Genève II annonce le retour imminent des jihadistes tunisiens

Guest contributor, Dr. Alaya Alani, is Professor of Contemporary History at al-Manouba University, Tunisia
 

Genève II ouvre des perspectives et donne une lueur d’espoir aux Syriens qui vivent au rythme du terrorisme depuis plus de trois ans. Cependant, le soulagement qu’ils connaîtraient prochainement avec l’éventuel cessez-le-feu et la fin des hostilités entre les belligérants aurait des effets néfastes sur d’autres peuples arabes dont le nôtre, et pour cause. L’une des retombées de ce congrès international, c’est le retour de nos jeunes jihadistes qui ont servi de combustibles à cette guerre fratricide. 

Ils seront, très bientôt, parmi nous, ce qui veut dire que la scène tunisienne risque fort de suppléer à celle de la Syrie d’autant plus que ces jhadistes ont acquis une expérience indéniable en matière de manipulation d’armes. Les filles parmi eux excellent dans les opérations suicidaires sans compter leurs prouesses dans le jihad du sexe. Donc, il faut s’attendre au débarquement de toute une armada terroriste, comme nous l’affirme note invité qui nous fait part, toutefois, des plans que le pouvoir politique devrait mettre à exécution afin de prévenir ce danger qui gangrène notre société et qui menace de nous faire vivre le syndrome syrien.  

               

-Le Temps : Les Etats Unis viennent de classer Ansar Charia comme étant une organisation terroriste, quelles en sont les répercussions en Tunisie et en Libye en cette période précise?

-M Allani : tout d’abord, cette décision découle de la conviction des Américains que ce courant commence à s’étendre et à menacer leurs intérêts d’autant plus qu’il a un agenda déclaré et un autre qui est occulté. Le premier consiste à lutter contre l’Occident comme le faisaient les Arabes afghans. Quant au second, il se rapporte au soutien des organisations jihadistes surtout ceux qui sont liés à Al Qaeda. Ensuite, le fait de cataloguer seulement Ansar Charia de l’Afrique du Nord et non pas ceux du Yémen et d’ailleurs est l’esquisse d’une mise en garde de ceux des autres pays qui sont, ainsi, avertis qu’ils connaîtraient le même sort si jamais ils oseraient toucher aux intérêts américains et occidentaux sachant que ce courant se trouve dans sept pays arabes. 

D’autre part, le classement de Ansar Charia de Tunisie comme un courant terroriste est une prémisse de démantèlement des camps d’entraînement établis comme des centres de recrutement des jihadistes pour la Syrie, ces centres n’ont plus de raison d’être, étant donné que la question syrienne est, dorénavant, soumise aux négociations et non plus à la guerre. Ce classement constitue, également, un début à l’encerclement des courants jihadistes de Libye après que les rapports solides entre l’islam politique et les jihadistes se sont clarifiés, ce qui est une entrave à l’épanouissement des courants libéraux comme il prépare la mise en place d’un noyau d’une armée et d’une police dont l’entraînement se fait actuellement à l’étranger. 

Ce noyau doit travailler dans de nouvelles conditions qui nécessitent la dissolution de plusieurs milices appartenant aux courants religieux. Il en découle que classer Ansar Charia de Libye comme une organisation terroriste est de nature à faciliter la tâche de constituer ces forces officielles qui dépendront directement à l’Etat et qui seront capables d’imposer la sécurité et la loi. Sur le plan interne, l’incrimination de ces jihadistes va permettre d’aplanir le terrain devant le Dialogue national, de créer des conditions favorables aux prochaines élections et d’installer des institutions démocratiques dans le pays.

-Comment vous expliquez le timing de la décision américaine?

-Il est significatif, car après la crise structurelle que connaît l’islam politique dans les pays du printemps arabe, les Occidentaux craignent que les organisations salafistes jihadistes n’occupent ce vide pour s’installer dans ces pays.  Et il y a des informations qui circulent selon lesquelles ces derniers seraient en train de recruter entre trois et quatre mille Tunisiens et Libyens pour les préparer à accomplir des attentats contre les intérêts occidentaux dans ces deux pays. 

Ce qu’on pourrait remarquer c’est que la coordination entre la Tunisie, l’Algérie et la Libye, qui a pris forme, dernièrement lors de la visite du premier ministre Sellal à la région, était concomitante à la décision de classement de Ansar Charia comme une organisation terroriste. Ce qui veut dire que l’opération de démantèlement du triangle jihadiste, mis en place après le printemps arabe et liant ces trois pays, a entamé sa phase décisive, et il se peut qu’aux prochains jours il y ait des arrestations de quelques symboles de ce courant.  

Mais il ne faut pas oublier que ces organisations jihadistes, dont l’effet peut se réduire, ne meurent pas et attendent toujours des conditions favorables pour reprendre à nouveau leurs activités ; et j’entends par là la faiblesse du pouvoir central, la propagation des manifestations de la marginalisation et de la misère, l’absence des libertés et la médiocrité de l’enseignement. Ce sont les conditions idéales de leur épanouissement.  

-Les informations se sont contredites à propos de l’arrestation de Abou Iyadh, le lieu de cette capture et les parties qui ont exécuté cette mission. Est-ce qu’il était arrêté ou pas, selon vous ?

-Cette question n’est pas importante en soi, ce qui important c’est de savoir, d’une part, pourquoi a-t-on annoncé son arrestation avant la fin d’année 2013, d’une part, et avant sa catégorisation comme terroriste de la part des Etats Unis, de l’autre. L’information de sa capture a perturbé ses partisans en Tunisie qui planifiaient des actes terroristes à l’occasion du jour de l’an, et elle a eu un impact positif sur la situation sécuritaire dans le pays. 

Quant à la Libye, les Américains sont dorénavant convaincus de l’implication de Ansar Charia dans le meurtre de leur ambassadeur à Benghazi et dans les événements de leur ambassade de Tunisie en septembre 2012. D’ailleurs, c’est ce qui explique le fait qu’ils aient inscrit son nom sur la liste du terrorisme mondial. Il s’agit là de questions touchant à leur sûreté nationale et qu’ils ne pourraient, donc, pas négliger. Il se peut que Abou Iyadh soit arrêté par des milices libyennes ou bien placé sous leur contrôle, et qu’il puisse être livré, ultérieurement, après que son organisation est poursuivie et qualifiée de terroriste.  

-Si Abou Iyadh était capturé, il serait livré à la Tunisie ou bien à d’autres parties, d’après vous ?

-Il est demandé par plusieurs pays dont les Etats Unis, ce qui rend les chances de sa livraison à la Tunisie très minimes. Cependant, il pourrait quitter la Libye à travers les frontières du sud mal gardées pour s’installer dans le Sahara africain pendant un certain temps. Je suis persuadé que serrer l’étau autour de Abou Iyadh et des leaders de Ansar Charia à Derna et Benghazi provoquera des dissidences au sein de ces courants entre les tenants du changement du nom  de l’organisation et la limitation de ses activités à la prêche et ceux qui s’attachent à l’action armée et au renforcement de  leur identification à Al Qaeda, et ce courant est majoritaire au sein de ces courants jihadistes dans le monde arabe. Je pense que les organisations de Ansar Charia vont entrer, prochainement, dans une phase de repli et que l’aile radicale va rejoindre directement Al Qaeda, et il se peut qu’on assiste, dans les jours qui viennent, à de nouvelles appellations de ces organisations avec de nouveaux agendas.  

-Quels sont les objectifs de la coordination tuniso-algéro-libyenne dans le domaine sécuritaire entreprise dernièrement ?

-Je crois que la reprise de cette coordination tourne autour de l’échange des informations à propos de l’emplacement de ces courants terroristes dans ces pays maghrébins, des CV  d’un nombre important des jihadistes ayant rejoint Ansar Charia après le printemps arabe et des objectifs proches et lointains des symboles de ce courant et leurs stratégies en Afrique.

-Par quoi expliquez-vous l’intérêt que prêtent les Etats Unis et la France à l’Afrique du Nord?  

-Cette concentration trouve son explication dans la grande importance qu’a l’Afrique, pour l’Europe et les EU, étant donné que ce continent est vierge au niveau des richesses minières et pétrolières. Cet intérêt s’est accru avec l’invasion chinoise grandissante qui continue depuis de longues années et aussi avec l’approche de la date d’épuisement des réserves pétrolières au Moyen Orient qui disparaîtront dans deux décennies et demie.

-L’Algérie a un grand rendez-vous au mois d’avril prochain avec les élections présidentielles, croyez-vous que la menace terroriste soit l’un des thèmes de la campagne électorale ?

-Je pense que les candidats sont face à deux questions majeures, les réformes politiques et économiques et les répercussions sécuritaires au Mali et à l’Afrique du Nord. Pour ce qui est des premières, il va sans dire que seuls les programmes les plus convaincants qui seront acceptés, vu le caractère vital de ces secteurs. Et face aux défis actuels, l’intérêt de l’Algérie réside dans des réformes profondes au niveau de la participation politique et dans le domaine de la presse ainsi que dans la lutte contre la corruption. 

Dans ce cadre, le procès fait aux hommes d’affaires constitue un avertissement pour tous ceux qui font l’objet de suspicion. La question sécuritaire jouira, également, d’une grande attention d’autant plus que les frontières de l’Algérie avec tous ses voisins connaissent une grande effervescence. Toutefois, elle a, dernièrement, réussi à faire accepter sa médiation entre le mouvement « Azawad » et le gouvernement central du Mali, ce qui aura des conséquences positives au niveau de la maîtrise de la sécurité au nord de ce pays et du renforcement de la lutte contre les terroristes qui pourraient revenir à cette région au cas où ils seraient encerclés en Libye et dans les autres pays du Sahel africain. C’est pourquoi il est dans l’intérêt de l’Algérie de participer à instaurer une stabilité sécuritaire au nord et ce en essayant de persuader le gouvernement central de la nécessité de respecter les droits culturels des habitants de cette région et d’améliorer leurs conditions de vie économique et sociale.

-Le phénomène des filles tunisiennes suicidaires en Iraq et sur les frontières syro-turques s’est propagé ces derniers jours. Faut-il y voir la détermination du courant jihadiste à entreprendre une guerre générale où il ferait participer des hommes et des femmes ?

-Je pense que l’intégration des filles tunisiennes dans ces opérations kamikazes constitue une imitation des filles suicidaires au sein du mouvement Hamas en Palestine. Ce qui est intéressant à savoir c’est que toutes les suicidaires tunisiennes, âgées entre vingt et vingt-quatre ans, ont subi un lavage de cerveau et que la plupart d’entre elles sont d’un niveau culturel très limité. Ajoutons à cela que certaines d’entres elles ont des liens familiaux avec des jihadistes. 

La présence de l’élément féministe tunisien dans ce domaine relate une fragilité à l’intérieur de ces catégories sociales dont on exploite la situation en la quasi absence du contrôle et de la vigilance de l’Etat et de la société civile. Le recrutement de jihadistes femmes a une signification politique et non pas religieux, parce que le jihad, d’après la religion, est exclusivement une affaire d’hommes, les femmes, elles, devraient se contenter de préparer le repas aux jihadistes et de prodiguer des soins aux blessés. Sa participation au jihad en Palestine est justifiée par certains chercheurs par le caractère général de la lutte contre la colonisation israélienne. Cependant, la présence de femmes jihadistes en dehors de ce pays est le produit d’exégèses qui sont exploités par des agendas politiques et partisans et non pas religieux.

-Quelle est la réalité des jihadistes européens ?

-C’est une vérité, et leur nombre dépasse les neuf cents. Ils sont éparpillés en Afrique du Nord et en Syrie, la plupart d’entre eux appartiennent à l’AQMI et à Ansar Charia. Le retour de ces jihadistes à leurs pays constitue un danger pour la sûreté nationale de ces derniers, eu regard aux compétences qu’ils ont acquises en matière de ceinture d’explosifs et les opérations suicidaires, d’une façon générale.  

-Comment devrait-on, à votre avis, traiter les jihadistes se trouvant actuellement à l’étranger et, notamment, en Syrie et qui s’apprêtent à rentrer ?

-Je pense qu’il y a environ trois mille jihadistes tunisiens à l’étranger répartis sur la Syrie, la Libye l’Iraq, l’Afghanistan et le Mali et même la Tchétchénie. Le plus grand nombre se trouve dans la région du Maghreb où leur présence est concentrée en Libye qui abriterait dans les deux mille, et en Syrie où ils seraient un millier. Ailleurs, leur nombre ne dépasserait pas les quelques dizaines. Ce qui est inquiétant c’est que ces jihadistes tunisiens agissent au sein des courants vouant loyauté à Al Qaeda tels que le front Al Nosra, Daâch, connus pour leur extrémisme et leur caractère sanguinaire. 

Le nouveau gouvernement devrait se préparer à leur retour d’autant plus que la poursuite de Ansar Charia en Libye aboutira tôt ou tard à l’expatriation des jihadistes tunisiens. Pour ce qui est de la Syrie, le démarrage de Genève 2 va, certainement, accélérer le retour de ces jihadistes. C’est pour toutes ces raisons que le gouvernement de Mehdi Jomâa devrait penser à la conception d’un programme de réhabilitation de ces jihadistes qui reviendront des champs de bataille syrien et iraquien et aussi libyen. Le programme en question devrait être exhaustif regroupant les dimensions sécuritaire, économique et idéologique, en ce sens qu’il faudrait procéder à des enquêtes autour des processus suivis par ces jihadistes, les armes avec lesquelles ils se sont entraînés et les opérations auxquelles ils ont participé. 

Ce programme devrait contenir des révisions idéologiques auxquelles ils seraient soumis avec la participation d’hommes de religion, de sociologues et de psychologues. il se dégagerait de ces révisions des textes insistant sur la nécessité de se départir de la violence et d’arrêter de s’attaquer au pouvoir en place, et un contrôle sécuritaire de ces jihadistes pour une période pour s’assurer qu’ils ne s’inscrivent pas encore une fois dans l’action jihadiste. Il faudrait, également, leur accorder des subventions pour leur permettre d’intégrer le circuit économique. Je suis persuadé que le gouvernement de M jomâa est capable, avec ses personnalités indépendantes, d’entamer ce programme qui se poursuivra, certainement, avec le gouvernement post-élections.

-Est-ce  que les pays frères et amis de la Tunisie pourraient lui prêter main forte en vue d’encercler le danger terroriste et de permettre à la démocratie tunisienne naissante de se bâtir sur des bases saines ?

-Je crois que la solution de ce problème épineux du terrorisme reste du ressort des Tunisiens et ce à travers l’ouverture de canaux d’un vrai dialogue et le programme dont on a parlé plus haut. Cependant, l’extirper depuis ses racines est un travail difficile à entreprendre tout seul ; pour venir à bout de ce terrorisme, il faut qu’il y ait une coopération à l’échelle maghrébine, arabe et internationale, que ce soit au niveau de la coordination sécuritaire, de l’échange des renseignements, ou bien dans les domaines économiques et sociales. Et dans ce cadre, je crois que le plan Marshall algérien pour la Tunisie sera le plus approprié et le plus efficace pour lutter contre ce fléau du terrorisme.  

Ce plan profite aux Tunisiens et aux Algériens sur le plan économique et sécuritaire. Les pays amis pourraient aussi participer par des investissements variés et l’organisation d’ateliers pour la gouvernance et les moyens préventifs contre le danger terroriste. Concernant les pays du Golfe, on pourrait ouvrir une nouvelle page avec eux après une révision radicale de notre politique étrangère dans le sens d’un réchauffement de nos rapports tiédis avec l’Arabie Saoudite, les Emirats Arabes et l’Egypte. 

Il s’agit là d’une tâche qui reste possible pour le nouveau gouvernement qui devrait s’éloigner de tout ce qui est de nature à envenimer nos relations avec ces pays, en premier lieu, se pose la question relative à la manière de traiter le dossier des frères musulmans en Egypte. A ce propos, je pense qu’accorder le refuge politique à des éléments appartenant à cette organisation provoqueraient des difficultés énormes à la Tunisie. 

La stabilisation de la situation sécuritaire, l’instauration d’institutions démocratiques à travers des élections transparentes, la réalisation d’une vraie réforme fiscale et la mise en place d’un enseignement de qualité et d’une modernité effective feront de la Tunisie la Suisse des Arabes. Le résultat direct d’une telle politique c’est l’éloignement du spectre du terrorisme de notre pays et peut-être de ceux qui l’entourent, ce qui pourrait constituer une plateforme pour reconstruire l’entité maghrébine qui serait, cette fois-ci, celle des gouvernements et des peuples. La réussite de la lutte contre le terrorisme au niveau du Maghreb pourrait donner l’espoir d’éradiquer ce phénomène à l’échelle arabe.

Le Temps 26 janvier 2014 (quotidien Tunisien indépendant)

Faouzi KSIBI

Will the ISIS attacks help unify Iraqi politics?

ISIS truck convoy in al-Anbar Province

When violence dramatically increased this past December after rising tensions between the residents of al-Anbar Province and the central government in Baghdad, and then were followed by attacks by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) in al-Falluja, Ramadi and other towns, Western pundits were prophesying the  breakup of Iraq.  Now, just a few weeks later, we see suggestions that the attacks may actually help to politically unify Iraq.  Which perspective is valid?  What can we predict about the outcome of the current crisis?

Several points should taken into consideration. First, the crisis is not one of an al-Qa'ida threat to Iraq.  Second, the crisis is not based in sectarian conflict, but rather is based in a struggle for political and economic power both at the national and sub-national level.  Third, the crisis demonstrates the political impact that the United States can have in Iraq when American policy-makers decide to exert influence in a positive manner.

Finally, the crisis could have a unifying impact on Iraq, but only if the US and the international community hold Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's feet to the fire and force him to engage in serious efforts at national reconciliation.  If there is  no follow-through by the US and other international actors such as the EU and the UN, once the crisis subsides, Iraq will return to its politically dysfunctional status.

The  nature of the threat to Iraq is still not clear.  While there is no doubt that ISIS fighters are located in al-Falluja, Ramadi, the al-Khalidiya region and elsewhere in al-Anbar (al-Hayat, Jan. 14), it is unclear how exactly the political and military cleavages are constituted.  On the one hand, some tribes have taken up arms against ISIS while a smaller number have been supporting it.  Many tribesmen fighting ISIS emphasize that their political stance does not indicate support for the Maliki government.  They point out that both ISIS and Maliki's efforts to marginalize Iraq's Sunni Arab community represent equal threats.

On the radical side, there are reports that the fighters that have attacked cities in al-Anbar are not all unified.  Indeed, there seem to be serious cleavages within the attacking groups just as we have seen develop in Syria between ISIS on the one hand, and the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra), and the Islamic Front (al-Jabha al-Islamiya), on the other.

Further, arguments have been offered that there is  no serious ISIS or al-Qa'ida threat.  Some have argued that the conflict is rooted but rather a dispute among tribal leaders within al-Anbar.  Indeed, a division has already developed among Ahmad Abu Risha, the leader of the original "Awakening" Movement (Sahwat al-Anbar) and the new "Awakening" led by Hamid al-Hayis and Wisaam al-Hardan (al-Sharq al-Awsat, January 20,  http://www.aawsat.net/2014/01/article55327556 ).  al-Hayis and al-Hardan want to demonstrate to Maliki that he should ally with them as they are the real power brokers in al-Anbar.  Thus we see some local political actors trying to gain favor with Baghdad.

Is the Anbar conflict only linked to ISIS/al-Qai'da?

Other commentators see the effort by Maliki to brand the demonstrations and violence directed at the central government as strictly an al-Qa'ida action as part of his strategy of enhancing his bid to gain a third term as prime minister in the parliamentary elections that will be held next April to legitimate attacks by the Iraqi army on the province.  One question that has been raised is why, if there was such a powerful al-Qa'ida threat in al-Anbar, didn't Maliki attack training camps in the desert of Western al-Anbar prior to the ISIS attacks on urban centers.

Why did Maliki attack al-Falluja and Ramadi, thereby threatening to inflict serious causalities on the local civilian population?  Could his strategy be aimed at sharpening cleavages  between Iraq's Sunni and Shi'i Arab communities?  It might also be intended to encourage Iran swing its support to Maliki.  If the al-Qa'ida threat is really serious, as the Iraqi prime minister asserts, then Shi'i voters will be prone to support Maliki in the next elections out of fear.  Iran might decide that supporting Maliki is critical to having a client who not only supports their actions in Syria, but who would also protect their interests in Iraq from a new reinvigorated Sunni insurgency.

While this argument has a definite conspiratorial ring to it, it seems that only the vigorous intervention of the US and other Western diplomatic missions in Baghdad were able to prevent Maliki from ordering an all out assault on al-Falluja and Ramadi (al-Hayat, Jan 11).  Instead, he has retreated to a position that the Iraqi army will avoid such an attack and instead try and reconstitute the Awakening Movement and eliminate the ISIS/al-Qa'ida threat through cooperating with local tribes.

Given the discontent in al-Anbar with the Maliki government which most Sunnis see as sectarian and authoritarian in nature, and the conflict among local tribes - related more to a struggle over political and economic power grounded in sectarian identities, the conflict should be viewed more as a response to central government policies than support of the local populace for ISIS or al-Qaida

As we saw in Baquba in 2006,and more recently in Syria, once ISIS takes power, it alienates the local residents as it has done during the past month in al-Falluja and Ramadi by limiting women's movement outside the home, regulating clothing that men and women wear, denying "forbidden" Western cultural activities such as watching soccer games on television, and imposing its repressive version of Islamic practices on the local populace.  Having already been largely defeated in Syria, it is highly unlikely that ISIS will continue to be able to control any urban centers in al-Anbar.

The second question raised here is whether the present conflict in al-Anbar Province is grounded in sectarianism.  The answer is that it is definitely not.  Some tribes have joined ISIS, most are fighting against ISIS (despite its exclusive Sunni Arab composition), and some tribes are aligning themselves with the Maliki government to gain political and economic benefits.  Indeed, prior to the ISIS attacks, Usama al-Nujafi, the Speaker of the Iraqi parliament, and the most powerful Sunni Arab politician in the country, had entered into a tentative agreement to support Maliki in  the coming April elections in return for becoming president of the republic.  In the present political environment, al-Nujayfi can no longer entertain that type of deal.

More telling is the experiences of Sunni refugees from al-Falluja. While many were unable to go north due to fighting, or west to Baghdad, given army roadblocks, 120 families decided to travel south to Karbala', one of Iraq's most important Shi'i shrine cities.  In the town of Ayn al-Tamar, they were welcomed by Mahfuz al-Tamimi, the mayor (Qaim-maqam), and the town residents.  al-Tamimi offered the Fallujan refugees guest houses in a local tourist village meant for Shi'i pilgrims coming to visit Iraq's shrine cities of al-Najaf and Karbala', while other residents took them to their homes as guests (al-Hayat, Jan 8; Niqash, Jan 16 http://www.niqash.org/articles/?id=3364).

This behavior recalls a conversation that I had with an Iraqi friend from the al-Najaf area who told me that, in the 1990s, after Saddam had suppressed the March 1991 uprising in the south, he began to try and undermine powerful tribes which he feared might take control of the countryside since many Ba'thist officials had been killed during the Intifada.  Reacting to Saddam's actions, the Al 'Issa tribe from the al-Najaf area sent representatives to al-Falluja to meet with shaykhs from the Sunni wing of the tribe, creating contacts that they had not existed prior to the 1990s.  In these meetings the Shi'i and Sunni tribal leaders discussed ways they could cooperate to protect themselves against Saddam's efforts to undermine Iraq's tribal structure.

The important point here is that tribal social and political identities usually cross-cut confessional identities.  Most tribes are much more loyal to tribal custom (al-'urf), than they are to Islamic norms as stipulated by al-Shari'a.  All tribes are proud that they include both Sunni and Shi'i clans. The continued effort  by Western analysts to reduce politics in Iraq and elsewhere in the Arab world to a simplistic sectarain calculus fails to delve deeply enough into the foundations of the crises currently facing the region.

How will the US respond once the ISIS threat to al-Anbar is contained?  It has wisely chosen not to support a full on assault by the Iraqi army on al-Anbar's population centers and it has encouraged Maliki to create an alliance with anti-ISIS tribes in the province.  It does not seem that the Apache attack helicopters that Maliki has requested will reach the Iraqi army any time soon.  This is a good decision because, if he were to use them on population centers, it would be viewed in Iraq and throughout the Arab world as a "Shi'i" attack against Iraq Sunni community, given the Shi'i preponderance in the current Iraqi army.

If, once the crisis subsides, the US pulls back from pressuring Maliki to develop a more inclusive government, it will send a terrible message to the Iraqi leader and the country's political elite.  In effect, it will say that Maliki can rely on the US to come to his aid whenever he utters "al-Qa'ida" and thus provide little incentive for the Iraqi leader to embark on a meaningful policy of national redconciliation.

If this occurs, the US and the international community will have lost an important opportunity to redirect the present trajectory of Iraqi politics.  Reports from al-Diyala province, northeast of Baghdad, where Iraqi army troops and Kurdish Pesh Merga forces had been sparring with each other, indicate that local tribal shaykhs and clerics now welcome a united Iraqi army-Pesh Merga force to fight ISIS infiltrators into the province (al-Hayat, Jan 15).

Meanwhile, Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) president, Masoud Barzani, has offered to mediate the dispute between the central government and al-Anbar Province, a dispute that erupted in full after Maliki ordered the arrest in late December of a very popular Sunni member of parliament, Ahmad al-'Alwani, which resulted in his brother and five members of his security staff being killed in a fire fight with Iraqi army forces.  Barzani's offer presents an opportunity for the Kurds to demonstrate a greater involvement in Iraqi Arab and not just in local KRG politics.

That Maliki has backed down from ordering an attack on al-Anbar and local tribal leaders and clerics in al-Falluja have responded by toning down their anti-government rhetoric is another example of a foundation on which steps toward national reconciliation could be built.

The current crisis in Iraq is largely the fault of the policies adopted by the Maliki government following the March 201 parliamentary elections.  As the saying goes, "the fish rots from the head down."  If the US and the international community are serious about using the current crisis to create a possible turning point in the downward spiral that Iraqi politics has experienced over the past 3 years, then they will need to formulate a long-term common strategy that will continue beyond the point when the firing stops and ISIS is eliminated from al-Anbar.

The ISIS (al-Qa'ida) attacks and the "blame game" in Iraq

The recent attacks by the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (ISIS) have not only have unleashed a stream of violence and mayhem in al-Anbar Province but a torrent of finger pointing and blame as to who is "at fault" for the ISIS assault.  What sense are we to make of what has occurred and who exactly is at fault for what has occurred?  Is there really an al-Qa'ida threat to Iraq?  Is Iraq doomed to sectarian conflict or is there a way out of the present conundrum?

I will argue that much of what is occurring in al-Anbar should be understood as a reaction to Maliki's policies and part of his strategy to mobilize greater support in the Shi'i community so that he can win election for a third term as prime minister in next April's parliament elections (a topic I will elaborate in my next post).

First, let's place the blame where it is most deserved, and that is with Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki who has pursued the most sectarian and statesman like policies that were intended to intimidate his political opposition and eliminate, one by one, any potentially powerful politcian from Iraq's Sunni Arab community who might rise to challenge him the future.

A close second is US policy in Iraq that helped replace the Sunni sectarianism of the Saddam Husayn regime with that of a Shi'i sectarian regime.  Placing political forces in power such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) - later to change its name to the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), the Islamic Call Party and the chameleon pro-American secular-turned-pro-Iranian Shi'i sectarian, Ahmad Chalabi, created the foundations for the current crisis.  The responsibility for this policy lies with the former neo-conservative policy-makers in the Bush adminstration.

Following at number 3 is the Obama administration's decision to cooperate (tacitly) with Iran to support Nuri al-Maliki - the loser in the March 2010 parliamentary eelctions -  in his efforts to circumvent  the Iraqi constitution and manipulate the political system to retain his position as prime minister.  The disingenuous efforts of the US  to establish a role for the election's winner, Ayad Allawi - the leader of the al-Iraqiya Coalition - as head of a never to be created National Council of Strategic Affairs (NCSA) created much resentment among those who supported to victorious al-Iraqiya Coalition.  Subsequently, when Maliki reneged several times in establishing the NCSA despite numerous promises to do so, the US did nothing to force Maliki to live up to his word.

Fourth, Iran's support of Shi'i militias in southern Iraq has contributed to destabilizing the country.  Iran has simultaneously intimidated Maliki, who desperately seeks Iran's support in his quest for a third term as prime minister following the next April's parliamentary elections, but also supported his authoritarian policies that are designed to exclude not only the Sunni Arab population but secular Shi'a, as well as the populist Shi'i  base, epitomized by Muqtada al-Sadr Sadrist Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sadri).

Finally, and pulling up the rear, is the Saudi-Gulf Arab-radical Islamist nexus that encouraged Sunni Arab extremism through verbal and material support.  From the 1990s when the Saudis offered Sunni women money for wearing the hijab and men for praying 5 time per day, to their current support for radical Islamist organizations fighting the Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria  - terrorists who double as tyrants and criminals as they behead members of the local populace and steal their property - Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies have been a force for instability in Iraq.

In trying to attribute for blame over the ISIS attacks in al-Anbar Province, many critics conveniently forget that the Bush administration signed a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with Iraq in late 2008 that required all US forces to leave the country by the end of 2011.  For Senator John McCain and others to argue that the US could have ignored that agreement and pressured the Maliki government to allow American troops to remain ignores the political pressures on the Iraqi prime minister from his main political enemies, the Sadrists, the head of Iraq's Shi'i religious community, Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, and Iran not to agree to restructure the SOFA.  They also ignore the overwhelming desire of American public opinion at the time for a complete US military withdrawal from Iraq.

When engaging in the "blame game," what should not be  brought into the argument?  First, it is completely disingenous to argue that, had the US been able to leave a residual military force in Iraq - 5,000, 10,000 or 15,000 troops - the current ISIS attacks in Falluja and Ramadi would not have occurred or could have easily been suppressed.  Had US troops remained in Iraq, clearly, none would have  been sent into battle.  Second, even with a residual military force, it is not the number of troops that determines a battle but that politcial strategy that informs the overall conflict.

ISIS has been successful largely becasue it has been able to  capitalize on  Sunni Arab political discontent.  No critics of the Obama administration have addressed the problem of Iraq's current political leadership and the fact that "the fish rots from the head down."  The reason for the success of the anti-American insurgency that began in late 2003 and continued until 2008, as Ahmad Hashim demonstrates so cogently in his study, Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq, was a series of destructive policy decisions made by the US after invading Iraq and its total lack of preparation
for occupying and bringing stability to the country.

The United States cannot and should not tell Iraq how to run their security policy.  However, the US is Iraq's main weapons supplier, particularly its providing of jet fighters and attack helicopters.  It is helping Iraq build its navy and training its military and security personnel.  The US is Iraq's main international backer.  If the US is going to provide a high level of assistance to Iraq, it should expect in return that its political leadership's policies should not jeopardize the country's political stability and security, especially when they run counter to both Iraq's and the US' national interests.

In the current instability in al-Anbar Province, a number of analysts have argued that the US should immediately deliver Apache attack helicopters.  Last April, the Maliki government used helicopters tro attack a camp of mostly peaceful protestors (some say a few radical elements had penetrated the camp) near Hawija, outside Kirkuk.  This attack, which killed 42 people, almost all civilians, and wounded 100, was instrumental in setting in motion the angry protests that culminated in the recent ISIS attacks in the cities of al-Fallaja and Ramadi.

Rather than jump every time Prime Minister al Maliki utters the word al-Qa'ida, the US should extract major concessions on pushing for a more inclusive politics before it gives his government further weapons.  Indeed, local analysts have asked why Maliki hasn't spent  more time trying to destroy ISIS camps in the dessert outside Anbar's cities and fear that, should he receive American helicopter gunships, they will be used in urban areas and result in still further civilian causalities.


If the US wanted to maintain a military presence in Iraq after 2011, it created the very problems that prevented that outcome.  In supporting Nuri al-Maliki to retain his position as prime  minister in March 2010, when it still could assert some power, the US tied its interests to a political leader who is authoritarian, maintains close ties to Iran, and consistently places his personal interests ahead of those of the Iraqi citizenry.  The Bush administration was responsible for putting Iraqi carpetbaggers in power and the Obama administration is responsible for maintaining their hold on power.

The ISIS attacks in al-Anbar are not the cause of Iraq's security problems.  Rather they are the outcome of ill devised US policies in Iraq.  Theses policies lead the US to continue to support a narrowly constituted political leadership whose behavior and decisions serve the interests of a narrow elite while offering little in the way of policies that benefit Iraq's long-term political, economic and social development.
 

The Blow-back from Syria in Iraq: what does the future hold?

The Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham

There is little question that the security situation in Iraq is deteriorating.  The origins of Iraq's current security problems can be traced back to the 2010 elections.  Despite losing the elections, Nuri al-Maliki was able to manipulate domestic and foreign support to retain his position as prime minister.  Subsequently he set out to solidify his power through initiating a number of sectarian policies that alienated Iraq's Sunni  minority.

Since its inception, how has the Syrian civil war  affected Iraqis politics?  How has its development interacted with the destructive policies pursued by Maliki? Likewise, what impact has the Syrian crisis had on Iraq's Kurdish provinces, that comprise the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)?  Has the combination of sectarian rule and the blow-back from the Syrian crisis intensified sectarian identities and could it lead to a breakup of Iraq?

Perhaps most disturbing is the inroads that the Islamic State in Iraq and the Sham (Levant) - the ISIS - has made in Iraq's western al-Anbar Province.  During the height of post-Saddam sectarian violence, al-Anbar had been a hotbed for al-Qa'ida activity led by the notorious Abu Mus'ab al-Zarqawi.  With the rise of the "Anbar Awakening" ( al-Sahwa), al-Qa'ida was sent running and stability returned to the region. Prior to the 2010 parliamentary elections, the province  was prospering and it appeared that its Sunni population might  be integrated into the new Iraqi political system

Nuri al-Maliki's sectarian policies changed all that.  His fear of and increasing reliance on Iran for support alienated large segments of the Iraqi population, especially the Sunni Arab minority.  As matters got worse, especially after Iraqi helicopter gun ships attacked peaceful Sunni protestors in Hawija, near the city of Kirkuk, this past April 23th, and Maliki continued to harass Sunni Arab leaders, such as the moderate former Finance Minister Rafi' al-'Issawi, ISIS began to make inroads in al-Anbar and elsewhere.

The logic of the uptick in anger in al-Anbar and throughout the so-called Sunni Arab Triangle is understandable given the the political marginalization of the Sunni Arab population.  What is less clear is why there has likewise been a recent increase in violent activity in the KRG.

When US forces invaded the Kurdish region in 2003, it quickly dispatched the Islamist Ansar al-Sunna group with the help of Kurdish Peshmerga forces.  At that time, estimates of support  for the Ansar al-Sunna, whose influence was limited to a small region near the city of Halabja,, were between 1-2% of the Kurdish population and then only along the border region with Iran due, in large measure, to Iranian financial support.

Arguments have also been offered that the strong tribal nature of Kurdish society cross-cuts religious identities.  The widespread membership of Kurds in Sufi orders, including the Kurdish Regional Government's political leadership, such as the Naqshibandiya and Rifaiya,  and the diversity of religious minorities, such as the Yazidiya and others, have been thought to have promoted an atmosphere of religious tolerance in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Thus it has been a great shock to the Kurdish political elite and much of the Kurdish population to find Kurdish youth attracted to Islamist groups fighting the Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria.  Recent reports indicate that youth returning from the Syrian conflict have organized local Islamist groups that have planned and carried out terrorist attacks within the KRG.

This month, the KRG Interior Ministry moved to ban the use of mosques for any non-religious activities.   Fearing that mosques were bringing together radical clerics and youth influenced by Islamist groups in Syria, efforts have been made to root out Islamic radicalism before it has a chance to spread (see al-Hayat, December 20).  The secret police realize that in the KRG, as throughout the Middle East, radical Islamists possess a significant advantage over other political forces ,namely the ability to use the large infrastructure of mosques as an organizing tool.

The reasons why youth in al-Anbar might support the ISIS are fairly clear.  However, why have Kurdish youth come to give support to radical Islamist organizations?  The answers are complex and cannot be reduced to one cause.  First, there has been a long-term antagonism among Kurdish youth who do not possess the necessary wasta (influence) that would allow them to find employment as a result of ties to one of the two main political parties, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK).

Second, the Kurdish political elite is not in as strong a position as once was.  The unraveling of the PUK, especially now that it has lost its leader, Jalal Talabani, and the rise of the Gorran (Change) Movement that began in 2009 have eroded its strength and demonstrated that it vulnerable to political challenges.  PUK weakness and the Gorran Movement have encouraged Kurds to mount more challenges to the Kurdish elite.

A third and very important reason for the rise of radical Islamist sentiments is the ideological vacuum that exists in the KRG and throughout much of the Middle East.  Arab nationalism has collapsed, Western liberalism is seen as suspect and unable to deal with social needs such as employment , education, housing and health care, and communism is viewed as an archaic and historically irrelevant.  Radical Islamism is thus "picking up the ideological pieces," as it were, of failed and discredited ideologies.

Political elites have been unable to articulate alternative ideological visions.  Those parties that have proposed moderate Islamism such as the Nahda Party in Tunisia , the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey appear to many youth as impotent, incapable of generating economic growth that helps the less fortunate of society and unable to meet the aspirations of the under 30 generation, a very large demographic in the contemporary Middle East.

Radical Islamism, whether of the Sunni or Shi'i variety, offers a well articulated vision of the future, however unrealistic it appears to outside observers.  Radical groups such as ISIS and the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) offer action and immediate results through armed struggle. Those youth who feel that their lives are stagnant see in these movements a way to escape from the feeling of having no hope in the future, not to speak of the meaning many find in becoming "true believers," committed to the cause of building an Islamic state and ridding the Middle East of those who exploit political power for particularistic ends.

It is not so  much the strength of radical Islamism as it is the failure of corrupt and sectarian political elites to articulate an inclusive political vision that offers social justice and at least a modicum of democracy.  The failure of elites, such as the Iraqi political class in Baghdad, and the Kurdish political class in Arbil and Sulaimaniya, to negotiate and compromise with rivals only serves to radicalize youth still further as they see that no solutions to the problems they face will be forthcoming.

Unless there is a change in the structure and political disposition of the two political elites that control Iraq - Arab and Kurdish - the security situation will only worsen, especially if the Syrian crisis drags on, which it almost undoubtedly will.   The Italian political theorist, Antonio Gramsci, noted many years ago that, to be successful, a political class must exercise "moral and ethical leadership."

The Maliki-Barzani axis exercises no such leadership.  Instead, it offers corruption, nepotism, authoritarian rule, and a lack of government services.  Arab and Kurdish rule in Iraq is devoid of ideological content.  Now it cannot even invoke its "fallback" position - support us because at least we offer you, the citizens of Iraq, security from terrorism.    Arab and Kurdish rule is political minimalism at its worst.

Education of Arab and Kurdish youth is key to fighting support for radical Islamism and their fellow travelers, the  numerous criminal syndicates that have proliferated throughput Iraq.  However, a successful pedagogy would involve inculcating in youth values that are antithetical to the political rule that currently prevails in Iraq.  Tolerance cannot develop alongside sectarianism.  Negotiation cannot develop alongside authoritarian rule.  Civic engagement cannot develop alongside corruption and nepotism.

What are forces outside the region doing to address the spread of radical in the Arab East (al-Mashriq al-'Arabi)?  Very little in terms of policies that will,have ab impact on the long term stability of the region.  Conforming to the adage that "better to support the devil you know than the one you don't," the US, the EU, and international NGOs and funding agencies turn a blind eye to the self-destructive policies followed by the Maliki and KRG regimes.

The only positive development has been the refusal of the US to become involved in saving the Maliki regime.  It will not commit any significant military resources to the central government.  Likewise, the US refuses to play favorites with the KRG or establish any military bases there.  It continues to scold the KRG for its thinly veiled threats to leave Iraq and declare independence in its struggle with Baghdad over the extraction and sale of oil and natural gas in the KRG.

Realizing that neither Iran nor the US will come to his rescue, Maliki has been forced to reach out to the remnants of the Arab Awakening in al-Anbar Province.  This has least forced him to soften his sectarian policies and pursue a more cross-ethnic agenda.  Likewise, the Kurds realize that they cannot afford to anger the US - their main foreign ally - and thus need to tone down their hostile rhetoric towards Baghdad.

Still, these short-term strategic calculations by the Arab and Kurdish political elites do not address the underlying problems in Iraq - the need to use revenues from hydrocarbon wealth to solve the country's myriad problems, implement democratic reforms and pursue cross-ethnic alliances - at the political social, cultural and economic levels - that will lay the basis for long-term stability and national reconciliation.

While the international community cannot solve Iraq's problems, it can at least keep up the pressure, in a more open and public manner, to force Iraq's political class to begin to offer the country's citizenry the rule they deserve.  This represents the only way in which disaffected youth will be drawn away from supporting political extremism in the region.









How does the emergence on 2011 of demonstration against the al0Aada regime in Syria  leading to demoinstartion and then violence again st the central governmentand

Could the Iranian nuclear agreement lead to a decrease in sectarian politics in the Middle East?

John Kerry and Mohammed Javad Sarif

What impact will the agreement between the P5+1 (the US, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, and Germany) and Iran have on sectarian politics in the Middle East?  Is it true, as many Western analysts argue, that sectarianism is ingrained in the region's political fabric?  If so, does that mean that the agreement will do little to reduce sectarian tensions? Or could the decision by Iran to submit to demands by the international community to eschew developing nuclear weapons lead to major political change in the Middle East?

The assessment offered here argues that the recent nuclear arms agreement will have significant positive ramifications for Middle East peace and stability.  Indeed, analysts in the Arab world are already picking up on the agreement's implications for Iran's relations with the predominantly Sunni Arab Middle East.  An example is Umar Qaddur's Op-Ed piece, "Does a less nuclear Iran mean that it will be less Shiite as well?, that appeared in al-Hayat, on December 1st. 

First, the Iran - P5+1 agreement has already had a significant impact on the Iranian economy.  Second, it has improved relations between Iran and the Gulf states, especially Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.  Third, if the 6 month agreement turns into a long term solution to Iran's efforts at nuclear weaponization, then it will probably mean a change in Iranian politics towards Iraq and possibly even towards the Syrian crisis.  Finally,  if a long term agreement follows a 6 month rapprochement between Iran and the international community, then we will certainly see a reintegration  of Iran into the global economy with all the political ramifications that such a development implies.  Let's examine each on of these issues in turn.

An immediate impact of the nuclear agreement has been to invigorate the Iranian economy and raise hopes among the Iranian middle classes in particular that they can look forward to a brighter future.  Many Iranians are tired of the crippling sanctions they have endured as a result of their country's nuclear weapons program and fear the possibility of a Israeli or even US military attack.

In the first day after the agreement was announced, purchases of foreign currency dropped 30% in the expectation that the Iranian rial would rise in value in relation to the dollar.  During the last month, the Iranian stock market has experienced a significant improvement, increasing 14% in value.  Private sector entrepreneurs and public sector managers have welcomed the lessening of constraints on Iran's ability to purchase spare parts and other supplies necessary to insure the proper functioning and growth of the economy.

Iranians have been suffering under a 40% rate of inflation which may actually understate the actual level.  The middle classes have increasingly found it difficult to sustain their standard of living.  The loosening of international sanctions has given the middle class a new sense of hope that their economic fortunes might improve.  Coming on the heels of the decisive victory of the moderate cleric, Hassan Rouhani, over hardliner Saeed Jalili, middle class Iranians also hope that the state's turn towards at least some liberal reforms may be in the offing.

What is key here is the chafing that the middle classes have felt under the severe international sanctions regime that will continue to cost the country at least $30 billion this year even with the agreement (see The Economist, November 30).  Their delight at the nuclear agreement was evident at Teheran's airport when large crowds welcomed Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Sarif and his negotiating team back to Iran, while extolling the virtues of President Rouhani.  If more  moderate elements within the Iranian polity acquire greater influence, then the ability of hardliners, such as the Revolutionary Guards, to continue to play the sectarian politics game could very well decline.

Now that the cat has been let out of the bag, there will be no forcing it back in.  The very fact that Supreme Leader Ali Khamanie praised Rouhani and the agreement indicates that hardliners are aware of middle class discontent.   If hardliners seek to return to the approach of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who consistently called for the destruction of Israel and whose policies were instrumental in bringing about the harsh sanctions regime, and no long term structural relief occurs, the regime could face not only increasingly severe economic constraints, but greater expression of middle class discontent.  We need only remember what occurred in June 2009 when thousands of Iranian turned out to protest the reelection of Ahmadinejad as president in what many considered to be a stolen election.

The recent whirlwind tour of Foreign Minister Mohammed Javad Sarif to Arab Gulf states indicates that Iran wants to tone down, if not eliminate, the "cold war" that has pitted it against Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Cooperation Council allies.  The visit by the UAE's foreign minister to Teheran and Iran's indication that it is willing to discuss the status of three islands near the Straits of Hormuz seized from the UAE by the Shah in 1971 - Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunbs - are further indicators of improved relations between the Arab Gulf and Iran. And while Saudi Arabia has indicated that " this is not the right time" for a meeting, Iran has called for just such a meeting which will undoubtedly occur in the near future.

These developments not only bode well for increased stability in the Gulf, but for a decrease in the shrill "Sunni-Shiite" political rhetoric that has characterized much of Gulf politics since the 1979 Iranian Revolution.  They will also constrain the ability of sectarian groups on both sides of the ethno-sectarian divide to manufacture Arab-Iranian hostility to promote their own personal agendas.

A third possible ramification of the initial and hopefully long-term agreement is the possibility of Iran playing a more constructive role in Iraqi politics.   At present, Iran is sponsoring a number of Shiite militias in the south to assure that Iraqi prime minister Nuri al-Maliki understands its ability to influence "conditions on the ground," and thus does not work against their interests in Iraq. These militias create serious political instability, seen especially in the ongoing battles between the remnants of Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi) and the so-called League of the Righteous People (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq), led by former Mahdi Army commander, Qays al-Khazali, that is currently supported by Iran (see al-Hayat, December 1).

A reinvigorated Iranian economy, a more robust middle class, and a willingness to conclude a side agreement with the US over their respective spheres of influence in Iraq may lead the Islamic republic to withdraw its support of destabilizing militias and inside rely more heavily on wielding its economic influence inside Iraq through increased trade and investments.  Such efforts, especially if they involved explicit messages to Iraq's Sunni Arab minority of such a new policy orientation, could greatly reduce sectarian tensions which represent a political powder keg at the moment as violence continues to escalate throughout Iraq.

While the US and Iran have been at loggerheads since the 1979 revolution, each has an interest in  containing the power of radical Sunni Islamists in the region.  A potential beneficial outcome of a US-Iran rapprochement, assuming Iran is serious about limiting its nuclear energy program to peaceful uses and allowing meaningful verification of the program, could pay dividends in the Syrian civil war.

In return for greater Western help in curtailing groups like the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (al-Dawla al-Islamiya li-l-'Iraq wa-l-Sham), Iran might be willing to ease Bashar al-Aad out of office in return for a government that was not hostile to Iranian interests in Syria but which was willing to implement democratic reforms and engage in a policy of national reconciliation.  Such a turn of events would dramatically undercut the power of both Sunni and Shiite sectarian elements in Syria, especially given the overwhelming rejection of sectarian politics by the vast majority of the Syrian populace.

Finally, and this might be the most important impact of the mini-agreement between the West and Iran on ending its nuclear weapons program, we may see new investment by Western firms in the Iranian economy.  The World Bank has indicated that Iran's oil industry cannot alone sustain a population of 82 million.  To meet its energy and production needs, Iran needs to import natural gas.

The interest that many Western oil firms have expressed in investing in Iran's energy sector, and the outmoded sector's need for investment to upgrade production, could signal the beginning of Iran's  reintegration into the global economy.  The impact of significant foreign investment and renewed economic growth would constitute another blow to the regime hardliners who have used sectarian identities to promote a radical foreign policy that has made Iran a pariah state in the Middle East.

The key here will be the United States.  On the one hand, the Obama administration and it allies in the P5+1 must keep the pressure on Iran to dismantle its nuclear weapons capabilities and provide for an inspection regime whereby the international community can be assured that nuclear energy is only being developed for peaceful domestic uses.

Attempts by the US Congress into impose new sanctions on Iran - assuming Iran lives up to its agreements - must be blocked through a campaign to educate American lawmakers on the stakes involved in preventing more conflict in the Middle East, such as an Israeli attack on Iran, and the regional nuclear arms race that would certainly ensue should talks break down and Iran proceeds to actually develop nuclear weapons.  Having Saudi Arabia (which reportedly has asked Pakistan if it could purchase nuclear weapons), Turkey, Egypt, and perhaps Algeria seeking to develop nuclear weapons in the world's most unstable region would constitute a disastrous turn of events

At a most basic level, the ability not only to keep Iran at the negotiating table and moving towards a final agreement, but the ability to ratchet down sectarian identities and violence in the Middle East as well, lies as much in Washington, London, Paris, Moscow, Beijing and Berlin, as it does in Teheran.

The Hawza vs. the state: Islam and democracy in contemporary Iraq

Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani

With all the focus on "radical Islamism" (a caricature of orthodox Islam based in ignorance and sectarian violence), little attention has been paid to clerics who have fought sectarian entrepreneurs who seek to politicize religion and manipulate it for personal ends.  The al-Hawza al-'Ilmiya, the network of Shi'i seminaries in and around the shrine city of al-Najaf in south-central Iraq, has been particularly effective in this struggle.   Led by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the leader of the world's Shi'a, the Hawza has fought against corruption, lack of government services and, above all, sectarian violence.  What do the Hawza's actions, as well as those of other moderate clerics, tell us about religion and politics in contemporary Iraq?

Recently, Ayatollah al-Sistani's representatives have waged a  public campaign against the proposed government budget of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki.  Sistani's representative in the shrine city of Karbala', Ahmad al-Safi, used a very effective phrase in his Friday sermon (al-khutba) on September 27th in which he declared, "Relying on oil is dangerous because oil will not last until the Day of Judgment."  Instead, al-Safi argued, the state should be investing in agriculture, industry and investment which continue to be neglected (al-Hayat, September 28).

The cleric further argued that "there is no strong economic plan for the future in the budget."  Despite Iraq's abundant oil wealth, al-Safi called upon al-Maliki government to think about future generations. Depending solely on oil is dangerous.  The cleric called upon economic planners to think in terms of  a multidimensional strategy in which other sources of revenues would be developed to augment the country's hydrocarbon wealth.

At the same time, al-Safi called for more investment in building schools as a sign of respect for Iraq's youth, which constitutes 70% of the populace under the age of 30.  Every new school requires training at least 20 new teachers, he declared.  In his view, the Ministry of Education should take its responsibilities more seriously if the next generation of Iraqi youth is to be properly educated and meet its potential as individuals and as citizens contributing to the common good.

Sadr al-Din al-Qabbanji

In al-Najaf, meanwhile, Imam Sadr al-Din al-Qabbanji, who delivers the Friday prayer (khutbat al-jum'a), called upon the government to transfer the country's security portfolio to the Badr Organization.  A militia that had once been part of SCIRI (the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq)  - now known as the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council (SIIC), the Badr Organization, which became a political party once it split from the SIIC, is  known for its military prowess.

In calling for this change in policy, al-Qabbanji was responding to the terrible increase in violence during the past 6 months.  This past September, the UN reported that almost a 1000 Iraqis were killed and over 2000 wounded, by assassinations, or suicide or car bomb attacks.  Criticism has been directed at the government for relieving competent security personnel from their posts and replacing them instead with those loyal to the current government.  Qabbanji emphasized that he was not calling for militias to control the country, but that there was a need to employ the most efficient counter-terrorism forces in light of the dramatic spread of violence.

These criticisms come in the wake of earlier comments by Ahmad al-Safi in which he asserted that low level  government bureacrtas were imnpeding the work olf the priovate sector, thereby forcing many companies to leave Iraq.(al-Hayat, September 14). In a sermon he delivered on Friday, September 13th, al-Safi  argued that small business sector is critical to the Iraqi economy.  However, private companies suffer from financial and administrative impediments created by government employees who prevent them from completing their work.  He noted that many companies that came to Iraq to engage in reconstruction have been stymied in their efforts to complete their projects and have left without completing them.

In the latter part of his sermon, al-Safi called on the government not to interfere with teacher evaluations of their students.  He asked that teachers to be treated with respected and in a manner consistent with Iraqi law.  In light of the fact that many government employees are not well educated, and often lack reading and writing skills (a problem created in large measure by the collapse of the educational system during the UN sanctions regime of the 1990s), al-Safi realizes the need for high educational standards if Iraq is to experience economic growth and social development.  Using bribes to get degrees and pressuring teachers to give students evaluations, degrees and entrance to universities  for political reasons, or due to bribery, rather than  merit, troubles al-Safi as it does many other Iraqis.

In asserting that government employees refuse to help private sector companies unless there is personal gain involved, Ayatollah al-Sistani is once again criticizing the Maliki government, through his representatives, for doing little or nothing to reign in corruption. Fortunately, unlike during the days of Saddam Husayn's rule when a cleric who criticized the government, even mildly, would be assassinated after the Friday prayers, the Shi'i al-marja'iya (the Shi'i religious authorities) do not have to fear for their lives in post-Ba'thist Iraq,

In this new quasi-democratic environment, the Shi'i clergy, under Ayatollah al-Sistani's leadership, has become a major force for democratic reforms, promoting anti-sectarianism and instilling a greater civic consciousness among Iraqis. What is especially significant is that Sistani and his representatives are not focusing on issues related to personal status law, such as marriage and divorce, inheritance and child custody, which have been the traditional concerns of the Hawza.

Instead, the Hawza is entering new territory and challenging the Iraqi government in areas of public policy not usually seen as the purview of religious clerics.  Criticizing government economic and education policy is important, however, as these issues are uppermost in the minds of most Iraqis who, public opinion polls over and over again demonstrate, are most concerned with jobs, the safety of their families and improving economic opportunities for their families.

In criticizing the government, the Hawza and other Shi'i clerics are pushing for greater transparency and rationality in decision-making, tackling corruption and promoting market forces, and improving Iraq's security situation.  One of the bright lights in Iraq's attempt at a transition to democracy comes from what many analysts would think to be an unusual source, namely Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the clerics of al-Hawza al-'Ilmiya, as well as moderate members of Iraq's Shi'i clergy.  These activities should be kept in mind next time a Western analyst argues that Islam is implacably opposed to democracy.

The ghost of Khomeini in the streets of Baghdad: the need for national reconciliation in iraq

Ayatollah Khomeini in Baghdad's Liberation Square

The recent controversy over the posting of photographs of the late Ayatollah Khomeini in city squares and along major thoroughfares in Baghdad caused a tremendous stir among Iraq's Sunni Arab population.  It even led to a fight between 2 deputies in the Iraqi parliament. 

For Iraq's Sunni population, these photographs  touched on one of their deepest fears, namely the idea that Iraq has fallen under Iranian control.  What does this latest indicator of sectarianism tell us about identity politics in contemporary Iraq and the future of political stability in the country?

For Sunni Arab politicians who reacted against the posters of Khomeini and the current Iranian ruler, Supreme Leader Ali Khamanei, they have a very short political memory.  Prior to 2003, Saddam Husayn's portrait in every government office and his photograph was de rigeur on the front page of all Iraqi newspapers.  Nevertheless, the posters represent a provocative act and were obviously designed to sen an implicitly sectarian message to Arab Sunnis and Kurds.  Iraq's Shi'a now control the government  and can count on Iran's support to keep political power resting in the hands of Shi'i parties and political elite.

Those who jump to the conclusion that the controversy surrounding the photographs of Khomeini along Baghdad thoroughfares is yet another indicator of Iraq's basic sectarian nature would be well advised to consider a number of historical facts.  First, the Ba'th Party was controlled through its first two iterations by Shi'is.  Fu'ad al-Rikabi ran the party from its founding in Iraq in 1952 until 1961.  During the mid-1960s, the party was dominated by 'Ali Salih al-Sa'di, a Fayli (Shi'i) Kurd.  Only after General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Husayn seized power in a bloodless coup d'etat in 1968 did power gravitate towards Sunni Arabs.

Even during the 1970s, many Shi'a joined the Ba'th Party holding out the hope that it did not consider ethnic or confessional background important for party membership. And several Shi'is became high ranking party officials before Saddam Husayn seized the presidency and place al-Bakr under house arrest in 1979.  Following his seizure of power, many top ranking Shi'a party members were executed by Saddam, not because they were Shi'a but because he viewed them as potential competitors for power.

An analysis of sectarian identities is beyond the scope of this post (for a more in-depth analysis, see the special edition of the International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, vol. 4/number 3 (2010),  which I guest edited, "The Question of Sectarian Identities in Iraq").  While always part of the political landscape to some degree, the issue of sectarianism has become a particularly salient issue in Iraqi politics since the toppling of Saddam Husayn and the Ba'th Party in 2003.

The coming to blows by Haydar al-Mulla, a Sunni Arab member of the al-'Iraqiya Coalition and Kadhim al-Sayyadi, a member of the al-Ahrar bloc, affiliated with Shi'i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, led Council of Deputies speaker, 'Usama al-Nujayfi to suspend the parliamentary session see al-Hayat, and al-Sharq al-Awsat, August 27).  The cause of the argument, which escalated into blows, was al-Mulla's request that the parliament discuss the posting of the photographs.  In subsequent statements, al-Mulla asserted that the posting of the banner and posters with Khomeini and Khamenei's photographs violated Iraq national sovereignty.

Shi'i leaders, such as Ibrahim Ja'afari, head of the Iraqi national alliance, responded by saying that these posters are religious in nature and reflect the loyalties of large segment of the Iraqi populace (i.e., Shi'a) who have loyalties to religious figures such as Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei.  Mulla responded that Sunni Arabs had removed pictures of Turkish Prime Minister, Rejep Tayyib Erdogan - considered to be sympathetic towards radical Islamists fighting the Bashar al-Asad regime in Syria - from areas under their control.

Clearly, those who put up the banners and posters knew that they would be incendiary in nature.  In not too subtle terms, these symbols of Iran's Islamic Revolution sent two messages, not only to Iraq's Sunni Arab population but secular Shi'a and Kurds and other minorities as well.  Power in contemporary Iraq resides in the hands of the Shi'a and is controlled by Shi'i parties and political elite.

In an Op-Ed contribution published in al-Hayat on September 6th, "What does 'Khomeini's photograph' want from Baghdad " (madha turid 'surat al-Khumayni min Baghdad?), Syrian writer Hamud Hamud argued that the problem is not just the Shi'i political elite "rubbing it in" that they control Iraq, but the problem that Sunni Arabs face in their own identity politics, namely the lack of any credible leader behind whom they can coalesce in seeking to gain more power at the state level.

Certainly few Iraqis, apart from a few unreconstructed Ba'thists, would offer a Saddam Husayn type figure as the symbolic standard bearer of the Sunni Arab community.  Despite being a member of parliament, Ayad Allawi, head of the secular al-'Iraqiya Coalition, which won the 2010 parliamentary elections, seems to have opted out of active politicking.  Iraqi Islamic Party leader and former Iraqi Vice-President, Tariq al-Hashimi, remains in exile in Turkey under a sentence of death, should he return to Iraq, allegedly running a terrorist ring in 2006.  The young, popular Sunni Minister of Finance, Rafi' al-'Issawi, is likewise charged with promoting terrorism. 

As Humud notes at the end of his Op-Ed, Khomeini's picture is not only part of an effort to dominate political discourse in Iraq but its public culture as well.  As such the posting of Khomeini's photograph is much more than just a political "slap in the face" by the Shi'i political elite to Iraq';s Sunni Arab minority.  It is as much an indicator of where Iraq's Shi'i political elite wants the country to go in the future, a future dominated by a destructive sectarianism that will marginalize all but the majority Shi'i population.

On the occasion of Iraqi Prime Miniuster's Nuri al-Maliki's visit to the United States, it is time for the Obam,a adminstration to make clear that his government needs to become more inclusive,  Supplying Iraq with attack helicptors and eventually F-16 fighter aircraft should be contingent on Maliki following a policy of national reconciliation.

Such a policy would involve, first and foremost, public statements by Maliki that he taking a new tack - one that seeks to give all Iraq's political groups a seat at the national political table.  Holding a national reconciliation conference, first behind close doors and then, after Iraq's competing parties agree at least on the need to continue a dialogue that will promote national unity, rather than  sectarianism, would go a long way to combating the violence that threatens to push Iraq back to the height of sectarian violence between 2004 and 2007.