The Iraq crisis: will the US try to remove Nuri al-Maliki?

Protest poster saying "No to sectarianism"

As the crisis in Iraq spreads, calls for Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to leave office have grown as well.  A May 2nd New York Times Op-Ed, "Why Maliki must go" argued that the US and its European allies should put pressure on al-Maliki to resign.  Is there any reason to expect that this scenario will become a reality?  What would the Iraqi government look like were Maliki to be deposed?

First, there is little chance that the US will bring pressure to bear on Maliki to resign.  Since its withdrawal of troops in December 2011, US influence in Iraq has dramatically declined. Part of the reason for this decline is not just the US troop withdrawal, but the decision of the Obama administration to put Iraq on the back burner in terms of its policy priorities.

Second, the US does not want to open a "second front" with Iran.  It is already discovered that, the severe sanctions imposed on Iran notwithstanding, Iran has still not indicated any willingness to curtail its development of a so-called nuclear energy program, which experts believe is actually intended to produce a nuclear arsenal.

The US had an option to hold Maliki's feet to the fire in 2010 when his State of Law Coalition narrowly lost the March national parliament elections.  According to the Iraqi constitution, Ayad Allawi, the head of the al-Iraqiya Coalition, which won 91 seats to State of Law's 89 seats, should have been asked to form a new government.  The US and Iran tacitly cooperated to make sure that Allawi was not allowed that opportunity.

Whether Allawi would have been able to form a government is beside the point.  The US looked the other way as Maliki used a variety of dubious manuevers to maintain the post of prime minister.  Instead, the US tried to have Maliki create a new National Council for Security Affairs that Allawi would head.  Maliki promised to create the new government agency and give its a wide range of powers over domestic security and national defenses.  However, once he saw that he would be not ousted, he reneged on all his promises.

The US cooperated with Iran to keep Teheran's man in Baghdad in power.  It was following the timeless US policy of  supporting strongmen rather than acceding to the wishes of the populace at large.  One would think that the US would have learned from its experiences with the Shah in Iran, Mubarak in Egypt, Bin Ali in Tiunisa, Qaddafi in Libya and Salih in Yemen that supporting dictators to achieve "stability" inevitably backfires.

There is a yet another reason why the US will not suppoort efforts to depose Nuri al-Maliki: arms sales.  As one of the world's largest producers of oil (and soon natural gas as well), Iraq's resource base will grow dramatically in the near future.  The US has already sold Iraq F-16 fighter aircraft and is helping it rebuild its navy as well.  The US hopes that Amercian businesses will find a myraid of investment opportunities in Iraq as well.

Forcing Maliki from power would anger Iran which would step up its support for Shiite militias in the south of the country.  Iran would try to make life miserable for any of Maliki's potential replacements.  This would be especially true if that political actor were someone who leaned towards the United States.

Authoritarian legacies also play a part in the reluctance to replace Maliki, not just on the part of the US but domestically in Iraq as well.  Saddam Husayn was careful to execute any politician who he perceived as a possible future threat to his power, including his boyhood friend Adnan Khayrallah, who became popular as defense minister during the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.  There were few politicians with any national credibility still alive when the US invaded Iraq in 2003.

The Bush administration erred when it brought a slew of Iraqi expatriate politicians back to Iraq in 2003, including Nuri al-Maliki.  These politcians which included the likes of Ahmad Chalabi, the incredibly corrupt head of the Iraqi National Congress, and Abd al-Aziz Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, did not retunr to Iraq with any civic agendas.  They were and still are, as Tareq and Jacqueline Ismael refer to them, "carpetbaggers."

Turning to the current crisis, many Iraqis who oppose Maliki do not want to see him removed from power bercasue they fear even more instability.  This is especially true in light of the spillover of the Syrian civil war in Iraq's so-called "Sunni  Arab Triangle" in the north west and north central region of the country.

A number of tribal leaders in al-Anbar and Ninawa provinces see Maliki as a strongman who will prevent al-Qa'ida and its arm, the Islamic State of Iraq, and the so-called Naqshibandi Army (jaysh al-Naqshibandiya), led by the former number two leader in Iraq's Ba'th Party, Izzat al-Duri, from reestablishing themselves in the Sunni Triangle.  These shaykhs remember the extent to which radical forces encroached on their economic and political prerogatives during the sectarian violence of 2004-2008.

Indeed yesterday, the Acting (Sunni) Defense Minister, Sa'dun al-Dulaymi, attending a memorial for Iraqi army troops recently killed in al-Anbar and Ninawa provinces, called upon local tribal leaders not to allow sectarian militias to reestablish themselves in Sunni areas indicating that that would lead to chaos (al-fitna) and a catastrophe (al-karitha).  Clearly, Maliki is using al-Dulaymi to swing tribal leaders to support his government rather than see a return to the highly destructive violence that followed the toppling of Saddam Husayn's regime in 2003 (see the Iraqi al-Sabah newspaper, May 5, 2013).

al-Dulaymi also attacked the convening of an Istanbul "Iraqi Spring" conference of anti-Maliki dissidents, arguing that the conference constitutes an interference by Turkey in Iraq's internal affairs.  In his statement, the Iraq Defense Minister again called attention to Turkey's attacks on Iraqi territory in pursuit of Kurdish PKK guerrillas who operate from the Qandil mountains in Iraqi Kurdistan.

Maliki's tactics are to "divide and conquer" in Iraq';s Sunni heartland by setting powerful tribal leaders against Sunni demonstrators who feel Maliki has marginalized them from political power and government employment, while accusing Turkey for being responsible for fomenting the crisis presenting facing Iraq.

Meanwhile, Secretary of State John Kerry has encouraged Maliki to negotiate with the Kurds to solve their problems over oil and the "disputed territories" along Iraq's Green Line which separates Arabs and Kurds in northeastern Iraq.  Indeed, Maliki's efforts to engage the Kurds is probably only a temporary move designed to further isolate his Sunni Arab opponents by preventing a Kurdish-Sunni Arab alliance.  Maliki cannot come to terms with the Kurdish leaders of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) because he would then be seen as ceding control to the Kurds of Iraq's oil resources in the north.

The recent negotiations between a Kurdish delegation from Arbil and Maliki's circle has smoothed over for the moment the contentious disputes between  the Baghdad and the KRG.  But Iraq's fragmented political elite has been down this road before and there is little doubt that the KRG's move to closer economic and political ties with Turkey presages more conflict in the future. 

Indeed, if Ankara is able to resolve its conflict with the PKK, and Turkey's large Kurdish minority feels its interests are finally being met, the temptation for the KRG to declare independence might be overwhelming, especially if Maliki and the Baghdad political elite do not curtail their hostile approach to Iraq's Kurdish population.  With Turkey's "Kurdish problem" under control, Ankara would be far less apt to see a KRG declaration of independence as threatening Turkey's national interests.

Maliki's calculus with regard to the KRG is much more shot-term in scope.  He sees any agreement that gives in to Kurdish demands for more control over their oil resources and any concessions on the disputed territories along the so-called Green Line as an invitation to his opponents to try and force him from office.  In his view, giving in to the Kurds would undermine his nationalist credentials and make him appear as only the leader of Arab Iraq.

The "wild card" in the crisis is the powerful Shiite populist, Muqtada al-Sadr, the head of the Sadrist Trend which holds 40 seats in parliament.  Over the past year, Sadr has been in the forefront of trying to impose term limits on the post of prime minister and other top political offices.  Sadr has always tried to maintain close ties to the Sunni community as a way of bolstering his nationalist credentials.  While he came out and criticized Israel's attacks on Syria yesterday, he still has not weighed in on whether he truly wants Maliki ousted as prime minister. 

In short, the US will not be seeking to oust Nuri al-Maliki as Iraqi prime minister.  The US has few options available to it in trying to solve the current crisis in Iraq.  It can urge Maliki to limit the use of force in confronting angry Sunni Arab demonstrators, cease accusing them all of being agents for al-Qa'ida and other radical forces, and give their political leaders greater representation among his cabinet ministers and in top posts in the state bureaucracy.

At the end of the day, the US has to realize that Maliki is yet another example of poor foreign policy decision-making.  The time to have dealt with Maliki was 2010 when there was the opportunity to strike a blow for democracy and help support Iraq's efforts at implementing a democratic transition.   Instead, the US helped ensconce an authoritarian ruler who has progressively alienated almost all segments of Iraqi society.

At the end of the day, Maliki still has an ace in the hole.  He can continue to use his plentiful reserves of  oil wealth to coopt just enough of his opponents, including Sunni Arabs such as his defense minister, thereby keeping those enemies who will not play by his rules of the game off balance.  For the US, the chickens have come home to roost,  As the saying goes, "you reap what you sow."

From the Boston bombings to Saudi Arabia: US Foreign Policy in the Middle East

Last evening, I returned from a conference, "Iraq + 10 - Looking Forward," which was organized by the Institute for Iraqi Studies, directed by my esteemed colleague, Dr. Augustus Richard Norton of Boston University.

Going out for an early morning run yesterday, I found the streets of Boston deserted and police vehicles everywhere.  A park along the Charles River in which I had run the previous day was deserted.  I had yet to learn of the shootings the previous evening.

Despite a lockdown of area universities, Professor Norton adroitly kept the conference on track by moving it to a restaurant attached to the hotel where most of the participants were staying.  However, the restaurant door was locked and patrons had to be let in by the staff.  Police were everywhere.

As we ate breakfast before beginning our conference panels, I asked myself, what are the political dynamics that have structured the extremist threat Americans face today?  What are the lineages of this horrific bombing of innocent civilians at one of the world's iconic sporting events, the Boston Marathon?

Listening to CNN later in the day, I heard its national security consultant, Fran Townsend, who worked in the Department of Homeland Security in the Bush administration, refer to the Tsarnaev brothers who perpetrated the Boston Marathon attacks, as attracted by "extreme Islam."  Despite her admonition not to paint an entire community, namely Muslims, with the same political brush, her comment was highly problematic.

First, what is the ordinary viewer supposed to understand by "extreme Islam"? What would they think if a CNN announcer referred to "extreme Christianity" or "extreme Judaism"?  What occurred in Boston has nothing to do with Islam, extreme or otherwise.  This is an "invented religion" that contradicts the tenets of Islam, just as the Ku Klux Klan's doctrine contradicts the tenets of Christianity.

Second, American television networks should employ consultants who know something about Islam.  Why hasn't CNN hired a prominent Muslim cleric to appear on its shows?  Such a cleric would inform viewers that Islam explicitly prohibits the killing of innocents, such as the young boy and 2 adults who were killed in the Boston Marathon bombings (Qur'an 5:32).  Muslims who engage in such prohibited acts will find themselves going to hell in the afterlife.  

Third, and this is perhaps most important, much political behavior that occurs under the rubric of radical Islamism is promoted by authoritarian rulers throughout the Middle East.  Many US allies in the region, especially Saudi Arabia and Qatar, provide funding for radical movements, such as the Jabhat al-Nusra (the Support Front) in Syria, and Salafi movements in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.

In Egypt, former president Husni Mubarak, once the US' most important Arab ally, allowed virulent attacks in the national media on Egypt's Christian and secular communities. Coptic Christians were prevented from building new churches or repairing existing ones.  Secular political parties and democratic Islamist parties, such as the Center Party (hizb al-wasat) were refused government licenses and thus excluded from national elections.  Successive US administrations remained silent.

To its credit, the US State Department recently criticized the government of Egyptian president, Muhammad Mursi, on its website, for attempting to prosecute the highly popular television comedian Bassem Youssef on charges of criticizing the president and Islam (see my earlier post, Who's Afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood,part 2," April 12, 2013).  Still, the US has failed to criticize the constant flow of anti-Christian and anti-secular rhetoric in the conservative press that the Mursi regime tolerates, just like the Mubarak regime before it.  Tout ca change, tout c'est la meme chose.


In Iraq, Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, another US ally, is engaged in a systematic attack on Iraq's Sunni Arab community   Recently, he tried to arrest Iraq's most powerful Sunni politician, Finance Minister Rafi' al-Issawi, on trumped up charges of being associated with terrorism.  Maliki regularly issues verbal blasts against the leadership of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), the semi-autonomous region in Iraq's 3 northern Kurdish majority governorates.

Meanwhile, Iraq's Kurdish leadership, which is strongly allied to the US, attacks the Arab government in the south as responsible for all the ills of the KRG.  Propelled by the same motivations of the regime in Baghdad, this particular "blame game" is meant to divert attention from the extensive corruption and nepotism that characterizes the Kurdish leadership of the KRG.

While the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, another US ally and NATO member, has recently attempted to reach accommodation with its large Kurdish minority, the Turkish government exhibits increasing authoritarian tendencies.  Almost 50 journalists languish in jail without trial.  For  the most part, their only crimes are that they are secularists who have criticized the AKP for its failure to implement meaningful democratic reforms and its not so subtle efforts to impose its brand of political Islam on the Turkish people.

In Bahrain, the US has directed virtually no criticism at the Al Khalifa monarchy's violent repression of peaceful demonstrators who are demanding the government implement promised democratic reforms.  The Sunni based monarchy dominates Bahrain's economy while the majority of the Shiite population often lives in squalid conditions and does not even possess the right to own land, much of which is owned by the state.  The jail terms that have been given to protestors are totally incommensurate with the "crimes" they are alleged to have committed.

US policy-makers frequently invoke the lack of "realism" in actively combating sectarianism and promoting its most important antidote, democratization, in the Middle East.  Democracy promotion in this area of the world, they argue, is naive and utopian.  Better to support the devil you know, than the devil you don't.

How did the "realistic" policies the US has followed to date work out with the Shah of Iran, Egypt's Husni Mubarak, Libya's Muammar Qaddafi, Tunisia's Zin al-Din Ben Ali and Yemen's Ali Abdallah Salih?  How well are they working with our supposed allies, Saudi Arabia (which is the world's largest oil producer) or Qatar (where the US has an important naval base as it does in Bahrain)?

By actively supporting despotic regimes in the Middle East and looking the other way when they pursue policies that promote sectarianism, which only causes further anger and regional instability (look, for example, at the recent riots in Egypt and the massive Sunni protests in Iraq against the Maliki government), the US does neither itself or the Middle East any favors.

The US should not assume the role of forcing democracy on the MENA region.  But it should, as part of an international effort, continue to put pressure on those regimes in the Middle East which continue to thwart the democratic aspirations of their respective citizenry.

At the end of the day, the worst culprit in promoting terrorism is Saudi Arabia (the only country in the world owned by a single family).  Its massive funding over many years of Wahhabism (a political ideology which has nothing to do with religion) throughout the world has poisoned the minds of countless young people, such as the Boston Marathon bombers, with hatred of the West, Christians, Jews, Shiite Muslims  and secularists.

The US should worry less about Saudi oil and the profits to be derived from arms sales by American defense contractors, and more about the extremely pernicious impact  the Saudi regime is having not only on the Middle East but the world at large.  When will America's elected representatives and policy-makers start holding accountable its purported allies - Saudi Arabia and Qatar - for their funding of organizations that propagate the extremist and perverse ideas that are creating so much violence and hatred throughout the Middle East and the world today?

In combating terrorism, the best place to start is with Saudi Arabia - the Mother of All Paymasters of  extremist movements which advocate sectarianism, the hatred of moderate orthodox Islam, Christian and Jews, and secularists, and the suppression of women's rights.  If the Saudis would stop propagating Wahhabi ideology and funding extremist organizations, the world would be a much safer place.

A Boston University police officer, who served in Beirut in 1983, put it so well to me yesterday morning when he said, "We are now part of the world."  Terrorism is indeed in our proverbial backyards.  9/11 was not an isolated incident.  Unless the US takes the lead in mobilizing an international coalition to thwart the spread of radical "Islam," the Boston Marathon bombing, like 9/11, will result in the the creation of more Tamarlan and Dzhokhar Tsarnaevs.
 

Who's afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood? (part 2)

During the  denouement of the Mubarak regime in January 2011, I posted, "Who's afraid of the Muslim Brotherhood? http://new-middle-east.blogspot.com/2011/02/whos-afraid-of-muslim-brotherhood.html.  I argued that that a relatively small number of Egyptians supported the Brotherhood's efforts to take power.  At the time, public opinion polls indicated that 15% supported a Brotherhood candidate for the Egyptian presidency.

Nevertheless, the Brotherhood succeeded in both winning both Egypt's 2012 parliamentary and presidential elections.  Where does the Brotherhood - and the larger issue of Islamist politics - stand in Egypt?  What does an answer to this question imply about the prospects for a transition to democracy in Egypt?

To sum up, Muslim Brotherhood rule in Egypt has been a disaster.  Its sectarianism has promoted violence which has only poured political oil on the firestorm that's consuming the Egyptian economy.  As protests against the Brotherhood have increased, its inability to rule has become ever more apparent, along with its increasingly sectarian politics and authoritarian tendencies.

What the experience of the Brotherhood demonstrates to date is that the "inevitable" trajectory of Islamist rule in the Middle East that Western analysts have consistently predicted is vastly overstated.  Unless the Egyptian military intervenes to consolidate the Brotherhood's hold over the country - a highly unlikely scenario - its popularity will continue to decline unless it radically changes the policies it has followed since winning parliamentary and presidential elections.  But before analyzing the current state of Egyptian politics, let's first return to 2012

Two important considerations need be kept in mind about the 2012 elections.  First, the Brotherhood was much better organized than its secular or Salafi opponents.  During its 30 year rule, the Mubarak regime made the Brotherhood the "official opposition."  A tacit agreement existed between the regime and the Brotherhood that allowed the latter to maintain offices throughout the country, publish newspapers and magazines and to participate in national elections.

However, the Brotherhood was never allowed to win more than a limited number of parliamentary seats until the 2005 elections when the Bush administration pressured Mubarak to conduct a more democratic vote.  To the consternation of the regime, the Brotherhood won 88 seats.  However, many of the new delegates refused to follow the dictates of the septuagenarian and octogenarian Brotherhood leadership leading to a spread of more democratic votes among many younger Brothers.

In pursuing this "official opposition" policy, the Mubarak regime used the Brotherhood as a political foil.  Whenever it was pressured to introduce democratic reforms, Mubarak responded with the rhetorical question: did those who advocated for greater democracy really want the Brotherhood to come to power if elections were completely free?

The tacit alliance between the Mubarak regime and the Brotherhood was evident in 1996 when a splinter group sought to form the "Center Party, (hizb al-wasat) whose name derived from the Prohet Muhammad's emphasis on moderation (al-wasatiya) in the Qur'an.  This party, which included a Christian among its founders, called for an end to sectarianism and greater democracy.  The Brotherhood, however, supported the Mubarak's regime's refusal to issue the new party a license (on the Hizb al-Wasat, see Augustus Richard Norton's article, "Thwarted Democracy: the Case of Egypt's Hizb al-Wasat, in Robert Hefner, ed., Remaking Muslim Politics, 133-160).

The key factor is that the secular liberals and secular left were always considered inherently more dangerous by the Mubarak regime because they posed a much more meaningful democratic alternative  than the Islamist movement.  In the back of many Egyptians' minds was fear of the "one election" syndrome, where a Brotherhood win at the polls would be followed by the abolition of electoral politics.

Second, aside from its leadership, and hardcore membership - probably no more than 15-20% of the populace - support for the Brotherhood has never been about "religion" in the abstract.  Instead, popular support has rested on the belief that, if it gained power, the Brotherhood would fight pervasive corruption and nepotism and would seek to better the lives of ordinary Egyptians. 

Many Egyptians remember the October 1992 Cairo earthquake in which thousands of buildings were damaged and large numbers of people killed or wounded, mostly in poorer areas of the city.  While the Mubarak regime was slow to respond to the crisis, the green tents (symbolizing Islam) of the Muslim Brotherhood were everywhere to be seen, with its physicians treating the wounded and the organization providing social services to the homeless.

Moving to 2011, the demonstrations made clear that  Egyptians protesting the Mubarak regime did not want to substitute an Islamist autocracy for a secular autocracy.  The Brotherhood was slow to join the demonstrations but worked with the April 6th Movement (named after a large strike at one of Egypt's largest textile factories in 2008) to oust Mubarak.  Despite assurances to the contrary, the Brotherhood has pursued an authoritarian agenda since taking power and turned the April 6th Movement from an ally into an opponent.

Egypt's precipitous economic decline is most evident in the drop in currency reserves from $36 billion prior to Mubarak's ouster to $13.5 billion at the end of March,   The Egyptian pound has lost 1/10th of its value this year.  Rather than confronting the ever deteriorating economy, the Brotherhood has instead been focusing on consolidating its power by populating all state agencies with its own followers, in the same manner as the ancien regime it replaced.

As currency reserves and the value of the Egyptian pound have declined, they have contributed to a projected annual inflation rate of almost 9%.  Food and energy prices have increased dramatically due to the need to import large amounts of essential commodities such as wheat and fuel oil. There is a shortage of diesel fuel needed by farmers to power agricultural machinery. The poor have been especially hard hit because the government is under pressure by the IMF to reduce state subsidies if Egypt is to receive a desperately needed $4.8 billion loan.

While the Mursi government is about to issue electronic ration (smart) cards, which are intended to rationalize consumption of subsidized commodities (e.g., by preventing wealthier Egyptians from purchasing such products at reduced prices), many Egyptians fear that the new ration cards presage a  move to restricting the amount of subsidized food available to the urban poor.

We need recall that when, under similar pressures in 1977, Anwar al-Sadat attempted to reduce subsidies, which are critical to sustaining many Egyptian families (30% of whom live on less than $1/day), there were massive protests and the proposed reductions were rescinded.  The difference then was that Sadat could turn to the US and other foreign donors for financial assistance.  This  option is much  more problematic for the Muslim Brotherhood dominated government today given the state of the global economy.

Foreign investment is drying up and Egyptian tourism, a mainstay of the economy is virtually non-existent.   In 2010, tourism supplied employment, either directly or indirectly to one of every eight Egyptians.  This past winter - the height of the tourist season in Upper Egypt - historical sites along the Nile such as Luxor and Aswan were virtually empty of foreign tourists.  Scared of the turmoil, cruise ships no longer dock at the Mediterranean Port of Alexandria.  Resort hotels at Sharm al-Sheikh in the Sinai Peninsula along the Gulf of Aqaba are talking about closing their doors due to very low occupancy rates.

Supporters of Egypt's ultraconservative Salafi movement have called not only for banning foreign tourists from purchasing alcohol in Egypt, but also forcing them to wear "conservative dress."  Such proposals have been attacked by Egypt's tourist industry which realizes that they will further deter Western tourists.

Salafi preachers have called for the demolition of Egypt's iconic pyramids - one of the world's greatest architectural feats - because they are "idolatrous."  Such comments remind many of the Taliban's destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas in Afghanistan which employed the same perverted logic (and one that is inconsistent with the overwhelming majority of Islamic thought throughout the Muslim world) to destroy one of the world's great historic monuments.

The real issue here is not the pronouncements of some Salafi preachers but the failure of the Egyptian government under President Muhammad Mursi to condemn these and other sectarian proclamations.  Indeed, the Coptic Orthodox Pope has condemned the Mursi government for ignoring anti-Christian slurs and insults on the website of the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party.

While attempting to suppress secular dissent, the Mursi government has allowed Salafi and sectarian Islamist media to engage in virulent attacks on secularists, leftists and Christians.  This "looking the other way" reflects the same type of media pattern that existed under Mubarak.

Pope Tawadrous II was especially scathing in condemning the lack of intervention of police during the funeral of 4 Christians killed (1 Muslim was also killed)  in a village north of Cairo, El Khusus, at the main Coptic Cathedral in Cairo.  Some witnesses indicated that, not only did the police fail to stop Muslim protestors from throwing gas canisters into the cathedral yard during the funeral and firing shots at the building, but some also joined in hurling canisters into the cathedral.

As violence has spread, many Muslim Brotherhood offices throughout the country have been burned.  Soccer fans, known as Ultras, have become especially angry at the Brotherhood after 31 of their members were sentenced to death at trials stemming from soccer violence in a match played Port Said in February 2012 in which 74 people were killed.  However, the police, who failed to intervene to stop the violence and actually locked many fans in the stadium who were subsequently killed because they could not escape, were given minimal sentences or no sentences at all.

In the recent elections for the board of directors of several of Egypt's professional associations, such as the Pharmacists Syndicate, the Muslim Brotherhood suffered a major defeat in not winning any seats.  When Anwar al-Sadt came to power in 1970, one of his first objectives was to smash the left wing of the Arab Socialist Union, his main enemies in the Nasserist movement.  He released Muslim Brothers from jail and enabled them to win elections in almost all Egypt's professional syndicates, ousting their Nasserist leadership in the process.  The Brotherhood's abysmal showing in these elections is an indicator of its loss of popular support.

Recently, the Supreme Judicial Council called for the resignation of Mursi-appointed Public Prosecutor, Talaat Abdallah, who is considered too close to the government and more concerned with defending it from criticism than protecting the rule of law.  After Abdallah had him arrested, the courts dismissed a lawsuit by a prominent Islamist against Egypt's most popular television satirist, Bassem Youssef (Basim Yusif)) for attacking the Egyptian president and  poking fun at radical Islam.  While Mursi himself distanced himself from the lawsuit, many Egyptians feel that it had the implicit support of the government since Youssef was prosecuted by the state after the lawsuit was filed.

What has offended large number of Egyptians is that the public prosecutor is spending times prosecuting cases of defamation while the country 's economy grows worse by the day.  In their view, political pluralism is being increasingly curtailed leading to more discontent and violence while only further undermines the economy.

The Bassem Youssef affair underlines the Mursi government's lack of political saavy and skills.  Youssef 's program al-Barnamij (The Program) is the most popular show in Egypt, and, according to YouTube, the most popular in the Middle East, in addition to his having 1,200,000 followers on Twitter.  Many Egyptians were outraged when he was arrested and forced to post a bail of 15000 Egyptian pounds (see al-Hayat, Mar 31).  Clearly, the arrest and then dismissal of the lawsuit not only made the government look foolish but further undermined its credibility and popularity as well.  

Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia, but especially Qatar, have been trying to prop up the Mursi regime with loans and other financial assistance.  But such assistance only exacerbates Egypt's problems by giving Mursi a false sense of security that he can continue his destructive policies.  Such financial assistance is not permanent and cannot address the problem of creating an economy that can grow sufficiently to keep pace with Egypt's rapid population growth.

Egypt is keen to conclude an IMF loan of $4.8 billion which has been under discussion since last fall, but was delayed when Mursi refused to implement proposed tax increase in December 2012.  The loan would not only allow Egypt to add to its currency reserves,  but would create opportunities for additional loans from other international sources.

The IMF, US, European Union should make this loan contingent on the Mursi changing his policies to implement the type of  tolerant politics he promised when running for the presidency and in accord with what he subscribes to when speaking with Western journalists. His purported support for freedom of expression and other democratic rights are all belied by his failure to reign in an increasingly virulent sectarianism directed against liberals, the left, Christians and secular Muslims who oppose his policies.  This inaction only encourages groups such as the Salafi Party of Light (hizb al-nur) to intensify its sectarian politics.

Secretary of State John Kerry's recent remarks that the US is increasingly concerned by the "direction Egypt is taking" was an important first step towards bringing pressure to bear on Mursi not to create a new dictatorship.  These words should now lead to action and a tougher stance towards the Muslim Brother dominated government.

The US and its democratic allies need to learn that, in the 21st century, authoritarian rule can only  produce a temporary stability in nation-states in the Middle East and that, inevitably, such rule will be followed by conflict and violence.  Democracy promotion is not, as some assert, an unrealistic policy. It is the only policy that will bring political stability and economic growth to the region.

The New "Sunni" Politics in Iraq

Finance Minister, Rafi al-Issawi, joining fellow Sunni demonstrators

Guest contributor and Iraqi scholar, Dr. Harith Qarawee, is author of Imagining the Nation: Nationalism, Sectarianism and Socio-Political Conflict in Iraq 

Until recently, few Iraqis identified themselves in sectarian terms. This was particularly true of the Arab Sunni population. Even though sectarianism has always been a powerful force in Iraqi society and politics, it has never been as explicit and public as it is today.  Sectarian identities and discourses are used by political entrepreneurs to achieve political goals. Although cultural symbolism and collective narratives are functional in this process, the real objectives are mainly political and largely instrumental.

The Process of Sunnification 

The so-called “Sunni” rule of Iraq before 2003 was not Sunni in the sense that the ruling elite’s ideology was based on a form of Sunni versus Shi’i solidarity.

This simplistic view of Iraqi society led some to create a narrative of Iraqi history as one of permanent “sectarian” conflict.  In fact, the national ideology that ruled Iraq was based on the centrality of ‘Pan-Arabism’, which legitimated or justified an exclusionary power structure in which people from Arab Sunni areas, the majority of whom were not religious, had controlled its core. 

“Sectarian” exclusion was coincidental to a system built on networks of clientalism whose criteria of loyalty were derived from kinship and tribal-regional links. As those who belong to Arab Sunni tribal-regional congregations were give preferential treatment by the state, the consequence was that the subsequent former regimes were seen as Sunni ones.

Although the Ba’th Party’s ideology was more Sunni than Shi’a, it was originally articulated to emphasize a cross-sectarian and cross-religious Arab unity.  This is proven by the fact that millions of Shi’a were members of Ba’th party (whose Iraqi branch was founded and initially led by Fu’ad al-Rikabi, a Shi’i from the southern city of al-Nasiriya).

Iraq’s Arab Sunni community has been subject to strong dynamics of “Sunnification.”   This process has resulted from a deep sense of alienation in post-Saddam Iraq and has also been inspired by the uprising in neighboring Syria.  Sunni leaders and protesters appear to be less reserved today when they speak about their sectarian community.  

Sectarian symbolism is present in the ongoing protests in Anbar, Mosul, and other Arab Sunni cities. Flags of the “Sunni” free Syrian army, mottos attacking the Iranian “occupation” of Iraq,  and slogans denouncing Syrian president Bashar al-Assad and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, imply that Iraqi Sunni protesters share with their Sunni Syrian counterparts a “common cause” in the struggle against two “Shi’i” pro-Iranian governments.  

Certainly, there are some similarities with what transpired after 2003 when clerics of the Association of Muslim Scholars (AMS), led by Shaykh Harith al-Dhari, played the role of the defender of the Arab Sunni community. However, there are also significant differences between the two situations.

In contrast to the current dynamic, the AMS was not an outcome of a large-scale and public socio-political mobilization.  Its main concern was to oppose and de-legitimize foreign occupation of Iraq by the United States. Today, that foreign occupation is over and many Iraqi Sunnis seem to think that the United States should play a role in exerting pressure on the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad.

In a letter addressed to President Obama, an increasingly popular cleric, ‘Abd al-Malik al-Sa’di, claimed that the United States has a moral obligation to save the country and to “reform what was corrupted by the wrong decision of invading Iraq in 2003”. 

Some Sunni politicians have started to speak publicly about Baghdad as a Sunni city, and some protesters have tried to symbolize that through calls to “march on Baghdad”.  Speaker of Parliament, Usama al-Nujayfi, told al-Jazeera television in an interview that the Sunni population constitutes the majority in Iraq, denying the Shi’a’s “claims” to be the majority.

Sunni politicians who are perceived to be less committed to the “communal cause,” such as Deputy Prime Minister Salih al-Mutlaq, face rejection and accusations of treason.  Last December, he was turned away by protesters in Falluja when he was tried to join them.

Mutlaq has been a fierce critic of Maliki, but his non-sectarian approach and recent efforts at compromise did not help him make  inroads among the young, angry demonstrators who feel no sympathy with politicians who have one foot in the government and the other one in the opposition.   

Like most youth movements, there is a tendency for a sort of puritanism that the current political class fails to provide.  In this context, the kind of speakers or leaders who are more likely to become popular are those whose representation of communal feelings has not been contaminated by the daily politics of one of the most corrupt political classes in the world. But with puritanism often comes “radicalization.” 

More Arab or More Sunni

This mobilization process is a show of strength that is building a Sunni political agenda and a new communal discourse.   Electorally, it can help producing a stronger leadership with broader communal legitimacy that could claim better position in any future negotiation with Shi’a and Kurdish leaders.

When the new Iraqi constitution was written in 2004 and 2005, Sunni areas were isolated by the uprising and Sunni representatives in the constitutional committee lacked a real constituency.  Consequently, the new political system was mainly a product of the Shi’a-Kurdish alliance at the time.

Many Sunni leaders seem to have accepted sectarian categorization and have even called for including sectarian identity in any future census, as did Nujayfi. Those who argue that there is a Sunni majority in Iraq tend to include Arabs, Kurds and Turkmen in their calculation, but ethnic differences might prove to be more powerful than any confessionally-based solidarity.  

Both the Prime Minister, Nuri al-Maliki, and the President of Kurdistan Region Government (KRG), Masoud Barzani, sought to take advantage of the absence of a united and powerful Arab Sunni leadership in order to promote their political agendas. When the Shi’a-Kurdish alliance began to disintegrate as a result of the tension between Maliki’s tendency to consolidate power and Barzani’s tendency to emphasize the independence of his semi-autonomous region, Sunni Arabs became a target for their competition.

Maliki formed a new regional military command in the ethnically-mixed disputed areas along the “Green Line,” which separates Kurdish and Arab areas.  He based his appeal to the Sunni Arab population living in those areas as an Arab leader who was willing to stop Kurdish encroachment on Arab land.  

For his part, Barzani expressed his support for the “legitimate” demands by Sunni leaders and protesters, and on several occasions stressed that Kurds and Sunni Arab share a common cause against the increasing authoritarianism of the Prime Minister. While Maliki was trying to revive Arab solidarity under his leadership, regional Sunni countries like Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar were urging the Kurds (who are predominantly Sunni Muslim), and the Sunni Arabs to join forces against the Shi’a-dominated government.

In fact, Sunni Arabs in Iraq were exposed to two conflicting forces that sought to separate their “Arabism” from their “Sunnism.” However, the current dynamic appears to affirm their “distinctiveness” from the co-ethnic Shi’as and co-sectarian Kurds.

Anti-Maliki slogans have escalated to a point where it is highly unlikely that he will win over any serious portion of the Sunni constituency.  In fact, “anti-Malikism” has become a significant element in shaping current Sunni Arab discourse.

At the same time, the continuing dispute over land and the legacy of mutual suspicions will make any potential alliance with the Kurds a tactical one (as was the case with the Shi’a-Kurdish alliance which was undermined despite the absence of any legacy of hostility). There is a simple fact about identity politics in Iraq and, perhaps, elsewhere: they are basically instruments used by political actors as they engage in the more fundamental conflict over power, status, and economic resources.  

What Next?

Sectarian mobilization is used by Sunni political, religious and tribal leaders to revive their support base and prevent Maliki from making inroads among their constituencies.  Similarly, Maliki is his confrontation with the Sunnis and Kurds has attempted to appear as a strong Shi’i leader who is defending Shi’a community and the ‘rule of majority’ which is targeted by regional Sunni powers and their ‘local’ proxies. With the deepening sectarian divide, the previously rejected idea of turning Iraq into a confederation of three ethno-sectarian groups seems like a self-fulfilling prophecy. In fact, the future scenario might prove to be gloomier if the confrontation turns into a new civil war.

However, exploiting ethnic and sectarian identities by political entrepreneurs is a way to manage the conflict over power and resources. To a large extent, this conflict in Iraq is taking place between centripetal and centrifugal forces. On the discursive level, the conflict is manifested through the clash between Maliki’s emphasis on state-building and rule of law and his opponents’ complaints about authoritarian and exclusionary policies. In fact, this reflects a substantial dilemma Iraq has always faced: how to consolidate state’s power without excluding disloyal social forces?.

Maliki’s actions appear to be confusing the state’s authority with government’s power, and governmental structure with his own personal authority.  His project of state-building is one based on maximizing his authority and monopolizing “legitimate” violence without creating the proper conditions to legitimize his authority. However, state-building is also about creating effective frameworks that persuasively organize state-society relationship and promote the necessary sense of political inclusion.

The political process in Iraq has been constructed on a conceptually confusing formula.  While the constitution mentions concepts like the “Iraqi Nation” and “Iraqi people,” there has been an increasing  emphasis on seeing Iraqi society as one composed of ethnic, religious and sectarian components.  This process has created greater confusion about where this political process is supposed to lead: more political and social integration or more disintegration.  In practice, the overarching political process seems to have lacked a clear vision, consequently paving the way for the current conflict.

The Sunni Arab leaders were historically in favor of the central rule when the government was controlled by them. Even after 2003, the ideas of decentralization and federalism were not appealing to them because of the then undisputed influence of the skeptical attitude which viewed as illegitimate the political process generated by the invasion.

Today, this attitude seems to be changing. Maliki and his Shi’i allies have strengthened their control over central government’s bodies. They led a massive process of sectarian replacement inside those bodies, through de-Ba’thification and clientalism, leaving Sunni Arabs with a feeling of being excluded and targeted. There is no way to know if state’s jobs are proportionally distributed between the two communities, but the Sunni feeling of alienation is unquestionable.

It is these feelings of marginalization and alienation that have made it easier for the current mobilization to begin, intensified, of course, by the Arab spring. The comparison with Syria is inescapable as both the Shi’a-dominated government in Baghdad and the protesters in the Sunni Arab heartland look to Syria as an extension of their own conflict.

But this analogy can lead to miscalculations and illusions about the intentions and capabilities of the contending parties.  The two conflicts are interconnected but they are not identical.  The Alawite-dominated regime of Bashar al-Asad is facing a Sunni-dominated uprising in a country where Sunni Arabs constitute the demographic majority (approximately 70%).

This is not the case with Sunni Arabs in Iraq who constitute an estimated 15 to 20% of the population.  A violent confrontation between Sunni groups and the Iraqi government would be very destructive, and only lead to more sectarianism and, probably, de facto partition of the country.

To avoid that scenario, the Iraqi government needs to give moderate forces more incentives to face radicalization.  This might not be a policy that Maliki would to pursue if he perceives that posturing as the “Strong Shi’i” is the only way in which to appeal to his electoral constituency.  

Nevertheless, as a rational leader, Maliki realizes that avoiding civil war must be a priority. If mainstream Sunni leaders and popular clerics manage to find a formula that can mobilize moderate elements while simultaneously isolating radicals, there will be better opportunity to negotiate a new pact between center and periphery after the next general election in 2014.

What Iraq needs is a clear vision and a formula that would solve the conceptual confusion about the relationship between the nation-state’s identity and those of its sub-national communities.  As much as the increasing sectarianism has jeopardized the very existence of this national community, it might present the last opportunity to re-think the basis on which Iraqi state should be constructed.

Ten Years after the American Invasion of Iraq

Guest contributor, Dr. Abdelhamid al-Siyam, former assistant to Special UN Envoy to Iraq, Sergio Viera de Mello, and director of Arab Media at the United Nations, teaches political science and Middle East studies at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. The interview below, "Iraq has transitioned from the tyranny of dictatorship to divisive sectarianism," was given to the Tunisian newspaper, al-Sabah, on March 20, 2013.

الخبير الاممي د.عبد الحميد صيام لـ«الصباح»: العراق انتقل من ظلم الدكتاتورية إلى الطائفية البغيضة عشر سنوات تمضي اليوم على الاجتياح الأمريكي العراقي بدعوى انقاذ العالم من مخاطر سلاح الدمار الشامل الذي يهدد الامن والسلم الدولي... عشر سنوات عاش خلالها العراق حملة تدمير شامل استهدفت المجتمع العراقي وأوقعته في شرك الفتنة ودفعت به الى هاوية الحرب الطائفية والاقتتال الذي أغرق شوارع العراق في دماء العراقيين. كل ذلك طبعا الى جانب حملة موازية لا تقل أهمية عن الأولى استهدفت ثروات العراق و كنوزه التاريخية والحضارية، وكما استنزفت ذاكرته الوطنية وتطاولت على متاحفه وآثاره مكتباته وجامعاته، فقد امتدت الى علمائه وباحثيه ومفكريه وشعرائه وفلاسفته فكانت حملة لالغاء الهوية العراقية واستبدالها بأخرى مسقطة غريبة عن بلاد الرافدين... بعد مضي عشر سنوات وفي أعقاب واحدة من أبشع حروب العصر التي تابع العالم تطوراتها يوما بيوم عبر الفضائيات لا يزال العراق يعيش على وقع التفجيرات اليومية عنوان الفوضى الخلاقة التي أراد لها مهندسو الشرق الأوسط الجديد أن تكون العراق مختبرا لها. وبدل الديموقراطية والحرية التي تطلع اليها العراقيون، يستفيق شعب العراق اليوم وبعد قرارالجيش الأمريكي بالانسحاب على الواقع الجديد بين مخاطر التقسيم والتفكيك ومخاطر التأثير الإيراني بعد أن تحول بلد الرافدين الى مأى لتنظيم القاعدة وللحركات المسلحة التي تمتد عبر المنطقة... أكثر من سبب من شأنه اليوم أن يدفع الى التوقف في هذه الذكرى العاشرة لاجتياح العراق لتأمل المشهد الراهن وتداعياته على المنطقة... رحل صدام وقتل أبناؤه وانهار جيشه ووقع اجتثاث «البعث»، مشهد قد لا يختلف كثيرا عما حدث قبل سنتين في ليبيا فللبلدين ثروات نفطية ومعدنية مغرية... ومع ذلك لا أحد اليوم بإمكانه أن يعرف عدد الضحايا الذين سقطوا في الحرب على العراق و لا أحد أيضا بامكانه اليوم أن يجزم بأن محاكمة من تورطوا في جريمة الحرب على العراق سيمثلون يوما أمام العدالة الدولية ليحاسبوا على ما اقترفوه ولكن ما يمكن تأكيده في المقابل في هذه الذكرى أن الدم العراقي و الدم العربي وحده الذي يسيل من ليبيا الى سوريا الى العراق و فلسطين بعد أن هان على أصحابه وبعد أن استهان به الآخرون... عشر سنوات على الحرب المدمرة في العراق وما خلفته من خراب و دمار من شأنها أن تدعو أكثر من وقت مضى الى تأمل المشهد العراقي و تداعياته فعسى أن يكون في هذه الذكرى ما يمكن أن يعيد الوعي الغائب عن الحكام الجدد أو يحي ضمائرهم المخدرة ويخلص عقولهم المجمدة من عقدها ومكبلاتها ويدعو الى استعادة العراق الى الساحة العربية والى اعتاق الشعوب العربية من قبضات المخططات الضيقة للمسؤولين المتدثرين بالدين لتحقيق أهدافعم الظلامية... عشر سنوات على اجتياح العراق تعني أن من ولدوا في تلك السنة بلغوا العاشرة من العمر و لم يعرفوا غير الاحتلال وأما الذين كان سنهم في العاشرة آنذاك فقد أصبحوا شبابا ليس في ذاكرتهم غير الماسي و الدمار... عشر سنوات على اجتياح العراق محطة نتوقف عندها بكثير من الألم لاستقراء المستقبل بحثا عن أمل و حلم يرفض أن يتحقق... من المهازل المسجلة في الذكرى العاشرة لاجتياع العراق أن يصبح بلاد الرافدين اليوم في المرتبة 176 من مجموع الدول الأكثر فسادا في العالم.... عشر سنوات على اجتياح العراق كانت فرصة التقينا خلالها مع الخبير الأممي السابق عبد الحميد صيام أستاذ دراسات الشرق الأوسط و العلوم السياسية بجامعة تغرز بنيوجرزي. وفي ما يلي نص الحديث . * عشر سنوات على اجتياح العراق.. عقد كامل يمضي وجيل يسحق، فكيف يبدو المشهد اليوم في بلاد الرافدين؟ وهل ما زالت أحلام الديموقراطية قائمة؟ - تستحق الذكرى العاشرة للاحتلال الأمريكي للعراق وقفة متأنية نراجع فيها نتائج تلك الحرب وأوضاع الأطراف المعنية فيها وخاصة الدولة العراقية والقوى المتحكمة فيها من جهة والولايات المتحدة وآثار تلك الحرب العسكرية والاقتصادية والسياسية والنفسية التي لحقت بالدولة العظمى من خلال احتلالها لبلد كبير بحجم العراق لمدة تسع سنوات. بالنسبة للولايات المتحدة فقد كان احتلال العراق غير قانوني وغير مبرر أخلاقيا أو سياسيا أو قانونيا. قد تكون حرب العراق الحرب الوحيدة التي شنت على بلد مستقل ذو سيادة بناء على حجج غير مثبتة ومبررات غير منطقية وبدون سند قانوني أو شرعية من مجلس الأمن الدولي. وقد كلفت هذه الحرب الولايات المتحدة نحو 4,500 قتيل وأكثر من 32,000 جريح بتكاليف زادت عن الثمان مائة مليار دولار مما سبب ما يشبه الانهيار الاقتصادي للبلاد في الأيام الأخيرة لعهد الرئيس السابق جورج بوش. لقد خرجت أمريكا من هذه الحرب التي تعد من أطول حروبها (الثانية بعد حرب أفغانستان) مهزومة سياسيا وأخلاقيا ونفسيا. أصبح العراق الآن شبه مقسم طائفيا، ومرتعا وملاذا آمنا للجماعات المتطرفة من أنصار القاعدة وأخواتها ثم خضع العراق الآن للنفوذ الإيراني شبه المطلق. فماذا جنت الولايات المتحدة من هذه الحرب الظالمة إلا الهزائم؟  بالنسبة للعراق فقد انتقل من مرحلة الدكتاتورية الكاسرة الظالمة إلى مرحلة الطائفية الكريهة. لقد تمزق الوطن واستبدل بالأقلمة الطائفية. إستبدل الانتماء إلى الوطن بالانتماء للطائفة. فقد العراق مئات الألوف من شبابه وشيبه ونسائه ورجاله وأطفاله لتستكمل الحرب الظالمة آثار13 سنة من الحصار القاتل الذي دفع الشعب العراقي بمجمله ثمنا باهظا لا يمكن تعويضه. لقد فكك الاحتلال كافة الأبواب والحواجز الأمنية عن هذا البلد الكبير وتحول إلى معازل طائفية ومناطق نفوذ وأرض خصبة للسيارات المفخخة والاغتيالات والتهجير والفساد غير المسبوق. لقد تغول التطرف الديني والتطرف الطائفي والتطرف العرقي حتى بدا العراق وكأنه قطع موزاييك صفت إلى جانب بعضها لا يربطها رابط، وقد تتفتت مع أول هزة كبرى فتتجه كل قطعة في اتجاه. العراق يحتل الآن المرتبة 176 من مجموع 179 دولة على سلم الفساد حسب مؤشرات منظمة الشفافية الدولية، ولم يتفوق إلا على أفغانستان وميانمار والصومال. كما تفاقمت نسبة وفيات الأطفال خلال الحصار وسنوات الاحتلال لتصل المرتبة ما قبل الأخيرة متفوقة على النيجر فقط. الغول الطائفي ما زال هائجا حتى كادت البلاد تخلو من سكانها المسيحيين بعد أن كان عددهم نحو مليون نسمة. في العراق يرفع الآن أكثر من علم ويتلى أكثر من نشيد وطني وتتنازع الأطراف على هوية المدن وعلى عوائد النفط وعلى المناصب وعلى الاستقواء بالخارج وعلى الاصطفاف مع من يحاولون سلخ العراق عن هويته العربية الأصيلة. ديموقراطية «الدبابة الأمريكية» * وأين مشروع الديموقراطية الذي جاء على ظهر الدبابة الامريكية؟ - الديمقراطية في العراق تتعلق بالشكل أكثر من المضمون. فالذهاب إلى صندوق الانتخابات لا يعني دخول البلاد مرحلة الاستقرار الديمقراطي. فالديمقراطية مضمون وانتماء وممارسة ومواطنة متساوية وشفافية ومجتمع مدني وسيادة القانون واختفاء المليشيات المسلحة واحترام نتائج الانتخابات ضمن التعددية السياسية والاحتكام للدستور وقيام البرلمان المنتخب بدوره التشريعي وخاصة مراقبة السلطة التنفيذية. معظم هذه الشروط غير متوفر. لقد أصبح بعض المسؤولين المنتخبين غير آمنين على أنفسهم وعائلاتهم بسبب الاستفراد الأرعن للسلطة. لقد تحول الحاكم الحالي للعراق أقرب إلى الدكتاتور منه إلى الرئيس المنتخب المنضبط للقانون.  لقد أساء للبلاد والعباد ووسع دائرة الأعداء وضيق دوائر الحلفاء. حتى من حالفهم بالأمس أصبحوا أعداء اليوم. وما هذا الحراك الشعبي الهادر في كثير من المحافظات وخاصة في الأنبار ونينوى وصلاح الدين إلا شاهدا على التململ الجماهيري العارم ضد الطاغية رغم أنه منتخب. لكنه ما زال مصرا على صم أذنيه عن نداءات الملايين التي تطالب بالإصلاح والمواطنة المتساوية وعدالة توزيع الموارد وتبييض السجون من سجناء الرأي والموقف وخاصة من النساء، لكنه ما زال يستخدم اليد الحديدية في الرد على المظاهرات وإطلاق النار على المتظاهرين وزج المزيد من شباب وقيادات الحراك في السجون. فهل هو حقا حريص على العراق ووحدته وسيادته ونهضته؟ دور ونفوذ إيران * وما حقيقة ما يروج عن الدور الإيراني في هذا البلد وأن أمريكا قدمت العراق هدية سائغة لإيران؟ - العراق أصبح منطقة نفوذ لإيران ومعبرا لأسلحتها لنظام بشار الأسد الذي يشن حرب إبادة على الشعب السوري. المخابرات الإيرانية تتحكم الآن في الداخل العراقي. تقتل من تشاء وتخطف من تشاء وتفرض أجنداتها كما تشاء. لقد قدمت الولايات المتحدة العراق هدية لأيران وحولته إلى ورقة مساومة في صراعها مع الدول الغربية حول برنامجها النووي. لقد كانت تلك الحرب مغامرة غبية من اليمين الأمريكي المتطرف والمحافظين الجدد الذين لا يعرفون شيئا عن العراق وكل ما في أذهانهم الانتقام لضحايا الحادي عشر من سبتمبر (2001) وضمان أمن إسرائيل وضمان تدفق النفط وأعتقد أنهم فشلوا في كل ما خططوا له. صحيح نجحوا في تفتيت العراق وإيقاظ الغول الطائفي، لكن الحقيقة تبقى أن رياح الاحتلال الأمريكي جرت تماما كما تشتهي سفن إيران. المنطقة العربية كلها تعيش مرحلة مخاض عسير. النظم الدكتاتورية تتهاوى شيئا فشيئا لأنها لم تعد تناسب العصر وغير قادرة على إحتواء ثورة الأجيال الجديدة. لكن البديل لها إما الحركات الإسلامية أو الفوضى. وهما خياران أحلاهما مر. فالجماعات الإسلامية ليس لديها مشروع وطني إقتصادي نهضوي وتحاول الاستفراد بالحكم أما الفوضى فسببها محاولة الدكتاتور اليائسة بالتشبث بالحكم حتى ولو كان على حساب الملايين من أبناء الشعب. نحن نعيش مرحلة خطيرة : القديم لم يمت تماما والجديد لم يولد بعد. وقد استغلت القوى الأجنبية المعادية للأمة هذا الوضع الخطير ودفعت بعملائها ومخبريها وجماعاتها لتخريب الثورات الشريفة وتأجيج الطائفية والمبالغة في خطر الجماعات المتطرفة لتبرير المواقف المتناقضة والمتخاذلة. إن ما يجري في سوريا الآن هو صدام دموي بين إرادتين/ إرادة الشعب العريق والحر الباحث عن الحرية والكرامة وإرادة الدكتاتور المتشبث بالسلطة حتى لو أفنى الشعب كله. وما بينهما عناصر هجينة دخلت على الخط ليس لها علاقة لا بسوربا ولا بهمومها ولا بمعاناتها. ربيع العرب * وماذا عن الربيع العراقي وموقعه من الربيع العربي؟ وأخيرا ونحن بانتظار انقشاع الظلام واستقرار الأمواج المتلاطمة وسماع صرخات المخاض بانتظار المولود الجديد سنبقى نضع أيدينا على قلوبنا ربما سنة أو سنتين أو خمسة- لا نعرف- خوفا على العراق من خطر التفتيت وعلى سوريا من خطر الحرب الأهلية التي لا تبقي ولا تذر وخطر فشل التجربتين الرائدتين التونسية والمصرية وخطر تحول اليمن إلى دولة فاشلة، وخطر اندثار القضية الفلسطينية وتغول القوة الإسرائيلية. لكننا واثقون كما قال إبن النحوي من مدينة توزر بالجنوب التونسي قبل ألف سنة: «إشتدي أزمة تنفرجي- قد قارب ليلك بالبلج».  حوار: آسيا العتروس

Iraq: 10 Years after the invasion

Mass grave discovered south of Baghdad May 27,2003

As we mark the 10th anniversary of the American invasion of Iraq, many would argue that the country is in no better condition than it was in 2003,and indeed maybe worse.  Is this in fact the case?  Would it have been preferable for Saddam Husayn's Ba'thist regime to remain in power?  More to the point, why has Iraq not made more progress towards establishing a democratic and stable political system over the last 10 years?

Answering the question of whether it would have been better had Saddam Husayn not been removed from power cannot be boiled down to a simple yes or no.  To fully answer this question requires assessing the the US role in Iraq in 2003 and after, as well as Saddam's policies.

Saddam Husayn was guilty of massive human rights violations.  Overwhelming evidence for his genocidal policies was already in the hands of the international community when over 20 tons of state documents were obtained after Iraq was defeated in the January 1991 Gulf War.

These myriad documents indicated that Saddam had authorized a wide variety of policies designed to eliminate actual and suspected political opponents.  The documents provided evidence for the atrocities of his infamous Anfal campaign during the mid-1980s which destroyed 175 Kurdish villages and led to the deaths and displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi Kurds.  Other documents showed Saddam's brutal methods of suppressing the February-March 1991 uprising (Intifada) in southern Iraq.

How anyone can argue that it would have been better to leave in power a ruler who led his country into two disastrous wars, killed between 2-3 million Iraqis during Ba'thist rule between 1968 and 2003 (10-15% of the population), and imposed extensive psychological trauma on Iraqi adults and especially children, from which many will suffer from for the rest of their lives, is incomprehensible.

The 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, which Saddam began, led to hundreds of thousands of Iraqi deaths and cost an estimated $600 billion dollars.  The 1991 Gulf War led to Iraq's industry and national infrastructure being bombed back to levels of the 1940s.   While the Iraqi government admitted killing 300,000 Iraqis during the March 1991 Intifada, the total was no doubt much higher.  The UN sanctions regime of the 1990s - a result of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program - decimated the middle and professional classes, forced the poor to turn to criminal activity in the face of a collapsed economy, and deprived an entire generation of Iraqi children of their education as the national education system shut down.

Women, who had gained rights during the 1970s and 1980s, lost those rights as Saddam sought to gain the support of Iraqi males when his regime was weakened after the Gulf War uprising.  Forced to leave their jobs, and having no access to education, Iraqi women were in an extremely difficult position when the US invaded in 2003 and have still not been able to gain the status they once enjoyed prior to the Iran-Iraq War.

At the same time, the US's unilateralism in invading Iraq in March 2003 was a violation of international norms.  If the US had been serious about removing Saddam from power, it would have allowed the Iraqi Intifada to overthrow Saddam's regime in the spring of 1991.  Instead, the US allowed Iraqi helicoptor gunships to take to the air which turned the tide of the conflict, ordered American troops to destroy weapons depots so that they would not fall into insurgent hands, and forbade US troops on Iraqi soil from intervening in the uprising.  Just think how much blood, toil and human sacrifice could have been avoided had Saddam been ousted by his own people in 1991.

The Bush administration should have used international law to remove Saddam from power which would have been totally appropriate given his huge massive rights violations directed against his own citizenry. Saddam and his henchmen could have been tried in absentia and, if found guilty, forcibly brought to trial  by the same type of military coalition that the US helped organize under UN auspices in the fall of 1990 to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait.  An international policy, such as that which brought Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic to trial in an international court, would have been the proper course for bringing Saddam to justice.

The Bush administration's ordering of the dissolution of the Iraqi conscript army and firing of the national police in May 2003 was a major blunder.  The 385,000 man army was comprised of an ethnically integrated officer coprs.  Both officers and conscripts disliked if not hated Saddam's regime for its poor treatment of the conscript army, including sub-standard weaponry and intermittent pay, and for it having been left to be carpet bombed in Kuwait during the January 1991 military campaign.  While the conscript army was being bombed in Kuwait, Saddam's elite Republican Guard units had been withdrawn into Iraq to protect Saddam from a potential uprising.

While it was necessary to dissolve the Republican Guard and Special Republican Guard units in 2003, since they were loyal to Saddam and his regime, had the US left the conscript army intact, it could have played a salutary role in suppressing the Ba'thist inspired insurgency - one that quickly attracted radical Islamists as well - that began in the fall of 2003.  By firing members of the conscript army, the US provided the insurgency with added forces since the Ba'th had not only buried weapons but money which many former conscript army members now needed to feed their families.

The Bush administration's de-Ba'thification policy was likewise self- destructive.  Under Saddam's regime, anyone who wanted a government or public sector job, e.g., university professors, was required to join the Ba'th Party (similar to what was required under Nazi rule in Germany).  The failure to differentiate between committed and nominal Ba'thists by mass firings of party members deprived Iraq of needed professional and technical expertise as Iraq began a process of reconstruction following the ouster of the ancien regime.

The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which which governed Iraq from May 2003 though June 2004, created the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), the first government explicitly organized along sectarian lines since the founding of the Iraqi state in August 1921.  The formation of the IGC sent a message to Iraqis that sectarian criteria constituted the new organizing principle for Iraqi politics.

Bringing a large number of Iraqi expatriates with the American invasion force in 2003 turned Iraqi politics over to politicians who had personal rather than civic agendas and often sought to enact revenge for having been forced to leave Iraq during Ba'thist rule.  These included 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI), Nuri al-Maliki, a leader of the Islamic Call Party (hizb al-da'wa al-islamiya), and Ahmad Chalabi, head of the Iraqi National Conference (al-mu'tamar al-watani al-'Iraqi), none of whom have worked to establish democratic governance and promote national reconciliation.

While the US government began giving subsidies to American farmers in the 1920s, the CPA eliminated government subsidies to Iraqi agriculture in August 2003, disingenuously arguing that the state have no right to use public funds to subsidize farmers.  With Iraqi fruits and vegetables even less competitive than before with those imported from Iran and Syria, many more (young) farmers migrated to urban areas where they joined sectarian militias and criminal organizations hostile to the United States.

Under the direction of General David Petreaus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, the Bush administration changed course in Iraq in 2006.  In conjunction with the 2006 "Surge," which sent 30,000 additional troops to Iraq who were embedded in neighborhoods threatened by sectarian violence, the security situation began to improve.

One key variable in improving the security situation was a new policy of listening and respecting Iraqis and letting them define the reconstruction agenda.  The development of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which provided technical personnel to help Iraqis to achieve goals that they set, rather than those set by Americans, changed the perception of many Iraqis that the US was an arrogant power that sought to force its policies on Iraq.  As Iraqis felt more respected by Americans, relations with the US improved substantially.

The Obama administration comes in for its own share of criticism.  Rather than holding then Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to his own promises to implement democratic reforms if he won the March 2010 national parliament elections, the US has done little to counter the increasingly authoritarian polices that Maliki has followed since retaining his position as prime minister after the elections.

The outcome of the US' failure to pressure Maliki in 2010 to "walk the walk," and not just "talk the talk," is evidence that US still has not learned that support for authoritarian rulers is not only bad for local populaces but a policy that consistently comes back to bite the US.  If the US hasn't learned by now from its experiences with the Shah of Iran, Egypt's Husni Mubarak, Tunisia's Zin al-Din bin Ali, and Yemen's Ali Abdallah Salih, just to name a few bad "political investments," then it has no one  to blame but itself for the continued failure of its foreign policy in the Middle East.

Worse still, the US did little when Maliki tried to circumvent the Iraqi constitution after the March 2010 elections.  Because the al-Iraqiya Coalition headed by Ayad Allawi received more votes and thus seats than Maliki's State of Law Coalition (91 to 89), Allawi should had been given the first opportunity to form a new government. 

Instead of supporting the constitution, which would have sent a positive message to the Iraqi people about playing according to democratic rules, the US tried to have Alawi assume a role as head of a new national security council which it proposed and which Maliki agreed to form if he could continue as prime minister.  It was not much of a surprise when Maliki subsequently reneged on his promise to the US and al-Iraqiya by refusing to give the new security council  any power.

While Allawi would not have necessarily been a less corrupt prime minister, as head of a multi-ethic coalition which attracted the votes of Arab Sunnis, Kurds and secular Shiites, his government would have not have been as sectarian as Maliki's has proved to be.  Since March 2010, Maliki has taken control of Iraq's Independent Higher Election Commission, and its Central Bank, and has intimidated judges to force them to adjudicate legal matters in ways that support his interests.  Maliki has also attacked many prominent Arab Sunni politicians which has angered Iraq's Sunnis who feel he is trying to marginalize them.  He has appointed military and intelligence service commanders who are loyal to him.

It is interesting to note that it was the heads of Iraq's two major religious communities - Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, head of Iraq's Shiites, and Ahmad 'Abd al-Ghaffar al-Samara'i, head of Iraq's Arab Sunni community - not the US, that forced Maliki not to postpone the March 2010 elections.  Maliki sought a postponement so he could improve his position in the polls.

The two religious leaders also forced Maliki to use an open rather than a closed list ballot system.  Because Iraq's constitution requires that 25% of parliamentary seats go to women, a closed list system would have allowed political parties to put up women candidates who were under the thumb of the male heads of these parties, such as their wives, daughters, sisters and other women who would follow party dictates.  Instead, a number of strong and independent women won seats in Iraq's parliament.

Maliki's authoritarian and increasingly sectarian policies have led to a national outcry, not just among Iraq's Sunni population but among Shiites as well.  One of the most vocal opponents of Maliki's policies is the Shiite Sadrist Trend, led by the young cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, which holds 40 seats in parliament.  The Shiite Supreme Iraqi Islamic Council and the Badr Organization, two other powerful Shiite parties, likewise oppose Maliki.  The three main Kurdish parties oppose Maliki's policies as well.

All these parties are trying to depose Maliki through a parliamentary vote of no confidence and recently organized a successful vote in parliament to impose term limits so Maliki cannot run for office again in 2014.  Because Maliki controls Iraq's Supreme Court, the parliamentary vote on term limits will undoubtedly be declared unconstitutional. 

It would be totally unwarranted to assign all the blame to the United States for the political instability and sectarian tensions that are currently bedeviling  Iraq.  In my forthcoming, Taking Democracy Seriously in Iraq, I analyze extensively the domestic problems facing a transition to democracy in Iraq, along with negative "neighborhood effects,"particularly Iran's meddling in Iraq's internal affairs.  Clearly, much of what ails Iraq today was not caused by the United States.

Nevertheless, when Americans pick up a newspaper, journal or turn on the television and come face to face with the spread of violence and political tensions in Iraq, they should resist the temptation to sit back and opine that the Iraqis are an unstable people who do not know how to run their political affairs, let alone establish a democratic form of government.  Instead, Americans would do well to look in the mirror to learn the sources of many of the problems that face Iraq today.