Saturday, December 31, 2022

From Bad to Worse: The Globalization of Middle East Autocracy

Arab-China Summit, Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, Dec 9, 2022

More than any other region of the world, authoritarian rule is pervasive and institutionalized in the Middle East (MENA).  In the one Arab Spring success, Tunisia is now ruled by Ka'is Said, a quasi-dictator who has eviscerated its constitution and created a rubber-stamp parliament.  This week the Algerian military shut down Radio M, the last free media outlet in the country. 

In Egypt, 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi has imprisoned thousands of dissidents for mild criticism of his regime. In the country's notorious prisons, they suffer brutal conditions including torture.  In Iran, youth are hung in public for demonstrating against the government (accused of "warring against God") while young women demonstrators are raped in security forces detention facilities.

Saudi dictator Muhammad bin Salman (MBS) represents a new type of autocrat in the mold of Saddam Husayn. Gone is the norm of consultation among Saudi royals with the king acting as primus inter pares.  After fleecing all Saudi princes who might be future opponents, MBS has offered the Saudi people "bread and circus," such as Western wrestling matches and rock concerts while simultaneously engaging in massive human rights abuses.

MBS has ordered mass executions of Saudi citizens, most of whom are innocent of any crime, and the jailing of dissidents.  The execution of 81 Saudis , 41 of whom were from the Kingdon's Shi'a minority, occurred 3 days before former British Prime Minister Boris Johnson's visit in May 2022. During the visit, MBS hypocritically discussed the need for human rights with the British leader. And let's not forget MBS' ordering the murder and dismemberment of the respected Washington Post journalist, Jamal al-Khashoggi, a dual national with US and Saudi citizenship, for which the Saudi dictator has suffered no consequences.

Meanwhile, the few traditional democracies in MENA have collapsed or are in the process of collapsing. Lebanon is a failed state which is under the control of Hizballah, an armed militia supported by Iran. An estimated 80% of the population lives in poverty and Lebanese citizens can't even withdraw funds from their bank accounts.  Grain imports are tenuous and serious food insecurity is on the rise throughout the country. 

In Turkey, Recip Tayyib Erdogan has transitioned from a mild-mannered Islamist who supported the trappings of democracy to a full-on autocratic.  Turkey enjoys the dubious distinction of having the largest per capita imprisonment of journalists of any country in the world.  To ensure that he wins this coming year's presidential elections, Erdogan engineered the 2 and a half year imprisonment of his strongest rival, Ekrem Imamoglu, the popular mayor of Istanbul.

Israel, long touted as the MENA region's only democracy, is now ruled by a hard right government which seeks to marginalize the judiciary by giving parliament the right to override Supreme Court decisions.  Because Israel lacks a formal constitution, the Court has been the main institution in Israel which has protected minority rights and the rule of law. 

With the Ministry of Defense and new Ministry of National Security, which controls the police, under ministers who seek to expel Palestinians from the West bank and East Jerusalem and potentially annul the citizenship of Israel's Palestinian Arab citizens if they engage in "anti-national" behavior, Israel is on the road to autocracy.  Meanwhile, talk of annexing the West Bank - the Palestine National Authority - grows, as do plans for dramatically expanding illegal settlements on Palestinian land.

If these examples of increased authoritarian rule in the MENA region weren't bad enough, a new development threatens to further strengthen the rule of local autocrats.  This threat stems from the increased involvement of Russia and China in MENA region affairs.

Russia has been supporting the scelrotic Syrian regime of Bashar al-Asad, primarily to protect its sole Mediterranean naval base at Tartus and its Khmeimim airfield near Latakia.  Russia has sent the Wagner Group, a brutal mercenary organization, to help the al-Asad regime fight radical jihadists in Syria.

However, after Putin's invasion of Ukraine, the degree to which Russia and Saudi Arabia under MBS have formed an alliance in OPEC+. is clear.  In a major snub to the United States, one almost unheard of in past Saudi-US relations, MBS refused to increase oil output to dampen rising global energy prices. Instead, the Saudis maintained a small increase in production which helped keep prices high, providing higher revenues for Putin with which to pursue his brutal war in Ukraine.  

Facing an unexpected protracted war in Ukraine, Putin recently turned to Iran (and North Korea) to bolster his forces with munitions and arms as Russian supplies have dwindled. The most serious threat to Ukraine has come from Iran which has supplied hundreds of Shahed 129 drones to Russia.  These drones have been used to attack Ukraine's electrical, water and other infrastructure to devastating effect.

Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has been training Russian forces how to use the drones in occupied Crimea and there is a proposal to build a factory in Russia to produce the drones.  In exchange, Russia has promised  the Iranian regime that it will supply it with fighter aircraft, adversely impacting the balance of military power in the Gulf region. 

As other NATO members have imposed sanctions on Putin's regime following the invasion of Ukraine, Turkey has drawn closer to the Russian dictator.  Russian oil sales to Turkey have dramatically increased, providing Putin with desperately needed revenue to pursue his illegitimate war. Istanbul has become a refuge for Russian oligarchs and their wealth, e,g., their super yachts.

Turkey isn't the only MENA region state to assist Putin in his war making. Neither Saudi Arabia nor the any of the Arab Gulf states have imposed sanctions on Russia.  Indeed, Dubai has become a desired destination for Russian oligarchs who need not worry that their assets will be seized while staying there.

A greater threat is the increased presence of China in the MENA region.  Xi Jinping's recent visit to Saudi Arabia stood out for the extravagance and pageantry with which the Chinese president and his delegation were received by MBS, compared to the much more muted and low-key reception of President Biden during his state visit to the Kingdom this past July.

This year Saudi Arabia made a $10 billion investment through its oil company, Aramco, to develop a refinery and petrochemical complex in China’s northeast.  That Xi's visit led to a joint statement following 3 days of meetings which stressed the future of Saudi-Chinese energy cooperation demonstrates the degree to which the United States has been shoved aside by the kingdom in its traditional role of providing security in exchange for purchasing Saudi oil. 

What was left unsaid in the Saudi-Chinese joint statement at the end of Xi's visit was whether China will supply its highly sophisticated surveillance technology to Saudi Arabia and other Arab Gulf states with which it is cultivating relations.  This technology would place a weapon in the hands of MENA region dictators which would greatly enhance their capacity to intensify repression of their respective populations.   

It is ironic that, with the United States emphasizing its "shift to the East," namely to confront growing Chinese power in East Asia, China has moved to fill the vacuum in the MENA region caused the downgrading of American policy in the MENA region. Disturbed by what they see as growing threats from Iran's influence in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon, and a feeling that the United States can no longer be trusted to protect their security, Saudi Arabia and its Gulf neighbors are looking to China for arms sales.

Are there potential problems with MENA region autocrats shifting their policy towards Russia and China?  First, how is Putin going to reconcile his closer military ties with Iran and the close relations he wants to maintain with Saudi Arabia in the context of OPEC+? Second, neither Russian weaponry, which has performed terribly in Ukraine, nor untested Chinese weaponry, can serve as a substitute for much higher quality American and Western arms.  China likewise will need to find ways to balance its Arab ties with those it maintains with Iran.

Third, will Arabs and Iranians view these new ties favorably? The populations of most MENA region countries are comprised of youth under the age of 30.  Will Russian and Chinese culture and the authoritarian policies they embody be attractive to these highly Westernized demographics?  Will MENA region youth find the Chinese 9/9/6 model acceptable, namely working 9 am to 9 pm, 6 days a week? 

Could expanded ties with Russia and China, potentially leading to even intensified repression, encourage a large "brain drain" from the region? While a growing brain drain might not harm a country like Egypt, the Arab Gulf states suffer from small populations and can ill afford their youth leaving the country for Europe, the United States and other countries where political and cultural freedoms are less restrictive.

What is clear is that the United States does itself no favors but focusing on China and East Asia to the exclusion of the MENA region.  Xi promised MBS that China would help the Kingdom develop nuclear energy. Could that assistance lead to a nuclear arms race between the Saudi and Iranian regimes?  With the war in Ukraine, global inflation and supply chain problems, and the ongoing Covid pandemic, the Biden administration has a lot on its plate. But its neglecting the MENA region is a policy that is penny-wise and pound foolish.


Wednesday, November 30, 2022

World Cup 2022: Profits and Authoritarian Intolerance or Human Rights and Sports Integrity?

Should a new set of rules be developed which will force FIFA, football's international governing body, to follow certain guidelines when awarding a country the right to host the World Cup?  Does the world want the World Cup to be held in intolerant authoritarian nations which do not allow their citizens to practice the freedoms and liberties which those who live in democratic societies take for granted?  

Held every 4 years, the World Cup is a huge celebratory event, highlighting the most popular sport in the world.  A sporting event of such popularity and magnitude, which bestows great international prestige, on the host country should not be compromised by authoritarian rulers.  

A football stadium under construction in Qatar

Authoritarianism, corruption and awarding the 2022 World Cup 

Awarding the 2022 World Cup in Qatar was a colossal mistake.  The Arab Gulf state is ruled by an authoritarian regime which tolerates no dissent.  The al-Thani monarchy suppresses women's rights and those of members of the LGBTQ+ community.  One family should not have the type of control it has has wielded prior to and during the 2022 World Cup.

We should ask how and why Qatar was awarded the right to host the World Cup.  It seems that corruption played a major role as the 22 member FIFA board of directors was wined and dined by the Qatari regime for a lengthy period of time running up to issuing the award.  Two members of the FIFA board were dismissed due to accusations they sold their votes for holding the World Cup in Qatar.  Plot to buy the World Cup

Qatar, a country the size of Connecticut, was the most unlikely venue for the 2022 World Cup when it received the award in 2010.  First, it had no infrastructure where football games could be played.  Second, its national team was virtually unknown in international competition.  Finally, it has a small population (87% of the local residents are migrant workers) who, to this day, show little interest in football.  Indeed, the fans who attended the Qatari team's games (both of which the national team lost), were actually Lebanese who were hired as surrogates for the Qataris who declined to attend their home team's matches.

That Qatar spent more than $220 billion to prepare for the World Cup, including renovating its sole stadium and building 7 new ones, demonstrates the extent to which it sought to use the sporting event to promote its influence in the Arab Gulf and project it onto the world stage. Surrounded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, both of which imposed an embargo on Qatar until recently due to its support of the Muslim Brotherhood regime in Egypt in 2012-2013,  the small emirate finds itself largely isolated in the Arab Gulf.  Thus, football was not the motivating factor for Qatar in using its huge fossil fuel wealth to buy local and international influence and prestige.  Qatar has spent well over $220 billion on a flawed world cup

The migrant worker scandal

By the regime's own reckoning, large numbers of migrant workers who were employed to build the stadium and other infrastructure for the World Cup either lost their lives. Other workers suffered heat prostration whose damaging health effects will not become manifest until later in their lives. Only after international pressure did Qatar agree to improve working conditions for migrant labor.   Even so, the pressure to complete preparations for the 2022 World Cup still led migrant labor to be exploited.Fact Check: How many people died for the World Cup in Qatar?

According to Steve Cockburn, Amnesty International’s head of economic and social justice, “The continued debate around the number of workers who have died in the preparation of the World Cup exposes the stark reality that so many bereaved families are still waiting for truth and justice. Over the last decade, thousands of workers have returned home in coffins, with no explanation given to their loved ones.” Qatar official says ‘400-500’ migrant workers died on World Cup projects

The Role of FIFA in World Cup awards

FIFA has made huge profits from the 2022 World Cup.  However, these profits were not only made at the expenses fo the health and lives of low paid workers, who were paid as low as $10/hr and labored under abysmal working conditions. It was only after an international outcry and pressure on FIFA, that working conditions were marginally improved by the Qatari regime. FIFA earns record $7.5bn revenue for Qatar World Cup

In an effort to placate the Qatari regime, FIFA outlawed armbands celebrating LGBTQ+ rights.  Indeed, fans who wore such armbands, or any other clothing which indicated support for the LGBTQ+ community, were forced to remove and dispose of the item deemed unacceptable to the regime. There was no tolerance evident at the 2022 World Cup nor was free speech allowed.  These failures are FIFA's responsibility.

The need for a new institutional order for hosting the World Cup

There is already talk that Saudi Arabia would like to host the 2030 World Cup.  The kingdom's ruler, Prime Minister Muhammad bin Salman (MBS), ordered the killing and dismemberment of Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent Saudi journalist who worked for the Washington Post and also held American citizenship. To award Saudi Arabia the right to host. the 2030 World Cup when MBS has faced no consequences for Khashoggi's murder would be obscene.

The European Union, the United States and other democratic countries should ban together and notify FIFA that their national teams will boycott all future World Cups held in nation-states controlled by authoritarian rulers who suppress democratic freedoms and engage in human rights abuses.

Before the 2022 World Cup recedes from the mass media and global consciousness, new rules should be hammered out with FIFA to make sure that the Qatar model is never used again.  Th World Cup must always be an event that all countries can be proud of, including the citizens of authoritarian dictatorships.


 

Sunday, October 30, 2022

Saudi Arabia under Muhammad Bin Salman's Regime is No Longer a US Ally: The Need for a New American Foreign Policy in the Gulf

MBS and Putin at G20 Summit, November 2018

Why is United States foreign policy in the Gulf no longer relevant given the region's current political climate? What has changed that requires the United States to adopt a new foreign policy approach?  How should the US confront Saudi Arabia, one of the two major powers in the Gulf? 

United States foreign policy in the Gulf region is facing a crisis.  The two culprits are Saudi Arabia and Iran. While I will write about Iran in my next post, this post focuses on the rule of Saudi Prime Minister and Crown Prince, Muhammad bin Salman (MBS).  He has turned Saudi Arabia from a ally (or perhaps a better characterization is frenemy) to a state whose policies contradict American interests and those of the Western community.

After FDR met with King Abd al-Aziz al-Sa'ud aboard the USS Quincy in the Great Bitter Lake south of the Suez Canal in February1945, he declared that Saudi oil was critical to American national interests.  Since that meeting, the United States and the Sa'ud family have established a tacit bargain. Saudi Arabia would produce sufficient oil to meet the demands of the US and its Western allies and, through its market dominance, maintain price levels which would not constrainWestern economic growth.  In return, the US would provide for the Kingdom's defense, and Saudi royals and businessmen would benefit from investing in the US economy. What happened when Saudi King Abdul Aziz met US President Roosevelt

Moving to the present, what is often overlooked is the "soft coup" which has taken place in Saudi Arabia.  In 2015, MBS became Minister of Defense.  Gradually, he convinced his father, King Salman, to transfer the everyday running of the kingdom to him. MBS has used that power to consolidate his power by upending the structure of the traditional Saudi political elite.  

Having imprisoned a large number of Saudi princes on charges of corruption in Riyadh's Ritz-Carlton Hotel in November, 2018, he forced them to turn over large amounts of their wealth.  His subsequent behavior, such as intensifying the bombing campaign in Yemen in the war against Iran-aligned Houthi rebels, has led to widespread civilian casualties, and created what the United Nations has characterized as one of the world's worst humanitarian disasters.  

As Crown Prince, and now Prime Minister, MBS has demonstrated a frequent resort to violence. MBS' treatment of the captive princes at the Ritz-Carlton, e.g., Prince Waleed ibn Talal al-Sa'ud, was brutal, e.g., severe beatings and hanging them by their wrists or upside down. 'Night of the beating': details emerge of Riyadh Ritz-Carlton purge

Saudi prince, al-Waleed ibn Talal al-Sa'ud

The October 2018 murder of Saudi national and Washington Post reporter, Jamal Khashoggi, in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul, Turkey, after which his body was dismembered, has been widely  condemned as a particularly shocking example of MBS' extensive human rights abuses.  Despite American intelligence agencies having determined that MBS ordered Khashoggi's assassination, the Saudi leader has yet to face any consequences for the murder. CIA concludes Saudi crown prince ordered Jamal Khashoggi’s assassination

A few days day before former British prime minister Boris Johnson visited Saudi Arabia this past March, MBS ordered the execution of 81 prisoners, the largest such execution in the kingdom's history.  Three weeks before that, MBS had given an interview to foreign journalists indicating that he was in the process of reforming the Saudi criminal code, and reducing the crimes subject to capital punishment, especially for youth. Saudi Arabia: Mass Execution of 81 Men Rampant Abuses in Criminal Justice System Make Fair Trials Highly Implausible

In terms of Saudi foreign policy, MBS' most egregious behavior is his alliance with Russia in OPEC+.  His recent decision to cut Saudi oil production not only raised the price of gasoline, but undermines the ability of Democratic Party candidates to complete in the soon to held US midterm elections, among the most consequential in the country's history.  After Joe Biden's July visit to Riyadh where oil process were a central concern, MBS' decision to cut production just before the American mid-term elections is a slap in the face not just to the Biden administration but the United States as well.

MBS' decision also has had a global effect by increasing gasoline prices worldwide.  It will no doubt be part of the effort by right wing populists in the European Union to try and undermine military and humanitarian support for Ukraine given high inflation. Thus, MBS has not only helped Vladimir Putin continue his brutal, unprovoked war in Ukraine by raising oil prices, but also made it more difficult for those who support Ukraine to continue that support.U.S. Executives Are Flocking to Saudi Davos in the Desert

On. another front, MBS is developing ties with large US banks and corporations as see in the current investment conference being held in Riyadh.  As the New York Times noted, this conference defines the current transactional approach to US foreign policy which was promoted by the Trump administration.  American investors such as former Treasury Secretary, Steven Mnuchin, Trump son-in-law, Jared Kushner, JP Morgan CEO, Jamie Diamond, and countless oil executives are being recruited by MBS. Saudis Find More Sympathetic American Ears at Business Forum

MBS' end goal is to develop a powerful group of US corporate executives  - an American power elite - which he can use to lobby members of Congress and thereby make an end run around the Biden administration, and future administrations, who seek to curtail his decision-making in using oil as a political weapon. To further insure the loyalty of this power elite, MBS is rewarding them - as he already had done with Mnuchin and Kushner - with large sums of investment capital from the kingdom's sovereign wealth fund, including joint partnerships in real estate and the tourist industry under development as part of the Crown Prince's Vision 2030. A Saudi official’s harrowing account of torture reveals the regime’s brutality

While there has been no shortage of Saudi lobbying during prior US administrations, MBS' gambit represents a new and much more ambitious effort to mobilize support for him personally in the US.  By developing luxurious tourist hotels and resorts designed for the ultra-rich, MBS seeks to attract a clientele which will fit his emerging foreign policy which seeks to become much less beholden to the United States and the Western countries who disapprove of his human rights abuses which they condemn.

What policies can the United States and the West adopt to counter MBS' support of the rogue Putin regime and his openings to China which is currently the main purchaser of Saudi oil exports?  One of the key cards in the West's hands is arms supplies. Many human rights activists have been calling for years for reducing, if not ending, arms sales to Saudi Arabia.

The options available to Saudi Arabia for replacing American with other imported arms are limited.  The Ukraine war has demonstrated the poor quality of Russian arms.  China, on the other hand, may be interested in providing the kingdom with arms.  However, the US supplies not only arms, but significant intelligence assistance to Saudi Arabia.  Loss of arms transfers and intelligence sharing would harm Saudi Arabia more than the United States.

What is the possibility of a possible shift of Saudi Arabia to dependence on China, militarily and economically?  First, the image of China as a growing super power has been seriously eroded by a number of crises and challenges, including the Covid pandemic, the aging of the Chinese population, the reduced interest of Western forms in investing in China, the environmental threats China faces and, most of all, the negative impact of  President Xi Jinping's authoritarian rule.  

All these developments, compared to the strong US dollar, and superiority in technological innovation, would make Saudi and Gulf Arab elites think twice about shifting the Gulf region's dependence from the West to Xi's China.  Xi's confirmation for an unprecedented third term as the Chinese Communist Party's Secretary General led to a sharp decline in the Hong Kong stock exchange. Breakingviews: Xi Jinping’s third term gets markets thumbs-down

Increasingly, Chinese private enterprise has been severely restricted because Xi views powerful private entrepreneurs as a threat to his rule.  That those entrepreneurs who have acquired great wealth over the past decade, and have no recourse to legal protections of their property rights, will also make Saudi and Gulf Arabs think twice about military dependence on China.  Because the Saudi and Arab Gulf model has favored private capital, and will need to continue to assure Western corporations that their investments are secure, developing closer military ties with China would undermine trust in the Saudi and Arab Gulf business climate.

China's close relations with Iran should also raise red flags in the kingdom and among the other Arab Gulf states.  China purchases significant amounts of oil from Iran, thereby allowing the Tehran regime to mitigate the international sanctions which it currently faces. If a crisis arises, would China favor Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states or would it favor Iran? Such ambiguity is another factor undermining a move to replace Western arms with those from China. The 25-year Iran-China agreement, endangering 2,500 years of heritage

Cultural factors also impact a possible shift to dependence on China for arms.  Few Saudis and Gulf Arabs speak Chinese.  There is strong preference among political and economic elites for Western culture which is evident in the types of tourist attractions MBS is developing to lure more Western, not Chinese,  businessmen and potential investors to the kingdom.  As MBS seeks to use his huge sovereign wealth fund to bribe Western investors and celebrities (think also of his LIV golf initiative which competes with the PGA), his efforts to create a powerful lobbying force in the US run counter to developing closer military ties with China. 

What should the Biden administration respond to MBS' decision-making and behavior to date?  How should it confront his working against US national interests, especially supporting Putin's brutal war in Ukraine which threatens world peace and global food supplies, and his ongoing flagrant human rights abuses?

First, the United States should cut off arms transfers to the MBS regime.  Second, it should encourage its European Union and NATO partners to do the same.  Third, it should withdraw the small contingent of US troops in Saudi Arabia.  Fourth, it should seriously downgrade intelligence sharing and technical support for weapons already sold to the MBS regime.  

Fifth, the US State Department should be much more public in its criticisms of the inequities of the Saudi legal system and the persecution of its Shi'a citizens, Saudi activists and Saudi women's rights supporters.  A good place to begin would be to condemn the lashings and excessive prison sentences meted out for those posting critical comments of MBS' regime on social media outlets or blogs. Saudi Arabia sentences US citizen to 16 years over tweets critical of regime

Sixth, the Biden administration should conduct an active behind-the scenes campaign to dissuade US corporations which are considering investing in Saudi Arabia from doing so. The implicit question of such an intervention should be the following: Would your corporation's shareholder agree with investing its funds in a country run by a repressive dictator who kills and executes its citizens at will and supports Putin's unprovoked and destabilizing war in Ukraine? Saudi Arabia: 10-year travel ban for freed blogger Raif Badawi

Finally, the Biden administration should terminate official cultural exchanges with MBS' regime.  Instead, it should offer grants to legitimate Saudi human rights and women's rights organizations, whether they operate inside or outside the kingdom.

Of course, the best way to curtail MBS's authoritarian ambitions and repressive actions is to speed up the transition from fossil fuels to wind and solar energy, and hydrogen to replace natural gas (as Germany has begun to do).  The 2022 Inflation Reduction Act should be used to put thousands of new EVs on the road and dramatically increase EV charging capacity.  Even though difficult, the US should try and improve its refinery capacity so as to reduce its dependence on imported oil. Perhaps a cooperative venture with Canada might overcome some of the current hurdles in refining gasoline in the United States. The Real Reason Gas Is So Expensive? The US Needs More Refineries

The bottom line is that MBS will be ruling Saudi Arabia for the foreseeable future. It is not in the United States' interest to continue to rely on a brash, narcissistic and unpredictable dictator. The sooner the Biden administration charts a new foreign policy towards the MBS regime, the sooner it can extract itself from the road to failed expectations and outcomes. 


                 

Thursday, September 29, 2022

"Women, Life, Freedom": Could a hijab dispute topple the Islamic Republic of Iran?

Mahsa Amini

Mahsa Amini was an Iranian Kurdish woman who was visiting Tehran with her brother for the first time.  Either she wasn't wearing a hijab in Tehran or her hijab revealed some of her hair.  Whatever the case, Amini was stopped by Iran's hated "morality police" and arrested for  transgressing Iran's female dress code.  On the way to prison, she was tortured.  Three days later she was dead.  Apparently beaten around the head by the police, she died while in custody or at the hospital to which she was later taken.

Amini's death has caused outrage throughout Iran.  Quickly, demonstration began in Saqqez, Amini's home town in Iran's northwest region. The region is home to Iran's Kurds who number 10 million and constitute 10% of the population.  However, protests then spread to all Iran's cities and all Iran's 31 provinces.  While women were among the first protestors, men from all age groups began to join them Iran Protests Feature Smaller Gatherings, Rooftop Chanting as Crackdown Intensifies

The ongoing protests in Iran are notable for several region. First, the Kurds have been neglected by the central government for decades and Kurds have been viewed as second-class citizens.  Little investment has been directed towards the northwest where roads are in poor condition and schools and hospitals receive little aid.  That the death of a Kurdish citizen has stirred demonstrations through Iran indicates that eth nic lines have been crossed with Amini;s death.

Second, the demonstrations reflects generational anger.  Young people have no personal ties to the revolution of 1978-1979.  Those who did participate are now in their 70s.  Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is 83 and has been ruling Iran since Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989. Among the 80% of Iran's population under the age of 40, there is little hope in the future. This demographic doesn't identity with sclerotic clerical leadership in Tehran.  

Third, the rejection of the current regime is especially acute among women.  Khamenei and his repressive elite have done all they can to prevent women from entering the public sphere. Despite these impediments, many women in Iran are highly educated and have university degrees.  As amy have pointed out, the protests against the regime for Mahsa Amini's death are in fact an uprising led by Iranian women.  

Thus, the protests are in effect a women's revolution.  Women have not been attributed much agency among analysts of Middle East politics.  That they would assume such a central role in what seems to be one of the greatest challenges faced by the Tehran regime since it consolidate power after 1979 behooves us all to take women more seriously as agents of change.

Some of the most effective aspects of women's protests have been the creation of bonfires in which women throw their hijabs, expressing their rejection of not only the regime oppressive dress code and enforcers, the "morality police," but a repression of the core patriarchal nature of Khamenei and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Basij militia. 

The rejection of patriarchy is also evident in the many women who have cut their hair and called on their sisters in other countries to do the same. Through this tactic, Iranian women have internationalized the protests.  The more women in countries around the world who cut their hair, the greater the degree to which the Iranian women's uprising calls attention to the oppression they face.

The recently elected president, Ebrahim Raisi, is a hardliner who has littl or no understanding of the generational divide which Iran is facing.  Rather than use Iran's oil wealth to invest in education, health care, job training, Raisi and his clique which controls the IRGC persist in their efforts to prop up the spent al-Asad regime in Syria and support. the Hizballah militia in Lebanon and its counterpart in Iraq, the Popular Mobilization (al-Hashad al-Sha'bi).

Regime resources continue to be devoted to its nuclear energy program, which could ultimately allow Iran to develop nuclear weapons, and to establishing a ballistic missile force which could deliver such weapons.  Raisi seems not to realize that the younger generation rejects his repressive policies at home and the regime's reckless foreign policy.

At the same time, Raisi seeks to force women to forgo wearing brightly colored hijabs and clothing. This attempt to force Iran to return to the even more repressive years of Ayatollah Khomeini reminds Iranians that Raisi gained his reputation as the hanging judge when he presided over sham trials in which thousands of dissidents were sent to the gallows. A Brief History of the 'Butcher of Tehran'.

State security forces can only kill so many demonstrators. And we should remember what happened when the Shah ordered his forces to shoot demonstrators. Once the Shah reduced spending on urban construction to reduce inflation, unemployment rose as the economy weakened. Many workers began demonstrations which their sympathizers in the security forces refused to suppress. Instead of shooting the protestors, they laid down their guns and refused orders to kill the protestors.

Is Iran at such a moment now? Will women be shot and killed for removing their hijabs and cutting their hair?  Such repression will further undermine sympathy for the regime which is already facing the imminent demise of the aging and ill Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and the succession struggle which will follow.

The hijab and Iran's dress code for women has attained the status of a symbol of oppression.  The current demonstrations by young Iranian women and their millions of supporters from all sectors of society show that the genie is out of the bottle.  They may bring down the regime but Raisi and his clerical elite will have a hard time forcing it back in the bottle.  A lengthy period of instability is in the offing in Iran 

Tuesday, August 23, 2022

Does the United States Really Misunderstand Iran آیا آمریکا واقعا ایران را اشتباه می‌فهمد؟

Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi
A recent Opinion article in the New York Times, "How the United States Misunderstand Iran," argues that the United States fails to comprehend the current political dynamics in the so-called Islamic Republic.  Reading this piece by Karim Sadjadpour, it is not clear exactly what the author is trying to argue.  Because the author's argument about comprehending your adversary is absolutely correct, what is the nature of current US-Iranian relations? How the United States Misunderstands Iran

In this article, the reader never learns exactly what it is that the United States government fails to understand about Iran.  The article largely focuses on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  However, surely the United States, or any power for that matter, needs to examine the Iranian regime beyond it main leader. For example, the recently elected president and hardliner, Ebrahim Raisi, is never mentioned, even though he wields considerable power.

In an article which alleges that the US misunderstands Iran, one assumes that the author would offer new American policy options commensurate with the analysis he suggests.  Yet little is offered beyond the argument that sanctions, the main tool the US has used against Iran, have only a spotty record of success internationally.

Apart from Dr. Sadjadpour's excellent analysis of the manner in which Khamenei uses  anti-Americanism to sustain his rule, we never learn why hardliners have recently come to dominate the regime, especially after a period of two decades in the 1990s and after when at least some moderate leaders occupied the office of the presidency, namely Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani.  

Does the rise of the hardliners reflect an actual weakening of the regime? While sanctions won't bring down the regime, they have clearly taken a toll on Iran's economy and promoted popular discontent with the regime.  This is especially true because the populace is aware of the extensive corruption which pervades the regime and its praetorian guard, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).

It is striking that, for Dr. Sadjadpour, history begins in 1979 with the victory of Iran's revolution which toppled the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, the largest American blunder, and example of US misunderstanding of Iran par excellence, was the CIA's overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, in 1953.

Mossadegh was guilty of the sin of wanting to help the citizens he represented enjoy a higher standard of living.  To do this, he demanded the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company pay higher royalties per barrel beyond the pittance Iran received for the oil extracted from its wells. In the political instability which followed, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled the country. 

For its part, Great Britain organized an international boycott of Iranian oil. Ultimately the CIA, and its agent, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., mobilized Iran's army and religious clergy to support a coup d'etat which reinstated the young Shah to the Peacock Throne.  After regaining power, the Shah enacted brutally repressive policies which marginalized much of Iran's population apart from a small, wealthy Westernized elite. 

One possibility for the US to open a powerful initiative would be to admit the mistake that it made in 1953 in overthrowing Mossadegh and restoring the Shah to power.  In conjunction with this declaration, the US could call on Iran to release its large number of political prisoners, including the many dual nationals in its prisons. 

There would be no expectation that Tehran would agree to release political prisoners. Nevertheless, an apology for the events of the early 1950s when the US interfered in Iran's internal affairs would undercut the anti-American rhetoric which Dr. Sadjadpour shows is so central to the regime's legitimacy.  

Another initiative which the author mentions but doesn't elaborate on is the possibility of the US developing economic ties with Iran.  While excellent in the abstract, this policy would have no traction among Democrats and Republicans in the US unless Iran changes its behavior in at least two respects.  First, it would need to commit to ending its uranium enriching program to assure that it does not acquire nuclear weapons, and, second, it would need to rein in its regional interference in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Conspicuously absent from Dr. Sadjadpour's analysis is the current negotiations of the US and the European Union with Iran to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) . After Donald Trump unilaterally abrogated the agreement in 2018, Iran increased its uranium enrichment program and has continued to develop ballistic missiles.  

The prospects for the current JCPOA negotiations to be successful are dim at best.  Iran has engaged in significant behavior beyond its borders intended to intimidate expatriate dissidents or even assassinate them.  Its gloating over the stabbing of Salman Rushdie, and blaming the author and his supporters for the attack, was both despicable and certainly will not improve its standing in the international community. Will Anyone Punish Iran for Its Murderous Behavior?

The proof of the pudding is the eating.  Iran's behavior points to an increasingly rogue state.  The question at the end of the day is not, "Does the United States Misunderstand Iran," but rather, "Does Iran Misunderstand What It Means to Be a Responsible Member of the Global Order?" As long as Iran refuses to change its behavior, the US and the West should continue their policy of isolating it.

 

 



Tuesday, July 26, 2022

أزمة المياه في العراق: هل يمكن لسد بخمة المساعدة فيحلها؟ Iraq’s Water Crisis: Could the Bakhma Dam Help Solve It

The New Middle East is pleased to welcome Jabbar Jaafar, a strategic communications specialist, as co-author of this post , especially because he suggested the topic of the Bakhma Dam analyzed below
The Initial Construction on the Bakhma Dam
As authoritarian rulers in the Middle East continue to repress dissent and corrupt elites steal from the public purse, little is being done to address the region’s climate crisis. With widespread drought, extreme heat, desertification, and dust storms afflicting the region, the ability to access water resources looms ever larger. Iraq is one of the MENA region countries facing the most severe water resources problem. What can be done to mitigate this problem? 

Historically, Iraq has been blessed with waters from its two rivers, the Tigris and the Euphrates, which gave it its ancient name, Mesopotamia – the land between the two rivers – as well as its appellation as the Fertile Crescent. Today, Iraq derives 98% of its water from the Tigris and Euphrates, and their tributaries.  However, their ability to supply Iraq with its necessary water is severely threatened. 

Iraq has suffered a severe drought since 2007.  


Water shortages have been exacerbated by Turkey’s building dams on the Upper Euphrates River and Iran building dams on the Zab and other rivers which feed into the Tigris.  Already tribes in southern Iraq have engaged in conflict over access to water and Iraq’s southern provinces have accused the northern provinces of taking more water from the Tigris and Euphrates beyond what they are officially allocated.  


Clearly, water shortages suggest a rise in domestic and international conflict if not seriously confronted.  Even more ominous, the lack of water may make certain areas of Iraq uninhabitable in the future.  With a 34 mile coastline, Iraq cannot hope to receive its water supply by desalination, using the Persian (arab) Gulf.


However, one area of possible water resources has yet to receive adequate attention. Iraq’s three northern provinces in the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) have ample sources of water.  Although the KRG has also been adversely affected by drought conditions, e.g., a substantial number of its 10,000 wells have run dry over the past decade, it is blessed with considerable water.  The high mountains in the KRG produce significant water runoff each spring. This runoff has yet to be captured and used in a more efficient manner. 


To more efficiently use the water resources in Iraq's Kurdish region, this post discusses the Bakhma (Behme) Dam project near Erbil in the Duhok region.  While the dam is one of the largest infrastructure projects ever conceived for Iraq, it has yet to be completed. Were the dam constructed, it could provide a substantial amount of water,and hydropower, which could help address Iraq’s water and electricity shortage needs.

 

Iraq’s current rulers, both Arab and Kurdish, they have shown little interest in improving the lives of the Iraqi people. Their behavior has been characterized by extensive corruption and does not indicate a concern to develop Iraq and bring prosperity to their constituents.  An examination of their achievements over the last 20 years shows no tangible results in contributing to infrastructure development.  For example, Iraq's southern city of Basra still lacks adequate electricity and potable water.  Unfortunately, Iraq’s development has been lacking in all areas, including the water sector, which has been deliberately neglected with no dams or other water reservoirs having been built. 

 

Historical perspective 

In many respects, Iraq’s ancient rulers were more forward looking than the current political elite in maintaining the country’s water supply. During Emperor Hammurabi’s reign, Babylonia, witnessed his care in maintaining and expanding irrigation networks by constructing new canals and dams.  By 1760 BCE, when Hammurabi established control over all of Mesopotamia, and especially the city-states of Sumeria, he restored the irrigation canals there to their best condition and brought water back to areas of the south which had previously deprived of it.

 

Hammurabi’s unification of the entire south and the lands north of Babylon allowed him to construct lengthy canals to the various cities of the empire. These canal, which he named, "Hammurabi-is-the-abundance-of-the-people," ran to Nippur, Isin, Uruk, Larsa, Ur, and Eridu, and covered a stretch of land covering 160 kilometers. These irrigation works brought economic development and increased the wealth of the population to unprecedented levels. 


The idea of the Bakhma Dam 

Iraq’s Hashimite monarchy has often been vilified, given its repression of Iraq’s nationalist movement from 1921 until its overthrow in 1958 and lack of addressing the needs of the poor.  In the area of water resources, however, the monarchy implemented a number of projects, the most important of which was the Wadi Thathar Flood Control Project between the Tigris and Euphrates rivers north of Baghdad. The project, which began in 1952, and was completed in 1956, was designed to divert waters from the spring floods into Lake Tharthar to prevent flooding in Baghdad and other Iraqi towns and villages and to increase water for irrigation. 


The Wadi Tharthar Flood Prevention Project
The idea of the Bakhma Dam in Dohuk Governorate dates back 90 years when an American journalist published an article in the al-Awqat al-Baghdadia newspaper (August 18, 1932) suggesting using Iraq’s rivers to generate electric power and equip industrial plants.  The article proposed and the constructing an 800-foot-high dam whose turbines would be able to generate 1500 kilowatts of electricity.  

In 1937, a British advisory council conducted the first geological study of the project area in Iraqi Kurdistan.  Experts issued a report on its explorations and recommended the construction of a high dam at a site near the village of Bakhma at the entrance to the Klei Bekhmael Gorge.  In 1939, British geologists indicated the most suitable site of a dam would be at the entrance to the gorge, the product of the Zab River, the largest river within Iraqi Kurdistan, with a watershed extending well into southern Turkey and with many smaller tributaries, such as the Rawanduz River.  Finally, in 1941, a report developed by a British irrigation engineer proposed constructing a dam at the height of 470 meters high, with capacity storage of about 1.25 billion cubic meters of water. 


After World War 2, the Hashimite monarchy formed by the Supreme Council for the Study of Water Resources and Development in Iraq to conduct geological surveys and produce academic studies between 1946 and 1949. The goal was to obtain greater technical information about the Bakhma Dam site and its facilities.  The dam’s key objective was to control the waters of the Upper Zab River and reduce the floods threatening Baghdad.  In 1950, the Supreme Council approved a study for constructing a high dam in the Bekhmal Gorge for flood control and using the dam as a strategic reservoir for irrigation and farming in fertile areas below the dam. 

 

The Bakhma Dam project is still considered one of the vast and promising infrastructure projects designed to address Iraq's water shortage. The dam is located near the district of Aqrah in the Behdinan region of the KRG and 45 miles from its capital, Erbil. It is considered the most expensive of Iraq's dams, and it faces many technical obstacles. Cost estimates indicate that it would require $7 billion to complete.  In light of Iraq’s current revenues from oil sales, this amount does not seem prohibitive, especially if foreign funding, e.g., from the United State and EU, could cover part of the dam’s construction costs. 

Bakhma Dam water diversion tunnel
As international political and economic influence shifted away from Great Britain after WWII, the United States assumed a central role in Iraq’s development project.  In the early 1950s, the Reconstruction Council referred the dam design to the Harza Engineering Company in Chicago, which conducted a study and issued its planning report in December 1952.  

The Bakhma Dam’s cost was calculated according to the amount of water being stored which is measured in billions of cubic meters. The Harza Company report, which indicated that the higher the dam, the lower the cost per billion cubic meters of storage, recommended that the most economical cost for the construction of the dam would be a height of 550 meters.  

 

The company’s report estimated that the Bakhma Dam’s reservoir could hold 8.6 billion cubic meters of water which could irrigate 2 million plots of agricultural land.  Further it would increase the water supply of the Tigris River, reduce flooding in Baghdad, and generate 2-3 billion kilowatt-hours of electrical energy.  


In 1975, given the high oil prices at the time, the Iraqi Ministry of Irrigation asked Harza to re-evaluate its proposal for the Bakhma Dam project. The company was asked to present several alternatives so the Ministry could choose the optimal proposal, according to Iraq's need for water for irrigation, agriculture, and electricity generation at the lowest cost. The company submitted its report in 1976, which offered indicated three alternative placements for the dam, with the confluence of the Rawanduz River with the Greater Zab tributary at the entrance to the gorge being chosen as the most suitable site. 


In 1978, the Ministry of Irrigation requested seven foreign consulting companies from Japan, France, the United States, and communist bloc countries to submit offers and conduct detailed geological and hydrological examinations, preparing final designs and directing the implementation work of the dam. Studies to build the dam began in March 1979. 

 

Bakhma Dam Description 

 

In 1987, the first phase of the Bakhma Dam’s construction was begun.  The dam’s height was to be 750 ft, its length 2000 ft, and it was to have a storage capacity of 17 cubic kilometers and surface area of 100 kilometers (39 square miles)—with a total estimated cost was about $1.5 billion. 

The Bakhma Dam Project and its Reservoir
The objective in building the dam was to store water, irrigate the Erbil plains, produce hydroelectric power, and reduce floods that threaten Iraqi cities. Experts estimated that if the dam was built, it would be able to store 14,4 billion cubic meters of water.  Thus, it would be the largest Iraqi dam in the volume of water reserves.  

The contract to build the dam was awarded to a consortium of Turkish-Yugoslavian firms, ENKA Hidrogradnja and Energoprojekt.  A colossal tunnel was built to drain the excess water. The diversion tunnel the size of car tunnels was dug into the mountain by the Turkish company ENKA, a company specializing in the field of engineering and power plants, which removed thousands of tons of rock. The Yugoslavian company, Hydrocravenia, helped build the chambers for the underground powerhouse and transformers. 

 

Work suspension 

 

Between 1987 and 1991, the two companies completed about 35% of the dam.  Construction was halted with the outbreak of the second Gulf War in 1990 after the Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. The war was followed by the popular March 1991 uprising (Intifadat Sha'ban). As a result of this uprising, most Kurdistan region broke away from control of the central government. The equipment and machinery of the two companies were looted, so the Iraqi government was forced to compensate for the losses of the Turkish and Yugoslav companies at a cost of $175 million dollars. 

The Bekhmel Gorge
After Saddam's regime fell in 2003, efforts were made to complete the dam's construction. In 2005, several Iraqi technical and foreign advisory committees were organized to review the project.  By this time, the dam's cost had risen to $3 billion dollars based on subsequent studies and designs. In 2007, the estimated amount rose to $5 billion dollars. Nevertheless, the Council of Ministers headed by Nuri al-Maliki agreed to allocate this amount and the Kurdish Regional Government expressed interest in the project.  

 However, the Bakhma Dam project did encounter some opposition. A Kurdish leader objected to the establishment of the dam because his clan resides in the region of Aqrah, east of the Great Zab River. Several villages, his tribe complained, would be flooded with the waters of the dam's lake, erasing the history and traces of those villages and the graves of the former prominent sheiks. 

 

On November 17, 2019, Mr. Kifah Mahmoud, an adviser to the Kurdish Democratic Party, claimed that "Bakhma dam was designed to separate (the) Soran (area) from Badinan (Bahdinan), in a malicious attempt to divide the partition by natural means.”  However, new construction designs were formulated so that the reservoir would not constitute a water barrier between different regions in Kurdistan. 


The Politics of the Bakhma Dam 

The Bekhmel Gorge area inundated by Bakhma Dam
The Bakhma Dam wasn’t completed after the toppling of Saddam due to a number of objections.  In 2007, the Council of Ministers, led by Prime Minister Nuri al-Malik, agreed to fund the dam whose cost had now reached $7 billion.  However, in 2008, the Federal Government decided not to pursue the dam project due to the drought affecting the country and fears it will reduce water supplies to the south of Iraq. Thus, once again, the Bakhma Dam project was put on hold. 

 Could the current water crisis change the calculus of the Baghdad and Erbil political elites and permit the dam project to finally move forward?  First, the KRG leadership is well aware is that the water crisis in the south can only produce political instability. In neighboring Syria, the severe drought along the Euphrates led to the Arab Spring uprisings there and subsequently helped the Islamic State recruit local farmers and youth. A destabilized Arab Iraq would present a major challenge to the landlocked KRG. 

 

Second, the rise in oil prices makes it easier for the Federal Government in Baghdad to make concessions on the division of Iraq’s oil wealth.  While the sharing of oil wealth with the KRG needs to be shielded from corruption (and in the south as well), e.g., designated for specific uses such as KRG government salaries, pensions, and infrastructure projects, greater flexibility on sharing Iraq’s oil wealth could incentivize the Kurdish political elite to allow the Bakhma Dam project to move forward. 


Third, Iraq could use the ties it has recently developed with Saudi Arabia to raise funds from the kingdom and the GCC to invest in the KRG’s agrarian sector.  Much of the Kurdish region's agriculture was destroyed during Saddam’s Husayn’s brutal ANFAL Campaign of the later 1980s when over 150 Kurdish villages were razed to the ground.  Currently, with many KRG government employees returning to the agricultural sector as a result of sporadic salary payments, now would be the time to revive Kurdish agriculture. This could help assure the KRG and Iraq’s food security and lessen Iraq’s dependence on food imports.   

 

To assure that the Bakhma Dam project was resumed, it would be important for the United Nations and the European Union to serve as mediators between Baghdad and Erbil. These parties would be viewed as neutral arbiters who could hopefully encourage the two political elites to come together on promoting the dam which would serve both Kurds and Arabs. 

 

If neutral mediators could bring the Federal Government and KRG to develop a comprehensive national water policy, it might encourage Iraq to try and establish a regional water authority including Iraq, Iran and Syria.  The problem of access to water is only going to become worse as global warming increases.  A water authority encompassing Iraq, Turkey and Iran could provide a model for the entire MENA region. 


Finally, accommodation should be made for the estimated 20-40,000 Kurds whose villages would be destroyed by the Bakhma Dam’s construction and the heritage which would be lost to the dam’s large reservoir.  Drawing up efforts in Egypt to save precious heritage during the building of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s, similar measures should be taken to assure that as much heritage as possible is saved for posterity.