Tuesday, July 30, 2019

The Popular Mobilization Units: A Threat to the Development of Political Stability and Democracy in Iraq?

The flag of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashad al-Sha'bi
Max Weber famously defined the state as that "human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a given territory."  Many states have not been afforded this luxury.  An example is Italy where what began as social movements to provide services and protection for local constituencies, such as La Cosa Nostra (Mafia), Camorra and ‘Ndrangheta, later morphed into organizations specializing in protecting powerful and wealthy clients, becoming a nationally powerful crime syndicates in the process.

Iraq has likewise seen the rise of powerful militias, the Popular Mobilization Units (PMUs) or 
al-Hashad al-Shacbi since they were established following a fatwa (religious decree) from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani in 2014.  For a discussion of the Islamic State’s rise, see my A Comprehensive Plan to Defeat the Islamic State

The PMUs, which number 60 odd militias at the moment, are mostly Shi a but include some Sunni, Christian, Yazidi and Turkmen units as well. The key concern is that the PMUs are designated by the Iraqi government as “state affiliated organizations.” This means in effect that they are largely independent of central government control.

What are the implications for the Iraqi state being unable to control these armed militias, some of which are transforming themselves into economic actors.  To what extent is a state within a state being built in Iraq?  Can the PMUs be brought under control or are they now a permanent fixture of Iraq’s political system?

On July 1, 2019, Iraqi Prime Minister Adil Abd al-Mahdi announced that all PMUs would be brought under control of the central government.  Many Iraqi and non-Iraqi analysts were skeptical that cAbd al-Mahdi proclamation would have any serious impact on the PMUs. This is especially true in light of the criticism of cAbd al-Mahdi’s cabinet which, to date, has failed to implement the reforms it promised when it took office.

Recently, Falih al-Fayyad, National Security Advisor, indicated that all PMU “offices” in Iraqi cities and towns must close their offices and their members must remove themselves from urban areas to designated bases.  What seems of greatest concern underlying this decision is that the PMUs have become actively involved in Iraq’s economic and financial affairs.  While they were originally formed as defensive units, they now are trying to translate that legitimacy into economic gain.  Reflecting a growing concern, Ayatollah cAli al-Sistani issued a statement in April 2019 warning the PMUs to “stay away from economics.”

In the process of policing Iraq’s cities, such as Mosul which was recaptured from the Dacish in 2017,  the PMUs have established “committees” (lijan) or “offices” (maktabib). This unofficial organizations have acting engaged in raising funds. To cover the high costs of sustaining the militias as well as providing the PMU leaders with lucrative salaries.  PMUs engage in trade, auctions, and real estate transactions.  Thus, the Iraqi governments efforts to close these offices in urban areas is to prevent the PMUs from entrenching its economic power.

Mosul offers the PMUs lucrative business opportunities. With massive reconstruction underway, the PMUs have pushed their way into the process using force and blackmail to control the flow of funds coming into the city.  Business owners in Mosul complain that the PMUs subject them to extortion and often force them to take on a militia as a commercial partner.

For example, Ikhlas al-Dulaymi, a parliamentarian from Ninawa province, accused Qais al-Khazali, 
leader of  the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq militia, of forcing a Mosul business man of accepting it as a partner 
with a 30% stake in the contract. al-Dulaymi also implied that the sinking of a ferry in the Tigris  
River in March, 2019, which caused 103 deaths, was not due to navigational negligence but the 
security problems created by the PMUs in the city.

Also disturbing to Iraqis and their governments is the control over territories by the PMUs which 
are off limits to the Iraqi Army or government officials. The most well know is the city of Jarf al-Sakhr, in the northern part of Babil Province, which the PMUs have controlled since 2014.  The city’s 100,000 residents have yet to be able to return to their homes.
 On several occasions, Iraqi Army units, parliamentarians and other government officials have been 
prevented from entering the city.  This has made many Iraqi politicians and analysts believe that the 
city has prisons, and makes weapons and explosives in workshops with material supplied by Iran. 
Indeed, Jarf al-Sakhr is an example of a “mini” state within a state. 

Sunday, June 30, 2019

What's wrong with Basra? How a toxic brew of global warming, corruption and sectarian politics threatens Iraq

Protests against sub-standard social services, Basra, June 29, 2019
Recently, I attended a panel discussion on Iraq’s port city of Basra held at the Middle East Institute in Washington, DC.  While well aware of the problems facing Basra, I was unprepared to learn how bad conditions in the city have become.  The questions raised by current economic, environmental and health threats are not only highly problematic for the city, but suggest what could be the fate of MENA region and other port cities situated in hot climates throughout the world. 

Not only are residents deprived of essential services, often a threat to their health and even lives, but they inhabit areas prone to ongoing conflict and civil strife.  Basra has become the “perfect storm,” reflecting a problem which not only adversely affects Iraq, but many other countries and one which will spread as global warming and drought begin to take hold in many hot areas of the world.  Given these conditions, the danger is obviously the spread of civil strife. What the can we learn from Basra?

First, Basra has been the epicenter of wars and civil conflict since the 1980s.  Having visited the city during the spring of 1980, just prior to Saddam Husayn’s invasion of Iran, the city still lived up to its reputation as the “Venice of the Middle East,” given its many canals and economic dependence on the. Shatt al-cArab (the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers before they enter the Persian Gulf). 

All this changed after the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988 in which the Basra region was severely damaged by the attacks by each side on the oil facilities located at the northern tip of the Persian Gulf.  Basra was almost cut off from the rest of Iraq during the Iranian invasion of 1984 when Iranian forces sought to seize the Fao Peninsula.  During the war, the Shatt al-cArab was blocked due to the sinking of many ships located in the port of Basra.

Basra is Iraq’s only major port and key access point for exporting oil. The devastation wrought on the Basra region by the Iran-Iraq War, which destroyed much of the oil industry’s infrastructure, was only made worse by the UN coalition's bombing during the Gulf War of January 1991.   Matters came to a head when Iraq’s conscript army, retreating through Basra from Kuwait after the US led coalition’s victory, spurred a large uprising - the  March 1991 Intifada) - which almost toppled Saddam Husayn and resulted in even more destruction, especially in the south of Iraq.

The US invasion of 2003 could have helped Basra rebuild if the large amount of reconstruction funds authorized by the US Congress had been spent on projects to improve the city’s water, electricity and health infrastructure.  We know in retrospect that the contracts awarded to US corporations by the Bush administration lacked a bidding process. Of the funds allocated, much were designed to improve the bottom line of the corporations receiving the award, and not Iraq’s needs.  Often projects weren’t even completed.  In short, the US invasion of Iraq failed to help Basra recover from the devastation of the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War and the March 1991 Intifada.

After the toppling of Saddam in 2003, Basra became locked in multiple political struggles.  One pitted the US occupying authority against Iran which quickly became a major player in post-invasion Iraqi politics.  Another pitted  local tribal leaders against one another as they tried to gain control of reconstruction funds and the local economy, and became involved in widespread smuggling. Yet another conflict, more traditional in nature, pitted the Basra region against Baghdad, much like the conflict between Bagdad and Erbil, the seat of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Traditionally, Basra region has felt marginalized by Baghdad.  Finally, a political struggle developed between Shi'a political parties and militias to control the city’s lucrative economy.

Meanwhile, conditions for residents of Basra have continued to deteriorate.  Between August and November 2018, 100,000 Basra area residents were treated for water poisoning (Reuters 2018). No one can explain why 13 water treatment plants completed in 2006 are still not functioning.  Ministry of Health data show Basra’s tap water’s chemical contamination level is 100% while its bacterial content stands at 50%. Film: Iraq's Poisoned Rivers

The main problem is the dependence of Basra and the surrounding region on the Shatt al-cArab for its fresh water supply.  However, with the drought which has plagued Iraq since 2007 and the damming of the Euphrates River in Turkey, the Shatt al-cArab has shrunken in size enabling saline water to enter from the Persian Gulf.  Not only has this process irreparable damaged the date industry along the river, but is has decreased the availability of fresh water.  Iraq's Ministry of Water Resources indicated in 2018 that Iraq's river had lost 40% of their water during the past 20 years.  Iraq's farmland is shrinking by 5% each year. Iraq's water crisis is intensifying

As noted by the panelists at the Middle East Institute forum, many farmers in the Basra region suffer not only from water shortages but from toxic chemicals which have entered their cropland.  Iraq's fishermen, both those who formerly fished in Iraq's famed marshlands (al-ahwar), and in the Shatt al-cArab and Persian Gulf have abandoned fishing because it no longer provides a livelihood for their families. As many have tried to become farmers, that has created conflict with farmers who already own land.

After Saddam’s ouster, a new patronage system was established in Basra.  Local residents became dependent on political parties and later militias for jobs and social services. Thus, when conditions began to seriously worsen, many Basrawis were initially reluctant to join demonstrations protesting the lack of electricity during the brutally hot summer.  Because parties and militias often threatened protestors, the prospect of being attacked for joining a demonstration was a deterrent.

However, that has all changed this year.  With temperatures recently reaching 120 degrees (49 degrees Celsius), demonstration have been ongoing with security forces using live ammunition to contain them.  The intensify and size of the demonstrations threatens the government of Prime Minister  'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi. Two parties, the Sadrist Trend, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, and the Hikma Party, led by 'Ammar al-Hakim have been highly critical of the government in Baghdad and its inability to address Basra’s problems.

What then do conditions in Basra tell us about Iraqi politics and what are its implications for urban areas in similar climate zones elsewhere?  First, it shows the limits of sectarian “divide and conquer” politics.  With conditions in Basra having reached a tipping point which now makes them intolerable to all inhabitants, trying to set different groups against one another politically, whether by sect, ethnicity or tribal affiliation, seems to have run its course and no longer be effective. 

Second, the Basra crisis demonstrates the extent to which global warming has profound implications for the politics of nation-states in zones where such warming threatens local residents' ability to remain in their places of residence.  With water supplies increasingly limited, and food contaminated with toxins also a problem, a national effort will need to be made in such conditions to prevent economic and social dislocation from creating civil strife and political instability.

Third, many LDCs will soon discover that they cannot afford to sustain a highly corrupt and nepotistic form of politics which undermines the central state’s ability to address problems created by climate change.  The threats caused by global warming have yet to be frontally addressed by political analysts.  However, as the deteriorating living conditions in Basra clearly indicate, central states ignore problems caused by climate change at their own peril.  Indeed, the government of Prime Minister 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi faces a threat of collapse, in large measure, due to its inability to solve the Basra crisis.

Finally, Iraq may find that its key source of revenues, namely its ex[rot of oil, is disrupted if social and economic conditions in basra continue to deteriorate.  Already, oil companies, such as Exxon Mobil, have withdrawn from efforts to drill in the Basra region. With Iraq dependent for more than 95% of its foreign revenues on sales of oil in the world market, such a development would pose extremely serious problems.

As it is, the demonstrations in Basra have weakened the Federal Government in Baghdad.  Prime Minister 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi will find it more difficult to arrive at an accommodation with the KRG about the status of Kurdish oil production and the distribution of revenues from its sale. He will also find it more difficult to fend off efforts by Iran and the United States to influence his policy decisions

Thursday, May 30, 2019

Caught in a Vise: Iraq between the United States and Iran in Their Struggle for the Middle East

As the tension between the United States and Iran escalates, Iraq has been drawn into the conflict, despite the fact that the government of Prime Minister cAdil cAbd al-Mahdi and the Iraqi people have no appetite to become part of it.  How has the conflict’s dynamics affected Iraq?  What can Iraq do to avoid damaging its economy and political stability by becoming part of a struggle over which it has no control?

The Iranian regime has little support, either domestically or in the MENA region.  It is repressive, corrupt, and offers the Iranian populace little in the way of economic development, education or social services.  Its military involvement in Syria and Lebanon and financial support for irregular militias in Iraq, the Popular Mobilization Units (al-Hashad al-Shacbi) has only increased political instability in the Arab Mashriq, while draining economic resources at home.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration’s efforts to recruit Iraq in its struggle with Iran is counterproductive.  By pressuring Iraq to conform to the sanctions it has imposed on Iran, the Trump administration has made unreasonable demands on Iraq.  This is especially true in terms of Iraq’s extensive purchases of natural gas from Iran.  

Pressure is also being exerted to have Iraq reduce its financial and commercial exposure to Iran which provides 20% of Iraq’s electricity and whose construction companies are key in helping Iraq rebuild its infrastructure after decades of war and neglect by the state.

Why does Iran want to maintain political influence in Iraq?  First, Iraq provides an important land bridge which is critical to Iran’s efforts to create “strategic depth” by maintaining a corridor to the Mediterranean. To institutionalize this strategic depth, Iran supports the Bacthist regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria and Hizballah in Lebanon, in addition to 3 of the most powerful Shica militias in Iraq.

Second, Iraq provides an important vehicle to allow Iran to sidestep the increasingly onerous sanctions which the US has imposed on it.  Goods which Iran is unable to obtain in the world market can, in certain instances, be acquired through the Iraqi market. Finally, Iraq continues to offer Iran a critical market in which it can sell its manufactured, agricultural and energy products, especially natural gas which Iraq requires to power its national grid.

Third, Iran seeks to use its political influence in Iran to prevent a hostile regime, like that of former Iraqi dictator, Saddam Husayn, from come to power in Baghdad.  Likewise, Iran seeks to maintain a powerful position in the Shica shrine cities, especially in al-Najaf, the center of global Shiism, and Karbala’, both in south central Iraq.  If Iran can play a role in selecting the key religious clerics in al-Najaf, then it can mobilize this influence to promote itself among the world’s Shica population.

It is less clear what US national interests are in Iraq, aside from its current interest in using it as part of its policy to bring the Iranian regime to its knees.  Any concern with promoting democracy in Iraq died long ago, if in fact that ever was a goal of the Bush administration’s 2003 invasion.  

The Obama administration wanted nothing to do with Iraq. Its foolish decision to enable Nuri al-Maliki to secure a second term as prime minister in 2010, even though he lost national elections, came back to haunt Iraq and the US in 2014 when his arch-sectarian policies led to the fall of Mosul, Iraq’s second largest city, to the Dacish.

Certainly, the Trump administration has shown no interest whatsoever in Iraq’s form of governance, whether democratic, sectarian or authoritarian.  Indeed, the Trump administration lacks a coherent foreign policy in the MENA region, including Iraq.  All decisions are largely ad hoc and transactional, constantly in flux, and without historical grounding or cultural understanding.

Examining the Trump administration’s position on Iran, we can ask whether it seeks regime change, as National Security Advisor John Bolton advocates, or does it support a exclusively sanctions-based policy as advocated by Trump (although his views on foreign policy change with great frequency, often day by day). 

Because the Trump administration is unclear on its objectives in Iran, that fact is all the more reason why Iraq seeks to avoid tying its fortunes to the US in this struggle.  Iraq will always need to live with and accommodate its powerful neighbor to the east, while the Trump administration may be gone after the 2020 presidential elections.

Increasingly, Iraq has become a pawn in a Trump administration game designed to bring Iran to its knees. This effort seems less a developed and well-thought through policy or strategy, with clearly defined goals and implementation process, than a set of tactics designed to bolster Trump’s political support with certain constituencies in the United States as part of his 2020 re-election campaign.  

Trump’s almost exclusive focus is on the trifecta of Saudi Arabia, Israel and the United Arab Emirates bears out this argument. 
Strong support for these 3 countries, all of which are extremely hostile to Iran, bolsters Trump’s position among evangelical Christians, one of his core constituencies, and, he hopes, among large segments of the American Jewish community.  

By pushing arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, even without Congressional approval, Trump can argue that his administration has created jobs.  Never mind that these arms are bringing death, devastation and the largest humanitarian crisis in the world to Yemen, and that the war is creating fertile ground for a new generation of terrorists who will plague Yemen, the region and future US administrations.

Current US behavior towards Iraq indicates a lack of sensitivity to diplomatic protocols. It likewise demonstrates a lack of cultural sensitivities to a country which was placed under American occupation from 2003 to 2011, and which suffered greatly from US bombing during the Gulf War of 1991.  

Diplomatic consultations have languished as Trump administration behavior towards the current government of Prime Minister cAdil cAbd al-Mahdi have taken on the character of “informing” the Iraqi government of the steps it needs to take to help the Trump administration isolate Iran politically and economically.

Trump’s recent decision to end sanctions waivers will cause Iranian oil exports to decline between 26-31%. Key industries - like the petrochemical, car and construction industries, which are highly dependent on imported equipment, spare parts and raw materials - are also suffering from the depreciation of the Iranian currency, which last year lost more than 100 percent of its value, significantly decreasing the purchasing power of Iranian companies on the international market.

Iraq has an unemployment rate of 25% in January 2019.  Iraq cannot afford more economic pressure if the US tries to disengage the Iraqi from the Iranian economy. Because the sanctions the Trump administration has imposed on Iran are achieving the goal of increasing its economic pain, there is no need to force Iraq to sanction Iran as well.

Trump’s populist project, inspired by former advisor Steven Bannon and current advisor Stephen Miller, eschew international agreements. This hostility to international cooperation is part of the ethic nationalism which is surging in many countries around the world, e.g., as seen in the recent re-election of Narendra Modi in India.  Such nationalism may help mobilize voting constituencies domestically, but are proving to be disastrous when they become a framing device for international politics.

As an example of the problems of conducting foreign policy on a country-by-country basis and transactional basis, devoid of international cooperation, and with little or no reference to prior efforts to solve a specific global problem, we can cite the Trump administration policy towards North Korea.  

Having invested his political capital and personal ego in coming to an agreement whereby the North Korean regime will agree to give up its nuclear weapons and create a nuclear weapons free Korean Peninsula, Trump now finds himself defending Kim Jong-on’s missile tests while castigating Iran which has yet to develop nuclear weapons.

This type of chaotic foreign policy is harming US national interests, not only in the MENA region but, as many analysts have noted, is also impeding the struggle against China’s global ambitions.  The idea that the United States can promote its national interests in isolation, without its traditional allies and the United Nations is deeply flawed.  If the US has remained in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), rather than withdraw, it would have had 11 partner nations to help in the struggle against China.

If the Trump administration would work with the EU and NATO, it could produce a truly meaningful strategy to prevent Iran from destabilizing the eastern Mediterranean region.  Likewise, it would reduce the possibility of other regional powers, especially Saudi Arabia and Turkey, from developing nuclear weapons should Iran decide to no longer abide by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), agreed to by the Obama administration, the EU, Russia and China.

If, through the refusal to develop a policy towards Iran, which will curb its adventurism and prevent it from developing nuclear weapons, the Trump administration needs to return to the international community and work with partners – partners which have been faithful allies since the end of WWII. 

Trump should be educated on the complexities of Iraqi politics and society. The Federal Government in Baghdad is still fighting the Islamic State (which is burning crops in north central Iraq), trying to conclude an agreement with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) on the federal budget, the sale of oil, and the contours of federalism, and confronting the problem of raising between $88 and $100 billion to rebuild the devastated city of Mosul and much of al-Anbar, Salahidin and al-Niniwa provinces, not to speak of pressing infrastructure needs elsewhere in the country.

Strategy needs to replace tactics. Unannounced or sudden visits to Iraq, such as Trump’s visit to US troops after Christmas in December 2018 when he didn’t exercise the courtesy of visiting the Iraqi leadership in Bagdad, and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s peripatetic visits, need to end because all they do is provide political ammunition for Iran’s allies in Iraq who would like to see US troops leave Iraq and curtail its influence in the country.

Iraq and the United States must be equal partners if the Trump administration is able to achieve any of its objectives in the eastern Mediterranean and the Gulf region