A New Biden Foreign Policy in Iraq: Towards What End سياسة خارجية جديدة لبايدن في العراق: إلى أي نهاية؟

Then US Vice President Biden meets Iraqi PM Nuri al-Maliki

Having won the 2020 presidential elections, President-Elect Joe Biden has been quick to declare to the world that “America is back.”  Biden’s promise to end the Trump administration’s “America First” policy – in reality a hodgepodge of unstructured, contradictory and often reckless decisions – has pleased the US’s traditional allies, particularly those in Western Europe.  But what exactly does it mean to say that “America is back”?  And what are the implications for US foreign policy in Iraq? 

The MENA region is facing a number of dangerous crises, all of which directly or indirectly affect Iraq.  The most dangerous problem is the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons. If “America is back” means the US will return to the Obama administration policies, the phrase has no meaning.  The MENA region has changed significantly in the last 4 years and the Biden administration needs to stake out new policies which reflect these changes.  To help Iraq, the most pressing issue facing the US is developing a new policy towards Iran. 

 

The idea that Iran will develop operational nuclear weapons anytime in the near future is highly unlikely.  Clearly, the United States and Israel have demonstrated the capability to impede that development.  However, Iran is engaged in enriching weapons grade uranium. Cyberattacks and assassinations of Iran’s nuclear program do not constitute a long-term strategy for thwarting Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons.  

 

As long as Iran continues to pursue a policy what could eventually allow it to acquire nuclear weapons, the MENA region faces the possibility of a nuclear arms race.  As one of the world’s most unstable regions, this prospect should cause us all to take pause.  Saudi Arabia and Turkey, 2 other candidates for developing nuclear weapons, would not allow Iran to possess a nuclear capability without developing them as well.  A Saudi-Egypt-UAE consortium could begin its own program, combining the technical skills and funding needed to make it a potential success.  Turkey would face more difficulties to fund a nuclear program but could probably develop a bomb.  

 

Should Iran develop nuclear weapons, even if its delivery capacity is lacking, Israel would no doubt be tempted to mount a preemptive strike.  Thus, the Biden administration has multiple incentives to reactivate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action adopted in October 2015. (JCPOA).  Neither the United States, the European Union or the United Nations can allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons which put the Middle East on a dangerous path leading a to regional war.  

 

If the Biden administration seeks to revive the JCPOA, it will encounter strong pushback from conservative Republicans in the US Senate and foreign policy hawks, like John Bolton, who argue military action is the only policy option towards the Islamic Republic.  In this context, the US should make clear to Iran that part of any deal which removes international sanctions is a commitment by Iran not only to end steps towards developing nuclear weapons but commit to a number of other policies.   

 

At the top of that list should be Iran’s commitment to dissolve its proxy militias in Iraq. Iran’s economic and political influence extends into almost all aspects of Iraqi society.  One of the main incentives for Iran’s efforts to control Iraq is economic.  Iraq provides an important market for many Iranian goods and vehicle for circumventing some of the sanctions it currently faces.  

 

Iraq also constitutes an important conduit for weapons and Iranian troops which support the genocidal Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad. The current Iraqi government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi is in no position to interdict funds and supplies that flow across its borders.  On the evening of his assassination by a US drone this past January 3^rd, Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC)  commander, Qassem Suleimani, had just flown from Tehran to Damascus and was on a stopover in Baghdad on his return to Iran to consult with Abu Mahdi Muhandis, the leaders of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Units (al-hashad al-sha’bi), who died in the drone attack as well.  The ease with which Suleimani was able to travel, dictate military orders, and make sure Iran’s wishes were being followed in Syria and Iraq underscores Tehran’s control of the two nation-states. 

 

One of the unintended outcomes of the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion of Iraq was not the containment of one of the three so-called “Axis of Evil” powers, but rather to have installed Iran as the major power in Iraq.  After the Obama administration failed to support Ayad Allawi, who won Iraq’s 2010 parliamentary elections, and allowed Nuri al-Maliki to begin a second term as prime minister, al-Maliki’s intensely sectarian policies completely alienated much of Iraq’s Sunni Arab population.  As I detail elsewhere, these policies were directly responsible for Mosul’s fall to the Da’ish in June 2014.

The Political Obstacles to the Defeat of the (so-called) Islamic State 

 

That Iran has been able to create a state within and state in Iraq is thus an outcomes of 2 fatal US decisions – Bush’s appointment of al-Maliki as Iraqi prime minister in 2006, over the objections of his advisors, and Obama failure to push Iraq to follow the dictates of its voters in 2010 by allowing Ayad Allawi to become the country’s leader – and the establishment of the Popular Mobilizations Units following the collapse of the Iraqi Army in Mosul in June 2014. 

 

Joe Biden has a problematic reputation in Iraq.  On social media, it was clear in the runup to this month’s US presidential election that many Iraqis were worried that Biden might still adhere to his earlier position that Iraq should be divided along ethnic and confessional lines, a position which most Iraqis, including many Kurds in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), vigorously oppose.  Biden’s earlier position was strongly influenced by former US ambassador, Peter Galbraith, who, together with his wife, maintained financial ties to a Norwegian oil company, DNO, for which he served as a lobbyist.  Galbraith saw an independent Kurdistan as beneficial to the company’s ability to exploit the KRG’s oil wealth as well as promote his family’s financial interests. 

Ex-Diplomat Who Advised the Kurds Gets Millions in Oil Deal

 

To offset the doubts Iraqis have about Biden, one policy he could immediately put into effect is to provide Iraq’s beleaguered health care system with medicine and physicians.  Once a vaccine is available, the Biden administration should offer to provide it to Iraq as well. To assure that any medical assistance does not fall into the hands of the corrupt elements linked to Muqtada Sadr’s political party, which controls the Ministry of Health, the US should offer to build temporary hospitals on Iraqi military bases which are controlled by Iraq's Counter Terrorism Forces, commanded by Lt. General ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa’adi, who is known for his honesty and patriotism. 

 

The US is fortunate in that there is widespread rejection among Iraqis - Arabs and Kurds - of Iran’s interference in Iraq’s domestic affairs and that its proxy militias are above the law and only answer to Tehran.  That many peaceful youth protestors, who have been active in the October revolution (Thawrat Tishreen) since October 2019, have been wounded, killed and kidnapped by members of these militias, as well as members of the Ministry of Interior’s security forces which are likewise loyal to Iran, has only added to the anger of Iraq’s populace. 

The Killing of Qassem Suleimani and Iraq's October Revolution: What Western Press Analysts Aren't Telling You but What You Need to Know

 

Thus, an effort to conclude a deal in which Iran receives sanctions relief in return for adhering to the JCPOA and dissolving its militias in Iraq would reduce the possibility of a nuclear arms race in the MENA region. It would also allow Iraq to begin the process of diversifying its economy which at present is highly dependent on oil sales which account for 90% of its foreign revenues.  A new consortium of Western financial agencies has committed to helping Iraq engage in the diversification process which will be facilitated by reducing militia control of much of Iraq’s national economy. 

 

While a US deal with Iran as just outlined would still allow many corrupt political actors, such as Nuri al-Maliki, to retain considerable power, these sectarian entrepreneurs would find their economic and political power reduced because financial support from the Tehran regime would sharply decline.  Further, if Iran can achieve relief from the crippling international sanctions, then its incentive to continue supporting the PMUs, and risk further antagonizing the Iraqi populace, would be reduced. Already, many Iraqis boycott imported goods from Iran. 

 

Apart from pressuring Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s de facto authoritarian ruler, to end the imprisonment of Saudi political dissidents, the Biden administration should actively encourage more investment by the Kingdom in Iraq.  Having formed the Saudi-Iraqi Coordination Council’s Economic, Trade, Investment and Relief Committee, Prime Minister al-Kadhimi has made clear his desire for increased trade and Saudi investment.  Assisting Iraq’s agricultural sector makes economic sense since it offers Saudi Arabia with an additional source of food imports.  The recent opening of the Arar border crossing with Saudi Arabia is an important step in developing closer economic ties. 

 

As for the argument that Iran will work to prevent Saudi investments in Iraq, especially in al-Muthanna, its poorest province in the country's south, the US-Iran deal on reducing sanctions should require Iran to commit to not impeding such investments.  Indeed, a stronger Iraqi economy will offer Iran increased opportunities to sell its food, industrial and other products in Iraq. 

 

The Trump administration has reduced the number of US troops in Iraq and Northeast Syria to train local forces to fight a resurgent Da’ish.  Rather than simply send more troops, the Biden administration should seek to establish a truly international military training force in Iraq whose mission is to help Iraq defeat the Da’ish terrorist group.   

 

The US should be only one of many partners, thus lessening its footprint in training and logistical support for Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Forces.  The force could be organized by NATO and include Arab partners, such as Jordan. A joint command structure would ensure that the Iraqi military is involved in all decisions, whether training or operational. 

 

Finally, the US should offer fellowships to Iraqi students to conduct graduate study in the US.  One of Nuri al-Maliki’s few positive contributions while Prime Minister was to offer 10,000 fellowships for Iraqi students to study abroad.  Rutgers University, where I teach, is proud to have graduated more than 125 Iraqi Ph.Ds. in a wide variety of disciplines who are now teaching in prominent universities throughout Iraq. 

 

“America is back” is important if it means that the United States will once again take its international role seriously.  However, the Biden administration won’t be successful unless it adopts new policies which are in line with local partners such as Iraq.  The probability of success will depend on the extent to which US officials listen to leaders of the nation-states it seeks to help.  The time for a “top-down” and “one size fits all” approach to US foreign policy is long past.  Respect and mutual understanding should be the “buzz words” which should inform the US relations with its international partners. 

Cultural Resistance - The Art of the October Revolution Protests -المقاومة الثقافية - فن احتجاجات ثورة أكتوبر

Guest Contributor Zeinab Shukur is a Ph.D. candidate at the University of California, Riverside.  Her research focuses on the political economy of the MENA region, with special reference to Iraq's past and present. 

In October 2019, large groups of Iraqis - mostly, but not limited to, students and unemployed youth - marched, in one of the most massive protests in the modern Iraqi state, to city centers across the country demanding social, economic, and political change.  Their protests have become known as the October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen).

These protests were the results of the Iraqi population’s frustration with an increasingly corrupt political system; frustration with the increasing levels of poverty in this oil-rich country; frustration with the neglect cities and their residents have experienced since and before 2003; and frustration with the greed of Islamist political parties which have turned the country into their personal gold mine. 

With increasing levels of corruption, state and resource mismanagement, and a bloated public sector, youth and recent university graduates - Iraqi youth under 30 make up around 70 percent of the population -  faced high levels of unemployment; in 2019, youth unemployment reached as much as  17% among men, and 27% among women. 

Unemployed Iraqis wait for daily employment opportunities

According to a 2019 Borgen Report, the quality of Iraq’s critical infrastructure, such as access to water and sanitation, has deteriorated to the point that only 9% of the poor and 13% of the non-poor have access to a stable supply of water, with poverty rates reaching an overall rate of 18.9% in the country. These dire economic, social, and political conditions have mobilized people, many of whom had no previous interest or history of social and political protest, to take to the streets. The Borgen Report - Poverty in Iraq

Political activism, and a thriving civil society, are not new to Iraq. During the 1940s and the 1950s, the country saw waves of protests among youth and the working class - mostly organized by the left - against colonial influence, as well as political and economic injustices.  

During al-Wathba (the Great Leap) of 1948, scores of students and workers filled the streets of Baghdad to protest against the Portsmouth Treaty, and were brutally suppressed and killed on a Baghdad bridge on the Tigris river -- later named Jisr al-Shuhada’ (Martyrs Bridge) -- in memory of the fallen.

Youth protestors on the Bridge of the Republic

In 2019, a new generation of Iraqis poured onto another bridge -- Jisr al-Jumhuriya (the Bridge of the Republic) - also to be met with live rounds of bullets but also skull-piercing tear gas grenades. And like 1948, the protesters relied on symbols, images, music, and different forms of artistic expression to express their economic and political anger and alienation, and the depth of their pain.  One of the most prominent examples was the elegy of the great Iraqi poet, Muhammad Mahdi al-Jawahiri, to his slain brother, Ja’far. 

Examining the art of the uprising is particularly important, since it provides us with an insight into the nature and the future of this powerful social movement, the October Revolution.  Art plays an important role in social movements, both as a tool of framing and as a tool of resource mobilization.  According to Edelman (1995:2): “Works of art generate the ideas about leadership, bravery, cowardice, altruism, dangers, authority, and fantasies about the future that people typically assume to be reflections of their own observations and reasoning.” Furthermore, social movements use artistic expression to facilitate internal communication, as well as communicate with the larger society. Thus, art is used to raise awareness and societal consciousness. 

Youth protest art inspired by Iraqi artist Jawad Salim

For example, songs and slogans recruit individuals through providing reassuring emotional messages, play on the spirituality of the general population, connect with important moments in the nation’s history, and create a sense of hope that change is possible. Once the movement starts, art allows its momentum to continue, by creating a feeling of solidarity, and group and collective unity. 

Chaffe (1993:30) argues that protest art in general under undemocratic governments plays the role of  “psychological warfare against the dominant culture and elite and reveals an emerging subterranean movement. This is threatening because it connotes a prelude to an organized opposition, or the existence of one...The act [of producing street art] symbolizes a culture of resistance exists that dictators pretend to ignore.”

Like most social movements, the 2019 uprising confronted a hostile and established political environment with very different interests vis-a-vis the protesters. And here is where the importance of the 2019 uprising lies in terms of what it tells us about the Iraqi society. While all anti-government movements face hostility from the established order, the 2019 protesters faced an added challenge that even their 1948 counterparts failed to experience in the same way - the challenge of a long undermined and weak civil society and sense of public space. 

Politically, the country has witnessed years of  authoritarian political practices. Saddam Husayn virtually monopolized power within the country for 30 years, eliminating most forms of political expression which were outside his control. Following its toppling in 2003, the autocratic Ba’thist state was followed by a political vacuum composed of competing factions and religious-political parties with an invested interest in maintaining an oppressive political structure based on a network of loyalties and patronage. 

Political oppression, combined with years of war and economic hardship, left the Iraqi population alienated from the political process with little faith in political parties or political promises. In different interviews with activists in Iraq in 2016 and 2017, almost everyone I spoke to expressed their rejection, and often hostility, when I mentioned the need for a formal political party to organize the population against the well-funded and well-organized religious-political parties which dominate politics and the economy.

Iraqi youth protestors on the Turkish Restaurant in Baghdad's Liberation Square

Furthermore, the 2019 uprising came on the heel of over a decade of protests across the country demanding political and economic change. These protests were met with varying degrees of brutality and oppression from the political elites, including but not limited to the kidnapping and murder of activists, journalists, and organizers. 

Since 2003, the danger of the Islamist political parties running the country is not limited to their ability to mobilize resources, weapons, and men to brutally oppress all who threaten their political hegemony.  The larger danger is that these groups have formed a state within a state. Their political and financial power has enabled them to weaponize sectarian and tribal identities, and claim religious imagery to their advantage. 

In political science and sociological research, scholars have long established that leaders cannot rely purely on the use of force to maintain their power.  It is necessary that political elites acquire at least some modicum of  legitimacy if they are to sustain their rule. And the different competing religious-political parties in the country have not only relied on the use of force but have also attempted to create a hegemonic system of ideas, images, and thoughts to protect their interests through promoting a disingenuous Islamist ideology. 

Against this backdrop, the largely peaceful October 2019 uprising arrived on the Iraqi political scene.  Protesters realized that, if their demands were to be heard, they must frame their movement’s goals successfully.  Snow and Benford (1988:198) argue that social movements “actively engaged in the production of meaning for participants, antagonists, and observers...They frame, or assign meaning to and interpret, relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists”

Art is central to the October Revolution's struggle 

Thus, protesters did not simply frame their grievances against an unjust political and economic system, but also framed their movement against the political elites’ hegemonic project, the same project which dominated Iraqi society for generations. One of the most powerful “devices” the protesters used was to reclaim religious identities, based in tolerance and pluralism of belief, and separate religion from politics, thus demonstrating the political elites' hypocrisy. As indicated earlier, contemporary Iraqi political elites rely heavily on utilizing religious imagery and language to legitimize their control of the state. 

Protesters have countered the political elites with slogans like “Bism al-din, bakona al-haramiya” or, “In the name of religion, the thieves have robbed us.” This slogan has been one of the most utilized and effective in the protests. First, it created a separation between religion as an institution, onto itself, and its use by political cliques who seek to manipulate it.  Second, the protests’ slogans have demystified the political elites, by calling them thieves, who often legitimize their right to rule by blending it with their supposed religious authority. 

Youth protestors stand before a painting of Imam 'Ali

Furthermore, the October Revolution is not an attack on religion, which would have alienated a large portion of the Iraqi population which views religion as an important moral code.  Rather, it is a reclaiming of religious identity and taking away the most significant source of legitimacy from the current political elite.  The protests’ methods signify another form of reclaiming religious identities and national historical memory. The large number of protesters, mostly youth, took their peaceful resistance to religious spaces during Shi’a religious ceremonies and rituals.  

The Arbaeen celebration, one of the most significant symbolic religious moments in the Shi’a ethos, and the largest peaceful gathering in the world, commemorates the 40th day of the martyrdom of Imam Husayn.  In Shi’a belief, Husayn, the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson, is a symbol of revolutions and protest against oppressive rulers.  Since 2003, Shi’a political elites have invested funds in these commemorations to cement their legitimacy and to mobilize voter support for elections.  

But art serves another purpose beyond the reclaiming of religious identities. On the walls of the 15-store shell structures of Baghdad’s Turkish Restaurant, self-declared stronghold of the anti-government protesters, the walls and the first five floors became the official art venue and gallery of the October Revolution. Tahrir Square was another creative hub in Baghdad, where art covered the underpasses, the green space behind it, and the streets leading into it. 

The political art covering the streets depicts the faces of women and men of the uprising and the violence they faced at the hands of the security forces.  More than 600 protesters have been killed and thousands injured.  One of those was Safaa al-Sarai, a human rights activist, poet, painter, and one of the first killed in the protests at the hands of security forces. His face was painted on the walls of the city, in a fashion similar to those iconic images of Che Guevara.  Individualized portraits of those killed are a common subject of the October Revolution. 

One of the October Revolution's first martyrs - Safaa al-Sarai

On other walls, one can see images of lions, a symbol of Iraq dating back to the Assyrian period. The walls were also painted with images of the alternative country the protesters envisioned - images of women empowerment, like Rosie the Riveter with an Iraqi flag on her check, images of economic commentary, like a red tuk tuk flying out of the roof. The tuk tuk became the protesters’ mascot, and the unofficial front line ambulance - a three-wheeled vehicle transporting the country’s working class as opposed to the tinted windows of the government officials’ high-end vehicles. 

The tuk tuk - the mascot of the October Revolution

Where the public space has often been dominated by men, the October uprising came to be a turning point for women who constitute an active part of the movement and its art. This moment brings back memories of another time where women played a significant role in Iraq’s public sphere. The memory of Bahija comes to mind, the brave woman who in 1948 marched against the Portsmouth Treaty, and later her death and that of her comrades prevented the treaty’s ratification.

Rosie the Riveter - according to the October Revolution

In a traditionally patriarchal society, especially with the rise of traditional forms of societal control in the form of tribal and religious values designed to enhance male control of women, women’s participation and leading role in the October Revolution signifies one of the most powerful forms of challenging the social, political and cultural structures created by the ruling political parties. Murals, often produced by women, sprung up across the capital, Baghdad, creating a collective community for women to reclaim their identity and reshape their marginalized position in society into one of empowerment. 

Iraqi women are active agents in the October Revolution

While the walls were covered with murals documenting the October Revolution, and connecting it to Iraq’s ancient history, there were few anti-American messages. Even after the assassination of Maj. Gen. Qassim Suleimani, head of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), by the United States, in January 2020, the outrage came from the supporters of the pro-Iran groups, rather than the protesters still occupying Iraq’s public spaces. 

A view most Iraqis share - Iran must end its political control of Iraq

Anti-Americanism has been a constant feature of pro-Iran religious-political parties’ public expression. For the October protesters to choose to separate themselves and their art from the anti-American messages does not necessarily indicate support of the United States or its policy in the country, but rather is a commentary against the dominant political players who refuse to address Iraq’s massive political corruption and pressing social needs.

The ancient Sumerian word "Amag'i" means freedom - the October Revolution's goal

Beyond art, Baghdad and other cities came to life with acts of civic engagement, such as  cleaning the city centers, food preparation, and fixing damaged streets.  Acts of reclaiming cities and homes that were deformed by concrete walls, barriers, and neglect have been seen in all cities in which youth demonstrations have occurred. In addition to visual art, theater, performing art, poetry, and songs have filled public spaces. 

Music as a framing device works on the emotional and cognitive levels.  Songs of the uprising combine traditional Iraqi music with current social and economic problems, such as the lack of services and lack of jobs.  Through artistic expression, protestors’ stories have reached thousands of Iraqis in their homes, inside and outside the country. For the first time in many years, Iraqi cities came alive with sounds and colors. 

In addition to framing, resource mobilization is another determining factor of the success of social movements. In the social movement literature, resource mobilization signifies the ability of the movement leaders to create a formal organizational structure, via a process of resource control, linkage with other groups, and obtaining external support. This formal organizational structure allows negotiation with political elites, representation in the political process, and future organization once the momentum of the initial uprising slows down.  

As indicated earlier, the protestors’ general mistrust of political parties, and the overall weakness of Iraq’s civil society, hindered the ability of protesters to formalize their uprising - a necessary step in most successful social movements.  This is one possible explanation for why the October Revolution was difficult to sustain once the initial wave of demonstrations slowed down. 

During the past year, many of the protestors’ grievances have yet to be addressed. However, that doesn’t mean that the protesters haven’t made important gains. The movement forced Prime Minister ‘Adel ‘Abd al-Mahdi to resign, and ultimately leading to the appointment of Mustafa al-Kadhimi as the new Prime Minister.  al-Kadhimi has shown a serious interest in addressing the protesters' demands and, since his appointment, has set June 6, 2021 as the date for early parliamentary elections. 

While one of the protestors’ major demands, a new election law which would allow for disrupting the traditional system of power, has not yet been achieved, the protests have at least started that political conversation. On October 25, 2020 protesters are expected to march again to the streets to celebrate the first anniversary of their uprising.

Iraqi youth celebrate the 1st anniversary of Thawrat Tishreen

Many factors will likely lead to a smaller showing this time around, such as Covid-19 restrictions, fragmentation among the protesters, and the continued violence used against the protesters and civic leaders. Yet, the October uprising represents a turning point in Iraq’s historical narrative. For the first time in a long time, a new Iraqi generation can see the possibility of a better future. 

 

Can Iraq Survive the "Perfect Storm"?

An Iraqi citizen being tested for Covid-19

Iraq faces a series of inter-related crises which haven’t been seen since the 1991 Gulf War and the March 1991 uprising (al-Intifada) which almost toppled Saddam Husayn’s Ba'thist regime. I refer to this crisis as a “perfect storm” because of the combination of severe shocks facing Iraq’s economy and body politic. With pressing health, economic and political problems confronting Iraq’s Federal Government and the KRG, what are Iraq’s prospects for being able to address this crisis and prevent widespread economic and political instability?

Iraq's announces new Covid-19 cases

The Covid-19 pandemic has stretched the capacity of an outdated, corrupt and inadequately funded national health care system.  The pandemic has resulted in a world-wide drop in the price of oil. Corruption in Iraq has intensified as Iran’s proxies – politicians and militias – have created a parallel or grey market economy which neither the Federal Government nor the KRG has been able to control. Poverty rates are climbing, not only workers and farmers but for middle class families, all of whom find it difficult to make ends meet. 

With Iraq dependent of 95% of its government revenues from oil sales, the collapse of oil prices has created a huge budget deficit.  Currently hovering around $40, a barrel of oil’s price must remain at $60 or above for Iraqi to meet its budgetary needs.  The recent rejection of al-Kadhimi’s budget by the Council of Deputies (Iraq’s parliament), which seeks to draw upon central bank reserves to cover part of the deficit, points to the problems facing the government in meeting its fiscal responsibilities, especially the salaries of the large salaried bureaucracy and those “ghost employees” who are paid regularly but fail to contribute any social benefit.

New Contract Signals Serious Development of Iraq's Huge Nasiriyah Oil Field

Since October 2019, a large youth protest movement (the October Revolution or Thawrat Tishreen) has been demanding an end of government corruption and early fair and free elections.  Despite the demonstrations’ overwhelmingly peaceful nature, over 1000 youth protestors have been killed and as many as 25000 injured by pro-Iranian militias and the so-called “Blue Hats” of the Sadrist Movement.  Many other activists have been kidnapped and tortured. 

Iraq's Thawrat Tishreen demonstrations in Oct. 2019

The government of Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has condemned these attacks and tried to quell them.  However, it has been largely ineffective in providing security for the youth protestors. Some police officials have been replaced, e.g., in the southern city of Basra, but the militias’ ability to attack demonstrators continues unabated.

Basra activist, Reham Yacoub, murdered by pro-Iran militia, Aug. 2020

The power of Iran’s proxy militias and their supporters within the Iraqi government, especially former prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, and Hadi al-'Amiri, the leader of the Badr Organization and its militia, do Iran’s bidding.  As many Iraqis have pointed out, it is no exaggeration to argue that al-Maliki runs a “deep state” on behalf of Iran and promotes its political economic interests in Iraq, at the expense of Iraq’s citizenry.

Part of the problem of aggressively confronting the crises which Iraq currently confronts is that it isn’t a sovereign state.  Prime Minister al-Kadhimi has attempted to reign in corruption at Iraq’s border crossings with Iran, eliminate militia control of Baghdad International Airport and the many illicit financial benefits such control bestows, and assert control over the Ministry of the Interior and other security forces which have failed to protect the Thawrat Tishreen’s peaceful demonstrations.  

In addition, Iraq is facing a threat which has received relatively limited attention to date. In the north central provinces, whose population is primarily Sunni Arab, the Daiish is working hard to reestablish itself.  Working in small cells, Da'ish terrorist have attacked oil refineries, police stations, and army patrols as well as destroying infrastructure and burning fields of crops.  

Lt.Gen. Gen. 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa'adi, Counter Terrorism Services commander

Iraq’s Counter-Terrorism Services, under the able leadership of Lt. General 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Sa'adi, have been working with US and Coalition forces to prevent the Da'ish from achieving their objectives.  Nevertheless, the areas in which the terrorists are active, including the city of Mosul, find many local residents displaced from their homes as a result of the 2017 struggle to defeat the Da'ish. 

al-Falluja residents, Anbar Province, displaced by war against the Da'ish

An estimated 4.5 million Iraqis were displaced during the struggle to regain the city of Mosul, and the additional territory the Da'ish had occupied in north central Iraq and along the Syrian-Iraqi border. The Federal Government’s curtailed revenues, resulting from oil price declines, undermine its efforts to implement reconstruction of homes, schools, hospitals and other infrastructure. Thus, these areas could become fertile ground for terrorist recruitment, especially of youth, in the future.

Climate change is adversely affecting Iraq.  As was evident this past summer when temperatures reached close to 130 degrees in Baghdad and elsewhere, Iraq lacks the ability to provide electricity to its population.  Further, the intense heat has harmed the cultivation and harvesting of crops. If we add to this problem the reduced water supply coming from Turkey and Iran through the Euphrates and Tigris rivers, Iraq faces a dangerous climate change induced crisis affecting its population and agricultural production.

Climate Change and Migration - the MENA Regions' next Big Challenge?ttps://castlereagh.net/climate-change-and-migration-the-next-big-challenge-for-mena/

Basra, Iraq’s second largest city, not only suffers from intense heat and lack of electricity, which leads to anti-government demonstrations each summer, but also suffers from a lack of potable water.  In fact, the water supplied to the city’s residents is not even suitable for bathing.  Lack of adequate municipal sewerage facilities adds to Basra’s woes and threatens its residents’ health. 

Solving Iraq's Electricity Crisis

All these crises interact to produce what can be called the “perfect storm.”  Reduced oil revenues severely constrain the Iraqi government, whether in Baghdad or Erbil, from paying government employee salaries and investing in projects designed to promote economic growth and improve the nation’s outdated infrastructure.  The massive corruption and nepotism which plagues the Baghdad and Erbil governments results in the waste of huge amounts of public funds which could be spent to improves Iraqis’ standard of living.  

Iran’s control of proxy militias, such as the Badr, Kata’ib Hizballah, al-Nujaha’ and several others, has created a state within a state. These militias benefit Iran’s economy and the militia members, but robs Iraq of huge amounts of revenue through illicit commercial transactions over which it has no control.  Through attacks on the US Embassy and other diplomatic facilities in Baghdad, the militias also hinder Iraq’s effort to crush the Dacish because such attacks have led members of the US led coalition to withdraw their troops from Iraq. 

Iraq’s underfunded health care system also costs the state because it lacks the necessary ability to engage in testing and contact tracing which would help curb the spread of the Covid-19 virus.  The greater the number of Iraqis who are infected as a result of inadequate health care services, the more people are removed from the workforce, further undermining the economy (not to speak of the suffering caused to those who become ill and to their families).

Lack of adequate electricity increases mortality rates among the elderly, the sick and young children.  In addition to the needless suffering that is causes to those who can’t find shelter from intense heat, the state incurs additional medical costs which could have been avoided.

Climate change is hurting Iraq's agriculture

State funds are also negatively affected by declining supplies of water for agriculture and the harm to crops by intense summer heat.  When domestic agricultural production is negatively affected, precious hard currency must be spent on importing food to make up for these losses.

What is to be done?  I would suggest that we divide state action into short and long-term policies.  The short-term policies need to focus on meeting immediate shortfalls in the Iraqi budget while the long-term policies need to address the issues which the Covid-19 pandemic and the collapse of oil prices have laid bare to the Iraqi populace and those outside Iraq.

First, it is critical that Iraq’s current government retain close ties to the United States and the European Union.  The US and the EU possess the clout to have the International Monetary Fund (IMF) provide Iraq with a loan which will cover its immediate revenue needs.

Second, Iraq should try and exploit the contacts that Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi has made with Saudi Arabia in establishing a joint investment initiative.  One way this collaboration could benefit Iraq is from a large Saudi investment in Iraq’s agrarian sector.  Such an investment would provide Iraq with much needed funds to improve agricultural production and the Saudis with greater food security.

iraq approves loans from Saudi Arabia, China/

Third, the al-Kadhimi government needs to more aggressively pursue its efforts to reign in corruption.  Despite replacing some officials at border crossings and removing police officials, e.g., in Basra where youth have been treated especially brutally by militias, there needs to be a coordinated national effort with televised and social media communications from a wide variety of officials who are respected who ask the Iraqi people for their help in reigning in corruption.

PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi meeting with KRG PM Masrour Barzani in Erbil, Aug 2020

Fourth, now is an opportune moment for Baghdad and Erbil to put aside their differences to come together to confront the “perfect storm” which adversely affects Arab Iraq and the KRG. If the two sides could agree upon a program to seriously confront corruption, that in itself would provide a large amount of desperately needed revenues.  Increased coordination between the Counter Terrorism Services and the Pesh Merga would also allow more effective prosecution of the campaign to rid Iraq once and for all of the Da'ish terrorists.

Fifth, Iraq’s economy must become diversified if it is to escape the “oil curse.” It cannot depend on oil revenues to sustain it in the future, especially as the world moves away from the use of fossil fuels and surpluses of oil grow, further depressing prices.  Thus, the private sector must be given a more central role in Iraq’s economic development.  How might that occur.

First, the Federal Government must pass laws which eliminate much of the bureaucratic and regulatory impediments which hinder the formation of private enterprise.  Forming a commission comprised of government technocrats with business and financial expertise, and successful entrepreneurs, should formulate solutions to immediate issues which need to be addressed, such as impediments to forming new commercial, industrial and financial enterprises, as well as a 5 year roadmap to diversification.

Iraqi youth, especially women, need greater access to employment

Second, the Iraqi government - both Federal and KRG – need to mobilize a highly underused resources, namely Iraq’s youth, which constitute 70% of the population under the age of 30, namely 28 of Iraq’s 40 million population.  One effective measure would be to provide resources – technical and financial – to establish thousands of new youth social entrepreneurial ventures.

Youth could play a critical role in improving Iraq’s national health care system.  During numerous protests, Iraqi youth who support the Thawrat Tishreen have established rudimentary health care clinics in the city centers in which their demonstrations are taking place.  These clinics have provided important services, especially to the poor and needy.

Iraqi youth need more incubators like al-Mahatta (the Station) in Baghdad

To date, Iraqi youth, both in the south and the KRG, have successfully established a wide variety of social entrepreneurial ventures, including recycling companies which purchase recyclables from local residents, which cuts down on neighborhood refuse.  Other firms seek to recycle food waste and one venture has created a successful school in Baghdad’s Abu Ghrayb district. 

With the problems of Basra’s potable water crisis, the Federal Government could fund a youth-run venture to assure the elderly, ill and families with children of access to clean water. The Iraqi government could create, both in the south and the north, a joint National Public Health Corps comprised of physicians, medical technicians and large numbers of youth who could assist in delivering much needed medicines to the ill, elderly and needy. 

Youth who were part of a national Public Health Corps could also disseminate information to households, especially in poor neighborhoods and villages which provide information about public health and vaccinations. They could also conduct questionnaires to obtain information regarding the medical needs of these neighborhoods and then provide the information to the local hospital or clinic. 

In terms of its large youth demographic, Iraq possesses a large amount of human resources which hasn’t been effectively utilized. Youth in particular haven’t been given the opportunity contribute to Iraqi society to date. For example, there are many youth who have been trained as engineers and natural scientists (including a large cohort educated at Rutgers University, my own institution).

These activities would serve another function which is to train the youth working to improve health care so that they might themselves become physicians or medical technicians. could contribute to helping to revive and improve Iraq’s agricultural sector. Again, youth could engage in data collections which could assist the ministries of agriculture in the Baghdad and Erbil better address the needs of farmers. Iraqi youth in the south and the north could disseminate information to farmers on where to best purchase seeds and fertilizer. In effect, they would serve as Agricultural Extension Agents as exist in the US and other countries.

 Iraqi youth continue to suffer from a high unemployment rate

Iraqis love their sports organizations, especially their football teams. Football provides an excellent way to bring Iraqis of different ethnic, confessional and regional backgrounds together. Establishing a National Sports League to teach sports and offer youth the opportunity to meet each other constitutes a way to mobilize youth.

Iraq's national team with 2007 Asia Cup trophy

 As has been done in other MENA region countries, sports center provide opportunities to offer youth civic education. In Egypt, for example, youth who visit sports centers in poor neighborhoods of Cairo learn not only how to become more physically fit and skilled in specific sports, but are taught that Islam is a religion which doesn’t support extremism and violence. Thus, sports centers can serve as educational institutions and as vehicles to promote civic engagement.

In my recent posts, I have focused on youth as constituting an important component in Iraq’s efforts to confront the multiple crises it faces at the moment. As a large demographic, the Iraqi government ignores youth at its own peril. Youth alone can’t solve Iraq’s myriad problems but, as the “generation in waiting,” who will soon assume positions of responsibility in all aspects of public life and in a growing private sector, training them for their future roles is critical to Iraq’s ability to successfully navigate the “perfect storm” it currently faces.

The Role of Youth in the Fight Against Corruption In Iraq دور الشباب في مكافحة الفساد في العراق

Recently, the New York Times published an article, “Inside the Iraqi Kleptocracy,” by Robert Worth, who has spent many years reporting from Iraq. The article was very disturbing in its detailed description of the many ways in which corruption has taken over Iraq’s economy and political system. How did this situation come about and what can be done to fight it? Inside the Iraqi Kleptocracy

Clearly, the corruption that dominates Iraq today can be traced back to the US occupation policy after Saddam Husayn’s Ba'thist regime was toppled in 2003. Rather than give Iraqis who had remained in Iraq under Saddam the ability to decide how the country would be governed, such as the highly respected elder statesman, Adnan Pachachi, the US offered positions to returning Iraqi expatriates, many of whom had close ties to Iran. 

A prime example was cAbd al-Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), which had been established in Iran in 1982 during the Iran-Iraq War and run during its first two years by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). Another unsavory character active in post-2003 Iraqi politics was Ahmad Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Congress, who had established close ties to many US policy-makers during his time in Washington, DC prior to the US invasion. Chalabi’s unsavory background included having been convicted of looting the Petra Bank in Jordan in 1967 for which he was given a prison term after being tried in absentia. 

Of all the political figures the US empowered after 2003, none was as destructive as Nuri al-Maliki. George W. Bush took him under his wing in 2005 and began to meet with him from Washington, DC, though video conferencing. Thinking he would follow Bush’s advice on how to rule Iraq, the President overrode the objection of his advisors who distrusted al-Maliki and appointed him prime minister nevertheless in 2006. 

Appointing al-Maliki prime minister was one of the worst the US decisions during its occupation of Iraq from 2003-2011. Although al-Maliki did not show his sectarian side immediately, during his first term in office between 2006 and 2010, once he obtained a second term followed the parliamentary elections of 2010, his destructive behavior ravished Iraq. Barack Obama was now complicit in keeping al-Maliki in office despite his main opponent, Ayad Allawi, having obtained 91 to his 89 parliamentary seats. Once pressured by Iran, Obama agreed to allow al-Maliki to remain in office, another disastrous US decision.

al-Maliki's policies in Mosul were the most egregious and important for understanding the corruption which engulfs Iraq today. In addition to attacking Iraq’s Sunni Arab community, Maliki undermined the Iraqi Army’s officer corps in Mosul. Professional career officers were replaced by his cronies, many of whom lacked military experience. These officers began stealing the salaries of Iraqi troops and offered other troops the option of turning over their salaries in return for not having to serve and being allowed to return home. 

Meanwhile, troops in Mosul established check points throughout the city which they used to collect “fees” to replace the salaries which they either no longer received or received as partial payments. Understandably, the response of Mosul’s residents was to view the army as an occupying force. Because the majority of troops were Shi'a, the army’s presence in Mosul began to be viewed in sectarian terms, namely Shi'a troops vs. Sunni Arabs, who constitute the majority of the city’s inhabitants. 

When the Da'ish arrived in Mosul in June 2014, the Iraq Army fled, leaving behind much US supplied equipment, some of it state of the art, such as armored personnel carriers. Over 1500 troops, all of them Shi'a, were captured after they left Camp Speicher where they had been training and were summarily executed with their bodies dumped into the Tigris River. Nuri al-Maliki’s corrupt and nepotistic policies provided Islamic State terrorists with the opportunity to penetrate Mosul prior to June 2014 and convince notables that they could “liberate” the city from what they called the “Shi'a occupation.” 

The Political Obstacles to the Defeat of the (so-called) Islamic State

Bribes were offered to local officials and the city residents offered no resistance when approximately 800-1000 Islamic State fighters on pickup trucks with mounted machine guns were able to take over the city. Mosul’s banks were looted of their funds and the Islamic State was now in control of Iraq’s second largest city. As terrorist forces seized territory beyond Mosul in other areas of north central Iraq and into al-Anbar Province, concern mounted as they moved closer to Baghdad. 

A fatwa issue by Grand Ayatallah 'Ali al-Sistani called on Iraqis to organize to stop any further seizure of Iraqi territory. al-Sistani’s fatwa legitimized in effect the Popular Militia Movements (al-hashad al-sha'bi) which, as Worth describes in his article, effectively control much of Iraq today. Because Iran sent units of its Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps to fight against the Da'ish, in effect in alliance with US forces, they extended their influence among existing Iraqi militias and the new ones which had just been formed. 

After the Dacish advance was halted, the IRGC, under the command of Qassem Suleiman, who was killed by a US drone strike in January 2020, consolidated Iran’s influence in Iraq. To be sure, Iranian influence in Iraq was prevalent, thanks to the Bush administration, after 2003. Once al-Maliki became prime minister, he worked to strengthen economic ties with Iran. He even sacrificed Iraqi industries, such as the ancient brick industry, by importing competing goods from Iran. 

Exploiting the quota system (nizam al-muhassasa) which has been used to allocate seats in Iraq Chamber of Deputies (parliament), corruption has been institutionalized in Iraq. A small number of political parties divide up the spoils. These parties are in reality cliques who agree prior to national elections who will be given control over which ministries and other parts of Iraq’s government depending on the election’s outcome, namely the share of party's the votes. For example, Muqtada al-Sadr’s party, the Sadrist Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sadri), has controlled the lucrative Ministry of Health and distribution of medicine since 2007. 

Iraq’s corruption is hollowing out the economy and destroying its citizens' trust in government. “Democratic elections” are becoming synonymous with stealing public funds and resources. As politicians become ever wealthier and the standard of living of ordinary Iraqi stagnates, and social services continue to deteriorate, Iraq’s populace has become ever angrier with the massive corruption which has engulfed their country. 

In October 2019, a new youth uprising burst onto the political scene. Known as the October Revolution (Thawrat Tishreen), and recalling the June-October 1920 Iraqi Revolution (al-Thawra al-'Iraqiya al-Kubra), it gained the support of thousands of Iraq youth. Demonstrations appeared in Baghdad and virtually all cities and towns in the south of Iraq (with many Sunni Arab youth in the north expressing sympathy but not participating to give the government the excuse to brand the uprising as “terrorist”).

مقتل سليماني وثورة تشرين في العراق: ما الذي عجز المحللون الغربيون ان يوصلونه لك وما الذي تحتاج ان تعرفه 

Despite vicious attacks by security forces from the Ministry of the Interior and militias, all of which have close ties to the Iranian regime, the demonstrations remained peaceful as deaths and injuries mounted and activists were kidnapped and tortured or some never heard from at all. In late November, the massive demonstrations forced the resignation of then Prime Minster 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi. 

Two candidates, Muhammad Tawfiq Allawi and Adnan al-Zurfi, who were nominated to succeed 'Abd al-Mahdi were denied the post when Thawrat Tishreen’s suppoirters rejected them. Finally, Iraq’s Director of Intelligence, and former journalist and human rights activist, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, was appointed prime minister, even though Iran felt he was too sympathetic to the United States. (For a discussion of al-Kadhimi, who has tried to protect the demonstrators, see my post,  Can Mustafa al-Kadhimi Save Iraq?

Iraq’s peaceful youth uprising has elicited broad support from the Iraqi public. It also was a reason behind an effort of Iraqis to boycott Iranian goods because the Tehran regime is viewed as organizing the violent suppression of the protests. Most recently, Iranian directives to kill youth activists in Iraq’s third largest city, al-Basra, in the far south, has infuriated Iraqis. 

What needs to happen now? Because Prime Minister al-Kadhimi has called for early parliamentary elections in June 2021, it is important that the supporters of Thawrat Tishreen move to institutionalize the revolution. First and foremost, this process requires establishing a political movement which can field candidates for the June 2021 elections. 

I would argue that any political movement which Iraqi youth seek to organize must be closely tied to members of the older generation who share their goals of ending the Iraqi government’s extensive corruption and nepotism, improving social services and restoring trust in democratic governance. Clerics, tribal leaders, professionals, educators and members of the private sector need to unite to form a powerful political list which will attract the votes of large segments of Iraqi society. 

To make this political effort succeed and win a large number of seat in parliament, Iraqi youth need to use social media and the online press, such as al-Mada, al-'Alim al-Jadid, and Glgamesh.com, just to name a few news sources, to document the deterioration of social services in Iraq under previous governments, including the antiquated health care system, an ineffective national school system, poor public transportation, lack of affordable child-care facilities, and proper maintenance of districts which incur health problems due to intermittent or non-existent refuse removal and street cleaning. 

The majority of youth who have been the drivers behind the October Revolution are from Baghdad and the south which explains the disproportionately large number of Shi'a youth in its ranks. Even though the demonstrators stress their tolerance toward all religions and ethnic groups and strong anti-sectarian bona fides, they do not seem to have reached out in any systematic way to Arab Sunni or Kurdish youth or youth in other ethnic communities, e.g., the Turkmen. 

Because youth in all Iraq's ethno-confessional communities are equally angry, the Thawrat Tishreen could expand its influence if it could establish a de-centralized network of candidates throughout Iraq and not just in the south. In the struggle over ideas, many of the parties in the Chamber of Deputies claim to be “religious parties.” They also claim that they are protecting Iraq from the ills and immorality of secularism. 

However, their corrupt activities have nothing to do with Islam. Instead, these so-called “religious parties” traffic in politicized religion. In other words, they manipulate religious categories to promote their financial interest and political power under the guise of supporting Islamic values. In this instance, it is important to engage clerics who can dispute the claims of these parties to be committed to strengthening religious values. 

By focusing on their corrupt activities and demonstrating that little or nothing which they do helps the poor and marginalized in Iraq society, Iraqi youth can use their political movement to dispute that the “religious parties” have any connection at all to the Islamic religion. The struggle to win seats in the Iraqi parliament will not be easy. Power is never ceded without a fight. However, only by gaining control of the avenues of power, beginning with the Chamber of Deputies, can Thawrat Tishreen gain the strength to achieve its goals, which is to end state corruption and establish a true social democracy.