(Elite driven) sectarianism is alive and well in Iraq

Despite public opinion polls and my recent focus groups with Iraqi youth that show a rejection of sectarianism, the behavior of Iraq's political elite threatens to undermine the gains that have made in the effort to implement a democratic transition. Sectarianism continues to manifest itself at the highest level as Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki refuses to budge on his unwillingness to come to terms with Ayad Allawi's al-Iraqiya Coalition which received the largest number of seats in the March 2010 parliamentary elections.
When the conflict between al-Iraqiya and Maliki's al-Da'wa Party first flared after the elections, the two Kurdish parties that dominate the KRG welcomed the split. Their reasoning was simple. If the Arabs fight it out in Baghdad, they'll have less time to devote to us. A power struggle in Baghdad would preclude a unified Arab front which would to try and block Kurdish interests.

Along the lines of the adage, "be careful of what you wish for," the Kurds have discovered that a dysfunctional government in Baghdad is actually not in their interest. Sectarian leaders often discover that, when you play with fire, you often get burned. The Kurds increasing unease with the stalemate in Baghad was evident in the Central Committee meeting of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) that was recently held in Sulaimaniya (ses al-Hayat, Oct. 21). PUK leader and Iraqi president, Jalal Talabani, expressed serious concern with the "uncertainty" surrounding a solution to the crisis pitting al-Iraqiya against Maliki's political alliance which seems to have no end in sight.

Even the Kurds, who seek a weak central government in Baghdad, realize the danger that exists if the present stalemate between Nuri al-Maliki and Ayad Allawi persists. Iraq's ability to defend itself, to develop its hydrocarbon wealth - oil and natural gas- and to create the necessary feelings of trust that will allow all of Iraq's regional and ethnoconfessional groups to work together to get the country moving forward are increasingly jeopardized.

Clearly, the fault here is not the Iraqi people but their ineffectual and narrowly partisan leaders. Whether as a result of pressure from Iran, or fears of being outflanked by populist elements such as the Sadrist movement, Maliki refuses to come to terms with Allawi and the members of his al-Iraqiya Coalition. Because al-Iraqiya won the majority of votes, it needs to be given a say in the daily functioning of the Iraqi government. As a primarily Sunni Arab coaltion, Maliki's unwillingnessl to bring al-Iraqiya into his government smacks of sectarianism among much of Iraq's populace.

By refusing to ceded any power to Allawi and al-Iraqiya, Maliki is stoking the fires of sectarianism. If he were a true statesman, he would put the interests of Iraq and the Iraqi people above his own sectarian partisanship.

A second indicator of the seriousness of sectarianism is the "struggle of the flags." Since the downfall of Saddam Husayn's Ba'th Party, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) has refused to fly the Iraqi flag. It is nowhere in sight when one crosses the border from Turkey into Iraq, nor does it fly elsewhere in the KRG. Because the flag still invokes memories of Ba'thist Pan-Arabism, and inscription "God is great" (Allahu akbar) was added by Saddam Husayn just before the Gulf War of 1991 to attract support from Muslim majority countries, the KRG has been loath to have the flag flying in its Kurdish majority provinces.

However, the Kurds have used the symbol of the flag for their sectarian purposes. When Iraq won a Cinderellaesque victory in the 2007 Asia Cup beating Saudi Arabia, many Kurds raised the Iraqi flag to celebrate the vicotry, especially since Iraqi Kurds play on the national team. Nevertheless, those Kurds who had raised the Iraqi flag were threatened with imprisonment if they did not immediately remove the flag from their homes.

In 1996, during the height of the Kurdish civil war that pitted the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) against its arch-rival, the PUK, Masoud Bazzani, the current KRG president, asked Saddam Husayn to send tanks into the Kurdish region to help him stave off a military defeat by PUK forces. As the tanks of the Iraqi army proceeded north into the KRG, Iraqi flags adorned the roads. This was the same Iraqi army that had been involved in the infamous ANFAL campaign between 1986 and 1989 in which Saddam's forces leveled 175 Kurdish villages, destroyed the Kurdish agrarian sector and killed thousands of Kurds in the process.

The most recent crisis is the order that the Kurdish flag be removed from government buildings in the city of Khanaqin, a Kurdish majority town in Diyala Province, not far from Iraq's northwest border with Iran. The town suffered under Saddam's Arabization policies as many Kurds were killed and their homes taken over by Arabs. However, during the the 1940s, and 1950s, Arabs and Kurds in the Khanaqin region enjoyed good relations and many shared membership in local labor unions, particularly oil unions since the area has important oil fields.

Whether Maliki ordered the KRG's flag removed, or the order came from an official in the Ministry of Interior, the issue has become intertwined with Maliki's introduction of a oil and natural gas bill into the parliament that apparently caught the Kurdish bloc in the Council of Deputies (national parliament) off guard (al-Hayat, Oc. 17). The order to remove the flag led to demonstrations in Khanaqin by its Kurdish community and the formation of a Kurdish delegation to go to Baghdad to demand that the order be rescinded.

The Kurdish suggestion for a new Iraqi flag that would resemble if not replicate the flag used under the rule of General 'Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), which used the ancient Mesopotamian star of Isis, is not unreasonable and is supported by many Iraqis. However, the "struggle of the flags" is really not about symbols but rather part of a larger power struggle between the Maliki government and the KRG. The winner's prize will be Iraq's vast hydrocarbon wealth (oil and natural gas).

Yet another example of the corrosive effect of sectarianism in Iraq is the decision of the Maliki government to dismiss 145 Iraqi professors at Tikrit University in Salah al-Din province, a province comprised primarily of Sunni Arabs. After the fall of Tripoli, former Libyan National Transitional Council prime minister Mahmud Jibril flew unexpectedly to Baghdad to inform Maliki that the NRTC had discovered that the Qaddafi regime was involved a plot with former Ba'thists to overthrow the Iraqi government.

It is unclear how serious the plot was since no documents have been released. Nevertheless, Maliki quickly moved to arrest many former Ba'thists. Because the party recruited a disproportionate number of Sunni Arabs, the arrests have strong sectarian overtones. The firing of professors at Tikrit University was particularly egregious because it is difficult to imagine that such a large number of academics at one particular university could have all been involved in a plot against the government. University professors are not know for their skills in organizing coups d'etat against the state.

Since almost everyone under Saddam was forced to join the Ba'th Party, the Iraqi parliament passed a law in 2008 amending the de-Ba'thification process to include only those who occupied positions that harmed other Iraqis. Clearly, the faculty members who lost their positions at Tikrit University were not in this category. The firings of the professors only enhanced the idea that Maliki was using the news of a plot to marginalize Sunni Arabs.

Aside from Ayad Allawi, who deos seem to want to create a government with a broad social base were he to become prime minister, most members of Iraq' s political elite suffer from sectarianism tendencies and promote policies that undermine inter-ethnic and inter-c0nfessional trust. Their behavior is motivated by their desire to increase their polticial power and enhance their economic wealth. Although Maliki himself has not been associatedwith economic corruption, he has done little to try and eradicate it.

As for Maliki, "the fish rots from the head down," as the adage goes. Not only is he failing to provide strong, civic leadership that could promote national reconcilaition - a key component of building the necessary trust to enhance security, political cohesion and economic development - but he is promoting policies that further inflame sectarian tensions.

Under these conditions, the ability of Iraq's political institutions to develop is severely curtailed. Prospects for implementing a democratic transition require effective eladership and a political culture of tolerance and political pluralism. Such a political culture represent the prerequisite for rebuilding the necessary trust that Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist henchmen worked so hard to destroy in Iraq.

What can the US learn from Turkey in the Middle East?

During the 1990s, Turkey was a relatively unstable country. The Islamist government of Necmitten Erbakan was removed by the military in 1997 following a longstanding pattern of Turkish generals removing any prime minister who threatened their prerogatives. Efforts to gain membership in the European Union were going nowhere and ethnic conflict between Turks and Kurds was growing as seen in the spread of support for the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK).

By the beginning of this century, Turkey was experiencing solid economic growth. EU membership was no longer a top priority, Turkish-Kurdish relations within Turkey were beginning to be addressed, and the PKK's leader, Abdullah Ocalan, was behind bars. Gradually, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which has won two parliamentary elections in 2007 and 2011 following its initial victory in 2002, has been able to eliminate the power of the army to intervene in the political process. While there have been attempts to manipulate the constitution and the judiciary, most Turks seem quite content with AKP rule.

Perhaps Turkey's most impressive achievement, beyond its economic growth, has been its ability to become one of the dominant powers in the Middle East. It has skillfully deployed "soft power" to inject itself into a number of volatile conflicts that threaten the region's stability.

By concluding important economic agreements with the Iranian government, particularly in the energy field, Turkey has pacified Iran, its historic enemy. In championing the Palestinian cause, and backing away from its traditional close ties to Israel, Turkey has ingratiated itself with the Arab countries of the region, the core provinces of the former Ottoman Empire. It has also situated itself as a possible intermediary given its ties to both Israel, on the one hand, and the Palestinians and the Arab states, on the other.

While its foray into Lebanese politics in early 2011, where it sought to bring together the country contentious ethnoconfessional groups, was unsuccessful, Turkey is now a major player in efforts to force the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad to cede to the demands of democracy activists who fill the streets of many Syrian cities demanding the end of authoritarian rule. Turkish army maneuvers along the border with Syria have sent a strong message to Syria's Ba'thist regime that the wanton killing of its citizenry who are calling for democratic reforms cannot continue indefinitely.

Turkey's rather spectacular rise in power is paralleled by a decline in US power in the region. With the Tunisian and Egyptian autocrats, Zine al-Din Bin Ali and Husni Mubarak, no longer in power, and authoritarian rulers such as Ali Abdallah Salih in Yemen and Muammar al-Qaddafi in Libya, who formerly cooperated with US anti-terrorism initiatives, likewise gone from power, the US has now to deal with governments that lack the stability and coherence of the autocratic regimes which have been deposed.

In Iraq, the US faces the ironic outcome that its removal of Saddam Husayn and his Ba'thist regime has led to much greater influence of its arch-enemy, Iran. The government of Prime Minister Nuri al-Malaki seems determined to demonstrate that it is not an American puppet as it seeks to placate Iran. Maliki's tilt toward Iran is most evident in his unwillingness to commit to allowing any significant number of US troops to remain in Iraq after the end of the Status of Forces Agreement on December 31 of this year (read my analysis, "US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq" by clicking here).

In the energy field, not only has Turkey signed energy contracts with Iran, but it is at the center of the 7.9 billion Euro Nabucco Pipeline Project that will channel natural gas from Central Asia, and Iraq through Turkey to an energy hungry Europe, allowing Europe to become less dependent on Russian energy supplies and those of Russia's surrogates.

What can the US learn from Turkey's almost meteoric rise to a regional power in the Middle East? How can it develop policies based on mutually beneficial interests that align US foreign policy in the Middle East with that of Turkey? How can the US work with Turkey to offset its declining options in the Middle East?

To answer these questions requires greater scrutiny of the Turkish success. First, Turkey is exercising its economic muscle in the Middle East based on impressive GDP growth rates over the past 5 years. While economic growth was minimal in 2008 and even dropped in 2009, in 2010, real GDP growth reached 8.2%. Turkey has used its investments in Syria but especially in Iraq to influence domestic policy in both countries. While this policy has not prevented Bashar al-Asad's regime from brutally suppressing pro-democracy demonstrators, it has weakened the Syrian economy. Many analysts argue that if the Syrian economy continues to decline, the business elites of Damascus and Aleppo, a core component of the regime's political base, will turn against the regime, possibly bringing it down in the process.

In Iraq, Turkey has invested heavily in the Iraqi economy to the tune of more than $6 billion. Its investments are still largely concentrated in Iraq's 3 majority Kurdish population provinces that comprise the semi-autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). While investments in the KRG have not led to an end of PKK attacks on Turkish forces that originate in Iraq's
mountainous Kurdish region, it has developed a greater inventive on the part of the KRG to reign in the PKK and prevent it from attacking Turkey.

Clearly, Turkish economic might has played and will continue to play a central role in its effort to become the regional hegemon. A key question here is whether the US is following Turkey's lead. Obviously it is not. On strategy might be for US firms to seek to form joint ventures with Turkish firms, such as the energy giants, Enerco Energy and BOTAS, to explore the region's undiscovered oil and natural gas resources

In Iraq, US-Turkish cooperation could not only benefit US firms and hence American overseas investment, but lighten its political footprint in a country that is still very sensitive to the charges by many political groups that the US' goal is to dominate Iraqi politics as a means to control its extensive hydrocarbon wealth (both oil and natural gas).

Turkey's foreign policy success is based on the fact that it treats other Middle Eastern states with respect and promotes a strong democratic agenda. Although it sent out ambiguous signals at first, evoking much anger among anti-Qaddafi forces, Turkey soon joined the chorus of states calling upon Muammar al-Qaddafi to step down from power. Its support for Mubarak's ouster in Egypt and its campaign against the Asad regime in Syria have strengthened its democratic credentials in the Arab world.

The US has not been as forceful as Turkey in supporting popular protest movements of the "Arab Spring." Continued public declarations of support for democratization in the Middle East would serve US interests, much as Turkey's support for democratic change has endeared it to Arab populations throughout the region. The mild Islamism of the AKP underscores the need to develop a model of democracy in the Middle East that reflects local cultural preferences. Here the US needs to recognize that a "one size fits all" definition of democracy can be counterproductive.

In comparing the foreign policies of the US and Turkey, we need realize that the government of President Recip Tayyip Erdogan faces few domestic constraints in exercising its foreign policy preferences. The US Congress has placed many roadblocks in the Obama administration's efforts to pursue American foreign policy objectives in the Middle East. Efforts to bring the Israelis and the Palestinians to the negotiating table have been labelled as "anti-Israeli" and "undermining our closest Middle East ally," as a number of Tea Party Republicans have declared. And Congress has yet to confirm the US Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford, who has been using visits to areas where pro-democracy demonstrations have taken place as a means to put pressure on the Asad regime to end the killing of demonstrators.

What the US needs to learn from Turkey is that investment strategies which are multilateral in nature, such as the Nabucco Pipeline project, can not only have important economic multiplier effects, but can exercise enormous political influence. More active engagement of Turkey in bi-lateral meetings where the US seeks to forge ties around policies, both economic and political, that both countries are pursuing in the region, can become a "win-win" situation for both countries.

This is not to argue that the US should forgo its traditional foreign policy goals in the Middle East simply to placate Turkey. Nevertheless, both Turkey and the US seek to prevent Iran from undermining regional stability. Turkey is as horrified at the prospect of an Iranian-Israeli military conflict as is the US. Turkey, like the US, realizes that economic development and democratization are the keys to the region's stability, especially to meeting the aspirations of the region's large youth demographic, which is often referred to as the "youth bulge."

Turkey still faces a major problem in enacting national reconciliation with its own restive Kurdish population which is growing at a faster rate than the indigenous Turkish population. Here the US can create greater good will by trying to help the Turkish government develop policies that will promote such reconciliation. If the US can become more involved behind the scenes in helping Turkey tackle what is clearly its most significant domestic problem, then it will ingratiate itself with the Erdogan government. Helping Turkey's Kurds meet their demands for economic, cultural and political reforms will undermine support for the militant wing of the PKK which advocates the use of violence to achieve those goals, rather than through the use of peaceful means.

What Turkey demonstrates most clearly is that a bold, forceful and consistent foreign policy is, at the end of the day, one that is most effective in the Middle East. It has also shown that it can learn from its mistakes, as it did in Libya. Greater attention to the manner in which Turkey has been able to develop such an effective regional foreign policy policy could teach the US how to increase its own success in the Middle East as well.

جائزة نوبل للربيع العربي ممثلا في المرأة اليمنية

The article below, "The Nobel Peace Prize awarded to the Arab Spring is represented by a Yemeni Woman: Tawwakul Karman," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, and appeared in the Jerusalem newspaper, al-Quds,

ثلاثة هم الفائزون بجائزة نوبل للسلام: المرأة اليمنية المناضلة المجسدة في شخص السيدة توكل عبد السلام كرمان وباقة النساء المناضلات من

حولها في صفوف الثورة اليمنية من أمثال أروى عبده عثمان وسامية وفاطمة الأغبري وبشرى المقطري ونادرة عبد القدوس وهدى العطاس وناديا الكوكباني وسارة جمال وهند وآمنة النصيري ونبيلة الزبير وأسوان عثمان ومنى لقمان وسعاد عطا وأروى أحمد عون ، وأمل الباشا ومها البريهي وأروى الخطابي ووفاء الأكحلي، والفائز الثاني هو الربيع العربي ممثلا في ثورة اليمن العظيمة التي حافظت على سلميتها رغم استفزازات النظام الدموي المتآكل، والفائز الثالث هو المرأة العربية المناضلة بشكل عام من جميلة بوحيرد إلى الشهيدة ليلي السرميني ابنة ال 45 ربيعا والتي سقطت يوم الرابع من هذا الشهر برصاص القتلة من أتباع النظام الدموي في سوريا في بلدة تلبيسة قرب حمص أمام عيون الكاميرا ومن بعدها أمام عيون العالم.

توكل عبد السلام كرمان إمرأة تجسد أمة ناهضة تتململ بعد غياب طويل صنعه أعداء الأمة ووكلاؤهم المحليون وهي على وشك أن تكسر الأغلال وتطيح بالطغاة واحدا بعد الآخر. أمة ستضع الآن تاجا من الغار على جبين توكل الطاهر الشريف ابنة اليمن السعيد الواعد بإنجاب المزيد من المناضلات. لقد شرفت توكل كل الرجال والنساء والشباب والشابات العرب من الغلابى والمضطهدين والعاطلين عن العمل والباحثين عن لقمة عيش وجرعة كرامة والذين قرروا أن يثوروا ضد العملاء والخانعين والقتلة والمجرمين والفاسدين وأجهزة البلطجة والبلاطجة والشبيحة ودوائر المخابرات والقناصة والمرتزقة.

تكريم توكل اليوم من السيد ألفرد نوبل اعتراف بدور المرأة العربية الجديدة التي تصنع فجرا ومستقبلا لأمتها وتشق طريقا وعرة بين أكوام الخراب التي خلفها هؤلاء الطغاة في شرق البلاد وغربها، شمالها وجنوبها. وجائزة نوبل هذه صفعة حامية على جبين النظام الكالح الجاف القبيح الذي يوجه رصاصه لصدور أبناء اليمن الغر الميامين ولم يكتف بأكثر من 33 سنة حكم، خرب فيها البلاد وأذل العباد ونهب الثروات وفرق الناس إلى تجمعات قبلية وعرقية ودينية كي يسهل مهمة القبض على خناق الوطن، ثم أدخل أطياف الشعب اليمني في حروب داخلية وساوم على سيادة البلد حيث أعطى صكا لدول خارجية لملاحقة أبناء اليمن وقتلهم على أرض اليمن.

هذه الجائزة تكريم لكل نساء اليمن اللواتي صرخن في وجه الطاغية الأمي: إرحل إرحل. هذه الجائزة هدية لفتيات ميدان التحرير من الشهيدة سالي زهران إلى إسراء عبد الفتاح، المرشحة العربية الأخرى لنفس الجائزة، وأسماء محفوظ وأمينة الطنطاوية وزميلهن وائل غنيم المرشح الآخر لنيل الجائزة والآلاف الذين حولوا ميدان التحرير إلى موقع لميلاد مصر الجديدة المناضلة العائدة إلى أمتها بعد سنين الاغتراب . هذه الجائزة أيضا لك يا راضية نصرواي ولك يا لينا بن مهنا ، المرشحتين التونسيتين لنفس الجائزة، ولزميلاتكما المناضلات في الثورة التونسية العظيمة ولابن سيدي بوزيد الشهيد محمد بو العزيزي ونساء ورجال تونس الذي تسلحوا بأطواق الياسمين وأسقطواعصابة بن علي و ليلى والطرابلسي.

وهذه الجائزة لمناضلات الثورة الليبية من إيمان العبيدي وإسراء بن محمود وهدى أبو زيد إلى عائشة قدور وفاطمة بريدان وأمل بشير، وكل الشباب والشابات الذين طاردوا الطاغية وأولاده من بيت لبيت ومن شارع لشارع ومن زنقة لزنقة فولى هاربا كالجرذ يفتش عن دهليز أو جحر يختبئ فيه مع أوهامه التي يبدو أنه ما زال متمسكا بها.

وهذه الجائزة باقة من الورد تقدم للفتيات السوريات اللواتي يتحدين الرصاص والتعذيب والموت ويناضلن، كل واحدة بطريقتها، لوقف تقدم الجيش والمخابرات والشبيحة والأمن السري والعلني من المناضلة مي كساب إلى الحقوقية رزان زيتون إلى الشهيدة ليلى السرميني. إنها جائزة للشباب الذين يتحدون الموت ويخرجون في الليل والنهار رافعين شعارا واحدا تلتف حوله كل فئات الشعب: سوريا بدها حرية.

وهذه الجائزة اعتراف بالمرأة العربية المناضلة من عهود الاستعمار إلى عهود الطغاة من صفية زغلول في مصر إلى سناء المحيدلي في لبنان ومن دلال المغربي وليلى خالد في فلسطين، إلى جميلة بوحيرد في الجزائر. إنها هدية للمناضلات اللواتي عبدن الطريق نحو الثورة المباركة. من هدى شعراوي ونوال السعداوي إلى توجان الفيصل ولويزة حنون وأسيرات الحرية في سجون الاحتلال: غفران زامل وسنا عامر ودعاء الجيوسي ومريم أبو دقة وجيهان دحادحة وفاطمة الزق وصونا الراعي وغيرهن.

هذه الجائزة إقرار بأن المرأة العربية لم يعد دورها مقصورا على المطبخ وغرفة الولادة. لقد ساهم الربيع العربي في إعادة تأهيل المرأة لأخذ دورها الحقيقي في التنمية والبناء والنهضة والتطور والتقدم، كما ساهمت المرأة أيضا في صقل الربيع العربي وإعلاء الجانب الإنساني والاجتماعي والحضاري منه. لقد خرجت إلى الشارع لتشارك الزوج والأب والإبن والأخ والمعلم والموظف والتاجر والعالم والمبرمج والسائق في نسج خيوط فجر يكاد أن ينبلج من بقايا ليل يكاد أن يمّحي.

نتمنى أن تحرك هذه الجائزة العروق في بقية الشعوب العربية التي ما زالت تقرفص على السياج بانتظار انقشاع غبار االثورات في اليمن وسوريا. ونريد لهذه الجائزة أن تضخ عزيمة مضاعفة في نساء هذا الوطن لينزعن الصورة النمطية التي تصور المرأة العربية خانعة ساكنة طائعة وطيّعة ومهيضة الجناح التي كرسها المجتمع الذكوري والفكر المتمترس في مجاهل التاريخ الذي فصّـلوه على مقاس كراسيهم.

نتمنى لجائزة توكل أن تخترق الحدود الموصدة على ملايين النساء في بلدان مجاورة، محرومات حتى من حق قيادة السيارة أو المشي أو السفر بدون محرم حيث اختصرت الأنظمة المتخلفة والمسلحة بالفتاوى دور النساء على أن يكن كومة لحم فقط مغطاة بالسواد دون وجه أو أنف أو عينين أو عقل.

تحية للسيدة المناضلة توكل وتحية مماثلة لزوجها الفاضل محمد إسماعيل الذي وقف مساندا ومشجعا ولولاهذه العقلية المنفتحة والمتفتحة لما كنا نحتفل هذا اليوم بفوز توكل بهذه الجائزة الكبرى. تحية للشعب اليمني العظيم وهو يكتب الفصول الأخيرة في نهاية حكم هذا الطاغية الأبله الذي يصر أن يبقى هو وأولاده في السلطة حتى ولو على جثث الآلاف.

دعونا نفرح هذا اليوم مع الشعب اليمني ومع مناضلاته الماجدات. دعونا نفرح ليوم واحد على الأقل لهذا الانجاز الكبير قبل أن نستأنف المسيرات السلمية وحمل الشهداء إلى موائلهم الأخيرة في صباح الغد في تعز وحمص وسرت وصنعاء ودير الزور وبلد الوليد، حيث يصر هؤلاء الطغاة أن "يأخذوا حصتهم من دمنا قبل أن ينصرفوا"، أما نحن فلنا ما ليس يرضيهم "لنا المستقبل، ولنا في أرضنا ما نعمل"

عبد الحميد صيام*

* أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

القانون الدولي والاعتراف بالدول.. خلفية من أجل فلسطين

عبد الحميد صيام

This article, "International Law and its Acceptance by the International Community: the Case of Palestine," was written by guest author, Dr. Abd al-Hamid Siyyam, for the Jerusalem paper, al-Quds, September 22, 2011

تستعد منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية للتقدم للأمم المتحدة بطلب الاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية مستقلة على حدود عام 1967 في شهر أيلول الحالي موعد انعقاد دورة الجمعية العامة السادسة والستين التي يرئسها الممثل الدائم لقطر السيد ناصر عبد العزيز النصر.

ورغم الضغوطات والتهديدات الأمريكية الإسرائيلية التي تمارس على القيادة الرسمية وخاصة التلويح بوقف المساعدات المالية إلا أن الأخيرة ما زالت مصرة على التقدم بمثل هذا الطلب لمجلس الأمن وفي حالة استخدام الولايات المتحدة لحق النقض سيتم تحويل الطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بعد تفعيل قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام" الذي يخول الجمعية العامة بمناقشة الموضوع بسبب فشل مجلس الأمن ويكون للقرار المعتمد بغالبية الثلثين سلطة القانون ويصبح شرعيا لا غبار عليه مثل سلسة القرارات التي اتخذتها الجمعية العامة في معالجة أزمة السويس عام 1956 بعد أن فشل مجلس الأمن في التعامل مع العدوان الثلاثي بسبب الفيتوين الفرنسي والبريطاني.

سيكون لهذا القرار في حالة نجاحه قوة قانونية ومعنوية وسياسية هائلة فتصبح دولة فلسطين كيانا معترفا به دوليا. صحيح أن أجزاء من أراضي هذه الدولة واقع تحت إحتلال بلد أجنبي (إسرائيل) لكن دولة فلسطين المستقلة والمعترف بها ستعمل ضمن القانون الدولي لإنهاء الاحتلال بالمفاوضات بين بلدين مستقلين متكافئين ومن حق كل طرف أن يدفع باتجاه تحقيق الحد الأقصى من طموحاته وإذا ما حدث وتم الاتفاق على كافة المسائل الخلافية فسيتم حينئذ إبرام معاهدة سلام شاملة بين دولتين بضمانة المجتمع الدولي الممثل في الأمم المتحدة وفي حالة تعنت إسرائيل في الرضوخ لمتطلبات الاعتراف بالدولة الفلسطينية تستطيع هذه الدولة جرجرة إسرائيل إلى محكمة العدل الدولية وتستطيع كذلك التقدم بشكوى رسمية إلى محكمة الجنايات الدولية بعد انضمامها لعضوية المحكمة لملاحقة محرمي الحرب الإسرائيليين. إستخدام الولايات المتحدة للفيتو في مجلس الأمن سيسبب إحراجا شديدا لإدارة أوباما التي ما فتئت تتحدث عن قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة وعندما جاءت اللحظة الحاسمة لترجمة ما وعدت به تلك الإدارة ها هي تقف وحيدة أمام العالم لوأد تلك الخطوة مما سيزيد من عزلتها أمام المجتمع الدولي بما في ذلك حلفاؤها الأوروبيون وسيعلم العالم كله أن الولايات المتحدة فقط هي من يقف حجر عثرة في طريق إنشاء الدولة الفلسطينية. الخوف كل الخوف أن تكون السلطة الفلسطينية غير مستعدة للتعامل مع نتائج هذا القرار وتعود الأمور إلى سابقها وتعتبر القرار انتصارا معنويا "وكفي المؤمنين شر القتال" وتصبح تلك الدولة حبرا على ورق والقرار الجديد يضاف إلى عشرات بل مئات القرارات التي داست عليها إسرائيل أمام المجتمع الدولي دون رادع أو حساب أو حياء بسبب الدعم الأمريكي لتلك الدولة المارقة. وأريد أن أناقش هنا شروط قيام الدول والوضع القانوني الذي يحول كيانا ما إلى دولة رسمية على قدم المساواة أسوة بمائة وثلاث وتسعين دولة.

الدولة وشروط قيامها

استنادا إلى نتائج مؤتمر وستفاليا (ألمانيا اليوم) للسلام عام 1648 بين الدول والكيانات والإمارات الأوروبية المتنازعة، تم الاتفاق على أن هناك ثلاثة شروط لقيام الدولة ذات السيادة وهي: وجود شعب بشكل دائم ومستمر، في رقعة جغرافية محددة ، وحكومة تمارس سيادة على الأرض والشعب. وقد أضيف شرط رابع عام 1933 في معاهدة مونتفيديو بالأوروغواي وهو إعتراف دولي بتلك الدولة بحيث تستطيع الدخول في معاهدات واتفاقيات ثنائية أو متعددة الأطراف مع أية دولة تختار.

منذ تأسيس الأمم المتحدة عام 1945 تم الالتزام بالشروط الأربعة والعمل بها عند ضم أعضاء جدد للأمم المتحدة بشرط موافقة مجلس الأمن الذي يرفع توصية للجمعية العامة والتي بدورها تصوت على العضوية بأغلبية الثلثين. فمثلا تتوفر الشروط الثلاثة الأولى في "تايوان" لكنها ليست دولة معترفا بها بسبب وقوف الصين بالمرصاد لاستخدام الفيتو فيما لو تقدمت بطلب الإعتراف الدولي من مجلس الأمن. بورتو ريكو فيها حكومة منتخبة تمارس سيادة ناقصة على شعب في رقعة جغرافية محددة لأن السيادة العليا في يد الولايات المتحدة وهي لا تستطيع إقامة علاقات مستقلة دون رضى واشنطن ولذلك هي ليست دولة. حكومة كردستان العراق تمارس سيادة في رقعة جغرافية محددة وعلى شعب متجانس ومستقر لكنها ليست دولة لأن المعادلة الإقليمية قادرة على منع الاعتراف الدولي بها حتى لو أعلنت عن قيامها. وجمهورية قبرص التركية تتوافر فيها الشروط الثلاثة إلا الاعتراف الدولي حتى لو اعترفت بها تركيا. وإقليم كوسوفو يعاني من نفس المأزق حتى لو اعترفت به معظم دول أوروبا والولايات المتحدة إلا أن الإقليم ما زال لا يتمتع بالاعتراف الدولي القانوني رغم تمتعه بما يسمى في القانون "الاعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع" لأن الفيتو الروسي قادر على وأد المحاولة في المهد أو مقايضة الاعتراف بكوسوفو باعتراف دولي بجمهوريتي أبخازيا وأوسيتا الجنوبية في جمهورية جورجيا وهو أمر شبه مستحيل على الأقل الآن. أما أفغانستان تحت حكم حركة طالبان (1996-2001) فكانت دولة رغم أن هناك ثلاث دول فقط كانت تعترف بها هي السعودية والإمارات وباكستان. أما بقية دول المجموعة الدولية فكانت لا تعترف بحكومة أفغانستان لا بدولة أفغانستان. والعكس صحيح، فإن إعتراف عدد كبير بمنظمة التحرير الفلسطينية لا يعني إعترافا بدولة فلسطين لعدم توفر شرط قيام الدولة. فاعتراف الجامعة العربية ومنظمة التعاون الإسلامي ومجموعة دول عدم الانحياز لا بفلسطين كدولة بل بكيانية منظمة التحرير كممثل لشعب فلسطين الذي يناضل من أجل قيام الدولة. وللتذكير فقط فإن رسالة الاعتراف التي بعثها إسحاق رابين، رئيس وزراء إسرائيل آنذاك، للمرحوم ياسر عرفات، رئيس منظمة التحرير الفلسطينية، في 9 أيلول عام 1993 تمهيدا لاتفاقية أوسلو المشؤومة نصت بالحرف الواحد على إعتراف إسرائيل بمنظمة التحرير "بصفتها الممثل الشرعي (فقط دون كلمة وحيد) للشعب الفلسطيني"، بينما نصت رسالة ياسر عرفات "بالاعتراف بحق دولة إسرائيل في العيش بسلام وأمن" وشتان بين الاعترافين، فالأول اعترف بسلطة شرعية والثاني بدولة. إذن من المهم أن نفرق بين الاعتراف بالدولة والاعتراف بالحكومة وكذلك بين الإعتراف بدولة الأمر الواقع (تايوان) والدولة من الناحية القانونية (193 دولة من توفالو بآلافها العشرة إلى الصين الشعبية بملايينها الألف والثلاثمئة).

فالاعتراف الدولي بأية دولة شرط أساسي ويجب أن تقره الجمعية العامة بأغلبية الثلثين بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن كما حدث مؤخرا مع جمهورية جنوب السودان. إسرائيل مثلا، إعطيت شرعية ضمن قرار التقسيم 181 الصادر عن الجمعية العامة بتاريخ 29 تشرين الثاني 1947 الذي منح نفس الشرعية لقيام دولة عربية وأعلن ديفد بن غوريون قيام الدولة عشية الرابع عشر من أيار 1948 لكن الإعتراف بها لم يتم إلا بعد قيام مجلس الأمن بالتصويت على قرار الإعتراف رقم 69 بتاريخ 4 آذار1949 الذي أوصى الجمعية العامة بالإعتراف بإسرائيل. بتاريخ 11 أيار 1949 اعتمدت الجمعية العامة القرار 273 والذي شرعن وجود دولة ذات سيادة اسمها إسرائيل وصفها بأنها "دولة محبة للسلام تقبل التزاماتها المنصوص عليها في ميثاق الأمم المتحدة وهي قادرة وراغبة في تنفيذ تلك الإلتزامات". وكم كانت رؤية الجمعية العامة ضالة ومنحازة عندما وصفت ذلك الكيان بانه دولة محبة للسلام وملتزمة بنصوص الميثاق.

أما سحب الإعتراف بحكومة دولة ما فهو أمر جائز في القانون الدولي ونود هنا أن نذكر بأن الجمعية العامة طردت من عضويتها حكومة الفصل العتصري بجنوب إفريقيا عام 1974 لكن ذلك لا يعني سحب الاعتراف بالدولة بل سحب الإعتراف بالحكومة العنصرية وعندما انهارت الحكومة العنصرية عادت الحكومة المنتخبة لتملأ المقعد الخالي في قاعة الجمعية العامة في 23 حزيران 1994 .

إذن آلية الإعتراف الطبيعية لا تصل إلى الجمعية العامة إلا بناء على توصية من مجلس الأمن. ومن هنا نعود إلى المربع الأول ونقول إن الولايات المتحدة قادة على إجهاظ فكرة الاعتراف بدولة فلسطين قبل إكتمال شروط الولادة وتكون الجمعية العامة التي ستعقد جلسة طارئة خاصة تحت سلطة قرار "الاتحاد من أجل السلام"هي المخولة شرعيا بمناقشة هذا الطلب واعتماده بأغلبية الثلثين.

شروط قيام دولة فلسطين من الناحية القانونية

وعلى فرض أن الجمعية العامة إعتمدت القرار فالسؤال الآن هل شروط قيام دولة فلسطينية مستقلة ذات سيادة كاملة أسوة ببقية الدول متوفرة حاليا؟ هل هناك رقعة جغرافية محددة ذات حدود مرسمة يسكنها شعب واحد متجانس ذو ذاكرة جماعية واحدة وفيها حكومة قادرة على ممارسة السيادة على كافة أبناء الشعب في تلك الرقعة الجغرافية المحددة؟ الإجابة ليست صعبة على هذه الأسئلة فالرقعة الجغرافية غير واضحة المعالم وممزقة وغير متصلة ليس فقط بين جناحي الوطن في الضفة وغزة بل وفي كانتونات الضفة وخاصة في منطقة القدس. كما أن الشعب في تلك المناطق مقطع إلى أجزاء كل جزء تحكمه قوانين مناقضة ومخالفة للقوانين التي تخضع لها المناطق الأخرى، فليس سكان القدس الشرقية كسكان غزة ولا المجموعتان كثالثتهما في الضفة. بالإضافة إلى أن هناك استبعادا لغالبية الشعب الفلسطيني في المنفى والذي يشكل الغالبية من المجموع الكلي للشعب الفلسطيني. والأخطر من ذلك وجود مجموعات سكانية طارئة لا تنتمي للشعب الفلسطيني داخل نفس الرقعة الجغرافية وتخضع لمنظومة قوانين مناقضة تماما لقوانين الدولة الفلسطينية. وبالتالي سيكون هناك مجموعتان من السكان في رقعة جغرافية واحدة تحكم كل مجموعة منظومة قوانين مختلفة بل ومتناقضة، وهذا يخل بمبدأ سيادة السلطة المركزية التي ستجد نفسها غير قادرة على إنفاذ أي قانون في مناطق المستوطنين الصهاينة، ومن المؤكد أنهم سيشكلون تحديا لهيبتها وسلطتها مرتكزين على حائط الإسناد القوي المتمثل في دولة إسرائيل.

إذن فالشروط الثلاثة غير متوفرة لا الشعب ولا الأرض ولا السلطة القادرة على ممارسة السيادة على الإثنين. أما عن القدرة على عقد الاتفاقيات بعد توفر الاعتراف الدولي فليس لهذا البند إلا قيمة معنوية إذ إن الكيان المنبثق عن هذا الاعتراف غير قادر على استقبال ضيف يحل زائرا على السلطة نفسها التي لا تسيطر على حدود ومعابر تلك الدولة ولا مجالها الجوي ولا شريطها الساحلي ولا الحركة من وإلى الدولة.

ترجمة القرار إلى واقع على الأرض

نخلص إلى نتيجة أن التقدم بطلب إلى الجمعية العامة بالاعتراف بدولة فلسطينية حتى ولو نجح بغالبية الثلثين (129 دولة على الأقل) لا يعدو عن كونه انتصارا معنويا لا يمكن ترجمته على أرض الواقع حتى لو أعلن الفلسطينيون قيام دولتهم كما فعلوا في 15 تشرين الثاني عام 1988. لكن القرار يمكن أن يكون سندا قانونيا لشن حملة قانونية لطرد الاحتلال بالمقاومة السلمية المتواصلة وتوجه الشعب الفلسطيني بكامله لطرد المستوطنين وهدم الجدار العازل وإعادة السيطرة على كل شبر من الأراضي المحتلة وعدم إسقاط الحق التاريخي للاجئين الفلسطينيين في ديارهم الأصلية.

فعرض قضية الاعتراف أمام الجمعية العامة في شهر أيلول (سبتمبر) يجب أن يتزامن مع مظاهرات سلمية شاملة ومتواصلة لا تضعف ولا تكل ولا تمل ولا تنهزم ولا تتراخى ولاتتراجع ولا تتوقف تحت أي ظرف من الظروف. يجب إنطلاق المظاهرات العارمة يوم مناقشة الموضوع أمام الجمعية العامة من رام الله والقدس وكل مدن وقرى وبلدات الضفة والقطاع وعمان وبيروت والقاهرة والخرطوم وتونس والجزائر والرباط وإسطنبول وجاكرتا وإسلام أباد وباريس ولندن ومدريد وأثينا ونيويورك. عندها ستصبح الدولة الفلسطينة المستقلة أدنى إلى التحقيق من هذه المناورات التي نخشى أن يكون الهدف منها تسجيل انتصارات معنوية فقط. فالدولة الفلسطينية المستقلة تصنعها إرادة الجماهير المناضلة المصممة على تحقيق الانتصار لا المفاوضات العبثية ولا المناورات المكشوفة ولا المقذوفات البدائية التي تطلق من غزة لأغراض حزبية ونادرا ما تؤذي أحدا. وكما استطاعت الشعوب العربية أن تطيح برؤوس ثلاثة من كبار الطغاة والحبل على الجرار فحري بشعب الانتفاضتين والكفاح الطويل المرير وقوافل الشهداء ورائد العلم والإبداع أن يخرج إلى الشوراع في كافة أنحاء العالم بطريقة حضارية سلمية منظمة واعية ليفرض على العالم قيام دولته المستقلة في الواقع لا في العالم الافتراضي. دولة مستقلة ذات سيادة مترابطة تتحكم في حدودها ومواردها وتمارس سيادتها على كل شبر من أراضيها معافاة من سرطان الاستطيان وجدار الفصل العنصري. دولة تكون حاضنة وطنية للشعب الفلسطيني كله ومجسدة لآماله وحقه في العودة وتقرير المصير فعلا كما نص على ذلك قرار الجمعية العامة 3236 (1974). وأقترح على السلطة الفلسطينية ومفاوضيها أن يراجعوا هذا القرار المهم للتعرف على رزمة حقوق الشعب الفلسطيني التي أقرتها الأمم المتحدة إن كانوا نسوا أو تناسوا تلك الحقوق.

__________________________________________________________________

*أستاذ جامعي وكاتب عربي مقيم في نيويورك

US Foreign Policy in Post-SOFA Iraq

The end of 2011 will mark a watershed in U.S.-Iraqi relations. The Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) that the United States and Iraq signed in December 2008 calls for all American forces to leave Iraq by December 31, 2011. While it is still unclear whether U.S. troops will remain in Iraq beyond this year, there is little doubt that U.S.-Iraqi relations will undergo significant change. What will that change look like? Will it mean a substantial decline in U.S. influence in Iraq? In light of Iraq’s strategic importance both in the Middle East, and to U.S. regional interests, as well as the importance of its continued efforts at democratization, what form should U.S. policy take after the drawdown of U.S. troops?

U.S. policy in post-SOFA Iraq will need to focus on five main areas of mutual interest to both countries, all of which are interrelated. Their focal points include: security, governance and institution building, democracy promotion, economic growth and development, and regional, bi-lateral relations. As a proviso, the United States will need to be sensitive to the legacy of tensions that developed with Iraq following the 2003 invasion that overthrew Saddam Hussein’s Ba'thist regime. An effective U.S. foreign policy will require treading softly as it pursues its national interests in Iraq.

The following article was published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute. It can be read in its entirety by clicking here.

Syria’s Arab Spring: Phase Two of the Crisis

Guest writer Ghaidaa Hetou has conducted extensive research in Syria during the past year. She is currently writing her PhD dissertation on alliance behavior in Syrian foreign policy and the determinants of Syrian foreign policy making between 1970 and 2010.

It has been six months since protests erupted in Syria. The current political sluggishness in Syria, where calm has not been completely restored by the government, nor have the protests gained traction in major cities such as Damascus and Aleppo, has ushered in the next phase in the ongoing crisis.

During the first six months, various opposition groups have insisted on the peaceful nature of the protests. However, violent clashes that have occurred in Jisr al-Shughur, Homs, Hama and other towns. In addition, the declarations of the armed Syrian opposition committee have marred the efforts of thousands of Syrians who have continued to peacefully brave the wrath of the totalitarian apparatus of Bashar al-Asad's Ba’thist regime.

The conflicting efforts of protesters and armed rebels mirror the ideological competition among the various opposition groups. From the secular left to the religious conservatives, such as members of the Muslim Brotherhood, the contrasting political agendas of the Syrian opposition are impeding its ability to develop a united front. It has now become the norm for these various opposition groups to send their delegates to Washington, Europe and Moscow to meet separately with government representatives. A number of Syrian opposition conferences - in Turkey, Qatar, France and Germany - have tried to narrow the gap between the opposition group’s conflicting ideological agendas, but with little success.

On the domestic front, two minority groups in Syria, the Kurds and Christians, have adopted a position of neutrality towards the uprising. Their position has been reinforced, especially after recent chants of some demonstrators of “" عربية, عربية “"عمر, عمر” and “ المسيحي على بيروت أو للتابوت”, the first saying that this is solely an “Arab movement,” the second using the slogan of “Omar” in an effort to underscore the Sunni nature of the movement, and the last chant stating that the Christians have two choices, either to leave Syria for Beirut or in a casket. These chants prevail among groups that are calling for armed confrontation. In a demographically diverse society, social movements can easily, in an effort to garner popularity, alienate minority groups who might have otherwise tipped the scale in their favor.

What has ushered in the next phase in Syria’s crisis is precisely the country’s stagnant situation, with neither the government nor the opposition able to achieve their objectives. It is clearly a time of reassessment of means and ends by both sides in the conflict. Recent statements by opposition figures, like Ammar al-Qurabi in Moscow, indicate that they are ready for a “conditional dialogue with the regime.” From its part, the Syrian government has recently encouraged its allies, especially Moscow and Iran, to host these negotiations. Dr. Nabil al-Arabi, head of the Arab League, visited Damascus today to hand the Syrian president an Arab endorsed proposal containing 13 provisions to end the crises.

Due to lack of a unified opposition, any perceived attempt by one opposition group to negotiate with the government is sidetracked by another group, accusing it of treason and short selling Syrian sacrifices to date. Unfortunately, the stagnant situation, characterized by protests, bloody crackdowns and confrontations, will continue, until a number of opposition groups are able to consolidate their positions and form a majority in order to coordinate and legitimize their strategies.

The dust that has been stirred up by the sudden political awakening in Syria is settling. The euphoria that the protestors created by breaking the wall of fear and silence is being replaced, among many Syrians, by a frantic search for a political outlet, reflecting decades of frustration. The political upheaval that was silenced in 1962 has reawakened with the same political fury that prevailed in the 1950s in Syria, namely the struggle between conservatives and progressives, large urban areas and their suburbs, and between more prosperous cities and smaller towns that are outside the economic mainstream. This struggle manifests itself in a dispute over political identities and loyalties, which are all symptoms of a painful and ongoing process of state formation and the slow evolution of what it means to be a “citizen” in post-colonial Middle East.

Nevertheless, one thing is absolutely clear. Syria is on the road to transition and there is no possibility of a return to the status quo ante.

The Tea Party and the Middle East

As President Barack Obama's approval ratings decline, pushed ever downward by a global and domestic recession that shows little sign of abating, the prospects of a Republican in the White House in 2012 loom ever larger. It is not at all out of the question that, if a Republican is elected, she or he will have strong ties to the Tea Party.

Thus far, little attention has been given to the implications of a Tea Party dominated White House for US foreign policy, especially in one of the world's most volatile regions, the Middle East. What would be the consequences of a Tea Party administration for US policy and interests in that region?

As others have already been noted, there are (at least) two trends in the Tea Party movement regarding US foreign policy. One, a neo-isolationism advocated by the supporters of Ron Paul (but perhaps by those of Rick Perry as well), reflects the isolationism that characterized much of US history prior to World War II.

The other, which argues for the decisive use of force against our enemies in the region, calls for strong support for Israel and relying on it to fight terrorism in the Middle East and to help restrain Iran. This policy is considered especially important for the US and the international community's efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. At least two candidates with close ties to the Tea Party, Michelle Bachmann and Rick Santorum, fall into this camp.

The problem with the Tea Party is that it has no policy for reconciling declining American economic power - both in absolute and relative terms (especially in relation to China) - with sustaining US global influence. The US has faced severe constraints in fighting two wars simultaneously in Iraq and Afghanistan. If the US were forced to militarily engage Iran, especially if it were to attack Israel, as well as simultaneously confront an outbreak of hostilities in the Korean Peninsula, an unlikely but possible scenario, the US would be hard pressed to mount the forces necessary to meet such as a challenge.

Tea Party advocates either call for US withdrawal from much of the world to improve the budget deficit or the use of military force to intimidate our enemies. Both of these perspectives fail to appreciate the implications of our economic crisis for US "hard power" (the use of military force). They also fail to comprehend the opportunities for enhancing US policy in the area of "soft power" (public diplomacy, technical and educational support, and direct engagement of our adversaries where appropriate).

Tea Party supporters make an important point when they argue that US government spending has outstripped its ability to pay for this spending. Clearly the US economy is experiencing serious economic difficulties caused largely by the mortgage lending debacle that came to a head in 2008.

But do the US' financial problems imply the need for an isolationist strategy? Likewise, is there an alternative to the second policy prescription, namely a reliance on force as the primary element of our foreign policy in the Middle East? Is there not a third way that could achieve our objectives in the Middle East but without "breaking the bank"?

As the "Arab Spring" has shown, there is considerable convergence between Arab and US political interests in the Middle East. The warmth of the Libyan people towards the US over the past 6 months, especially now that the Libyan dictator, Mu'ammar al-Qaddafi has been overthrown, is just one indicator of those interests. It suggests that, even in a country that has been under repressive authoritarian rule, citizens can both quickly embrace democracy and reject decades of anti-American and and anti-Western rhetoric and propaganda.

Rather than making an effort to better understand the political, cultural and economic dynamics that currently engulf the Middle East, Tea Party candidates have, to date, opted instead for a simplistic approach to US foreign policy. Either we need to withdraw into "fortress America" or hit our enemies hard when they challenge our interests in the Middle East or elsewhere. The problem is that neither of these approaches will work, Indeed, they both pose a serious threat to the US' national interests in the region.

What, then, are the dynamics that Tea Partiers have failed to grasp? First, the Middle East is ripe for serious and positive change. It has a "youth bulge" which means that a large percentage of the region's youth, 70%, is under the age of 30. As my current research with Iraqi and other youth in the region indicates, many of these youth admire American popular culture and values, especially our values of freedom of expression and creative freedom.

Although most youth in the Middle East have not had the benefit of a social science education, either in secondary schools or at the university level, many intuitively understand that there is a strong relationship between individual freedoms and personal success. They also realize that the countries where individual freedoms reign are precisely those countries that enjoy prosperity and political stability - key factors for these youth if they are to have any hope in the future.

Second, Tea Partiers fail to see the need to reach out to other cultures which they often assume are hostile to American values. Many Tea Partiers have wrapped themselves in a mythical American Golden Age during which the United States was supposedly close to being a perfect society.

While the US did make tremendous progress throughout the late 19th and 20th centuries to become the world's industrial and military superpower, such thinking forgets that such growth had its dark side - the political and economic marginalization of women and African Americans, labor strife, the Great Depression, two world wars and the struggle against communism. This is not to direct criticism at the US, but simply to point out that selective readings of history do not produce good domestic or foreign policy.

The US should be proud of its values and accomplishments. The desire of so much of the world's population to emigrate to the US is a striking reminder of that. However, we are now a global society in which "Golden Age" politics, in whatever form, no longer has a place. Inter-cultural understanding is not a matter of being "politically correct." Rather, it is absolutely necessary that our political leaders make a serious effort to understand the cultures of the Middle East and engage its peoples so that they can make the most effective decisions as they affect US interests in the region.

While Israel is a strong and trusted ally, the idea that we can rely on Israel alone to pursue American interests in the Middle East is naive. To link US support for Israel to Christian Biblical injunctions is no substitute for a rational foreign policy, nor is it in the interest of Israel, much less the peoples of the Middle East. As the most prominent Tea Party candidate to view the Middle East through the prism of the Bible, Michelle Bachman's advocacy of a foreign policy based on her interpretations of Biblical texts is a strong example of why our Founding Fathers sought to keep religion out of politics.

In the Christian world, the idea that God has bestowed His (Her?)grace on a particular group of people brought us the the Crusades, the Spanish Inquisition, the 100 Years War, and many other examples of religious intolerance. Voltaire noted the absurdity of the notion of a "Chosen People" in Candide when he described the (Christian) Bulgars and the (Muslim) Ottoman Turks praying to God for victory over their enemy as the sun began to rise over the battlefield on which they would fight later that day.

The US has lost many allies in the Middle East in recent years. Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Yemen, and Libya (yes Qaddafi supplied the US with intelligence after agreeing to end his WMD program in 2006) are the most prominent examples. Likewise, Israel finds itself more isolated than ever in the Middle East.

With the election of an Islamist government in 2002, Israel no longer has a close ally in Turkey. Following Husni Mubarak's ouster in Egypt, ties with that country have deteriorated as well. Turkey's recent recall of its ambassador from Israel and the conflict with Egypt over containing Hamas in the Gaza Strip are only the most recent examples of Israel's deteriorating relations with its former allies.

If the Tea Partiers sincerely want to reduce the deficit, enhance our influence in the Middle East, and help strengthen Israel, our closest ally in the region, they need to eschew basing foreign policy on Biblical injunctions, and prescribing withdrawal, or an exclusive use of force as the main tools in the US' foreign policy arsenal. The NATO success in Libya is probably not going to be replicated elsewhere in the region anytime soon (although US and EU cooperation in squeezing Syria economically may end up ousting the Ba'thist regime of Bashar al-Asad as well).

Using American technical expertise in the Middle East, much as it has been done by developing Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan, should become the model for encouraging economic growth and development, along with improvements in education, health care, housing and agriculture. Such assistance, especially if it is based on local needs (rather than prescribed by the West), can help to develop close ties with the countries of the Middle East. There is a reason why developed countries do not engage in wars or experience serious political instability - the citizens of these countries have very little incentive to engage in such activity, especially when they have hope in the future.

Offering US technical assistance (a great way to put unemployed American professionals to work overseas), offering Middle Easterners scholarships to study at American universities, and engaging the peoples of the Middle East, especially youth, whether thorough social media and/or exchange programs, would cost much less than military engagement and building new weapons systems that were appropriate for an earlier era of wars among nation-states, but now are much less effective in fighting terrorism and "asymmetric war."

Engaging the youth who have been the main force behind the Arab Spring will demonstrate that our rhetoric of supporting democracy has teeth. Many Middle Eastern youth realize that autocrats such as Qaddafi used anti-Zionism as a propaganda tool to distract attention from domestic repression and lack of government services. If the US can move forward the creation of Palestinian state, living side by side in peace with Israel, along with engaging the peoples of the region, much of the region's anti-American rhetoric and radicalism will dissipate.

As we approach the 10th anniversary of September 11, 2001, all those who aspire to the US presidency owe it to the American people to offer them well thought through foreign policy alternatives. We need to develop a smart foreign policy in the Middle East which views the peoples of the region as potential allies, not as inherently hostile to our interests and way of life. With the stakes so high in the Middle East, and with the economic challenges facing the US, empty rhetoric is clearly unpatriotic.