Youth Building the New Iraq: The 2020 Iraq Public Leadership Program. الشباب يبنون العراق الجديد: 2020 برنامج القيادة العامة في العراق

This month, I once again had the privilege of working with the participants in the Iraq Public Leadership Program (IPLP).  Now in its ninth year, the IPLP is a highly sophisticated program designed to train Iraqi youth professionals in social entrepreneurship. What role does the IPLP play in helping a new generation of young Iraqis contribute to developing and diversifying Iraq’s economy?

The IPLP reflects the best of the new Iraq. A highly competitive program, it draws upon the best participants from a large applicant pool. This year’s cohort reflects the spirit of a future Iraq in which all members of the country’s diverse ethnic and confessional tableau are represented. The IPLP members include Arabs and Kurds and almost half the group are women.

IPLP participants receive a very broad training from a wide variety of experts.  Under the excellent direction of Dr. Yass al-Khafaji, Professor of Business Administration at the American University of Sharjah and founder, CEO and Principal of Alkafaji and Associates (A&A), the IPLP has attracted many outstanding young Iraqis who have gone on to make numerous contributions to Iraqi society.

With Iraq facing an extended period of decline in oil prices and a the Covid-19 pandemic, the need to diversify its economy is a pressing concern.  Currently, Iraq relies on oil revenues for over 90% of its foreign currency reserves.  Already, the closing of Iraq’s borders with Iran and Turkey due to the corona virus has boosted Iraqi manufacturers, small businesses and farmers who had difficulty competing with foreign imports prior to the pandemic, suggesting tht Iraq's private sector has the opportunity to become more robust under more supportive circumstances.

What type of training did we engage in during the sessions on which I worked with this year’s IPLP members?  The training centered on 6 themes: democracy and civic engagement, women’s empowerment, environmental sustainability, improving public health, diversification of the economy and promoting social entrepreneurship.

First, participants are concerned with the ability of Iraqi youth to bring about change. Thus, they want Iraq’s political system to offer more opportunity for youth who seek to use their creative energies to develop social entrepreneurial ventures. to participate in civic affairs. In this regard, one of my presentation, “Democracy, Civil Society and Democratic Thought: Iraq’s Gift to the World,” was intended to remind us, Iraqi and non-Iraqis, that modern forms of democracy actually trace their lineages to ancient Mesopotamian civilization.

A slide from "Democracy, Civil Society and Democratic Thought

A slide from the "Democracy, Civil Society and Democratic Thought: Iraq's Gift to the World"

The presentation offered examples from ancient Mesopotamian civilizations, the Abbasid Empire (750-1258 CE) and the 20^th Iraqi nationalist movement to demonstrate Iraq’s historic contributions to modern notions of democracy and civil society. The presentation's purpose was threefold.

First. the goal was to document these contributions.  Second, the presentation sought to help to offset the negative feeling many Iraqi youth have towards their country based on repressive Ba^cthist rule (1968-2003), the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88) and Gulf War (1990), the March 1991 Intifada in which hundreds of thousands were killed, and sectarian violence following the US invasion and toppling of Saddam in 2003. The presentation shows that Iraq is not a country of dictatorship, wars and violence but has a history which gave the world much of its civilization, a fact of which Iraqis can be very proud.

Third, the presentation was intended to lay the basis for a social entrepreneurial venture. The proposed venture would have Iraqi youth create a website for secondary school teachers and university faculty which would contains lesson plans and instructional materials on democratic governance, citizenship, the rule of law, cultural and religious tolerance, gender equality, civil society and citizenship.

Iraq developed the first legal system in the form of Hammurabi’s Code in 1752 BCE. This code is still part of the legal system of 140 nation-states today. One reason for its centrality to the law over many centuries is its comprehensive structure and the concern Hammurabi showed for the less fortunate of society.

The word for freedom, as understood in its modern meaning, was first used in ancient Mesopotamia which can also boast not only of having the first parliament, but of a parliament which required the ruler to obtain its permission before he began a war against a neighboring kingdom.

The incentive for ancient Mesopotamians to develop the world’s first language was a response to the Fertile Crescent's prosperity and the extent of their trade which extended from southern Egypt to the Black Sea and to present day Myanmar (Burma). Traders needed a notational system to keep track of their long distance trade. At the same time, the ancient Mesopotamians developed the world's first system of accounting and first financial contracts.

During the Abbasid Empire, Iraq developed the first planned city, Baghdad, and made great contribution’s in the sciences and mathematics, inventing chemistry (al-kimiya) and algebra (al-jabr).  The Caliph al-Ma’mun (813-833 CE) was highly intellectual and established an important library-university, Bayt al-Hikma (The House of Wisdom). The Bayt al-Hikma sought to compile all the knowledge of the world that existed at the time.

Today, many in the West looks to classical Athens for the origins of Western civilization. However, it was al-Ma’mun who helped preserve Greek culture through having his advisers bring the writings of Plato, Aristotle and other intellectuals to Baghdad to be translated into Arabic by members of the Chaldean Christian community Even though many of the works of the Greeks were subsequently destroyed, those preserved in the Bayt al-Hikma would later be translated from the Arabic into Latin during the European Renaissance.

Youth at work on Iraq's large "blogosphere"

The second presentation I offered, “Empowering Iraqi Youth: Social and Generational Perspectives,” sought to document the contributions Iraqi youth have made to Iraqi society since the fall of Saddam Husayn’s regime.  It included many activities, such as creating a large and influential “blogosphere,” which advocates for the rights of women, the poor, and the marginalized, working in NGOs devoted to promoting conflict resolution, contributing anti-sectarian programing to Iraqi television, mentoring poor students and creating myriad new social entrepreneurial ventures. 

Most recently, Iraqi youth have organized the "October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen). Peaceful demonstrations, which has been ongoing since October 2019, have demanded that the Iraqi government end its extensive corruption and nepotism and establish a true social democracy. Their vision is accountable governance, religious and cultural tolerance, anti-sectarianism, gender equality and sustainable development. 

Iraqi youth have been the vanguard fighting sectarianism since 2003

The purpose of the presentation of empowering youth was to stimulate a discussion among IPLP participants regarding the possibilities of using social entrepreneurship in the future as a central vehicle to bring about economic, political, social and cultural change in Iraq. The beauty of social entrepreneurship model is that it serves two critical functions simultaneously: it can offer its practitioners steady employment while simultaneously making an important contribution to society.

Following our sessions which discussed and analyzed the first two presentations, IPLP participants were asked to choose between 6 topics and develop, in small groups, a project related to the topic. The topics were: Promoting Democracy and Civic Engagement in Iraq;  Empowering Youth and Social Entrepreneurship in Iraq; Increasing the Contribution of Iraqi Women to Building the New Iraq; Promoting Environmental Sustainability in Iraq; and Improving the Capacity of Iraq’s Public Health Infrastructure.

Groups of 5-6 participants took a week to develop their projects. The outcome of the exercise was very impressive.  Each project was presented as a Power Point.  All projects were creative, innovative, and extremely well formulated and thought-through. Not just limited to the realm of ideas, each project offered concrete proposals of how it would be implemented.

Although space does not allow for a full review of the projects, a few examples of the concepts and ideas for developing them offer a sampling of the IPLP group’s creativity.  “Recycling Food Waste into Fertilizer” noted how Iraqi cities have grown rapidly from the 1950s to 2020 and the growth of material waste has likewise dramatically increased. Thus, this project continues a 4 part plan to reduce food waste through donating excess food to the poor, using food waste to feed animals, composting to transform food waste into fertilizer (and anaerobic digestion to produce biogas), and  home, community and commercial composting.

TEDx Nishtimani conference on women's role in Iraqi Kurdistan society

Another project, “Increasing the Contribution of Iraqi Women in Rebuilding the New Iraq,” addressed the pressing problem of empowering women and increasing their ability to participate in and contribute to the public sphere.  The problem identified by this project is the inability of educated women to translate the skill sets they have learned during their educational training into full-time employment and careers.  By providing them with pathways to employment, the project seeks to enhance the confidence of Iraqi women of their ability to contribute to Iraqi society. 

To increase economic opportunities for women, the project proposes to improve their skills in obtaining and effectively using micro-grants to establish new social entrepreneurial ventures. One component of the plan is to establish an online company which would assist poor women to bring products to market such as handicrafts, food and sewn items.  A second idea is to create a women-owned and managed transportation company which would provide taxi and delivery services which meet the needs of Iraqi women.

Perhaps the most ambitious component of the project is to offer a series of 2-4 week courses, in cooperation with the Ministry of Labor, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Oil and Gas, to train Iraqi women for positions in public agencies and private firms which require specific skill sets.  These short courses would be offered through the establishment of a new training institute which would benefit from Iraqi government and international support.

Tala - know as "Mother of the South" for helping Iraqi children with cancer

Another project, "Improving the Public Health Infrastructure in Iraq," developed a sophisticated public opinion survey to use in communities throughout Iraq where the local heath care system fails to provide adequate services. The questionnaire seeks to document the needs of local inhabitants with a view to developing hard data which could subsequently be used to improve health care delivery.

Developing  Iraq's Public Health Infrastructure 

This "bottom up" approach could provide local physicians, health care clinics and hospitals with badly needed information of what residents in the areas they serve are lacking in terms of health care. The data would also be useful to health care agencies in Iraq's provinces and to the Ministry of Health in Baghdad because it would allow them to target their services and funding in a more focused manner.

"Promoting Democracy and Civic Engagement in Iraq" grapples with the problem of political change in Iraq.  Without such change, this project argues, reducing violence and political instability can't be achieved. Nor can the rule of law and human rights become core components of Iraq's political culture.

What is particularly compelling about this project is the assertion that democracy must in fact take the form of social democracy.  Unless there is a more equitable distribution of income in Iraqi society and more opportunities for Iraqis from all socioeconomic sectors and ethno-confessional backgrounds of society, Iraq can't become a truly democratic country.

To promote democracy and civic engagement, this project proposes to develop new educational curricula.  One component of the educational process is teaching youth in elementary and secondary school about the many contributions of Iraq to world civilization and to encourage pride among them in Iraq's impressive cultural heritage.  

Promoting Democracy and Civic Engagement in Iraq's Active Learning Model

The learning model proposed by this project involves active learning.  Rather than merely write down what the instructor says in the classroom, students are encouraged to engage in simulations of the democratic process, such as elections, and meet with representatives f the Iraqi government who visit their classes.

The "Micro Lending Project" developed by another group of IPLP participants points to the large unemployment rate among Iraqi youth - currently 22% - and the degree to which the lack of jobs contributes to ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to recruit youth to their ranks. This project proposes to create a cooperative to help applicants go through the process of obtaining a loan as well as form a limited liability corporation to oversee the loans, their effective use and repayment.  

The proposed micro lending process in Iraq

Micro-finance and lending has already been used in others parts of the Arab world, such as by the  Egyptian financier, Sharif Samy, whose "Mashru'i" (My Project) offers groups of 4-5 women micro loans.  This project has been very successful since the group of borrowers makes sure the payments are made when required even if one borrower might have difficulty with making her part of the payment.  The default rate of Mr. Samy's fund is less than 1%. Given this success in Egypt, there is no reason why it couldn't be replicated successfully in Iraq.

These projects make clear the wide range of entrepreneurial talent which exists among Iraq's youth population.  Because youth constitutes 70% of the population under the age of 30, Iraq loses a huge amount of human resources by not enabling youth to contribute to society. 

Many Iraqi youth are keen to create social entrepreneurial projects but don't have access to investment capital. The critical question which remains is when the older generation of Iraqis will realize that the oil economy is in peril and diversification of Iraq's economy is a must. The inclusion of Iraq's younger generation is key to assuring the long-term economic growth and stability of the country. 

is a fundamental solution in stopping the cycle of violence in Iraq, ensuring political stability linked to the equitable distribution of wealth, opening new opportunities, and guaranteeing all human rights and individual freedoms

  

A Specter is Haunting the Arab World: the Threat of Failed States شبح يلاحق العالم العربي: تهديد الدول الفاشلة

Arab states are facing unprecedented threats to their stability.  Economic challenges, civil strife, environmental degradation, authoritarian, corrupt and ineffective governance and a global health pandemic.  What do these challenges tell us about the future of the Arab world and what efforts are being made to address them?

What do we mean by a failed state?  Clearly, the collapse of the central government is at the core of state failure. However, citizens’ loss of trust in their government produces a loss of legitimacy, deep disaffection with social services and their standard of living and a lack of hope about future aspiration all point to many “quasi-failed states” and the possibility of future collapse.

Using a 5 point scale, we can rank Arab states as having become failed states or facing that prospect in the foreseeable future.  If 5 represents the worse-case scenario, then Libya and Yemen already qualify as having collapsed, politically, socially and economically. Neither has a central government, and both are rent with sharp political cleavages and internal conflict which shows no sign of abating anytime soon.

Syria does not face as dire situation as Libya and Yemen.  However, after 8 years of civil war, the country is bankrupt as its currency is virtually worthless and its economy is in tatters, much of the country’s cities and infrastructure has been destroyed, and deep divisions plague its social fabric. President Bashar al-Asad seems determined to follow a “scorched earth” policy even if leads to Syria’s complete destruction.

Neighboring Lebanon has seen a state-sponsored Ponzi scheme, which was used to fund the country over many years, collapse, causing inflation to spire out of control. Lebanon’s political elite is deeply divided and neither able to address the political or economic challenges facing the country.  Much of its highly-educated citizens, especially the young, have already fled and migrated to other Arab countries or the West.

Other countries in the region also face serious challenges, not only economic but environmental.  Egypt’s tourist sector, which at its peak in 2010 comprised 11% of GDP and employed 12% of the population, had been suffering through 2016.  The Arab Spring uprising of 2011 and attacks on tourists in the Red Sea area by an ISIS affiliate in the Sinai Peninsula led to a serious drop in visitors to the country iconic cultural sites.  By 2019, just Egypt had recouped its 2010 level of tourist visitors, the tourist industry collapse once again due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

Egypt faces a more existential environmental crisis resulting from Ethiopia’s decision to build the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam which it fears would deprive it of Nile River waters which are critical to its ability to survive as a nation-state.  Egyptian farmers could be adversely affected by a decline in water availability. Because Egypt’s continues to experience rapid population growth, which intrudes on agricultural farmland, the long term fear is feeding its population.  Although only 6% of Egypt’s population currently faces the problem of “water stress,” the government estimates 25% of its agricultural population would be adversely affected by the filling of the Renaissance Dam

Jordan and Palestine (the PNA) likewise face a potential water crisis as the aquifer on which they depends is controlled by Israel and is being depleted.  Jordan has one of the highest indices of “water stress” of any Arab state which affects 87% of its population.  Gaza, which has no desalinization plant, faces both water shortages and sewerage processing problems. 

Still another group of Arab states are facing economic problems due to the precipitous drop in the global price of oil.  Although oil prices have recovered from their lows of $10/bbl last month and were hovering around $40/bbl at the time of this writing, they are still too low for countries like Iraq and Algeria which depend on them to finance their national budgets.

Iraq requires a price of at least $60/bbl to meet its budgetary needs. Both the Federal Government in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil employ 65% of the workforce.  Recently, the new government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi  was forced to take a loan to meet government salaries this June. While “double salaries” and the extravagant benefit packages enjoyed by members of parliament and high level government officials are to be cut, there is strong resistance to al-Kadhimi’s proposed moves.

Algeria is also suffering from declining oil prices.  A price of $30/bbl would cut its GDP by 22%.  According to the World Bank, Algeria’s GDP is expected to experience a negative growth rate of -3%.  Like Egypt, Iraq and Syria, Algeria suffers from a bloated and inefficient public sector and weak government support for private sector development.  Human resources are wasted as women and youth fail to receive state support to develop entrepreneurial ventures which could offset stagnant public sector growth in the future.

Tunisia is one of the Arab world’s bone fide democracies, perhaps the only one worthy of that title.  It is resource poor and has always depended on European tourism, like another North African state, namely Morocco.  Many Tunisian youth have soured on democracy because they don’t see the economic benefit they expected from the ouster of the authoritarian ruler, Zein al-Din Ben Ali in early 2011. Youth unemployment is high, and the country still faces a social and economic cleavage between the more prosperous, and often Francophone, population on the country’s coast and the poorer segments of the interior who struggle to make ends meet.

We might place Egypt between 3 and 4 in the category of potential failed states, especially since the al-Sisi regime has done little to offset the negative impact of the Covid-19 virus. Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia, on the other hand, should be placed in the 3 category. Will they be able to ride out the current health pandemic? And will they be able to use the pandemic as an argument to make inroads in the fight against corruption.

Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf States will be able to weather the dual challenge of falling oil prices and the corona virus.  However, Saudi Arabia is still mired down in its war with the Houthi rebels in Yemen who continue to confront its facilities with rocket attacks.  The tourist industry envisioned by Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman is on hold and the kingdom has bene forced to drastically cut the number of pilgrims. Bin Salman’s Vision 2030, which seeks to diversify the economy and move it away from oil dependency, is facing serious challenges.

For the Arab Gulf states, which have small populations, the ability to bring necessary labor from South Asia and East Asia as it has done in the past, will be severely constrained by the downturn of the global economy. Dubai’s role as a global financial hub is likely to see much of its capital resources dissipate.  These states also will face growing environmental problems as temperatures in the Gulf rise into the 60 degree Celsius range as we move towards 2050 which will limit human behavior during the heat of the mid-day.

What can Arab states do to offset the economic, environmental and health threats which they confront?  How can they avoid following in the path of Yemen, Libya, Syria and Lebanon?  First, these countries require honest leadership.  Such leadership is sorely lacking throughout the Arab world.  Perhaps one positive sign is the appointment of Mustafa al-Kadhimi this past May to become Iraq’s prime minister. Already, al-Kadhimi has been straightforward with Iraq’s citizenry, earning him a high degree of respect which he will need to make hard decisions regarding Iraq’s economic woes.

Second, Arab leaders need to tap into the human resources which have been largely sidelined in most Arab states. Women, who often comprise up to 70% of university student populations, have been largely neglected in the process of economic development.  Likewise, youth, who constitute 70% of the population under the age of 39 in many Arab countries, lack resources to begin businesses and social entrepreneurial ventures.

Third, corruption must be tackled.  Lebanon is the poster child of a country which went off the rails in large measure due to massive corruption, which existed well before the refugee crisis caused by the Syrian civil war.  Only Mustafa al-Kadhimi has made corruption a central issue in his effort to bring it under control in Iraq, which ranks as 169 of 174 on Transparency International’s list of the world’s most corrupt countries. 

Fourth, environmental challenges have to be addressed head on.  Much of the water scarcity in the Middle East is not as much a function of droughts and  declining sources, but also caused by the lack of water management programs implemented by Arab states.  If the state could use education and a form of the US’ agriculture extension agents who help farmers learn how to conserve water, positive change could be made in this area.

Greater use of solar energy, as we already seeing in Egypt and Morocco, and the use of wind, for example in the Atlas mountains, the Lebanese mountains and the mountains of Iraq’s KRG could offer cheap and abundant energy, reduce pollution, provide new areas of employment, and promote greater technological innovation in the Arab world.

Finally, the Arab world needs to take economic cooperation seriously.  The Gulf Cooperation Council has yet to fulfill this need but does suggest how regional bodies could be used to begin the process. hopefully creating the functional equivalent resembling the European Economic Community in the near future.

Can Mustafa al-Kadhimi Save Iraq?هل يستطيع مصطفى الكاظمي إنقاذ العراق؟

Prime Minsiter Mustafa al-Kadhimi

What does it mean to pose the question: can Mustafa al-Kadhimi save Iraq?  Iraq has yet to meet the expectations its citizens have held since the toppling of Saddam and his Ba'th Party regime in 2003.  Saving Iraq thus means meeting those expectations by conceiving and implementing policies which can allow them to become a reality. Democracy is what Iraqis want. However, democracy needs to be more than just the right to vote and personal freedoms. 

In Iraq, meaningful democracy not only requires the rule of law, transparent and accountable governance, but also jobs and social services, such as healthcare, housing and education. Saving Iraq presents any Iraqi leader with a huge challenge.  Is Mustafa al-Kadhimi up to the task?

Background to Mustafa al-Kadhimi taking power
Iraq has had several prime ministers since national elections were first held in January 2005. None have inspired the Iraqi people and none have implemented the type of democratic change, improvement in social services and the growth of jobs that Iraqis desire.  Perhaps Haydar al-Abadi, a Ph.D. in electrical engineering from the University of Manchester, was the only candidate to raise hopes due to the time he spent in the UK, his technical skills and a background devoid of corruption.

Poster criticizing the corruption in 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi's government 

Iraq’s youth uprising – the October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) – forced the resignation of Prime Minster 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi through widespread and peaceful protests in late November 2019.  Not since the 1948 Wathba had popular protests forced an Iraqi leader - in that instance, Iraq’s first Shi'i prime minister, Salih Jabr - from office.

Youth supporters of Thawrat Tishreen protesting in Baghdad's Liberation Square

From this past November until this May, Iraq has had a caretaker government.  Efforts by two candidates proposed by Iraqi president, Barham Salih - Muhammad Tawfiq 'Allawi and 'Adnan al-Zurfi - to form governments failed. 'Allawi was unable to obtain the parliamentary votes for his ministry due to his focus on appointing technocrats as ministers who were not officials of political parties.  Iranian opposition to al-Zurfi, who had lived in the US, doomed his chances as well.  Despite Iran’s displeasure, Iraq’s intelligence chief, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was able to form a government on May 7th, 2020.

The new prime minister has an atypical political pedigree.  Although he was Iraq’s Director of Intelligence prior to becoming head of the Iraqi government, he was also a journalist associated with the highly respected and independent news website, al-Monitor, and a human rights activist.  Iran, the pro-Iranian militias in the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs/al-Hashad al-Sha'bi), and the Green Zone political elite’s corrupt parliamentarians all opposed al-Kadhimi.  They saw him as too independent of their control, inclined to cooperate with the United States and seeking to impose technocrats as ministers who would threaten their financial interests.

However, a number of factors ultimately worked in al-Kadhimi’s favor. The failure of the previous two candidates, which involved extensive in-fighting, exhausted Iraq’s political bosses and parliament.  Meanwhile, al-Mahdi’s caretaker government was doing nothing to address a wide range of pressing problems. These problems involved how the government should deal with the growing youth-led “October Revolution” (Thawrat Tishreen), problems with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) over the Iraqi budget and the division of revenues from the sale of Iraqi oil and an effort by the Da'ish terrorist to reestablish themselves in north central Iraq.

These problems were exacerbated once the coronavirus began to spread rapidly in neighboring Iran and posing the possibility it might overwhelm Iraq as well.  As the pandemic spread, oil prices collapsed and the Iraqi government faced the possibility of not being able to pay government employees' salaries this spring, which many feared would produce economic chaos.

Meanwhile, Iran’s economic woes multiplied, as the result of a lethal trifecta of ever harsher US sanctions, the worsening Covid-19 pandemic and the collapse of global oil prices.  Iran found itself unable to continue funding Hizballah, its Lebanese ally, and forced to begin withdrawing some of its Revolutionary Guard troops from Syria.  Meanwhile, reports surfaced that the US and Iran had cut a deal: Iran wouldn’t oppose al-Kadhimi’s nomination to become prime minister if the US quietly relaxed some of its sanctions and allowed the transfer of funds from Luxembourg which the US had blocked.The secret US-Iran Deal which installed al-Kadhimi in Baghdad

Even before the full force of the coronavirus and the collapse it caused in oil prices, Iran faced serious economic problems.  Coming in the wake of the killing of Qasem Suleimani, its tottering economy has forced Tehran to seek better relations with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states.  In Iraq, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani moved this past April to undermine those Popular Mobilization Units which serve as Iranian proxies, leading to a split in the moment between militias loyal to him and those loyal to Tehran.

Further, Iran sent emissaries to Iraq informing its allies that they should not block al-Kadhimi’s nomination. Thus, al-Kadhimi's candidacy came at an opportune time, despite the extreme hostility to him by some Iranian clients such as Kata’ib Hizballah, the most powerful of the militias.  Hizballah  accused al-Kadhimi of being involved in Suleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis’ deaths in his role at the time as Iraq's intelligence chief. Iran is retreating from the Iraqi political scene

Kata’ib Hizballah, whose leader, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, was also overall PMU commander, saw its candidate, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Muhammadawi, also known as Abu Fadak, rejected to replace al-Muhandis as chief of the militia movement. The position instead went to Abu Muntazir al-Husseini, a former leader of the Badr Organization. Thus, al-Kadhimi took power during a period in which Iran has been forced to curtail its regional adventurism.

Former IRGC commander, Qasem Suleimani, and PMU chief, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis

Ten challenges confronting Mustafa al-Kadhimi
Iraq’s new prime minister faces huge challenges. First and foremost, he needs to deal with the coronavirus in the context of an outdated, underfunded and inefficient health care system.  While it seemed as if Iraq might be spared the extensive spread of the disease in Iran, especially after it sealed its almost 1000 mile border with its neighbor, it is now experiencing an uptick in the number of reported cases, especially in Baghdad.

To date, Iraq has only devoted 2.5% of its budget to healthcare.  Further, the Ministry of Health, especially when it was under the control of Muqtada al-Sadr's movement, has been notorious for its corruption, which deprived hospitals of medicines, supplies and improvements.  When the previous Minister of Health asked for $5 million this past winter to address the corona virus pandemic, 'Abd al-Mahdi’s caretaker government informed him the funds weren’t available.  With funds even more limited now with oil revenues in sharp decline, al-Kadhimi risks being blamed for the Iraqi government's inability to effectively treat the ongoing pandemic.

Workers disinfecting streets in Baghdad

Taking a page from Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal Works Progress Administration, (WPA) al-Kadhimi could hire hundreds of unemployed Iraqi youth to serve as contact tracers, especially in urban centers such as Baghdad.  These youth could work in their neighborhoods, where they're known and trusted, to learn how those who contracted the coronavirus did so and thus assist the Ministry of Health in its efforts to contain the pandemic in Iraq.

Pres. Franklin Roosevelt greets workers who were trained for new jobs by the US government

Second, Iraq faces the same economic pressures as Iran, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states with the collapse of oil prices. Responsible for over 90% of its foreign revenues, oil must remain above $60/bbl to enable Iraq to enact a budget which meets the country’s basic needs.  However, projections are that oil prices will remain much lower for at least the next 2 years as the global economy adjusts to the coronavirus and its aftermath.  And no one knows when a vaccine for the virus will be discovered and the global economy will return to some level of normality.

The first person to call al-Kadhimi after he was approved as prime minister by Iraq’s parliament was Saudi Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman. Clearly, Salman wants to wean Iraq away from Iran and was calling to see who the Saudis and the Gulf Arab states would now be dealing with.

Before the coronavirus and oil crises, efforts had begun to develop funds whereby youth could receive investment funds to develop entrepreneurial start-ups.  Belatedly, the Iraqi government has begun to turn its attention to diversifying its economy. Already the Baghdad incubator, The Station (al-Mahatta) has been supported by a coalition of private banks and provided funds for youth entrepreneurs.

al-Mahatta (The Station) incubator, Baghdad

As long as there is no problematic quid pro quo, al-Kadhimi could turn to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait for funds which could be used to put more Iraqi youth to work. Maintaining close ties to the US and the European Union also makes sense because they too might help the new prime minister develop a fund of seed money to promote the development of Iraq’s private sector, both for prospective youth entrepreneurs but also for already successful entrepreneurs to expand and improve their businesses.

Third, al-Kadhimi must walk a fine line between retaining close ties with the United States and, at the same time  not alienating Iran which has extensive economic interests in Iraq and many political allies.  If he is perceived as doing the United States’ bidding in Iraq, that will inflame public attitudes which are already sensitive to the US having killed Qasem Suleimani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, this past January 3rd without informing the Iraqi government.

On the other hand, Iraqis have developed widespread anger with Iran for the thousands of deaths and injuries that Iran’s proxy militias have caused to peaceful youth protestors in support of the October Revolution.  They also resent the extent to which Iraq’s Green Zone political elite is subservient to Iranian political and economic demands.  One of the youth uprising's most popular slogans is "Iran out of Iraq (Irhal Iran).

'Adil' Abd al-Mahdi: "Get out you corrupt agent of Iran"

Iraqi youth join their Lebanese counterparts in opposing Iran

Fourth, there have been persistent calls for early elections, especially among the supporters of the October Revolution. If al-Kadhimi tries to enact significant reforms, it would be much easier if he could work with a parliament in which the number of members who are engaged in corrupt and nepotistic activities were removed from office and replaced by those who supported his efforts.

Because we have seen large turnovers in parliament members in prior elections, and because members of the current parliament realize the low level of esteem they have among the Iraqi voting public, organizing early elections won’t be easy.  In this instance, the prime minister will need to use his skills at mobilizing public opinion to put pressure on parliament to assure that early elections do take place.  Given the skills he has shown already, such a move might indeed be successful.

Fifth, al-Kadhimi must act on his promise to investigate the attacks on peaceful Iraqi youth demonstrators who organized the protests which began the October Revolution in late 2019.  Of course, this means a confrontation with Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units. When he was nominated, Iranian allied militias – Kata’ib Hizballah, 'Asa’ib 'Ahl al-Haqq, al-Nujaba’, al Khurasani Brigade, the Imam 'Ali Brigade and the Sayyid al-Shuhada’ - all vehemently opposed al-Kadhimi’s nomination.

Iraqi youth protestor killed by tear gas grenade in the southern city of Basra

The prime minister has already taken action which indicates that he is not intimidated by the PMUs.  First, he sent forces to stop an al-Basra based militia Thar Allah (The Revenge of God) from attacking youth protestors.  Although militia members have since returned to their headquarters in al-Basra, al-Kadhimi followed his actions with an emphatic statement that, “I will never order the security forces to attack peaceful protestors.” Thus, he has sent a message early in his tenure as prime minister that he will oppose attacks on peaceful protestors and extra-legal violence by militias.  He has also informed the Iranian government that all political and military information must be exchanged through official, not private, channels.

Sixth, al-Kadhimi must confront the extensive corruption which has led Transparency International to rank Iraq in 2019 as 164 of 180 most corrupt political systems in the world.  Reports of former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki’s son, Ahmad, purchasing the most expensive property in the world, a French chateau for $301 million and former prime minster 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi’s estimated personal fortune at $64 billion, while speaker of parliament, Muhammad al-Halbusi, was caught spending large amounts of money at Monaco’s gambling casino are just some of the more prominent indicators of the extent of the problem. Iraq's ranking on Transparency International Perception of Corruption list

The problem of corruption is not just a legal-ethical one for the new prime minister but one which, if not confronted, could contribute to Iraq becoming a failed state.  The example of Lebanon’s economic collapse due to extensive corruption, built on an official state-run Ponzi scheme, is an example what can happen when. financial chicanery continues unchecked.  Why protestors in Lebanon firebomb banks

Further, al-Kadhimi excluded the Iranian-backed militias from the consultations Iraq is holding with the US on bi-lateral relations, first in Baghdad and then in Washington, DC.  Not only are the militias excluded but so are the “usual cast of characters,” namely the sectarian entrepreneurs who lead the Green Zone elite’s corrupt political parties.  Instead, al-Kadhimi has assembled a professional team of military officials, intelligence specialists, members of the Judicial Council, and technocrats from the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, Trade, Oil and Justice.

Iraq's national hero - Lt. General 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa'adi

In the military sector, al-Kadhimi made th excellent decision to reappoint Lt. General 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa'adi, to his post in Iraq's elite Counter Terrorism Services (CTS). Considered a national hero for his role in defeating Islamic State forces in Mosul and north central Iraq,  and for his declaration that he had "zero tolerance" for sectarianism among his forces, al-Sa'adi's dismissal from his post by former prime minister 'Abd al-Mahdi, which was one of the key factors igniting the outbreak of the October Revolution.  Appointing the "best and the brightest" leaders in all sectors of Iraqi society sets the stage for important reforms by the al-Kadhimi government.

Seventh, al-Kadhimi must develop new policies to reduce the high levels of unemployment among Iraqis, especially youth. One of the most important ways to address this issue is to use the oil crisis to promote diversification of the Iraqi economy. One of the positive outcomes of the corona virus has been a shot in the arm for the Iraqi businesses and producers. With the Iranian border closed, as well as the border crossings with Turkey and Kuwait, foreign imports have declined dramatically, including those from China.  Iraqi goods have begun to fill the vacuum of imports.

Because prices of foreign goods were often less than those of equivalent domestic products, Iraqi businesses have faced difficulty competing with imported goods.  However, even before the current health and financial crises began, Iraqi were beginning to boycott Iranian products due to anger over the large number of peaceful youth protestors supporting the October Revolution who had been killed and wounded, in addition to others who were kidnapped and tortured, by Iran’s proxy militias.  Now Iraqis are proud they are selling products marked “made in Iraq.”  This nationalist economic trend is one that al-Kadhimi’s government can build on.

Basra's fishermen say their business is better now that they have less foreign competition

Eighth, al-Kadhimi must find a formula that will allow the Federal Government in Baghdad to finally reach an agreement with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil over the allocation of oil revenues and what percentage of the national budget should be given to the Kurds.  Success in strengthening Iraq’s federal structure is critical, not just for economic reasons but because Iraq’s Army and Kurdish Pesh Merga forces need to remain unified in their fight against the resurgent Da'ish terrorist organization in north central Iraq.

Ninth, al-Kadhimi’s government must grapple with the rebuilding of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, which was devastated in the war to oust the Islamic State from Iraq in 2017, and other provinces of north central Iraq which also experienced substantial destruction and displacement of the population.  If jobs, education and housing cannot be found for the 4.5 million Iraqis who were displaced by the war, then a new generation of terrorist may be in the offing.

Tenth and finally, the promotion of Iraq’s transition to a true democracy, which garners widespread support of the Iraqi people, is ultimately the most important challenge faced by al-Kadhimi.  If Iraqis feel marginalized and excluded from the political process, democracy will lose its legitimacy as a system of governance and open the door to more violence and instability in contemporary Iraq. Thus, al-Kadhimi’s most important legacy will be the degree to which he can promote trust in government, thereby bringing the Iraqi people together and overcoming sectarian and regional divisions.

Mustafa al-Kadhimi's impact on the future of Iraq
No one person can "save" Iraq.  However, Mustafa al-Kadhimi has become prime minister during one of the most challenging periods in modern Iraqi history.  The coronavirus pandemic is spreading throughout Iraq, global oil prices have collapsed, a powerful youth uprising continues to gain strength, and the Iraqi people had reached the end of their patience with the corruption and nepotism of a rapacious political elite which is only interested in using political office for financial gain.  Crises create hardships but they often provide unique opportunities for change.

Iraqi democracy hangs by a thread.  Only through a sincere and skilled use of communications networks - television, social media and visits to constituencies throughout the country, including the the citizens of the KRG - can al-Kadhimi hope to bring Iraq's democracy back from the brink of destruction by mobilizing the necessary national coalition required to enact meaningful political and economic reforms.

If he plays his cards right, the new prime minister can mobilize large segments of Iraqi society who are profoundly dissatisfied with the current state of affairs and thus will welcome his efforts to bring about true democratic change.  Reform-minded politicians, skilled technocrats, Iraq's professional classes, loyal military and intelligence personnel, members of the private sector, forward looking clerics and tribal leaders and, perhaps most importantly, Iraq's youth who constitute 70% of the population under age 30 - almost 28 million of Iraq's 40 million population - al. crave fundamental change in their society.

One of the most effective way for al-Kadhimi to reach out to the Iraqi people would be to use a "national town hall" (majlis watani). where he meets with Iraqis on a periodic basis - via television and/or social media - to discuss the problems they face in their daily lives.  If he were to also give the Iraqi people the opportunity to aks him questions, and he responded to them during the town hall, he would demonstrate his commitment to serve them, not the interests of a narrow political elite.

A critical part of any reform agenda must be confronting gender inequality in Iraqi society. While many institutions of higher education have a 70% enrollment of female students, Iraqi women still constitue just 25% of the national workforce.  Women need not only to have access to employment but they must be placed in positions of authority, such as the mayor of Baghdad, Dr. Zekra Alwash.  And eliminating once and for all the scourge of the so-called "honor crime" ("jarimat al-sharaf") must be a top priority of al-Kadhimi's government.

Iraqi women supporters of Thawrat Tishreen who are fighting for gender equality and social justice

 Iraq's Kurdish, Turkmen and minority groups must be made to feel that they are citizens who are equal to Iraq's  Shi'i Arab and Sunni Arab populations. Iraq has always been a diverse mosaic of religious, ethnic and regional communities. Perhaps the most damaging legacy of Saddam and the Ba'th was to divide these communities.  If Mustafa al-Kadhimi can reach out to these communities, such as having youth from all Iraqi groups spend time together getting to know each other in summer camps in the cool mountains of the KRG, then this policy could serve as a beginning to rebuild trust among the constituent elements of Iraqi society.

If Mustafa al-Kadhimi can mobilize public opinion behind his democratic reform efforts, seriously reduce corruption in Iraq's government, and professionalize the military by ending the PMUs' autonomy, he will have achieved what no post-2003 Iraqi leader has been able to accomplish. Not only would such accomplishments create a lasting political legacy, but they would act to sweep Iraq's rapacious Green Zone political elite into the dustbin of history.

The Islamic Republic at the Crossroads: Iran's Domestic and Regional Policy in a Post-Pandemic World

Even before the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, Iran was facing serious economic, social and political challenges.  Due to US and international sanctions, its economy was in dire straits, large segments of the populace have lost faith in the government of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and internal conflict within the Iranian elite sets extremists in the IRGC against moderates surrounding President Hasan Rouhani who would like to pursue rapprochement with the West. Standing at a crossroads, what decisions will Iran make in terms of domestic and regional policy?

What Iran decides within the next 6 months to a year will have serious ramifications for decades to come. Broadly speaking, Iran face two choices.  It can focus on foreign policy and continue its efforts to continue with missile development, enriching uranium and sponsoring destabilizing forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and continue its conflict with Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states. Alternatively, it can decide to focuses on domestic needs which offers the possibility of sanctions relief and propping up the current regime’s legitimacy.

Iran's regional interests in the Levant

From a cost-benefit analysis, the latter policy would be Iran’s most sensible choice. However, extremist elements will work hard to prevent any moderation of Iran’s current regional policies and view a turn to domestic concerns as a threat to their long term interests. Nevertheless, the question remains: if we view Iran through a different frame, will changing economic and regional conditions force Iran to abandon policies which may have brought benefits in the past but could threaten regime stability and even viability in the future?  In other words, is its radical foreign policy viable over the long durée?

Since the 1978-70 revolution which overthrew Shah Mohamed Reza Pahlavi, the current regime has witnessed an erosion of its legitimacy, especially after Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in1989.  Revolutionary propaganda is belied by massive government corruption which is clear for all Iranians to see, and a state which fails to deliver on economic growth and social services.

At least 631 Iranians were killed during Nov 2019 anti-regime protests 

As corruption has spread, and a privileged elite consolidated power, the regime has drawn down on its legitimacy.  Many would argues that its “bank account” is almost empty.  Proclamations that Iran is in the vanguard of revolutionary change in the MENA region and larger Muslim world increasingly fall on deaf ears. Youth in particular chafe under rules which they see as oppressive and increasingly express themselves through anti-regime demonstrations.

One sources of regime sustenance has been its aggressive policies, not only in Iraq, but especially in support of the regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria and Hizballah in southern Lebanon.  Iran’s hostility to Saudi Arabia for its close ties to the United States has been touted as proof that the Islamic Republic, not the Saudi royal family, is the true defender of Islam and Islamic interests.  Iran’s threat to Saudi Arabia assumed a military dimension in 2019 when one of its drones hit a Saudi refinery, temporarily sending shock waves through global oil markets.

Qom and Tehran - where the Covid-19 pandemic began in Iran

In its proxy war in Yemen with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Iran seems to have gained the upper hand through the Houthi rebels, its local allies.  The UAE withdrew from the war in late 2019 and recently Saudi Arabia declared a unilateral ceasefire, indicating it seeks an end to the war.  Meanwhile in Iraq, Iran’s proxy militias, such as Kata’ib Hizballah, the Badr Organization, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq (League of the Righteous People) have regularly attacked US troops stationed at Iraqi military bases. 

These militias not only assumed a dominant role in decision-making in the Iraqi state under the docile leadership of Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi, but they have served as a conduit for hard currency to the Iranian regime as well as engaged in other illicit activities such as human and organ trafficking.

At the same time, stringent sanctions imposed by the Trump administration have taken a deep bite out of an already reeling economy.  Possessing the third largest reserves of oil in the world, Iran has been unable to export at the 3.5 million bbl./day it once enjoyed and currently finds itself exporting less than 300,000 bbl./day. Even with efforts to make its economy less dependent on oil, and through selling oil at discounted prices to China have not enable Iran to sustain its regional ambitions, let alone deliver the needed domestic benefits expected by the Iranian populace.

Iran’s ability to “squeak by” came to a crashing halt with the onset of the corona virus pandemic.  In a problem largely of its own making, Iran has become the MENA country with the highest number of Covid-19 infections and deaths.  Following the path of China’s President Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei refused to address the spread of the corona virus when medical experts brought it to his attention.

Nothing was done to control the flow of pilgrims within Iran to holy shrines. Further, in an effort to bolster the regime’s legitimacy through a large turnout, the government urged Iranians to go to the polls in March national elections, despite fears that voting would intensify the corona virus outbreak. With many voters traveling to polling places, the elections became an incubator for spreading the virus as voters brought the disease back to their home cities, towns and villages. Travel by Chinese to Iran wasn’t curtailed because China, where the corona virus originated, is one of Iran’s strongest allies.  As of this writing, there are estimates that more than 37,000 Iranians have died from Covid-19.

In neighboring Iraq, Iran faces widespread hostility. The killing of more than a 1000 peaceful youth protestors and the wounding of more than 20,000 others who began demonstrations against corruption, nepotism and lack of democracy were viewed as a threat by Iran. Its proxy militias and militia members who have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior have been responsible for the killings as well as kidnapping and torture.

As the corona virus spread in Iran, Iraq has sealed its 1000 mile border. Despite Iranian entreaties to allow goods to be imported into Iraq, the Iraqi government has refused. Meanwhile, a campaign to boycott Iranian goods, which had already developed during the October Revolution demonstrations, to protest the killing of peaceful youth protestors, has acquired new momentum. Iraqis fear purchasing Iran goods could bring the corona virus into their households.

Meanwhile, a cleavage within Iraq’s militia movement (al-hashad al-sha^cbi) has further reduced Iran’s control over Iraqi politics. On the one side, pro-Iranian militias seek to use Iraq as a springboard for Iranian military and financial action in Syria and Lebanon while benefitting themselves from economic ties with the Islamic Republic.  On the other side, militias with ties to Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Shi^ca clergy who support him seek to constrain Iranian influence in Iraq. 

With al-Sistani in ill health, there is an emerging struggle over his successor with many members of al-marja^ciya fearful that Iran’s doctrine of the State of the Supreme Jurisprudent (wilayat al-faqih; vilayet e-faqih) will be imposed on Iraqi Shiism, which eschews direct links between religion and politics.

The most recent prime minister delegate, Dr. Mustafa al-Kadhimi, is much less sympathetic to Iran than the current caretaker prime minister, ^cAdil ^cAbd al-Mahdi.  Kadhimi has made Iraq’s sovereignty a core component of his platform, signaling to Iran that he will not follow in the subservient footsteps of ^cAbd al-Mahdi. The pro-Iranian Hashad’s opposition to 

al-Kadhimi’s ministerial choices is indicative of Tehran’s displeasure and fear that he will cooperate with the United States.

IRGC forces stationed in Syria

In Syria, Iran finds itself mired down in a “forever war.” The al-Asad regime will countenance nothing less than a complete military victory over its enemies. However, with Turkey supporting anti-Asad forces in Idlib and Syria’s northern rim and a resurgent Da’ish in the al-Badiya eastern desert region, the country’s civil war offers no end in sight.  Iran also has to contend with Israel attacks on its weapons shipments to the Asad regime, especially missiles, and competition with Russia whose policies in support of the regime do not always align with those of Tehran.

Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)

In addition to losing IRGC fighters, Iran’s support of al-Asad is costly. Iranians ask among themselves why the regime spends so much of the state budget on foreign adventurism rather than improving the economy and social services at home. With an Iraqi state and public increasingly hostile to Iranian interference in Iraq’s internal affairs, a weakening of the militia movement die to internal cleavages, and the decline in hard currency finding its way from Iraq into the Islamic Republic,  Iran’s ability to sustain its support of the Syrian dictator will be sorely tested.

The collapse of Lebanon’s economy has jeopardized Iran’s influence in the south of the country through its support for Hizballah. As a dominant partner in the current Lebanese government, Hizballah has come under criticism even from its own members. Increasingly, pro-Hizballah Shi^ca ask why the organization continues to focus on “struggle” when people no longer have jobs and can’t feed their families.

As the Lebanese lira loses its values, Hizballah has tried to take over Lebanon’s banking system as a means of obtaining funds.  Clearly, Iran is in no position to bail out the organization which also bears responsibility for the millions of Syrian refugees who have placed such an economic burden on the country.  What was once a vaunted militia, more powerful than the Lebanese Army itself, is now seeing a decline in its power. Its ability to support Iran’s interests in Syria, which involved sending its forces to help the Syrian Army, is no longer a given.

Streets being disinfected in Tehran

Despite the active involvement of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in helping to fight the corona virus pandemic, the failure of the Iranian government to take the pandemic seriously in the first place has further undermined public trust in the state and its institutions.  Despite the first death from Covid-19 in February, it took until the end of March before the regime began to implement serious measures to contain it. Rather than seek international help, the regime forced Doctors Without Borders to leave Iran in March, rather than allow them to witness the virus’ spread and lethal consequences.

Even though the first fatality of the virus was reported in the holy city of Qom on February 19^th, local clerics, with the support of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, successfully argued against a Ministry of Health request that local shrines should not be closed to the public thus spreading the disease. Like Donald Trump, Khamenei downplayed the virus’ threat for over a month and proposed quack cures for the virus.  He and IRGC leaders continued to refer to the virus as a “United States and Israeli plot.”

Posters for Iran's February elections

That the February elections had the lowest turnout (42.57%) since the Iranian Revolution established the current state in 1979. Turnout in 2016 was 61% with the lowest prior to that being 51% in 2004. The disqualifications of 9,000 progressives and moderates by the so-called Guardian Council prior to the elections undermined regime efforts to encourage large-scale voter participation.

The state’s interference in the elections and lack of transparency in confronting the Covid-19 pandemic were only reinforced by the accidental shooting down of a Ukrainian civilian airliner by the IRGC this past January, killing all 176 passengers aboard, which took the regime over 72 hours to acknowledge its responsibility.

The Iranian regime still has the string support of hardline elements in Iran. Trust however is a rare commodity in Iran as the populace as seen hardline elements work to stymie all of President Rouhani’s efforts to promote the economy by sidelining the financial empire of the IRGC.  That the IRGC killed more Iranian protestors, largely youth, during November protests against a sharp spike in gasoline prices, has not been forgotten.

Satelleite photo of mass graves prepared for Covid-19 victims-March 2020

The Trump administration has played into the hands of Khamenei and Iran’s hardliners. They will probably dominate the Iranian presidential elections in 2021. However, by not recognizing the economic reality of a post-corona virus world and a populace which increasingly views the Islamic Republic as a corrupt, nepotistic and ineffective regime, Iran’s political class will lose even further confidence and legitimacy.  Because Iran refuses to use the pandemic to implement reforms which would strengthen the state, its aspirations to become a regional hegemon are in the process of being severely curtailed.