The Islamic Republic at the Crossroads: Iran's Domestic and Regional Policy in a Post-Pandemic World

Even before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, Iran was facing serious economic, social and political challenges.  Due to US and international sanctions, its economy was in dire straits, large segments of the populace have lost faith in the government of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and internal conflict within the Iranian elite sets extremists in the IRGC against moderates surrounding President Hasan Rouhani who would like to pursue rapprochement with the West. Standing at a crossroads, what decisions will Iran make in terms of domestic and regional policy?

What Iran decides within the next 6 months to a year will have serious ramifications for decades to come. Broadly speaking, Iran face two choices.  It can focus on foreign policy and continue its efforts to continue with missile development, enriching uranium and sponsoring destabilizing forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and continue its conflict with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. Alternatively, it can decide to focuses on domestic needs which offers the possibility of sanctions relief and propping up the current regime’s legitimacy.

Iran's regional interests in the Levant

From a cost-benefit analysis, the latter policy would be Iran’s most sensible choice. However, extremist elements will work hard to prevent any moderation of Iran’s current regional policies and view a turn to domestic concerns as a threat to their long term interests. Nevertheless, the question remains: if we view Iran through a different frame, will changing economic and regional conditions force Iran to abandon policies which may have brought benefits in the past but could threaten regime stability and even viability in the future?  In other words, is its radical foreign policy viable over the long durée?

Since the 1978-70 revolution which overthrew Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the current regime has witnessed an erosion of its legitimacy, especially after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in1989.  Revolutionary propaganda is belied by massive government corruption which is clear for all Iranians to see, and a state which fails to deliver on economic growth and social services.

At least 631 Iranians were killed during Nov 2019 anti-regime protests 

As corruption has spread, and a privileged elite consolidated power, the regime has drawn down on its legitimacy.  Many would argues that its “bank account” is almost empty.  Proclamations that Iran is in the vanguard of revolutionary change in the MENA region and larger Muslim world increasingly fall on deaf ears. Youth in particular chafe under rules which they see as oppressive and increasingly express themselves through anti-regime demonstrations.

One sources of regime sustenance has been its aggressive policies, not only in Iraq, but especially in support of the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria and Hizballah in southern Lebanon.  Iran’s hostility to Saudi Arabia for its close ties to the United States has been touted as proof that the Islamic Republic, not the Saudi royal family, is the true defender of Islam and Islamic interests.  Iran’s threat to Saudi Arabia assumed a military dimension in 2019 when one of its drones hit a Saudi refinery, temporarily sending shock waves through global oil markets.

Qom and Tehran - where the Covid-19 pandemic began in Iran

In its proxy war in Yemen with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran seems to have gained the upper hand through the Houthi rebels, its local allies.  The UAE withdrew from the war in late 2019 and recently Saudi Arabia declared a unilateral ceasefire, indicating it seeks an end to the war.  Meanwhile in Iraq, Iran’s proxy militias, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, the Badr Organization, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous People) have regularly attacked US troops stationed at Iraqi military bases. 

These militias not only assumed a dominant role in decision-making in the Iraqi state under the docile leadership of Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, but they have served as a conduit for hard currency to the Iranian regime as well as engaged in other illicit activities such as human and organ trafficking.

At the same time, stringent sanctions imposed by the Trump administration have taken a deep bite out of an already reeling economy.  Possessing the third largest reserves of oil in the world, Iran has been unable to export at the 3.5 million bbl./day it once enjoyed and currently finds itself exporting less than 300,000 bbl./day. Even with efforts to make its economy less dependent on oil, and through selling oil at discounted prices to China have not enable Iran to sustain its regional ambitions, let alone deliver the needed domestic benefits expected by the Iranian populace.

Iran’s ability to “squeak by” came to a crashing halt with the onset of the corona virus pandemic.  In a problem largely of its own making, Iran has become the MENA country with the highest number of Covid-19 infections and deaths.  Following the path of China’s President Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refused to address the spread of the corona virus when medical experts brought it to his attention.

Nothing was done to control the flow of pilgrims within Iran to holy shrines. Further, in an effort to bolster the regime’s legitimacy through a large turnout, the government urged Iranians to go to the polls in March national elections, despite fears that voting would intensify the corona virus outbreak. With many voters traveling to polling places, the elections became an incubator for spreading the virus as voters brought the disease back to their home cities, towns and villages. Travel by Chinese to Iran wasn’t curtailed because China, where the corona virus originated, is one of Iran’s strongest allies.  As of this writing, there are estimates that more than 37,000 Iranians have died from Covid-19.

In neighboring Iraq, Iran faces widespread hostility. The killing of more than a 1000 peaceful youth protestors and the wounding of more than 20,000 others who began demonstrations against corruption, nepotism and lack of democracy were viewed as a threat by Iran. Its proxy militias and militia members who have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior have been responsible for the killings as well as kidnapping and torture.

As the corona virus spread in Iran, Iraq has sealed its 1000 mile border. Despite Iranian entreaties to allow goods to be imported into Iraq, the Iraqi government has refused. Meanwhile, a campaign to boycott Iranian goods, which had already developed during the October Revolution demonstrations, to protest the killing of peaceful youth protestors, has acquired new momentum. Iraqis fear purchasing Iran goods could bring the corona virus into their households.

Meanwhile, a cleavage within Iraq’s militia movement (al-hashad al-sha^cbi) has further reduced Iran’s control over Iraqi politics. On the one side, pro-Iranian militias seek to use Iraq as a springboard for Iranian military and financial action in Syria and Lebanon while benefitting themselves from economic ties with the Islamic Republic.  On the other side, militias with ties to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Shi^ca clergy who support him seek to constrain Iranian influence in Iraq. 

With al-Sistani in ill health, there is an emerging struggle over his successor with many members of al-marja^ciya fearful that Iran’s doctrine of the State of the Supreme Jurisprudent (wilayat al-faqih; vilayet e-faqih) will be imposed on Iraqi Shiism, which eschews direct links between religion and politics.

The most recent prime minister delegate, Dr. Mustafa al-Kadhimi, is much less sympathetic to Iran than the current caretaker prime minister, ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi.  Kadhimi has made Iraq’s sovereignty a core component of his platform, signaling to Iran that he will not follow in the subservient footsteps of ^cAbd al-Mahdi. The pro-Iranian Hashad’s opposition to 

al-Kadhimi’s ministerial choices is indicative of Tehran’s displeasure and fear that he will cooperate with the United States.

IRGC forces stationed in Syria

In Syria, Iran finds itself mired down in a “forever war.” The al-Asad regime will countenance nothing less than a complete military victory over its enemies. However, with Turkey supporting anti-Asad forces in Idlib and Syria’s northern rim and a resurgent Da’ish in the al-Badiya eastern desert region, the country’s civil war offers no end in sight.  Iran also has to contend with Israel attacks on its weapons shipments to the Asad regime, especially missiles, and competition with Russia whose policies in support of the regime do not always align with those of Tehran.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

In addition to losing IRGC fighters, Iran’s support of al-Asad is costly. Iranians ask among themselves why the regime spends so much of the state budget on foreign adventurism rather than improving the economy and social services at home. With an Iraqi state and public increasingly hostile to Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, a weakening of the militia movement die to internal cleavages, and the decline in hard currency finding its way from Iraq into the Islamic Republic,  Iran’s ability to sustain its support of the Syrian dictator will be sorely tested.

The collapse of Lebanon’s economy has jeopardized Iran’s influence in the south of the country through its support for Hizballah. As a dominant partner in the current Lebanese government, Hizballah has come under criticism even from its own members. Increasingly, pro-Hizballah Shi^ca ask why the organization continues to focus on “struggle” when people no longer have jobs and can’t feed their families.

As the Lebanese lira loses its values, Hizballah has tried to take over Lebanon’s banking system as a means of obtaining funds.  Clearly, Iran is in no position to bail out the organization which also bears responsibility for the millions of Syrian refugees who have placed such an economic burden on the country.  What was once a vaunted militia, more powerful than the Lebanese Army itself, is now seeing a decline in its power. Its ability to support Iran’s interests in Syria, which involved sending its forces to help the Syrian Army, is no longer a given.

Streets being disinfected in Tehran

Despite the active involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in helping to fight the corona virus pandemic, the failure of the Iranian government to take the pandemic seriously in the first place has further undermined public trust in the state and its institutions.  Despite the first death from Covid-19 in February, it took until the end of March before the regime began to implement serious measures to contain it. Rather than seek international help, the regime forced Doctors Without Borders to leave Iran in March, rather than allow them to witness the virus’ spread and lethal consequences.

Even though the first fatality of the virus was reported in the holy city of Qom on February 19^th, local clerics, with the support of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, successfully argued against a Ministry of Health request that local shrines should not be closed to the public thus spreading the disease. Like Donald Trump, Khamenei downplayed the virus’ threat for over a month and proposed quack cures for the virus.  He and IRGC leaders continued to refer to the virus as a “United States and Israeli plot.”

Posters for Iran's February elections

That the February elections had the lowest turnout (42.57%) since the Iranian Revolution established the current state in 1979. Turnout in 2016 was 61% with the lowest prior to that being 51% in 2004. The disqualifications of 9,000 progressives and moderates by the so-called Guardian Council prior to the elections undermined regime efforts to encourage large-scale voter participation.

The state’s interference in the elections and lack of transparency in confronting the Covid-19 pandemic were only reinforced by the accidental shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airliner by the IRGC this past January, killing all 176 passengers aboard, which took the regime over 72 hours to acknowledge its responsibility.

The Iranian regime still has the string support of hardline elements in Iran. Trust however is a rare commodity in Iran as the populace as seen hardline elements work to stymie all of President Rouhani’s efforts to promote the economy by sidelining the financial empire of the IRGC.  That the IRGC killed more Iranian protestors, largely youth, during November protests against a sharp spike in gasoline prices, has not been forgotten.

Satelleite photo of mass graves prepared for Covid-19 victims-March 2020

The Trump administration has played into the hands of Khamenei and Iran’s hardliners. They will probably dominate the Iranian presidential elections in 2021. However, by not recognizing the economic reality of a post-corona virus world and a populace which increasingly views the Islamic Republic as a corrupt, nepotistic and ineffective regime, Iran’s political class will lose even further confidence and legitimacy.  Because Iran refuses to use the pandemic to implement reforms which would strengthen the state, its aspirations to become a regional hegemon are in the process of being severely curtailed.

Corruption, Corona Virus, Collapse: How Can the Iraqi People Survive the Demise of the Green Zone Elite?الفساد ، فيروس كورونا ، الانهيار: كيف يمكن للعراق أن ينجو من زوال النخبة في المنطقة الخضراء؟

"Corruption is devouring Iraq"

Is Iraq’s political class on the brink of collapse?  Three crises have combined to create the greatest threat to Baghdad’s Green Zone elite since the Bush administration put it in power after toppling Saddam Husayn in 2003. What does this “perfect storm” of crises suggest about the immediate future of Iraqi politics? What implications does it have for other nation-states who suffer the same problems as Iraq?

The possible fragmentation and collapse of Iraq's political class raises a key question. How should the Iraqi people respond to this problem?  What options do they have? Using the example of Iraq's October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) which, organized by Iraqi youth, has mobilized tens of thousands of Iraqi in Baghdad and the cities and towns of the south, I suggest Iraqis build on the local networks which have been developed to ride out the existing period of political, social and economic instability.

Since 2005, when a new political class began to crystallize after 2 national parliamentary elections in January and December 2005, Iraq has suffered from extensive corruption and nepotism. Despite the initial enthusiasm of Iraqis for democracy, seen in public opinion polls and voter turnout which reached 60% in early national elections, there has been a secular decline in the trust Iraqis place in their political leaders and political institutions.  With the low turnout in the May 2018 national elections, estimated at 44% but probably much lower, the level of discontent with the Green Zone elite reached a new low

"14,000 cases of corruption opened and $450 billion in losses"

Corrupt governance has become institutionalized in Iraq. It is no exaggeration that what I refer to as “sectarian entrepreneurs” have seized control of the state, including its executive branch and legislature and civil bureaucracy.  Transparency International’s statistics summarize the situation well: Iraq is ranked 162 of 180 nations in the NGO’s 2019 Corruption Perception Index (compared to Iran which is ranked 146/180 and Saudi Arabia which is ranked 51/180).
Iraq's ranking on Transparency International's 2019 Perception of Corruption Index I

Details of the negative impact of corruption on Iraq society

Corruption has prevented Iraq from making all but minimal progress since 2005 in improving social services, diversifying the economy, increasing the number of jobs available to youth entering the job market, improving primary and secondary school education, strengthening the health care system, generating jobs for women, or addressing the problems of lack of potable water and reliable electricity in many parts of the country.  Instead, Iraq’s political class have been content to live off the “fat of the land,” namely exploit Iraq’s oil wealth which constitute 95-97% of Iraq’s foreign revenue stream.

By 2019, Iraqis’ patience with the crooked and isolated Green Zone elite had run out.  The blatant nature of corrupt governance was a fundamental driver behind the peaceful uprising led by Iraq youth which began in early October 2019 which has come to be known as the “October Revolution” (Thawrat Tishreen).

Iraq's national hero -  Lt. General ^CAbd al-Wahhab al-Sa^Cdi

The tipping point for the uprising was, in part, anger at the firing of Lt. General ^CAbd al-Wahhab al-Sa^Cdi, who became a national hero after defeating the Da^cish terrorist's "Caliphate" in Mosul and north central Iraq in 2017, from his position as a high ranking officer in Iraq’s elite Counter-Terrorism Services (CTS).  It also reflected Iraqi youth’s anger at the lack of jobs, poor and non-existent social services and, above all, the widespread corruption within the Iraqi government.

Iraqis express their anger at Iran's Khamenei and the late Qasem Sulimani

Quickly, however, the youth uprising became a demand for fundamental political and social reforms.  The cry for social democracy - meaning free and fair elections, government transparency and accountability, and the improvement of Iraqis' standard of living - rallied thousands of Iraqi youth, and millions more older Iraqis, who supported these calls for change.  Among the demands were direct election of Iraq’s president and the formation of single member electoral districts to end the power of “political parties” (actually small cliques of power brokers) from dominating Iraq’s Council of Deputies (parliament) and government.

A major demand of the October Revolution is ending Iran’s control over Iraq’s political process, especially through proxy militias, such as Kata‘ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq and al-Nujaba’, which provide the Tehran regime with hard currency and other financial services (in addition to engaging in other illicit activities, including human trafficking and organ trafficking).  The number of Iraqi youth who have been killed by militia members, and militia members who have been given positions in the Ministry of Interior (known as al-damaj), is close to 1000, while the number wounded which has reached 25,000.  Leaders of the uprising have been kidnapped and torturing in Baghdad and throughout other cities and towns where demonstrations have taken place. 

Cartoon calling for the ouster of Iran from Iraq and Lebanon

This violent response, which was orchestrated by Quds Force general, Qasem Suleimani, and former Kata’ib Hizballah leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, both of whom were killed by a US drone strike on January 3, 2020, indicates the degree to which Iran views the October Revolution’s demand for democracy as a major, if not  existential, threat.  However, the corona virus pandemic has made it much more difficult for Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq to operate and coordinate their activities, much less engage in cross border economic activity, given the size and impact of the pandemic in Iran and now in Iraq.

Procedures in Baghdad to attempt to control the Covid-19 pandemic

Still active this March, before the Covid-19 pandemic hit Iraq, the October Revolution has shaken Iraq’s political class.  In late November, 2019, it forced the resignation of Prime Minister ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi.  Although ^cAbd al-Mahdi, a weak leader who largely followed Iranian dictates, has remained as caretaker prime minister, as of this writing, the political class hasn’t been able to agree upon a replacement.  Because the youth protestors enjoy widespread support among the Iraqi populace, the political class has been forced to take the uprising seriously. Indeed, Adnan al-Zurfi, the prime minister designate, has indicated that the two issues which of are of greatest concern are the Covid-19 pandemic and the October Revolution demonstrations.

In the Iraqi press, the term “the street” has come to mean that the Green Zone elite must take into account the reaction of the supporters of the October Revolution when proposing a new candidate to replace ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi as prime minister. This has led to a split within the Green Zone elite between those who seek a candidate who will at least introduce some important reforms to the political system, and those, largely drawn from supporters of Iran and its proxy militias, who adamantly oppose any political reforms at all.

The second shock to Iraq’s political class was the outbreak of the corona virus (Covid-19) pandemic in China in late 2019.  When the Chinese economy shut down as the disease spread beyond the city of Wuhan, global demand for oil declined.  By the end of March, the price of oil had dropped well below $30/bbl., erasing 50% of Iraq’s income from foreign oil sales.

If Covid-19 produced an external shock in the form of rapidly declining oil prices, the Iraqi state wasn’t prepared for the internal shock of a severe national health crisis. Whatever the correct figure, which ranges from 2.5% to 5.5% of Iraq’s annual budget which is spent on the health, Iraq’s health care infrastructure is unable to treat the large number of patients who are expected to contract the Covid-19 corona virus. Indeed, President Barham Salih warned Iraqis to practice “social distancing,” indicating that Iraq’s health care system isn’t capable to handling the crisis.

Pres. Barham Salih urges Iraqis to stay at home because the health care system is too weak to cope with the Covid-19 pandemic

Due to corruption, many hospitals and health care clinics fail to receive adequate or proper amounts of medicine and medical equipment from the state.  Rather than reaching public medical facilities, government procured medicines and supplies are frequently sold in the private market.  Patients often need to pay bribes to receive proper treatment in Iraqi hospitals.  Despite a rise in oil prices prior to the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, when the Minister of Health recently requested $5 million to support the fight against the corona virus, he learned that no funds were available.

Because populist leaders and clerics, such as Muqtada al-Sadr, refuse to warn their followers of the need to socially isolate themselves and instead allow large gatherings at religious shrines, the Covid-19 pandemic is destined to harm those segments of the Iraqi populace which are least able to fight it, namely the poor and marginalized sectors of  society.

The third crisis is the collapse of the global oil market.  Adding to the dramatic drop in industrial production worldwide, Saudi Arabia and Russia began a war over oil prices after Vladimir Putin refused to follow OPEC’s decision in March to cut oil prices.  Saudi Arabia responded by increasing its output and offering selected buyers discounted prices.  Because Putin has transformed the Russian economy to dependence on oil, this new flood of crude led to a drop in prices which, on March 30, were at $20/barrel.  To realize what damage this collapse of the oil market is causing to the Iraqi economy, we need remember that Iraq earns between 95 and 97% of its foreign revenues from oil sales.

What is to be done?  First, let’s consider the mutually reinforcing impact of corruption, the corona virus, and the collapse of oil prices on the Green Zone elite.  Since 2005, corruption and nepotism have become institutionalized components of Iraq’s political process. That means that the various political cliques (referred to officially as “political parties”) and their leaders have come to expect a certain proportion of the economic pie each year.  The “take” of each party was not arrived at without struggle and is recalibrated as the political fortunes of different political cliques and their leaders rise and fall.

The period since the October Revolution uprising has already demonstrated the fragility of the relations among the competing cliques within the Green Zone elite.  Once the youth protestors forced the resignation of ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi following the killing, wounding, kidnapping and torture of large number of peaceful youth protestors, the internal weakness of Iraq's political class was clear for all to see.

Speaker of Iraq's Council of Deputies, Muhammad al-Halbusi

The Green Zone elite, which an Iraqi friend and colleague likens to Naguib Mahfouz’s “haraafeesh” (الحرافيش), is an amalgam of competing interests whose focus is limited to their short-term interests in accumulating as much wealth, political power and status as the can, through manipulating laws and regulations or via illicit activities, e.g., the Speaker of Parliament waiving customs duties for Iraqi merchants who import cigarettes in exchange for bribes.  

What the Green Zone elite has demonstrated is its complete lack of any vision for Iraq’s future.  They are not only isolated and fragmented but have shown no interests in proposing and implementing new public initiatives which would address and offer solutions to Iraq’s many infrastructural shortcomings.  In effect, they have sat in their offices collecting salaries, benefitting from many perks, such as subsidized housing in Baghdad, fleets of cars, and drivers and numerous assistants to meet their every needs.

To date, little attention has been paid to what the Covid-19 pandemic and global oil market collapse will have on the inner workings of the Green Zone elite. The “division of the spoils” among competing groups in Iraq’s political class wasn’t arrived at without struggle. Further, who benefits from corruption and nepotism is not a static process. In other worlds, who gets what, when, where and how is constantly being renegotiated as the strengths and fortunes of cliques within the political class rise and fall.

Irans' Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and Iraqi militia leaders

What the current crisis suggests is that the already weak fabric of Iraq’s political class could very well be shredded by the internal conflict which is developing over distributing an ever dwindling amount of material resources. Oil revenues are tanking, cross-border trade with Iran has become much more difficult, the fear of holding face to face meetings to try and sustain corrupt and illicit activities, and travel within Iraq all create obstacles which the Green Zone elite has never had to tackle.

Further, anger is evident in the possible shortage of food products and the fees and taxes the government has imposed on bakeries and other essential small businesses. We have already seen such anger in al-Nasiriya where local residents fear bakeries may be forced to close due to stifling government financial regulations.

Nasrawis ask why Iraqis who suffered during the March 1991 uprising (Intifadat Sha^cban) against Saddam Husayn, many of whom sought refuge from Saddam’s forces in. Saudi Arabian camps near the northern town of Rafha’ near the Iraqi-Saudi border, still receive salaries to this day when many live outside Iraq and many poor Iraqis receive no government support at all.

Iraqis in Dhi Qra Province protest against government taxes and fees on bakeries and local businesses

Given the decline of the Green Zone elite, as a result of declining financial resources, trying to juggle the pressures from the Iraqi populace as the Covid-19 pandemic spreads, and medicine and food shortages extend to all parts of the country, and the pressures from Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq, what are the opportunities for democratic forces in Iraq to benefit from this situation?

Until the youth supporters of the October Revolution, who were demonstrating  in Baghdad and cities and towns throughout southern Iraq were forced to suspend their activities, they established strong networks, not only among the youth of many cities and towns, but among local residents who believe in their cause.  Now is the time to transform these networks into an organized political movement which can be ready to compete in the next national elections.

As long as this movement is based on local ties and supporters, but linked together across cities and towns, it can be successful.  Using social media, the goals and strategies for meeting these goals, can be discussed and debated through social media. Candidates for local and national offices can be chosen and efforts can be made to force officers in security forces in cities and towns who have killed or wounded Iraqi youth protestors to resign their positions.  Security force personnel who are sympathetic to the democratic platform of the October Revolution can take their places.  Local municipal councils and provincial governors can assist in this process.

October Revolution protestors in Baghdad's Liberation Square

It is a great a credit to the October Revolution that the peaceful youth protestors have categorically refused to respond to the brutal attacks on them by Ministry of Interior forces and the pro-Iranian militias, including those of the so-called “Blue Hats” of Muqtada al-Sadr Saraya al-Sallam.   The attacks only seem to have made the youth more determined to achieve their goals of democratic reform

Organization is the key concept in assuring the success of the October Revolution.  In addition to developing a powerful network which unites Iraqis who want to take their country back and establish a meaningful social democracy, the youth supporters of the October Revolution should continue giving assistance, especially during the Covid-19 pandemic, to the poor, sick and needy in the areas where they have been protesting.  Such action demonstrates to the Iraqi people that the October Revolution is not just talk but meaningful action which makes such talk a reality.

The Covid-19 is a global tragedy in which no nation will be spared. However, postive social change can emerge from the pandemic. One of the most important aspects of this change is the decentralization of power away from authoritarian elites.  In Iraq, this means establishing a much stronger political presence in the cities and towns of its governorates, in addition to the residential quarters of Baghdad.

With the help of the youth who have organized the October Revolution, a new spirit of civic engagement can be promoted and institutionalized through groups coming together in each block of urban quarters.  Such groups can work to socialize more youth into the values of the October Revolution: social democracy, religious and cultural tolerance, gender equality, the rule of law, human rights, and an end to corruption and nepotism in Iraq's government, both in the Federal Government in Baghdad and in the Kurdish regional Government in Erbil.

Once the Covid-19 pandemic has ended, Iraqis could discover they have developed a new foundation for creating a true democracy in Iraq and bringing the corrupt governance which has brought their country to the brink of destruction to an end.

مقتل سليماني وثورة تشرين في العراق: ما الذي عجز المحللون الغربيون ان يوصلونه لك وما الذي تحتاج ان تعرفه

شكل مقتل سليماني، غير المتوقع، صدمة للكثيرين حيث لا يوازيها شيء سوى الصدمة التي انتابت المحللين الغربيين الذين انشغلوا بتحليل اسباب وتداعيات مقتله. وبدلا من وضع عملية قتله في سياق تاريخي، أو مناقشتها ضمن عمليات سياسية واقتصادية أوسع في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، الا ان المناقشات تركزت إلى حد كبير على الشخصيات وقد 

كانت هذه المناقشات وصفية أكثر منها توضيحية وهذا بحد ذاته يعتبر قصورا في فهم المشهد العام

على الرغم من التغطية الدولية الواسعة للضربة الجوية التي اودت بحياة سليماني، وزعيم المليشيا العراقي، أبو مهدي المهندس الذي كان يرافقه، لم يقدم للجمهور الغربي سوى مجموعة كبيرة من الحقائق المفككة. ومن خلال التركيز على الزعماء الاستبداديين والفاسدين دون التطرق للمواطنين من اهل المنطقة. وترى المحللين الغربين يتحدثون كثيرا عن الزعماء السياسيين الذين يأتون ويذهبون، لكنهم لا يتحدثون كثيرا عن التغييرات المهمة التي تحدث في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا

ما الذي نستشفه من حالة التجاهل لواحدة من أكبر الانتفاضات المستمرة في تاريخ العراق منذ ثورة العشرين (الثورة
 العراقية الكبرى) عن وضعية مستوى التحليل لسياسات منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا من قبل المحللين الغربيين؟

ما الذي نحتاج إلى معرفته لكي نفهم أسباب هذا التجاهل طوال هذه الفترة؟ لماذا يقتصر التركيز على الجهات الفاعلة والنخب السياسية على حساب القوى الاجتماعية والحركات المهمة التي تجري حاليًا في المنطقة؟

تتمثل إحدى الثغرات البارزة لدى المحللين الغربيين في انتفاضة الشباب الضخمة التي تحدث في العراق وغيرها من بلدان منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. وهناك قضية أخرى قد تم اهمالها ترتبط بالعلاقة بين مقتل سليماني وانتفاضة الشباب المستمرة في العراق منذ الأول من أكتوبر (ثورة تشرين) التي يمكن مقارنتها مع ثورات الربيع العربي، إن لم تكن أكبر.

وقد طالبت الانتفاضة تحت قيادة الشباب بإعادة هيكلة النظام السياسي العراقي بشكل كامل وتطبيق الديمقراطية الحقيقية
 وقد أدى ذلك بالفعل إلى استقالة رئيس الوزراء العراقي عادل عبد المهدي، وأجبرت النخبة السياسية في العراق على الدخول في مناقشات جادة بشأن تغيير هيكل النظام السياسي في العراق.

وعلى عكس مقتل سليماني، فإن ثورة أكتوبر لازالت وسائل الاعلام والمحللين السياسيين يتجاهلونها بشكل شبه كامل،وقد حشدت الانتفاضة الآلاف من الشباب العراقي والعديد من المؤيدين لهم من كبار السن من العراقيين، وكذلك على سبيل المثال عمال النفط والنقابات المهنية، الذين يطالبون بإنهاء الحكم الفاسد، وتوفير فرص العمل، وتحسين الخدمات الاجتماعية الحكومية. وقد كان أهم مطلب لهم هو إنشاء نظام سياسي ديمقراطي حقيقي جديد، يتميز بالديمقراطية الاجتماعية.

.

أولاً، اما ان المحللين الغربيين لا يفهمون التغيير الهائل لدى الأجيال او قد لا يأخذونه على محمل الجد ما يحدث حاليًا في منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا. وفي العراق، كما هو الحال في العديد من بلدان منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، يشكل الشباب 70٪ من السكان دون سن الثلاثين، أي بواقع 27.5 مليون من 39 مليون نسمة في العراق. ويعاني الكثير من هؤلاء الشباب من حالة الفقر ومنهم من لديه مستوى دراسي عالي الا ان فرصهم المستقبلية شحيحة

ولا يمكن لاقتصاد القطاع العام الذي يفتقد الي النشاط والذي يتركز في بيئة حيث يستشري الفساد اذ تقتصر الوظائف الحكومية على من لهم علاقات سياسية (ما يسمى بالواسطة)، تلبية احتياجات العمالة حيث الأعداد الكبيرة من الشباب
الذين يدخلون سوق العمل كل عام، أو أولئك الذين ليس لديهم مهارات ممن يعانون من البطالة

تكررت انتفاضة الشباب العراقي في جميع أنحاء منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، حيث مظاهرات السودان، التي كان في طليعتها الشباب وقد تمخضت عن اسقاط الطاغية، اللواء عمر البشير، الذي يحاكم الآن لارتكابه جرائم ضد الإنسانية. وتخطط الحكومة الانتقالية التي تتألف من مدنيين وضباط عسكريين والتي مدتها ثلاث سنوات، لإجراء انتخابات ديمقراطية بعد انتهاء هذه المدة. وقد أدين عمر البشير بسبب ارتكابه اعمال فساد. Omar al-Bashir convicted of corruption

اما في الجزائر، فقد أجبرت مظاهرات الشباب رئيسها الراحل عبد العزيز بوتفليقة على الاستقالة بعد أن سعى إلى الحصول على ولاية خامسة. وقد ساعد الشباب بعد ذلك على تنظيم مقاطعة وطنية للانتخابات الرئاسية أنداك لأن النخبة السياسية الجزائرية رفضت تقديم التنازلات اللازمة التي طالب بها المتظاهرون. ومع ذلك، فإن الرئيس المنتخب حديثًا قد طبق بالفعل سياسات جديدة، مشيرًا إلى أنه يدرك أن هناك حاجة لإصلاحات كبيرة في النظام السياسي الجزائري إذا ما اريد استرضاء الجماهير وبضمنهم الشباب.

وفي لبنان، الذي يمكن ان يكون على حافة الانهيار المالي، أجبر المتظاهرون الشباب هناك رئيس الوزراء سعد الحريري على الاستقالة وواصلوا الضغط على الحكومة من اجل إحداث إصلاحات سياسية. ونتيجة لذلك الضغط فقد شكلت الحكومة لجنة لدراسة الأزمة المالية اللبنانية التي تهدد الجميع. ولم يعرف لحد الان فيما إذا كانت هذه اللجنة ستتمكن من معالجة مشاكل لبنان الاقتصادية بطريقة فعالة

ان الأزمة المالية في لبنان هي نتيجة لتجاهل الحكومات المتعاقبة للفساد الهائل الذي تعاني منه معظم بلدان منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا تقريبًا. وبينما حاول حزب الله، المدعوم من إيران، إيقاف الاحتجاجات، على طريقة الميليشيات الموالية لإيران في العراق التي تهاجم المتظاهرين الشباب، فإن المتظاهرين اللبنانيين الشباب لم يتقهقروا واستمروا بمواصلة الاحتجاجات.

اما الشباب الإيراني فقد كانوا يحتجون كذلك على الفساد الهائل في جهاز الدولة ونقص الوظائف المصحوب بالتدهور السريع للاقتصاد. لقد طرح العديد من الشباب السؤال الذي طرحه العديد من الإيرانيين الآخرين: لماذا ينفق الملالي في طهران الكثير من الأموال لدعم نظام الأسد في سوريا، وحزب الله في لبنان، وما يسمى فصائل الحشد الشعبي في العراق والمتمردون الحوثيون في اليمن بالرغم من الضائقة الاقتصادية المحلية؟ 

ثانيًا ان أحد التطورات المهمة التي لم يتناولها المحللون بعد هو التسامح الذي تروج له حركة احتجاجات الشباب في العراق، وحركات الشباب في أماكن أخرى من منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا، ورفضها التام للطائفية الا ان التركيز على سليماني مرة أخرى يبين الازدواجية التي تميز تحليل سياسات الشرق الأوسط، وما يسمى بالانقسام السني - الشيعي. اذ ان ايران دولة ذات أغلبية شيعية في حين أن المملكة العربية السعودية عدوها اللدود دولة سنية؛ لكن الشباب لن يكون لديهم شيء

من هذا فقد تم حظر الطائفية من مملكتها وينظر إليها بشكل صحيح على أنها "خدعة للتغلب على هذا الطرف او تقسيمه" ولتعزيز المصالح السياسية والاقتصادية للنخب الحاكمة الفاسدة

وتبرز هناك مشكلة أخرى عندما يحاول المحللون تطبيق هذا الثنائي العرقي (السني – الشيعي) على ثورة أكتوبر. ان الغالبية العظمى من المتظاهرين هم من بغداد وجنوب العراق حيث الغالبية الشيعية. لقد اسقطت هذه الحقيقة الحكومة العراقية، التي تسيطر عليها أحزاب الشيعة والميليشيات التي تمولها إيران والتي هي شيعية كذلك. وبالتالي، فإن الهوية الطائفية لم تكن متاحة لأصحاب المشاريع الطائفية في بغداد لاستغلال وتحويل الانتباه عن المطالب الحقيقية للثورة وأسباب قيامها

على عكس العديد من المحللين الغربيين، فإن الشباب أكثر تطوراً في فهمهم لديناميكيات سياسات منطقة الشرق الأوسط وشمال إفريقيا المحلية. لأن الغالبية العظمى من المتظاهرين الشباب في العراق هم من الشيعة، فقد تجنب الشباب السني، الذين يدعمون الانتفاضة، العمل كمجموعة محددة، وبالتالي منع الحكومة العراقية من استخدام المعايير الطائفية لمعارضة الانتفاضة ودعواتها المشروعة لإحداث التغيير السياسي والاجتماعي المطلوب

بمعنى آخر، إذا انخرط الشباب السني العربي بأعداد كبيرة في المناطق ذات الأغلبية السنية في محافظات الأنبار ونينوى وصلاح الدين، على سبيل المثال، يمكن للعناصر الطائفية في الحكومة العراقية أن تجادل بأن الانتفاضة كانت برعاية داعش او ما يسمى (الدولة الإسلامية) وهي منظمة إرهابية. وبدلاً من ذلك، فقد عبر الشباب السني العربي عن دعمهم من بعيد أو شاركوا على أساس فردي مع أخواتهم من الشيعة وإخوانهم في بغداد ومدن الجنوب - البصرة والنجف وكربلاء والناصرية وبابل، والديوانية، والحلة، الكوت وغيرها

المسألة الثالثة التي أهملها المحللون هي التي تؤكد كيف ان مقتل سليماني يثبت ان النظر إلى الشرق الأوسط من خلال عدسة طائفية مسالة خاطئة. على الرغم من دعم سليماني للقوات الطائفية في الجزء الشرقي لمنطقة الشرق الأوسط، سواء كان نظام بشار الأسد أو ميليشيا حزب الله اللبنانية أو فصائل الحشد الشعبي في العراق، فإن اغتياله ليس له علاقة تذكر بالتأويلات السنية او الشيعية للإسلام. فقد كان سليماني رجل أعمال طائفي استخدم الطائفة للترويج لجدول أعماله، كان جدول أعماله الأساسي دائمًا يتعلق بتوسيع القوة السياسية والعسكرية والاقتصادية لإيران في الشرق الأوسط وليس له علاقة بالدين

ان وضع وفاة سليماني، وشريكه في الجريمة والفوضى، أبو مهدي المهندس، نائب رئيس هيئة الحشد الشعبي ومؤسس ميليشيا كتائب حزب الله، في إطار محدد من حيث الهويات الطائفية، لم يفشل في ان يأخذ في الحسبان تغيير الأجيال فقط بل يتوافق مع الثنائي الثابت وغير المحدد الذي يقع الكثير من المحللين فريسة له، أي رؤية الشرق الأوسط في إطار محدد وهو الصراع الكبير بين السنة والشيعة (التي يزعم بوجود ديناميكيتاها التي تفتقر الى التفسير))

بالنسبة لثورة أكتوبر، دفعت هذه المغالطة المحللين الغربيين إلى التقليل من أهمية الديناميكيات وراء السياسات الشبابية في جميع أنحاء المنطقة، بما في ذلك ثورة الشباب الحالية في العراق. إنها تبين لنا بأن الشباب الذين يدعمون ثورة أكتوبر قد رفضوا الطائفية بشكل واضح وصريح لأنهم يرونها بحق قوة خلافية تتلاعب بها النخب السياسية المحلية.

العنصر الرابع لثورة أكتوبر كيف ان مطالبها الأولية تمثل قمة جبل الجليد. آن انتفاضة شباب العراق، والتي بدأت في أوائل أكتوبر 2019، قد تحولت مطالبها بسرعة إلى المطالبة بإعادة هيكلة النظام السياسي العراقي بشكل كامل وإقامة ديمقراطية (اجتماعية) حقيقية في العراق. أولاً وقبل كل شيء، دعا المتظاهرون إلى استبدال نظام قائمة الأحزاب بدوائر انتخابية متعددة ذات مرشح واحد. وسيؤدي هذا النظام الجديد إلى القضاء على نظام المحاصصة الذي على أساسه توزع المناصب الحكومية في داخل وخارج مجلس الوزراء وفقًا للصفقات المبرمة بين الأحزاب الفائزة في الانتخابات العامة. ووفقا لنظام المحاصصة يكون منصب رئيس الجمهورية، وهو منصب تشريفي، من حصة الاكراد ومنصب رئيس الوزراء للعرب الشيعة اما منصب رئيس مجلس النواب فيكون للعرب السنة

وفي أعقاب مطالب المحتجين الشباب، سيتم التخلي عن النظام الذي يكون فيه رئيس الوزراء هو الرئيس التنفيذي الذي ينتخبه البرلمان لصالح نظام رئاسي حيث سينتخب الناخبون المسجلون في جميع أنحاء العراق رئيسًا لا يرتبط بطائفة أو عرق أو منطقة معينة من البلاد

وفي ظل الهيكل السياسي الجديد الذي دعت إليه ثورة أكتوبر، سيتم القضاء على "النظام الطائفي" غير الرسمي الذي يشبه ما معمول به في (لبنان). وقد تم العمل في هذا النظام خلال الاحتلال الأمريكي للعراق في عام 2003 حيث شكلت سلطة التحالف المؤقتة، التي كان يرأسها الدبلوماسي السابق، ل. بول بريمر، نموذجا

كارثياً من خلال إنشاء أول حكومة طائفية تتخذ شكل مجلس الحكم العراقي. الذي تم اختيار أعضائه على أسس طائفية وعرقية.

المطلب الأخير للناشطين الشباب هو أن تغادر إيران العراق وهذا ما لاحظناه في هتافات الشباب (ارحل). تهدف هذه الدعوة إلى إنهاء سلطة فصائل الحشد الشعبي، وخاصة الجماعات الكبيرة التي تمولها إيران. هذه الجماعات ليست مدججة بالسلاح فحسب، بل إنها قوية سياسيا لانها خلقت كيان داخل الدولة العراقية أي اوجدت دولة داخل دولة. كما بدأت الميليشيات في تطوير مصالحها المالية الخاصة في العراق من خلال الانخراط في التهريب وغيرها من الأنشطة الاقتصادية غير القانونية وشبه القانونية. باختصار، قام الحشد الشعبي بتوسيع نفوذ إيران بشكل كبير في العراق وسيطرته على نظامه السياسي والاقتصادي

وبالعودة إلى السؤال الذي طرحناه سابقا، ان مقتل قاسم سليماني وأبو مهدي المهندس قد أغضب إيران والميليشيات التابعة لها في العراق. وبمنظار الربح والخسارة فان إيران ووكلائها المحليين، يرون ان عملية قتل سليماني والمهندس تعزز قوة الولايات المتحدة ونفوذها في العراق على حساب إيران.

منذ بداية المظاهرات التي طالبت بإجراء تغيير ديمقراطي، تعرض أنصار ثورة أكتوبر لهجمات متكررة من قبل قوات الأمن العراقية وخاصة من قبل العديد من افراد قوة الرد السريع التابعة لوزارة الداخلية الذين هم في الواقع تابعين للمليشيات التي تمولها إيران والتي اضطرت الوزارة لدمجهم في صفوفها على الرغم من افتقارهم إلى التدريب العسكري الكافي.

ويطلق على هؤلاء المنتسبين بـ (الدمج) ويمتازون بمعاملتهم الوحشية للمتظاهرين ورد فعلهم العيف على المتظاهرين الشباب العزل ردودها على الرغم من عدم وجود أي تقارير حول ممارسة العنف من قبل المتظاهرين، وقد استخدمت هذه القوات عبوات الغاز المسيل للدموع من الدرجة العسكرية، أي عشرة أضعاف وزن تلك المستخدمة للسيطرة على الاحتجاجات المدنية، واستهدفت رؤوس المتظاهرين مما تسببت بإصابات بليغة في صفوفهم.

وقد تصاعد العنف مع مقتل سليماني والمهندس ولم يقتصر الأمر على تعرض المتظاهرين للهجوم أثناء احتجاجاتهم، بل قامت المليشيات في المساء بمهاجمة المحتجين وحرق الخيام التي أقاموها في ساحات المدن، مثل بغداد والبصرة

والناصرية. ورغم ذلك فقد أظهر المتظاهرون في الناصرية براعتهم من خلال إعادة بناء ملاجئهم باستخدام البلوك حتى لا تتمكن الميليشيات من تدميرها بسهولة. Nasiriya with -Iraqi youth protestors building shelters in al.bricks

سفراء 16 دولة في بغداد يدينون قتل الحكومة العراقية للمتظاهرين المسالمين:

وعلى الصعيد الدولي، بدأت أعمال العنف التي تُستخدم لقمع احتجاجات الشباب يتردد صداها ضد الحكومة العراقية حيث في الآونة الأخيرة أدانت سفارات 16 دولة مختلفة في العراق مقتل ما يزيد عن 600 شاب عراقي وجرح أكثر من 20.000 هذا بالإضافة إلى اختطاف العديد من المتظاهرين والناشطين الذين لم يسمع عنهم منذ اختفائهم، وذكر آخرون أنهم تعرضوا للتعذيب قبل إطلاق سراحهم. Ambassadors of 16 countries in Baghdad condemn Iraqi government killing of peaceful protestors

وفي الوقت نفسه، يدرك عدد قليل من المحللين الغربيين أهمية عملية التثقيف عندما يكون العمل في جو الانتفاضة الثورية. الشباب الذين يتظاهرون يقضون الكثير من الوقت معًا. ترى ماذا يحدث عندما يجتمع الشباب العراقي للاحتجاج؟

هذه المرة لا يقتصر الامر فقط على الاحتجاج في أجزاء مختلفة من المدن والمناطق العراقية المختلفة، بل يتعداه الى الاجتماع لمناقشة أسباب سخطهم وحنقهم على الوضع الراهن، وما هو المجتمع الجديد الذي يطمحون به؟

انهم يأملون في تحسن حياتهم وحياة جميع العراقيين. ان هذا التفاعل والحراك اليومي للمتظاهرين الشباب لم يتم بعد إدراك تأثيره على المدى البعيد.

وتمثل ملصقاتهم وأعمالهم الفنية مؤشراً واحداً على المجتمع المتحرر الجديد الذي ينشدونه. سيكون هذا المجتمع خالياً من الطائفية المتمحورة حول الذات ويعزز الديمقراطية الاجتماعية والتسامح والمساواة بين الجنسين، مما يمنح المرأة مكانتها المناسبة في المجتمع العراقي

ما الذي يمكن عمله لمساعدة ثورة أكتوبر على تحقيق أهدافها؟ هذا موضوع سينشر لاحقا. ومع ذلك، يتعين على الأمم المتحدة والولايات المتحدة والاتحاد الأوروبي ومجتمعات المغتربين العراقيين تشكيل تحالف دولي ينسق مراقبة ردود فعل الحكومة العراقية على الاحتجاجات. ويتوجب على هذا التحالف

أيضًا جمع معلومات عن العراقيين الذين قتلوا أو أصيبوا على أيدي قوات الأمن والتي يمكن استخدامها في المحاكمات المحتملة في المحكمة الجنائية الدولية ومحكمة العدل الدولية.

وبالعودة الى مقتل قاسم سليماني الذي ابتدأ به المقال، نحتاج أن نتذكر أنه كان مجرد فرد مهم لكن لابد من استبعاد فكرة عدم إمكانية قتله. فقد تم تعيين قائدا جديد لقوات القدس خلفا له وتم تعيين مجموعة من الضباط الشباب في قيادة قوة الحرس الثوري الإيراني. ومن جهة أخرى لا يمكن للحرس الثوري الإيراني أن يحسن الاقتصاد الإيراني، ويخلق فرص عمل للإيرانيين العاطلين عن العمل، ويتصدى لمطالب الشباب المتعلمين الذين يقبعون تحت قيود النظام السياسي القمعي الذي يرى أن الإبداع الفردي يشكل تهديدًا لسلطته.

كان سليماني مجرد جزء في عجلة إيرانية تسعى إلى السيطرة الإقليمية على البحر المتوسط ومنطقة الخليج، وهذه أهداف لا يمكن ان تحققها أبدًا

,إن ثورة أكتوبر برفضها للطائفية وسعيها لتحقيق الديمقراطية الاجتماعية والتسامح والمساواة بين الجنسين والحريات الشخصية لا تمثل مجرد هدف وطني عراقي، على عكس الجهود التي كان يبذلها سليماني لفرض الهيمنة الإقليمية لإيران

فإن انتفاضة شباب العراق تعكس رغبة عالمية تتميز بها الشعوب المحبة للحرية في جميع أنحاء العالم

The Killing of Qasem Suleimani and Iraq’s October Revolution: What Western Analysts Aren’t Telling You But What You Need to Knowمقتل قاسم سليماني وثورة تشرين في العراق: ما فشل المحللون الغربيون في إخبارك به ولكن ما تحتاج إلى معرفته

The unexpected killing of Qasem Suleimani came as a shock.  What is likewise a shock is the narrowly construed discussion of the meaning and ramifications of his killing by analysts in the West. Rather than situate Suleimani’s killing in a historical context, or broader political and economic processes in the MENA region, the discussion has largely focused on personalities, remaining descriptive rather than explanatory.

Despite the extensive international coverage of the strike which killed Suleimani, and the Iraqi militia leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis who was accompanying him, the Western public has been left with little more than a large collection of disjointed facts.  By focusing on (male) authoritarian leaders, who are corrupt and completely out of touch with the region’s citizenry, Western analysts tell us much about individual political leaders, who come and go, but little about the significant changes taking place in the MENA region.

What does ignoring one of the largest sustained uprisings in Iraq since the June October, 1920 Revolution (al-Thawra al-^cIraqiya al-Kubra) tell us about the state of analysis of MENA region politics by Western analysts?  What do we need to know to gain such an understanding of what has been neglected thus far?  Why is the focus confined to political actors and elites to the detriment of important social forces and movements currently underway in the region?

One notable lacuna among Western analysts is the huge youth uprising which has been taking place in Iraq and other MENA region countries. Another neglected issue is the relationship between Suleimani’s killing and the ongoing youth uprising in Iraq. In its fourth month, the October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) is comparable to the Arab Spring uprisings, if not larger.  

Led by youth,  the uprising has demanded the complete restructuring of the Iraqi political system and the implementation of a true democracy.  It has already led to the resignation of Iraq’s prime minister, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, and forced Iraq’s political elite to engage in serious discussions over changing the structure of Iraq’s political system.

Unlike Suleimani’s killing, the October Revolution continues to be almost completely ignored by Western analysts and the media.  The uprising has mobilized thousands of Iraqi youth and many supporters among older Iraqis, e.g., oil workers and professional associations, who demand an end to corrupt governance, the provision of jobs, and an improvement in state social services. However, their most important demand is establishing a new truly democratic political system, one characterized by social democracy.

Tunnel under Baghdad's Liberation Square where art has created an informal museum

First, Western analysts neither understand nor take seriously the massive generational change which is currently underway in the MENA region.  In Iraq, as in many MENA region countries, youth constitute 70% of the population under the age of 30, namely 27.5 of Iraq’s 39 million population.  Many of these youth, whether poor or highly educated, see little hope in the future. 

Inefficient public sector economies and endemic corruption, where government jobs are limited to those with political connections (al-wasta), can’t address the employment needs of the large numbers of youth who enter the job market each year, or those without skills who remained under- or unemployed.

Iraq's youth uprising has been replicated by youth uprisings throughout the MENA region. Demonstrations in Sudan, in which youth were the vanguard, brought down the despicable tyrant, General Omar Bashir, who is now being tried for crimes against humanity.  A three year transitional government comprised of civilians and military officers is now planning for democratic elections after the period concludes. Omar al-Bashir convicted of corruption

In Algeria, youth demonstrations forced its octogenarian president, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, to finally resign after he indicated he would seek a fifth term in office. Youth subsequently helped organize a national  boycott of recent presidential elections because the Algerian political elite has refused to make the necessary concessions demanded by the protesters. Still, the newly elected president has already implemented new policies, indicating that he realizes that significant reforms of Algeria’s political system need to be made if youth and the populace are to be placated.

In Lebanon, a county on the brink of financial collapse, youth protesters forced Prime Minister Saad al-Hariri to resign and have kept up pressure on the government to enact political reforms. In response, the government has created a commission to study Lebanon’s existential financial crisis. Whether this commission will be able to address Lebanon’s economic problems in any meaningful manner has yet to be seen.

Lebanon’s financial crisis is the result of successive governments having ignored its massive corruption which plagues almost all countries of the MENA region. While Hizballah, supported by Iran, has tried to shut down the protests, just like the pro-Iranian militias in Iraq which have attacked youth demonstrators, the Lebanese youth protesters have been unbowed in keeping their protests going.

Of course, Iranian youth have likewise been protesting against massive corruption in the state apparatus and the lack of jobs accompanied by the rapid deterioration of the economy. Many youth have raised the question, asked by many other Iranians: Why do the Tehran mullahs spend so much funds on supporting the al-Asad regime in Syria, Hizballah in Lebanon, the so-called Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashad al-Sha^cbi) in Iraq and the Houthi rebels in Yemen given Iran's domestic economic needs?

Second, an important development which has yet to be analyzed is the tolerance promoted by the youth protest movement in Iraq, and youth movements elsewhere in the MENA region, and its complete rejection of sectarianism.  The focus on Suleimani has raised yet again the facile binary which characterizes the analysis of Middle East politics, the so-called Sunni-Shi^ca divide.  Iran is a Shi^ca majority state while its arch-enemy, Saudi Arabia is Sunni Muslim. But youth will have none of it.  Sectarianism has been banned from their kingdom and is correctly viewed as a ploy to “divide and conquer” to promote the political and economic interests of corrupt ruling elites.

A problem arises when analysts try to apply this ethnoconfessional binary to the October Revolution.  The overwhelming majority of the protestors are from Baghdad and the south of Iraq and hence Shi^ca.  This fact has frustrated the Iraqi government, which is controlled by Shi^ca parties and the Iranian-funded militias which are likewise Shi^ca. Thus, the sectarian card - arguing that the protests are Sunni inspired and thus anti-Shi^ca - has been  unavailable for Baghdad’s sectarian entrepreneurs to exploit and divert attention from the revolution's valid complaints.

Unlike many Western analysts, the youth are much more sophisticated in their own understandings of the dynamics of local MENA region politics. Because the vast majority of the youth demonstrators in Iraq are Shi^ca, Sunni youth, who support the uprising, have avoided acting as an identifiable group, thus preventing the Iraqi government from using sectarian criteria to oppose the uprising and its legitimate calls for political and social change.

In other words, if Arab Sunni youth became involved in large numbers in Sunni majority areas in al-Anbar, Ninawa and Salah al-Din provinces, for example, sectarian elements in the Iraqi government could then argue that the uprising was sponsored by the Da’ish (so-called Islamic State) terrorist organization.  Instead, Arab Sunni youth have expressed support from afar or participated on an individual basis with their Shi^ca sisters and brothers in Baghdad and the cities and towns of the south - al-Basra, al-Najaf, Karbala', al-Nasiriya, Babil, al-Diwaniya, Hilla, Kut and many others.

A third issue which has been neglected by analysts is how Suleimani’s killing underscores the fallacy of viewing the Middle East through a sectarian lens.  Despite Suleimani’s support for sectarian forces in the Mashriq region of the Middle East, whether Bashar al-Asad's regime, Lebanon's Hizballah militia, or the People’s Mobilization Units (al-Hashad al-Sha^cbi) in Iraq, his killing has little to do with Shi^ca or Sunni interpretations of Islam.  While Suleimani was a sectarian entrepreneur who used sect to promote his agenda, his core agenda was always about expanding Iran’s political, military and economic power in the Middle East and had little to do with religion.

The framing of Suleimani’s death, and his accomplice in crime and mayhem, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units and the Kata’ib Hizballah militia, in terms of sectarian identities not only fails to take generational change into account but conforms to the static and ill-defined binary which so many analysts fall prey to, namely seeing the Middle East as defined by a monumental struggle between Sunnis and Shi^ca (whose dynamics are assumed but rarely if ever explained).

In terms of the October Revolution, this fallacy has led Western analysts to underestimate the dynamics behind youth politics throughout the region, including the current youth revolution in Iraq. It is telling that the youth who support the October Revolution have explicitly and very vocally rejected sectarianism which they rightfully see as a divisive force which is manipulated by domestic political elites to enhance their political power and influence. 

A fourth element of the October Revolution is how its initial demands represent the tip of the iceberg.  Iraq's youth uprising, which began in early October 2019, quickly morphed into a demand for a complete restructuring of the Iraqi political system and the establishment of true (social) democracy in Iraq.  First and foremost, the protestors have called for replacing the party list system with single member electoral districts model.

This new system would eliminate the despised “quota system” (nathâm al-muhassasât) which allocates seats in Iraq’s Council of Delegates (parliament) and among cabinet ministers according to deals cut between victorious parties following national elections.  This system allocates the ceremonial role of president to a Kurd, the position of prime minister to an Arab Shi^ci, and the Speaker of the Council of Deputies to a Sunni Arab. 

Following the demands of the youth protestors, the institution of prime minister would be eliminated in favor of a presidential system. Registered voters throughout Iraq would elect a president who would not be associated with a particular sect, ethnicity or region of the country.

"I'm an Iraqi. My parliament doesn't represent me:

Under the new political structure advocated by the October Revolution, the informal “confessional system” (similar to Lebanon) would be eliminated.  This system was facilitated by the US occupation of Iraq in 2003.  The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), headed by former diplomat, L. Paul Bremer, set a disastrous example by creating the first sectarian based government in the form of the Iraqi Governing Council which chose members based on their religious sect or ethnicity.

A final demand of the youth activists is that Iran leave Iraq (irhal Iran!).  This call is meant to terminate the power of the Popular Mobilization Units, especially the largest groups which are funded by Iran.  Not only are these groups well-armed, but they are politically powerful with  and creating a state within a state in Iraq. The militias have also begun to develop their own financial interests in Iraq through becoming involved in smuggling and other illicit and quasi-legal economic activities. In short, the al-Hashad al-Sha^cbi have dramatically extended Iran’s influence in Iraq and control over its political system and economy.

Unknown assailant kills Iraqi protestor

To return to the question raised earlier, the killing of Qasem Suleimani, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. infuriated Iran and its proxy militias in Iraq. Viewed in zero-sum terms, Iran and its local agents view the killings as promoting US power and influence in Iraq at the expense of Iran.

Since the beginning of the demonstrations for democratic change, the supporters of the October Revolution have been attacked by Iraqi security forces.  Many members of the Ministry of Interior's Rapid reaction Force are actually members of Iranian funded militias who the Ministry was forced to incorporate into into ranks despite their lack of adequate military training.  

Known in Iraqi slang as "al-damaj" (from the Arabic al-indimaj), these forces have been brutal in their responses to the youth demonstrations. Despite the lack of any reports of violence on the part of the protestors, the security fores have used military grade tear gas canisters, ten times the weight of those used to control civilian protests, and aimed them at the demonstrators' heads, with devastating results.

However, with Suleimani and al-Muhandis' killing, the violence has intensified. Not only have demonstrators been attacked as they protest, but the tents they set up in city squares, such as Baghdad, al-Basra and al-Nasiriya, have been attacked in the evenings and burned. However, in al-Nasiriya, the protesters demonstrated their ingenuity by reconstructing their shelters using bricks so the militias couldn't destroy them as easily.
Iraqi youth protestors in al-Nasiriya rebuild their shelters with brick

Internationally, the violence used to quell the youth protests has begun to reverberate against the Iraqi government. Recently, the embassies of 16 different countries in Iraq condemned the killing of what is now well over 600 Iraqi youth and the injuring of over 20,000. This in addition to the kidnapping of many protestors and activists who have not been heard from since they disappeared, Others report being tortured before being released. Ambassadors of 16 countries in Baghdad condemn Iraqi government killing of peaceful protestors

Meanwhile, few Western analysts recognize the important socialization processes at work within the revolutionary uprising. The youth who are demonstrating spend an enormous of time together. What occurs during when Iraqi youth gather to protest?

This time not only involves protesting in different parts of Iraqi cities and towns but meeting to discuss their discontents and how, in the new society they propose, they hope to improve the lives of themselves and all Iraqis. The long-term impact of the daily interaction of  youth protestors has yet to be understood.  

Their posters and art work represent one indicator of the new liberated society they seek. This society would be devoid of self-centered sectarianism and would promote social democracy, tolerance and gender equality, giving women their rightful place in Iraqi society.

What can be done to help the October Revolution achieve its goals?  This is a topic for a subsequent post. However, the United Nations, United States, European Union, and Iraqi expatriate communities need to form an international coalition which coordinates monitoring the Iraqi government's response to the protests.  

Iraqi women protestors' take on "Rosie the Riveter

This coalition should also gather information on Iraqis killed or injured by security forces which can be used in possible prosecutions in the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice.

To return the killing of Qasem Suleimani with which this post began, we need remember that he was only an individual, important to be sure. Unlike a man, an idea can't be killed. Suleimani has been replaced bu a new commander of the Quds Forces and control of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Force has been spread among a new group of younger officers.

But the IRGC cannot improve the Iranian economy, produce jobs for unemployed Iranians, address the demands of educated youth who chomp under the constraints of a repressive political system which sees individual creativity as a threat to its authority. Suleimani was just a cog in an Iranian wheel which seeks regional domination extending to the Mediterranean sea and the Gulf region, goals it will never achieve.

The October Revolution with its rejection of sectarianism, and embrace of social democracy, tolerance, gender equality and personal freedoms doesn't just represents an Iraqi national goal. Unlike Suleimani's effort to impose Iran's regional hegemony, Iraq's youth uprising reflects a universal desire characteristic of  freedom loving peoples the world over.