessmen from different sects, e.g., Kurds and Arabs.

Nor can Mr. Nordland explain why Sunni and Shiite Arab youth still intermarry or why many youth paint murals depicting peace on blast walls in Baghdad and elsewhere as a message that they reject sectarianism. The public opinion poles that show a trend towards a unitary Iraqi state (not one divided along ethnic lines, and a rejection of organizing politics along sectarian lines are also not discussed. The January 31, 2009 Provincial Elections that occurred with no reports of violence and that were considered very fair according to Iraqi and foreign observers likewise does not appear to be an appropriate topic.

Instead Mr. Nordland has focused on such topics as the interest of wealthy Iraqis in Hummer automobiles, Iraqis Snap Up Hummers as Icons of Power ("Iraqis Snap Up Hummers as Icons of Power"; the return of vice to Baghdad ("Secure Enough to Sin, Baghdad Revisits Old Ways"); and attacks on the Baghdad gay community, ("Iraq’s Newly Open Gays Face Scorn and Murder"). These articles represent an attempt to discuss daily life in Iraq, as opposed to Iraqi politics, such as US-Iraqi relations, the security situation and the problems of integrating the Sons of Iraq/Awakening Movement into the army, police and government bureaucracy. While these "human interest" stories, such as violence against gays, are very important, why can't Mr. Nordland find time to focus on positive developments in Iraq? Is there any society on the planet where everything is going in a negative direction, with no positive developments?

When I was a graduate students many years ago at the University of Chicago, I drove a taxicab. Like my fellow cab drivers, I would expound on almost any topic my passenger raised. However, I never told my fares that the best way to understand Chicago politics and society was to ride around the city in a taxi cab. American reporters need to get "out of the taxi cab" as it were, focus less on interviewing the power elite in Iraq and elsewhere in non-Western countries, and put in the time and effort to really get to know they societies on which they are reporting. They owe that to both their Western readers and the societies, such as Iraq, that they describe and analyze on a daily basis.

Arabic Translation of "10 Conceptual Sins" in Analyzing Middle East Politics

كتابة: الدكتور اريك دافيس

استاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة رتجرز

ومدير برنامج الدراسات العليا

والمدير السابق لمركز دراسات الشرق الاوسط

عشرة أخطاء جسيمة ومبدئية في تحليل سياسة الشرق الأوسط

الخطاء ألأول: إن عدداً كبيراً وللأسف من الذين يحللون سياسة الشرق ألأوسط من المحللين السياسيين أو الصحافيين أو الاختصاصين الاكدميين لا يتعاطون مع التاريخ بجدية وذلك لأنهم يفشلون في وضع سياسة الشرق الأوسط في ألإطار التاريخي ولن يكونوا موضوعيين إلا إذا كان لهم بعد نظر وعالجوا التحولات السياسية في المنطقة بشكل سليم.

بعض المحللين لاحظوا على سبيل المثال أن العراقيين لم يكونوا متحمسين عندما أسقطت أميركا نظام صدام حسين في نيسان 2003 فهذا لا يدل على أن العراقيين لم يكونوا ممتنين وشاكرين بل إن الأكثرية هللت لرؤية اندحار نظام صدام.

إن بعض العراقيين الذين يملكون الحس والوعي التاريخي يعرفون أن الولايات المتحدة ساعدت صدام حسين في الحرب الإيرانية العراقية ويذكر العراقيون جيدا أنه عندما دعاهم الرئيس جورج بوش الأب إلى الانتفاض ضد صدام حسين سنة 1990 أخذوا بكلامه وأطاعوه. في مطلق الأحوال ليس فقط إن الولايات المتحدة لم تتدخّل لتساعد الانتفاضة في شباط 1991 بل سمحت لطائرات الهليكوبتر المقاتلة دخول منطقة الحظر وضرب المقاومة.

أما عندما علّق "دونلد رامسفيلد" على عمليات النهب والسرقات التي حصلت في بغداد في شهر نيسان 2003 فقد صرّح أنها أتت نتيجة لسعر الحرية المستوجب على العراقيين دفعه. علماً أن وزارات الدولة نهبت بالكامل وكذلك المتحف الوطني فقد خسر معظم محتوياته التي لا تقدّر بثمن. ولذلك فقد العراقيون الثقة بالانضمام إلى قوات إدارة بوش والتي وعدتهم بنقل الديمقراطية إلى العراق.

ألخطأ إذاً يتعلق مباشرة بفكرة "الشرق إلاوسط ألازلي" أي بما أن الشرق الاوسط لن يتغير مطلقاً فلا ضرورة لفهم تاريخه الحديث او القديم. فكرة الغرب المسبقة إذاً عن الشرق الاوسط ليست بالشئ الجديد. (بالطبع هناك أفكار مسبقة للشرق عن الغرب).

من هذه الافكار المسبقة الخاطئة ان الاسلام هو ديانة الصحراء اليابسة التي لا تتغّير ولا مجال مطلقا للفصل بين الدين والدولة, وان الشرق الاوسط هو بؤرة للارهاب.

في مجال دراستي حالياً حول موضوع "الشرق الاوسط في السياسة الامريكية" أتناول التأثيرلت السلبية في دراسات المحللين والعلمانيين والمدنيين عامة في الولايات المتحدة, واعتقادهم الخاطئ إن الشرق الاوسط عاص عن التغيير.إذ أنه إذا كان هذا التحليل صحيحاً فلا يكون هناك اي أمل في إزالة او حل أي عقبة لمشاكل المنطقة. على كل من يريد معالجة سياسة الشرق الاوسط إذاً الابتعاد عن هذه الافتراضات السيئة.

ألخطاء الثاني: التشديد المفرط على العرق والهوية المذهبية. إن العديد من المحللين السياسيين في الشرق الاوسط يتجاهلون هذا التشديد ولا يرونه إلا من منظار مبدئي ضيق. فهم يركزون على الدين والعرق ويتناسون عوامل كثيرة اخرى. وهذا ما يوءدي إلى إبعاد البحث عن امور وعوامل مهمة تؤثّر على السياسة والمجتمع الشرق أوسطي. وتعطي فكرة ان الشرق الاوسط خصوصاً الدول الاسلامية وكأنها ملتزمة بهوية خاصة وهي الاسلام وبالتالي هويات ملحقة بها كالعرق والقبيلة.

هذا هو الاعتقاد السائد في الاعلام, ويعطي إنطباعاً ان المسلمين في الشرق الاوسط هم ليسوا وطنيين ولا هوية لهم, ونتيجة ذلك انهم يحتاجون الى حكم سلطوي للابقاء على كل الفئات المصطنعة. إن هذا النوع من التصوّر يعطي فكرة سلبية خاطئة عن الشرق الاوسط وكأنه انظمة طائفية وعرقية تسيطر على الوضع السياسي والاجتماعي. واذا كان الوضع كذلك فالذين من جنسيات واديان مختلفة لا يمكنهم العيش معاً وبسلام. ألنتيجة الحتمية إذاً الشرق الاوسط مكان خطير والصراع فيه لا مفر دائم.

هذا الموضوع هو ايضاً دائم الحضور في الاعلام ففي شهر كانون الثاني سنة 2009 كان البارز في الصحافة "الانشقاقات الطائفية والثوار يهددون بعدم إمكانية إجراء إنتخابات عادلة في مقاطعة ديالي العراقية" وأُبلغنا أنّ الصراع الطائفي الذي طال امده في ديالي اكثر من ايّ مقاطعة أخرى في العراق حيث صُورت في الاعلام كانها صورة مصغرة عن وضع العراق ككل. إن السنة و الشيعة والاكراد والعرب فلاحين ومتعلمين يعيشون بشراكة وأمان, إذاً ما تتناقله الصحافة من صراع وخلافات هو صورة مشوهة عن الوضع الحقيقي. تعتيم الصحافة عن الوضع المتحسن والسليم وان الاحزاب تحصل على إيرادات ووظائف ومساعدات وعقود عمل تحفزها إلى الدخول في كوادر الوطن. فالوضع في ديالي ليس سببه عدم وجود الوظائف والخدمات و هذا كله مؤمن إنما التعتيم عليه يزيد الشرخ بين المناهضين للامركة والمؤيدين للكائفية والمذهبية.

يبقى أنّ للقارئ الحكم ومعرفة الاسباب الحقيقية للعنف. ولذلك نرى أنّ المجتمعات المقسمة طائفياً ومذهبياً وعرقياً تولد بعض العنف بينما أخرى تبقى سليمة.

واذا كان العراقيون يميلون ألى العنف بسبب الخلافات المذهبية فكيف نفسّر وضعية نسبة 25% من الزواجات المختلطة بين هذه الطوائف؟

الاعتقاد أنّ النظام الطائفي يوّلد الارهاب هو خاطئ والاّ تكون النتيجة إنّ التغيير في العراق والبلاد الاسلامية في الشرق الاوسط غير ممكن.

ألخطاء الثالث: فكرة التفكير الجماعي.

عندما يأتي أحد المحللين السياسيين من العراق او مصر او ايران او اي بلد إسلامي اخر في الشرق الاوسط إلى الولايات المتحدة الامريكية ويتعرف او يحلل دين ولون وعرق إنساناً امريكياً فهل يمكنه معرفة ايديولوجيته واعتقاده السياسي؟ الوضع ليس مختلفاً بالنسبة لمحللي سياسة الشرق الاوسط, فالذين يبنون تحليلاتهم على الوضع اجتماعي لاحد الزعماء السياسيين, يستخلصون مسبقاً ان تصرفاته يجب ان تكون مطابقة لتصرفات كل أبناء عرقه ودينه وإنتمائه الاسري والقبلي. ما يعرضه هذا الانموذج كما في كتاب "الفكر العربي" يتناسى أنّ الفروقات العرقية والقبلية تخف بالخبرة الحياتية والعمر والثقافة والمهنة ومنطقة السلالة وغيرها وتتجه نحو إنتماء سياسي ايديولوجي. فلا يعقل ان يقاس جميع الناس بمقياس واحد. ولا يجوز ان يكون التفكير الامريكي هكذا.

خلال محاضرة للكاتب النيويوركي سيمور هرش في جامعة رتجرز في شهر تشرين الاول سنة 2005 اشار الى ان الاكراد هم "محتلو ارض" و العرب السنة هم "ارهابيون" والشيعة العرب هم"مسلمون مذهبيون متزمتون" واكّد ان لا شيء جيّد حصل من سقوط نظام صدام حسين. وجّه هرش إتهاماته إلى العراقيين الذين وقفوا الى جانب ادارة جورج بوش متجاهلاً التضحيات التي قام بها العديد من العراقيين الديموقراطيين.

الخطاء الرابع: التركيز على النخبة.

واضح أن النخبة السياسية هي في المركز الرئيسي في سياسة كل بلد. ولكن كما رأينا في انتخابات باراك اوباما, ان التحركات الشعبية لعبت دوراً هاماً في السياسة.

الثورة الامركية والفرنسية, وثورة اللاعنف التي قام بها غاندي ضد الاحتلال في الهند, واسقاط شاه ايران, وانهاء خالة التمييز العنصري في جنوب افريقيا, وتطورات سياسية اخرى كثيرة لم تكن لتحصل لولا التحرك والدعم الشعبي.

خلال الهجوم الاسرائيلي الاخير على غزة الصحافة العالمية لم تعطِ صورة حقيقية عن الاضربات في داخل اسرائيل نفسها والمناهضة للحكومة. حيث نلاحظ الاخفاق في تغطية التحركات الشعبية وإخفاء دورها عن سياسة المنطقة.

الرأي العام الذي غالباً ما يكون يتناقض مع تصرفات النخبة هو في العادة مستثنى من التحليل. لذلك التركيز فقط على النخبة يؤدي الى مفهوم متناقض لسياسة الشرق الاوسط. لأن النخبة تريد أن ترى مفهوم سياسي مختلف للذين يعارضون تصورهم وموقعهم السياسي.

هناك عدة استطلاعات شعبية تبّين أن اسرائيل تحارب الطائفية. 92% من استطلاعات الرأي العراقي اجابو بالنفي لما سؤلوا في اذار سنة2008 على "بي بي سي" هل تعتقد ان فصل الشعب في المناطق المختلطة طائفياً, وان ليس لهم ارتباط وثيق بالطائفة. والدليل على ذلك هو تدني نسبة الحضور الى المساجد.

النخبة التي تستغل الطائفية تعمل على تحريك السياسة لصالح مأربها الشخصية. في حين ان المواطنين يرفضون هذه السياسة لأنها تؤثّر على حياتهم العادية.

الخطاء الخامس: أسطورة التطرف الاسلامي.

ترى الصحافة الغربية ان التطرف الاسلامي إنما هي في صميم الشرق الاوسط إن لم تكن في كل مشاكله. سوف اعرض لاحقاً لدراسة هذا الموضوع مفصلاً اما الآن,

اوأكد ان فكرة التطرف الاسلامي ليست إلا مجرد اسطورة تبدأ باظهار ان كل الذين يدعون التطرف الاسلامي لا يعرفون شيئً عن العقيدة أو القوانين الشرعية. إختبرت هذا الامر عندما كنت في مصر منذ سنوات واجريت بحثاً علمياً عن واقع الاخوان المسلمين وتبين لي ان الاخوان الذين اوقفوا في المحاكم لارتكابهم اعمال ارهابية, كانت ثقافتهم متدينة ومحدودة جداً واجوبتهم للقضاء سطحية للغاية مما يظهر وبوضوح جهلهم التام للعقيدة والشرع, ولم يكن لديهم اي دليل او اثبات يرتكز على معرفة نصوص الدين, كل ما يعرفونه ان اعمالهم جاءت بحسب تعاليم الاسلام.

نكتفي الان باقامة مقارنة بين الاسلاميين المتطرفين وبين اعضاء "كو كلكس كلان" هذه المنظمة التي ارهبت الافارقة الامركيين باسم المسيحية, وهي لا تمت الى الدين المسيحي بصلة لا من قريب ولا من بعيد, والمسيحية ترفضها رفضاً قاطعاً.

بالمقابل الاسلاميون المتطرفون لايستحقون ان يدعوا كذلك لأن لا ثقافة ولا معرفة لهم بالاسلام, إنهم يقررون ثقافتهم بحسب ظروفهم الشخصية, ويصنعون ديانة خاصة بهم لا علاقة لها بالاسلام. حيث يكون لديهم برنامج سياسي مرتبط احياناً بالوضع الاقتصادي ومسيس إسلامياً بما يخدم اهدافهم ومصالحهم.

على سبيل المثال لا الحصر, وبعكس ما تحدده الصحافة الغربية, الجهاد بالنسبة للمسلم الحقيقي هو إجهاد النفس, والصلاة, وعمل الخير, والنهي عن المنكر للوصول إلى الله, وليس بالاعمال العنفية بل باحقاق الحق والدفاع عن حقوق الناس مسلمين وغير مسلمين.

الخطاء السادس: رؤية سياسة الشرق الاوسط بمنظار ثنائي.

إن النظرة الخاطئة هي ان تُرى الاحداث في الشرق الاوسط باللونين الابيض والاسود فقط. من الملاحظ ان اخطاءً كثيرة ارتكبها جيش المهدي في العراق بين سنة 2003و2007 بعدما فقد الكثير من قوته, ولكنه بقي وما زال يقدّم اكثر الخدمات الاجتماعية, فجيش المهدي هو الذي يؤمن العمل, والتأمين الصحي, والتعليم, وتوفير الامن وليس الحكومة المركزية, ما يجعلنا ندرك ضرورة التمييز بين جماعاته المسلحة والتي ارتكبت اعمال مشبوهة كالتطهير العرقي والمجازر و بين الفصائل التي تؤمن الخدمات الاجتماعية وتوفير المساعدات للشعوب الفقيرة المحتاجة.

إن مجلس الشورى الايراني الذي يترأسه اَية الله علي خامنئي والرئيس الايراني محمود احمدي نجاد يكوّن مجموعة من السياسيين الغير مرغوب بهم. عدداً وفيراً من إستطلاعات الرأي العام تثبت ان الارانيين باغلبيتهم يؤيدون الدمقراطية وبشدة خاصة المثقفين من الطبقة الوسطى. وبالفعل في اواخر سنة 1990 نال الاصلاحيون عدداً كبيراً من المقاعد في البرلمان الايراني وفي مجالس البلديات والتي حافظوا عليها لغاية سنة 2004 حين سيطر عليها مجلس الشورى وتضاعفت قوة المحافظين.

انتخاب الرئيس الاصلاحي محمد خاتمي سنة 1997 هو دليل اَخر يظهر ان قسماً كبيراً من المجتمع الايراني يتطلّع للتغيير الديمقراطي والاصلاح.

مرة اخرى ان النظر إلى ايران من منظار محور الشر كما صوّرها الرئيس السابق جورج بوش في خطابه في كانون الثاني سنة 2002 والموجه للامة يدل على فكر مزدوج ما يعطّل فهم المجتمع وامكانية تغيير إيجابي.

الخطاء السابع: عدم فهم تاريخ, ولغة, وثقافة المنطقة.

سنة 1961 أصدر "ديك غرغوري" الكوميدي والناشط الكوميدي المعروف البومه الشهير"ديك غرغوري المعيوش بالابيض والاسود" معتمداً على إنجازه في احد نوادي شيكاغو. فذكر عبارته الشهيرة قائلاً: "أليس من المضحك ان يكرهنا غربتشيف نفسه وليس مترجمه"؟ فكيف يمكن للصحافيين والمحللين الاكادميين الذين يتناولون سياسة الشرق الاوسط ان يقدموا معلموات صحيحة للغرب وهم لا يعرفون اللغة, ولا التاريخ, ولا ثقافة المنطقة.

في مقالة للنيويورك تايمز نهار الاحد تاريخ 25 كانون الثاني 2009 عنوانها "ثورة الفيس بوك" لسمنتا شابيرو تعرض كيف ان الفيس بوك في الانترنت يحفّز الشباب سياسياً لانتقاد الحكومة وخداعها في موضوع المراقبة وتأثيرها في عملها ضد حركات المعارضة ومنها الاخوان المسلمين. والكاتبة تعتمد على معلومات قدمها لها احد المصريين وهي لا تعرف اللغة العربية, وقد اعتمدت على مترجم للتخاطب مع المصريين الذين يعارضون حكم الرئيس مبارك. لا ندري كيف يمكنها الاعتماد على صدقية المترجمين للحصول على معلومات صحيحة؟ هل هي فعلاً حصلت على معلومات موثوق بها؟ أو ان هذه المعلومات هي وجهة نظر المترجم والمخبر؟.

أنا لا اقترح على الذين لا يعرفون لغة البلاد ان ينكفئوا عن نقل الاخبار والاوضاع السياسية. فأريك رولو مثلاً صحافي متمرّس عاش في منطقة الشرق الاوسط اكثر من ثلاثين سنة مراسلاً لمجلة اللومند, وهو يتكلم اللغة العربية وبطلاقة. هل من المعقول ان نعيّن رئيس مكتب تحرير يقيم في واشنطن دي سي ليكون مراسلاً لمجلة إيرانية اساسية او لبلاد عربية او تركيا او إسرائيل إذا لم يكن يتكلم اللغة الانكليزية؟

السؤال الذي يطرح نفسه هو لماذا مجلة او صحيفة على مستوىً رفيع من الاهمية لا تحاول تعيين مراسلين يتكلمون وبطلاقة لغة البلد مثل جان بارنز ونيل مكفاركوار في النيويرك تايمز. وصحيفة واشنطن بوسط التي تستخدم الصحافي المخضرم أنطوني شديد. هؤلاء فقط لاعطاء بعض الامثلة.

الخطاء الثامن: الفشل في عدم الاخذ بوضع الاقتصاد السياسي.

على الرغم من عدم وجود نماذج ثراء كثيرة بسبب اموال البترول في الشرق الاوسط (عملياً العديد من القادة السياسيين في ايران وفي الدول العربية المنتجة للنفط لديهم المال الوفير) يبقى ان الفقر المدقع والبطالة مستشرين في المنطقة, ونسبة الشباب تحت سن 25 تزيد على 60% في دول مثل العراق وايران ويوجد نسبة عالية جداً منهم عاطلون عن العمل او يعملون بمراتب زهيدة. بعض الصحف تداولت هذا الموضوع ولكن القليل منها بحثت في توفير شروط حلول الامن السياسي في الشرق الاوسط.

الخطاء التاسع: الفشل في معالجة التأثيرات الخارجية والداخلية لسياسة المنطقة.

النموذج السياسي المهم يقضي ان مؤشرات الديموقراطية ترتفع بشكل ملموس مع وجود بعض المتغيرات ومن ضمنها حروب المناطق, وارتفاع سعر البترول. فالاستقرار السياسي في لبنان مرهون بالوضع الاقليمي, والصراعات الداخلية بين الفئات السياسية المختلفة. لا احد يجهل انه اذا سوريا, اسرائيل, ايران, السعودية او الولايات المتحدة لعبوا دوراً ايجابياً في لبنان او عكفوا عن التدخل في اموره السياسية فسوف ينعم لبنان بالاستقرار السياسي و يتجه نحو الديموقراطية.

هذا النوع من الجدل لا يعطي الذريعة لمواطني الشرق الاوسط ان يلقوا خلافاتهم كلها على التدخل الخارجي. مع العلم ان الاستعمار كان له الاثر السلبي خلال القرن العشرين. فالذين يضعون اللوم على العراق في الاعوام الخمسة الماضية منذ سنة 2003 فليتذكروا ان كل جيران العراق من سوريا الى ايران فالسعودية فتركيا وحتى الاردن لا يريدون ان يروا العراق مستقراً وديموقراطياً لان هذا يؤثر على كون نظام الحكم في بلادهم سلطوي. لذلك كل هذه البلدان لعبت ادواراً وتدخلات سلبية في سياسة العراق منذ سنة 2003

الخطاء العاشر: لماذا لا يحبوننا؟

ألاعتقاد السائد لدى العديد من الامركيين بما فيهم المحللين السياسيين ان شعوب الشرق الاوسط وشعوب العالم الثالث يلزمهم اعتماد بعض المبادئ والقيم الغربية في انظمتهم لكي يصبحوا من الشعوب المتقدمة ويحصلوا على الديمقراطية الفعلية.

تبعاً لذلك فان الغربيين يقبلون بالمبدئ الذي طرحه "تومس فريدمن" وهو ان العالم مسطح. وان هذا الطرح يفرضه الامر الواقع. ويعني ان العالم ليس مسطحاً فقط بل يجب ان يكون مسطحاً. بمعنى اَخر يجب على الشرق ان يتأقلم مع تقنية الغرب ومعرفته. فالهنود الذين ملؤوا المكاتب والمراكز الغربية بالمعرفة والتكنولوجيا فقدوا وظائفهم بسبب الازمة الاقتصادية. إذ كان الاحرى بهم وبشعوب الشرق الاوسط وشعوب العالم الثالث الا يعتمدوا كثيراً على الغرب في حل مشاكلهم. يظهر ان فريدمن نسي الدور المهم والدقيق الذي لعبته الحكومة الهندية سنة 1966 تفرضها الضرائب وسنها القوانين لتمكين البلاد من بناء معرفة علمية ومؤسساتية للتكنولوجيا وعلم الكومبيوتر.

فيما يتعلق بالعراق سوف اعالج في كتابي القادم "الديموقراطية الحقيقية في العراق" موضوع " المعرفة الفطرية" ولي في ذلك امثلة كثيرة إستنبطها العراقيون واستعملوها لبناء مؤسسات اجتماعية ومجتمع مدني لنشر الديموقراطية. لا ننكر ان هناك ثقافة عالمية صادرة ومنتشرة في الغرب, ولكن نحن هنا في الغرب يجب ان نفهم ونتقّبل العادات الايجابية للشعب الشرق اوسطي, وامكانياته في تقرير مصيره دون تدخّل في شؤونه الداخلية والذاتية, وبالتالي لا نفرض عليهم ان يكونوا مثلنا.

في المستقبل ايضاً سوف اعالج موضوع انتخابات المحافظات العراقية, والعلاقة بين الاسلام والسياسة في الشرق الاوسط.

ترجمة: المحامي جان سويد