Will US Troops Remain in Iraq?

As the deadline nears for the Iraqi government to decide if a contingent of American troops will be allowed to remain in Iraq after the end of this year, the Obama administration has expressed mounting frustration that a decision has yet to be made. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta’s blunt language during his recent visit to Baghdad, which criticized Prime Minister al-Maliki’s indecision, reflected that frustration. However, no amount of American criticism or behind the scenes pressure can, by itself, alter the basic political dynamics that constrain Iraqi decision-making regarding US troops remaining in Iraq. Rather the al-Maliki government is going to have to make some difficult choices and make them soon.

One constraint is the profound sense of nationalism that characterizes the Iraqi people. At one level, the US should welcome this expression of nationalism because it underlines a sense of national unity that is belied by the usual focus in the West on Iraq as a nation-state rent by sectarian and ethnic divisions.

While the Kurds are much more amenable to US troops remaining in Iraq, neither Iraqi president Jalal Talabani nor Kurdish Regional Government president Masoud Barzani has been making a public case for retaining American troops after December 31, 2011. If US troop are to remain in Iraq, there will need to be justification by the Iraqi government as to how those troops serve its national interests.

A second constraint is more problematic from the US perspective. This reflects the problem created by the pressure being exerted on al-Maliki by his erstwhile ally, Muqtada al-Sadr, the leader of the Sadrist Trend and former Mahdi Army (now partially reincarnated as the Army of the Promised Day - Jaysh al-Yawn al-Maw’ud).

The Sadrist Trend, which is represented in the Iraqi parliament by the “Liberals” (al-ahrar) reflects a fundamental problem of Iraqi society, namely the continued deterioration of the quality of life for large segments of the country’s poor and marginal social strata. The agrarian sector’s decline means that agriculture cannot support the rural population, thus producing a steady stream of migrants to urban areas. These migrants tend to be young and uneducated and highly susceptible to recruitment to militias and criminal organizations.

Unfortunately, the Iraqi government, both under al-Maliki and former prime ministers, has done little to curb extensive state corruption. The lack of any serious effort to bring corruption under control has created an even more pernicious dynamic. It sends a message to cabinet minsters that they need not make an effort to improve government services. Corruption not only wastes huge amounts of public funds but produces a political culture in which holding a government office is viewed as a source of patronage, rather than an as institution whose raison d’être is to provide a public service. Corruption is also linked to nepotism because relatives and friends are given choice positions within government ministries.

These conditions result in poor and inadequate services and widespread cynicism among the populace at large. They create the “perfect storm” for populist and proto-authoritarian organizations such as the Sadrists who argue that they are the true embodiment of the common will, because only they take the public interest seriously.

In this respect, the Sadrists parallel movements in other parts of the Middle East where the government has abdicated its responsibilities towards its citizenry. Hizballah in Lebanon demonstrates many similarities with the Sadrist movement given the Lebanese government’s historical neglect of the Shiite dominated southern region of the country. Likewise, the PKK in south eastern Turkey and Hamas in the Gaza Strip would not have acquired popular support had the Turkish government and the PLO respectively been more attentive to the local populace’s needs.

A third constraint on American forces remaining in Iraq is the influence of negative “neighborhood effects.” As I have mentioned in previous postings, none of Iraq’s neighbors with the exception of Turkey, wants to see a democratic, pluralistic and tolerant political system develop in Iraq.

June 2011 was the worst month for US troop casualties in 2 years and almost all the deaths can be attributed to Shiite militias in the south who have been supplied with sophisticated arms by the Iranians. Clearly, Iran continues to put pressure on the US so as to hamper its ability to achieve its goals in Iraq, particularly through strengthening Shiite militias and encouraging them to attack US forces. By increasing tensions between American forces and these militias, focus continues to be placed on the presence of US forces in Iraq and the December 31 deadline for them to leave. These developments place more constraints on al-Maliki’s behavior.

According to the al-Hayat (July 5), the Iranians have let the US know through back channels that they would be willing to agree to some US troops remaining in Iraq if the US agrees not to pressure Hizballah concerning the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri, not to topple Bashar al-Asad’s regime in Syria, and to pull back in its efforts to punish Iran for continuing to develop its nuclear energy program which the US sees as intended to produce nuclear weapons.

The US will not accept such conditions and agree to strike such a bargain with Iran. Therefore, we can expect Iran to continue encouraging Shiite militias to attack US forces and to instruct the Sadrist movement to insist that all US forces withdraw from Iraq. The al-Maliki government’s failure to suppress these militias and to arrest their leaders has created great resentment among US forces in Iraq and can only serve to drive a wedge between the US and Iraq.

There is a solution to the problems just outlined but it would require al-Maliki to change course politically. Adopting a statesman-like approach in which he explained to the Iraqi public why some US forces must remain in Iraq after December 31, al-Maliki would detail the need for these forces to complete the training of the Iraqi army, assist Iraq in building an air force that can monitor and control the country’s borders, and help Iraq’s national police force acquire the skills it needs to insure control of terrorist and criminal elements.

In this process, al-Maliki can expect the withdrawal of Sadrist members of parliament from his government in protest of his decision to allow some US forces to remain in Iraq. The resulting political deficit could be filled by having al-Maliki reach out to his arch-rival Ayad Allawi. Al-Maliki would need to create what he has been calling for ever since the March 2010 elections, namely a “national unity government.”

With the support of the Kurds, and Allawi, al-Maliki’s government would not fall. However, the Iraqi Prime Minister would need to make concessions to Allawi. This would include allowing Allawi to have an important say in the selection of the ministers of defense and interior, positions which still have not been filled since the March 2010 elections.

It would also entail giving meaningful powers to the position of Director of the new National Council for Strategic Policies which the US proposed be created after the March 2010 elections to break the logjam over who would become prime minister. The idea was that Allawi, while unable to become prime minister, would still receive a meaningful political position in the new Iraqi government. By heading the new National Council for Strategic Policies, Allawi would be able to temper the prime minister’s power by having control over defense and national security issues.

Will al-Maliki see the necessity of forcing the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq with Muqtada al-Sadr, other Shiite militias and their patron Iran? Or will he give in to current political pressures and cede political influence to theses groups that pose a major threat to Iraq’s democratic development and its ability to maintain Iraq’s autonomy from Iran?

What Iraq requires is bold leadership. Prime Minister al-Maliki needs to face down the Sadrists and nascent Shiite militias, make clear to Iran that Iraq will no longer tolerate meddling in its internal affairs, clean up the political mess in Baghdad by coming to terms with Ayad Allawi and his al-‘Iraqiya List, and then use this political foundation to attack the pressing social problems facing Iraq which are security, job creation and economic development, and the provision of government services.

Such bold action would allow Iraq to more forward. It would place the issue of US troops remaining in Iraq in its proper context, namely helping Iraq achieve its national agenda.

What does Iraq's political crisis tell us about the Arab Spring?

How is Iraq confronting its own Arab Spring? What does Iraq’s current political crisis tell us about the possibilities of success for the Arab Spring? Much of what happening in Iraq today has important ramifications for the best candidates for a transition to democracy, Egypt and Tunisia. While all 3 countries are very different, Iraq's experience points to one of the main problems that emerges after the overthrow of authoritarian regimes. That problem is the inability of competing factions within the political elite to develop cohesive policies and adopt a civic as opposed to personalistic approach to politics.

Iraq celebrated the holding of successful parliamentary elections in March 2010. Iraq’s Higher Elections Commission and foreign observers agreed that the elections were fair and violence was almost non-existent. Voter turnout was 62.5% nationwide and as high as 70% in Iraq’s 3 northern Kurdish provinces.

In a rejection of what voters perceived as the parliament’s inefficacy in fighting corruption, over 60% of the sitting members of the parliament elected in 2005 were turned out of office. Further, a national coalition, al-Iraqiya, which rejected sectarian politics won 91 seats, the largest number of any political grouping. The fact that al-Iraqiya was led by a Shiite, former prime minister Ayad Allawi, and received significant votes from all 3 of Iraq’s main ethnic groups created great optimism about the future direction of Iraqi politics.

However, these expectations did not materialize. Sitting prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki refused to cede any power to Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition and instead worked to marginalize it by reaching out to the Iraqi National Alliance, which included the Sadrists and the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council, and the Kurdish Alliance. This maneuvering angered Allawi and al-Iraqiyia, especially the Coalition’s rural Sunni Arab supporters who felt that Maliki was trying to exclude them along sectarian lines.

It took until November 2010, over 7 months, before al-Maliki was able to form a new government that largely excluded al-Iraqiya. The Kurds stepped as king makers by brokering a compromise that allocated the prime minister’s position to al-Maliki, the position of speaker of parliament to al-Iraqiya, and the president of the newly created National Strategic Council, that was supposedly intended to coordinate national defense and security policy to Allawi. But the actual powers of the newly formed council were never clearly defined and Allawi refused to accept the position.

At the same time, Maliki has had to fight out attacks by his erstwhile coalition partner Muqtada al-Sadr upon whose parliament members he depends. Sadr has pounded away at the need for all US forces to be out of Iraq by the agreed date of December 31, 2011 as agreed by upon Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) concluded between Iraq and the US in 2008.

While no one expects Sadr to actually be able to act on his threat to reactivate the Mahdi Army if US forces aren’t withdrawn, he recently organized a march of thousands of his supporters in Sadr City who were dressed in a quasi uniform (Shirts emblazoned with the Iraqi flag), as he keeps up relentless pressure on al-Maliki’s government.

Although nominally al-Maliki’s ally, Sadr continues to attack the government for the lack of and jobs and services, and for failing to fight corruption. Thus the Sadrists are trying to assume the mantle not only as the political force that will protect Iraq against Western domination, but also bring transparent government and one that delivers the type of social services that the populace craves.

If the inter-elite cleavages were not destructive enough of effective governance, increased tensions have developed between al-Maliki and local government, both provincial governors and provincial councils. Not a day seems to go by that the Iraqi and Arab press fail to report some form of conflict between the central government and the provinces. Invariably these problems are caused by decisions by taken by Baghdad that rides roughshod over local rights. These decisions include appointing and removing local officials, failing to provide the provinces with funds to which they’re entitled or making investment decisions that concern local oil and natural gas resources without consulting local officials (in violation of the constitution).

What Iraq points to is the legacy of authoritarian rule for democratic transitions in the Middle East. Saddam Husayn destroyed all political institutions and civil society during 35 years of Ba’thist rule. He also killed any members of the political elite who he thought might at some point challenge his rule, even his former childhood friend who he appointed as defense minister during the Iran-Iraq War, Adnan Khayrallah.

Most of the players in Iraq’s unstable political game fled the country and hence were expatriates during Ba’thist rule. None enjoy any significant level trust among the populace at large. Constant infighting - often over what appear to the Iraqi electorate as petty matters - has further undermined the elite's popularity. That was certainly evident from research I recently completed among Iraqi youth who consistently used pejorative terms to refer to Iraq’s political class.

Unlike Egypt and Tunisia, Iraq is making economic progress. It plans to invest $150 billion in infrastructural development over the next 3 years, especially to rehabilitate oil and natural gas pipelines. Inflation rates have dropped from a high of over 20% in 2007 to an expected level of 6.2% in 2012. Oil export revenue has increased with the global rise in energy prices (Iraq earned about $7 billion in revenues from oil sales this past March). GDP growth is up from 1.5% in 2007 to a projected 10.9% in 2012.

But investing in the hydrocarbon sector does not produce many jobs. The revenues derived from the sale of oil and natural gas has not been translated into job creation or improved services. Indeed, 1 out of 6 Iraqis still lives below the poverty line on $2 per day, a situation that infuriates large segments of the populace.

Most analysts blame the recent uptick in violence in Iraq on the inability of the political elite in Baghdad to reach a national solution to the country’s political crisis. The lack of a political solution has recently seen an increase in attacks on prominent Iraqi political figures. There were unsuccessful assassination attempts on Atheel al-Nujayfi, the governor of Ninewa Province and an important figure in the Mosul-based al-Hadba' Party, and on al-Iraqiya's candidate for Defense Minister, Major-General Khalid al-Ubaydi.

The core component of a national solution to solving Iraq;s current crisis must center on giving all sectors of the elite a place at the political table. As long as al-Maliki refuses to do this, as evident in his continued reluctance to appoint al-Iraqiya members to the vacant positions of Defense and Interior ministers, resentment by those who feel excluded will persist and violence will be one of the results. How might such a national political solution come about? This is a topic to be explored in future postings.

the Arab Spring: Markets, Wasatiya and Federalism

The New York Times carried two articles this past Sunday, May 22nd, that point to the problematic way in which the Arab Spring is understood in the West. On the front page, headlines pronounced, "Promise of Arab Uprisings Is Threatened by Divisions." The article warns that the spirit of national unity that characterized the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere now threatens to devolve into social and political cleavages based in religion, tribe and ethnicity.

This doom and gloom tenor of this article stands in sharp contrast to an article in the magazine section, "The Hot Money Cowboys of Iraq," which describes the entrepreneurial spirit of Iraq's new business class. As these entrepreneurs press forward with numerous projects, they have little time to worry about social and political cleavages, or "religion, clan sect and ethnicity," to use the words of the front page story.

As Namir al-Akabi, one of the wealthiest men of the new business class, put it, "Iraq is a rich, virgin country!" While others view Iraq as an ethnically fragmented society, Iraq's new business class sees it as a great opportunity for economic reconstruction and profit.

The sense of individual initiative that characterizes the businessmen in "Hot Money Cowboys" recalls my interviews with Iraqi businessmen during the period when ethnic strife was still prevalent throughout Iraq. Interviewing one of Iraq's wealthiest Kurdish businessmen in Arbil in 2007, I asked him whether he had any problem working with his Arab partner who was sitting across the table from us. Both he and his partner looked at me quizzically. "We are trying to make a profit," they replied, "and if we can create some jobs in the process, so much the better." For them, they didn't have time to worry about ethnic differences.

Clearly, not all Arab countries possess the oil and natural gas resources of Iraq. However, the entrepreneurial spirit that I encountered in Iraq, even during the height of ethnic conflict, is not confined to that country. A new spirit of individual initiative, responsibility and openness to new ideas is spreading throughout the Arab world, especially among the young. This indeed was one of the findings of my recent research with focus groups of Iraqi youth.

The new spirit of individual initiative is reflected in the values of openness, toleration and moderation, not just among entrepreneurs, but in the interpretation and practice of Islam. One manifestation of this is the spread of al-wasatiya. Derived from the Arabic wasat, or middle, it connotes moderation in the interpretation and application of Islamic doctrine. This approach is often juxtaposed to more rigid and doctrinaire forms of Salafism.

For many Muslim clerics, the focus on wasatiya represents a return to the core values of Islam, which rejects extremism in all its forms (Qur'an 68:25). To be situated between extremes (al-awsat)leads the believer to a virtuous and fruitful life. Wasatiya does not represent a concession to modernity and a watering down of Islam as a religion, but rather the foregrounding of its true message for all humanity, namely an emphasis on the coming together of all peoples of good will, regardless of religion.

The threat with which authoritarian regimes have viewed wasatiya was evident in the refusal of the Husni Mubarak regime to approve a license for the "Middle Party" (hizb al-wasat). Founded in 1995 as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, this party stressed tolerance and inter-religious reconciliation (even including a Christian as one of its founding members).

Husni Mubarak's regime prevented the Middle Party (excellently analyzed by A.R. Norton in his, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of the Hizb al-Wasat"*)from becoming an official political party because it wanted to restrict the the "official opposition" to the more radical Muslim Brotherhood. Any time Western countries pressed Mubarak to liberalize and democratize Egypt, he could point to the Brotherhood and ask: "If we hold the elections you suggest, do you want the Islamists to take power?" If a more moderate Islamic alternative had existed, such as the Middle Party, Mubarak's ploy would have lost its power of persuasion. Thankfully, the Transition Military Council gave the Middle Party a license after Mubarak was ousted.

If the spirit of individual thought and judgment rings true to many Arab businessmen and youth, the concept of federalism supports this frame of mind. Federalism offers a palliative to the centralized authoritarianism that characterizes most Arab states. Such authoritarianism is the logical outcome of the corporatist "group think" that military and single party regimes have forced on their unwilling citizenry.

In Iraq, federalism has devolved power to the provinces where governors and provincial legislatures not only often offer better services to the citizenry than the central government, but also provide a set of check and balances against the abuse of power at the center(see my posting "Local Control and Democratization in Iraq," Nov. 8, 2010). The effort to exercise local control within a federal political structure has infuriated Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who has sought to centralize all power in his hands. Nevertheless, the federal political system represents one of the best hopes for building democracy in Iraq.

Federalism does not just apply to Iraq. In Yemen, it could be used to decentralize power and ameliorate much of the tension between the northern and southern portions of the country. As Dr. John Duke Anthony noted to me in a recent conversation, the concept of federalism is not alien to Arab political culture, despite arguments to the contrary. The United Arab Emirates (UAE)has existed as a federal state for over 40 years and tribes embody notions of federalism in their alliances (think of the Muntafiq, Shamar and other tribal confederations in Iraq and the Arabian Peninsula).

Correspondents, Western, Arab or otherwise, have a responsibility to report on political conflict and to call our attention to potential looming crises. However, there is no society or human community in which the direction of social change is only going in a negative direction without that society or community likewise experiencing positive change as well. As I found while conducting research in Iraq during the 1980s, even under Saddam Husayn's brutal regime, Iraqis still found ways to resist (as I documented in Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq).

Let's hope that the media - press, television and social media - offer more perspectives on positive change in the Arab world. The spread of open markets, ideas such as al-wasatiya, and the institutionalization of federalism can help promote a more democratic Arab world. These develometns call out for more reporting.

The process of democratization in the Arab world is not a "spectator sport." Whether the Arab Spring is successful will depend on the extent to which social, political and economic forces - both in the Arab world and beyond it - give it their support.

*Augustus Richard Norton, "Thwarted Politics: The Case of Hizb al-Wasat," in Robert Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics, Princeton University Press, 2005, 133-160.

The Pakistani Taliban’s Formulation of lex talionis

Guest author: Farah Jan

After the killing of Osama Bin Laden by the US navy seals on May 2nd, the Pakistani Taliban (TTP) issued a statement in which they threatened to avenge Bin Laden by targeting Pakistan’s army, navy and air force, along with the US and NATO interests. The Latin word lex talionis, translates as, “the law of retaliation.” This principle finds its roots in Biblical times and refers to the precept of “an eye for an eye.” The TTP and other militant groups have affirmed the retaliation pledge, but with no end in sight.

As the ancient Greeks proclaimed prior to the start of Olympics, “let the games begin!,” so the TTP have issued a similar message in a sinister fashion for the Pakistani government and its armed forces. In the process, the TTP has unleashed its war machine using its most effective weapon, “the suicide bomber.”

During the last few weeks, we have seen numerous attacks, starting with the twin attacks on Frontier Constabulary headquarters on May 13th, that killed 98 paramilitary recruits and civilians, the assassination of Saudi consulate official on May 16th, the attack on U.S. officials on May 20th, killing a passerby, and now the most embarrassing attack on the Pakistani naval base in Karachi on May 22nd. The TTP has taken responsibility for these attacks, each time issuing a statement afterwards that, “this was revenge for martyrdom of Osama Bin Laden. It was the proof that we are still united and powerful.” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13495127)

The May 22nd attack on the PNS Mehran base demonstrates the coordination and strength of the TTP and other al-Qaeda influenced groups. The naval base attack raises serious concerns regarding the ability of militant groups to launch small-scale combat against the seventh largest army in the world.

Indeed, the militant groups are deeply entrenched in Pakistan’s major cities. Through their recent attacks, they threaten to weaken the security institutions of the state. Incapacitating the state, supposedly the sole institution that has the right to exercise the use of force within the boundaries of the territory over which it rules, threatens to render Pakistan a failed state. According to the Weberian definition, the state is a “human community that successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory.” Thus the state via its security apparatus and institutions successfully asserts this use of force within its territory, as well as defending this territory from external threats.

The state of Pakistan today is at a critical crossroad in determining its security and defense from internal and external perils. The ultimate end for non-state actors like the TTP, would be to reconfigure current state structures, and replace them with institutions that advance their extremist agenda. Their short-term objective is to cripple Pakistan’s security institutions, further leading it to collapse.

A failed or collapsed Pakistan would be a regional disaster for South Asia, particularly for the economic and political stability of both China and India. The effects of Pakistan’s failure are not limited to the region, but would have global repercussions. For the United States, Pakistan’s geo-strategic location is crucial. Policy makers in Washington are expecting a forceful response by the Pakistani army against the TTP’s attack on the Karachi naval base . At stake is the Pakistani state’s capacity to use legitimate force for its own self-defense.

Sectarian Identities and the Arab Spring

Will sectarian identities derail the Arab Spring? Many observers fear that, were Bashar al-Asad to fall from power in Syria, the outcome would not be a transition to democracy but an outbreak of confessionally based violence, pitting the country's constituent religious groups against one another. The continued clashes between Muslims and Coptic Christians in Egypt likewise has led to fears that Mubarak's removal may represent a pyrrhic victory if religious based violence spreads. In Tunisia, threats against women by radical Islamists for not wearing "appropriate" Islamic dress has raised the specter of intervention by the army if these forces appear to be gaining too much power.

The problem of sectarianism continues to raise its ugly head in Iraq as well. Ethnically based violence persists, albeit at much lower levels than during the height of such strife between 2004 and 2007. The efforts of the Baghdad city council to ban alcohol earlier this year was seen as the beginning salvo in an effort to place constraints on, if not eventually close, Baghdad's famed social clubs and artist ateliers which are known not only for serving alcohol but for their avowedly secular cultural and political orientation and as venues where Iraqis from all ethnic and religious groups gather.

In an effort to better understand sectarianism in Iraq, I organized a special issue of the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies. The topic of the special issue is "the question of sectarian identities in Iraq." In addition to editing the issue and writing a theoretical introduction, I asked nine top scholars on Iraq to contribute to the issue.

The contributors include Adeed Dawisha, Peter Sluglett,Abbas Kadhim, Reider Visser, Orit Bashkin, Dina Khoury, Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael, and Bassam Yousif. The topics range from British efforts to manipulate sectarian tensions for purposes of colonial control, the impact of 1920 Revolution on sectarian identities, the position of Iraq's Jewish community in relation to sectarianism, Shi'a attitudes towards creation of a separate confessionally base state, the impact of the Iran-Iraq and Gulf wars on sectarian identities, the impact of expatriate politicians who returned to Iraq in the wake of the 2003 US invasion on sectarian identities, and the political economy of post-2003 sectarian identities in Iraq.

These historically and contemporary based essays emphasize that the dynamics of sectarian identities in Iraq are very complex. Nevertheless, the essays convincingly demonstrate that sectarian identities are a function of crises and the manipulation of these crises by political elites who seek to promote their narrow political and economic interests. Such elites have been historically referred to by Iraqis as the "merchants of politics" (tujjar al-siyasa). I prefer to call them "sectarian entrepreneurs."

At the same time, the journal essays underscore that sectarian identities cannot be seem as simply "socially and politically constructed." In Iraq, as in any nation-state, there are many histories, some of them tolerant and some of them politically divisive.

The Shi'a and Kurds, as well as other ethnoconfessional groups, have experienced social and political marginalization if not violence during the course of Iraqi history. That historical memory is always available in times of crisis for sectarian entrepreneurs to exploit needs to be recognized. While sectarian identities are rarely if ever "primordial" - so-called "ancient hatreds" - there is always a broad tableau of historical events that can be mobilized if the political and socioeconomic conditions are right.

What those who analyze sectarian identities often forget is the obverse, namely that ethnic groups can cooperate to achieve impressive political results. Indeed, the research by James Fearon and David Laitin shows that in ethnically divers societies, cooperation not conflict is the norm. The Iraqi nationalist movement, that began in the late 19th century but came into its own after the 1920 Revolution until it was viciously suppressed by the first Ba'thist regime that seized power in February 1963, was characterized by cross-ethnic cooperation. As I document in my Memories of State: Politics, History and Collective Identity in Modern Iraq, all of Iraq's ethnic groups - Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Kurds, Christians, Jews, Turkmen and other ethnic groups participated in the nationalist struggle.

If we look at Egypt, we see that it too developed a nationalist movement that, like Iraq, included Muslims, Christians and Jews. Tolerance and cross-ethnic cooperation have been the rule in Iraq's modern history. Only during the UN sanctions of the 1990s did sectarian identities begin to spread in Iraq and only during the immediate post-2003 period did Iraq experience persistent sectarian violence.

And we need to remember that, in Iraq, ethnically based violence was facilitated by the ill-advised US decision to dissolve the conscript army and the national police in May 2003. If that decision had not been taken, it is highly unlikely that the Ba'thist and al-Qa'ida sponsored insurgencies would have gotten off the ground.

In a future posting, I will report on my findings with focus groups of Iraq youth between the ages between 14 and 30. The positive findings are that these youth are not supportive of sectarianism. Young people realize that sectarianism threatens their future. They know that. all too often, they are the ones who suffer from ethnically based violence.

To purchase the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studiesspecial issue on sectarian identities in Iraq go to:
http://www.intellectbooks.co.uk/journals/view-Journal,id=144/view,page=1/

What Iraq "enjoys" unlike any other Middle Eastern country - two authoritarian governments!

Iraq has the distinct disadvantage compared to all other countries of the Middle East of having not one, but two authoritarian regimes. In Baghdad, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's government has not only suppressed peaceful protests but has systematically moved to eliminate any system of checks and balances that would constrain his power. In the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), President Masoud Barzani has likewise worked to remove any challenges to his authority. In this process, his Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) had been supported by the other power broker in the KRG, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). Put differently, Iraqis are oppressed by two authoritarian governments, one Arab and one Kurdish.

With all the current attention on Libya, Syria and Yemen, Iraq has been neglected in the Western media. However, demonstrations have continued both in the Arab and Kurdish areas of the country. These demonstrations have led to numerous arrests, and demonstrators being wounded and even killed. Despite ethnic differences, Arabs and Kurds in Iraq are protesting against the same issues.

In Baghdad, demonstrators continue to protest state corruption, the lack of public services, and the failure of the government to abide by transparent governance and the rule of law. Iraqi protesters have demanded that the al-Maliki government implement its election promises and cease attacking peaceful demonstrators who are trying to exercise their rights. On February 26th, 23 protesters were killed as Iraqis, following democracy activists elsewhere in the region, began their own "Day of Rage."

Following widespread arrests over the past two months, protesters are now demanding that the al-Maliki government release those who have been arrested. In other Middle Eastern countries, the slogan "Day of Rage" has characterized the regular Friday protests that follow mosque prayers. In Iraq, protesters have now added to that slogan, "The Friday commemorating the imprisoned innocents" ((jum'at mu'taqal al-abriya').

As reported by al-Hayat, (April 2), Iraqi security police have arrested women, children and the elderly and not just young men. These arrests have sparked more protests as security forces have blocked off streets around Liberation Square (Sahat al-Tahrir) in central Baghdad to prevent more Friday demonstrations.

Iraqi protesters have a right to be concerned with corruption. The Iraqi parliament's Integrity Committee has been investigating numerous cases of corruption which have been given greater impetus by country-wide protests that have condemned misuse of public funds (see al-Hayat, April 23). According to the committee's assistant chairperson, Ibrahim al-Juburi, financial and administrative corruption is widespread. He asserted that the lack of oversight since 2003, and the control of government funds by political parties and powerful political figures, explains Iraq's corruption problem.

The cases that the Committee are investigating range from contracts for buying aircraft from Canada, to expired foodstuffs that were purchased to be distributed to needy Iraqis, to metal detectors that do not function, to the purchase of a plot of land in downtown Baghdad on which a new university will be built. The new university, which will be known as al-Sadiq University (Jami'at al-Sadiq) will be run by one of al-Maliki's advisers, al-Shaykh Husayn Baraka al-Shami. The conditions under which the land for the new university was purchased are very suspect.

One of the important steps taken by the Iraqi parliament has been to abolish Article 136 of the District Courts' Foundational Law that prevents investigative agencies such as the Parliament's Integrity Committee, or the Agency for Financial Oversight (Diwan al-Riqaba al-Maliya), from prosecuting high ranking employees of government ministries, namely those who are director-generals or above.

Even with the Parliament's action, an unnamed high ranking member of the Integrity Committee expressed fear that the elimination of Article 136 would be prevented on political and legal grounds. al-Maliki's efforts to eliminate the independence of the Independent High Electoral Commission and the central bank, among other government agencies, raises questions of how much power Iraq's parliament can exert in controlling maleficence in the executive branch.

In the KRG, the Western and Arab media have been particularly remiss in not reporting the continuing demonstrations in the region's second largest city, Sulaimaniya. These demonstrations, which have been ongoing since last February 17th, follow the same pattern as in the Arab south. Protesters have demanded accountability on the KRG's part, an elimination of corruption, and the awarding of government employment on the basis of merit and not on the basis of ties to one of the two main political parties, the KDP or PUK.

While demonstrations have continued, security forces have attacked demonstrators and arrested numerous journalists who have sought to report on the protests. Reporters Without Borders has said that at least 14 journalists have been beaten and/or arrested in various areas of the KRG in connection with the demonstrations (al-Hayat, April 21).

Meanwhile, Iraqi President, Jalal Talabani, also PUK head, has accused the new Gorran (Change) Party of inspiring the unrest. Gorran is a party that was formed in 2009 that split from the PUK in demanding democratic reforms in the KRG. It successfully contested the July 2009 KRG Regional Parliament elections, winning 25 seats.

Talabani's response to peaceful protests parallels that of al-Maliki and other authoritarian leaders throughout the Middle East. Rather than confront legitimate grievances, blame is cast on "troublemakers, outside agitators, and Islamists." In this instance, his ire has been directed at Gorran for "stirring up trouble."

What developments throughout the Middle East suggest is the need for greater coordination among democracy activists. In Iraq, it would make great sense for Arab and Kurds (and Turkmen and other groups) to unite in a cross-ethnic coalition, much as occurred during the period of the powerful Iraqi nationalist movement (1908-1963) which brought together all Iraq's ethnic groups, Sunni Arabs, Shiite Arabs, Kurds, Christians, Jews, Turkmen and others.

Indeed, the Gorran Party flag contains the Arabic word for "change" (taghyir), indicating that it is not hostile to Arabs. Because many of the demonstrators who support Gorran in the KRG are young, like many of the demonstrators in the Arab south, there is the opportunity for both groups to use social media to coordinate their activities and make known to the rest of the world the oppressive behavior of both the al-Maliki government and the KRG. In other words, a Kurdish-Arab coalition, inspired by Gorran, could become a powerful force for democratic change in Iraq.

Ultimately, it would be helpful to have all democratic movements, from Egypt's April 6th Movement to Syria's Insan human rights organization to Gorran in the KRG, share websites that would serve as clearing houses for information, strategies and tactics throughout the Middle East. As we know, democracy is never a gift. It only comes to those who organize.

Welcoming Dr. Tariq Ramadan to Rutgers University

The following remarks that I delivered were intended to welcome Dr. Tariq Ramadan and contextualize a lecture that he gave at Rutgers University on April 19, 2011.

It is my great pleasure to add my welcome to Dr. Tariq Ramadan who we are very fortunate to have lecture to us tonight on the topic of “Religion, Radicalism and the Quest for Pluralism.”

In his recently published, The Quest for Meaning: Developing a Philosophy of Pluralism, Dr. Ramadan begins his study by pointing to a world lacking in self confidence, a feeling that he rightfully argues is closely associated with fear.

While I am not a student of religion but rather of politics, much of what Dr Ramadan argues in The Quest for Meaning and his other writings resonates with my own research on the Middle East, especially the problems of youth, sectarian identities and democratization . Thus I would like to share some thoughts as a political scientist on the topic of the evening, namely how do we arrive at a more pluralist and tolerant world.

Among the many important questions that Dr. Ramadan raises in The Quest for Meaning, one for me as a political scientist is particularly telling In his chapter on freedom, he asks: What can thinking about freedom and society mean, if society does not guarantee me the preconditions for my humanity?

This question took me back to my days at the University of Chicago when I conducted a study for my MA thesis on the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. I had begun my study as a comparative analysis - comparing religio-politcial movements in the United States with those in the Middle East. However, the Brotherhood quickly captured my attention.

As I focused on the Brotherhood, to my surprise, I discovered that the large sample of its members that I was able to develop through my research included few clerics or ‘ulama. Instead, I learned that most Brothers were well educated and from secular backgrounds, mostly from the teaching and other professions. What was characteristic of all the members of my sample was that they were both horizontally and vertically mobile. In other words, they were migrants from rural areas to Cairo and to other large Egyptian cities who aspired to upward mobility.

Unable to achieve this mobility once they arrived in urban areas because they lacked the requisite wasta or influence that would have allowed them to turn their education onto success, the Muslim Brothers often turned to radical politics and even violence. The name the Brothers used for the cells they organized was al-usra or family - an indicator of the alienation from society that they felt.

What I had discovered in my study of the MB was the beginning of what we refer to today as globalization. While authors such as Thomas Friedman and others extol the benefits of globalization, my own research in Egypt, Iraq and elsewhere in the Middle East has pointed to its dark under side.

What we see taking place throughout the 20th century and into the 21st century is the destruction of the agricultural sector of the economy and a massive rural to urban migration. With limited job creation in urban areas, the economies of Egypt and many other Middle Eastern and non-Western countries cannot absorb the migrants or their booming population growth . Egypt alone needs to create 250,000 jobs each year just to keep abreast of population growth.

The irony of globalization is that, on the one hand, we live in a world that is economically integrated . However, at the same time, we lack the political and social institutions as well as cultural knowledge that would allow us to interact as a global community based on values of pluralism, tolerance, mutual respect and social justice- all themes that are central to The Quest for Meaning.

Just as the members of the Muslim Brotherhood were angry that they could not realize their aspirations and dreams earlier in the 20th century, so too do many people in advanced capitalist countries and non-Western countries find their dreams thwarted as well. The so-called Tea Party with its xenophobic rhetoric, including anti-Muslim attitudes, indicates that the question of pluralism is global in nature and not a problem of the non-Western world alone.

In the Middle East, the problem of being able to look forward to a rewarding future is especially difficult for the large population of youth - what sociologists refer to as the “youth bulge” - where 70% of the population is under the age of 30. As economic inequality increases, employment opportunities shrink, education becomes more difficult to obtain, and health care is increasingly the realm of the privileged, many of those adversely affected by these processes of globalization are retreating from totalizing cross-cultural discourses, namely secularism liberalism and various forms of socialist thought.

Exactly at a time when the world is becoming more economically interdependent, the angry and the alienated withdraw into narrowly conceived forms of political discourses. These new forms of political discourse construct build rigid boundaries between “Us” ands “Them, between those who are “Authentic” such as the Tea Partyiers who claim to be the true and authentic patriots, and the vilified “Other” who becomes the scapegoats for all of a group or nation’s problems. These disaffected groups substitute hostility and sometime even violence for rational discourse based in shared values and negotiation. In this process, as Dr. Ramadan points out, pluralism, tolerance and mutual respect are the casualties.
While the process I have just described is often thought by Westerners to characterize the non-Western world, it permeates the West as well. All too often in the West, Islam is accused of standing against pluralism and reform, and of being supportive of intolerance, the suppression of women and authoritarian political practices. Certainly, such thinking reflects the undertone of the recent Congressional hearings on so-called radicalization of Islam in the United States that were held by Representative Peter King of New York.
It also explains why television evangelist Pat Robertson and Fox News Talk show host Glenn Beck recently supported the deposed president of the Ivory Coast, Laurent Gbagbo. Despite his having decisively lost the November 2010 presidential elections, and having refused to leave office and the fact that he was a repressive and corrupt ruler, Mssrs. Robertson and Beck still supported him. They argued that, despite losing the presidential elections, the West could not allow Gbagbo to be pushed from office because the rightly elected president of the Ivory Coast, Alassane Ouattara, was a Muslim, and his taking office would mean yet another African nation-state falling under the control of Islam. This view of Islam as a political ideology rather than a religion that is hostile to the West is the antithesis of the pluralism that Dr. Ramadan advocates in The Quest for Meaning.
What my comments about the Muslim Brotherhood and Westerners are intended to suggest is that those who are hostile to Islam (or any other religion) do not understand the meaning of religion. The religion of those who are characterized by fear and anger is really politics pretending to be religion - what in Arabic is referred to as al-din al-musayyas or politicized religion. In this instance, basic tenets of religion are distorted to produce desired political outcomes, almost always at the expense of other groups in society.

One of the most notorious examples of politicized religion in the United States is the Ku Klux Klan that invoked Christianity to lynch innocent African-Americans in an effort to intimidate them and exclude them from political and economic life. The irony is that those who promote politicized religion rarely know the fundamentals of the religion of which they purport to believe.

This evening we, the members of the audience - whether Muslim or non-Muslim - are not here to address an “problem of Islam, ” but rather to ask what role can religion - in the true meaning of the term- play in promoting our ability to live together as a global community. We are all God’s children. The famous section in Voltaire’s Candide where the two armies, one comprised of Christian Bulgarians and the other of the Muslim Turks pray to God to vanquish their respective enemy highlights the absurdity of thinking that God loves one social group more than another.

In his interpretation of Islam in many scholarly texts Dr Ramadan argues that religion needs to constantly be subject to examination as to how it applies to contemporary life. This calls attention to the dispute between Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib when the Khawarij condemned him for negotiating with his enemy, the Ummayids. When accused of substituting human reason for God’s word, Imam Ali laid a Qur’an on the table and asked it to speak. To this the Khawarij responded that the Qur’an is not human and therefore cannot speak. Imam Ali replied by saying that this is precisely the case since it is human beings who must interpret God’s word and hopefully apply it in the proper manner in their daily lives. This rejection of fanaticism and more humble approach to religion is precisely what is required if pluralism is truly to become a widely accepted value.

My recent research with Iraqi youth between the ages of 14 and 30 provides reason for hope, as does the mass movement of youth throughout the Middle East who are calling for freedom of expression and thought and the right to decide their own destiny. The Iraqi youth in my focus groups - both Arab and Kurd - are anti-sectarian and look to a future Iraq where employment is right of all citizens, where building a family is not beyond their reach, and where political leaders serve their constituencies rather than their wallets.

On the other hand, many of these youth know little about the history of their country or about religion. Clearly, education - another central theme in Dr. Ramadan’s writings, precisely what is happening here tonight, must capture more of our resources and attention if we care to transcend insecurity and fear of the Other.

In The Quest for Meaning, Dr. Tariq Ramadan argues that “Analytic reason does not recognize any dogma” (30) His writings seek to provide us with ways of transcending our fear of the world by coming together under a “big tent” in which all well intentioned people can enjoy the benefits of pluralism, grow as human beings and live together in peace and social justice. Working together, even in small ways, we can make his vision of the world a reality.

Thank you.