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| Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and President Ebrahim Raisi |
In this article, the reader never learns exactly what it is that the United States government fails to understand about Iran. The article largely focuses on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. However, surely the United States, or any power for that matter, needs to examine the Iranian regime beyond it main leader. For example, the recently elected president and hardliner, Ebrahim Raisi, is never mentioned, even though he wields considerable power.
In an article which alleges that the US misunderstands Iran, one assumes that the author would offer new American policy options commensurate with the analysis he suggests. Yet little is offered beyond the argument that sanctions, the main tool the US has used against Iran, have only a spotty record of success internationally.
Apart from Dr. Sadjadpour's excellent analysis of the manner in which Khamenei uses anti-Americanism to sustain his rule, we never learn why hardliners have recently come to dominate the regime, especially after a period of two decades in the 1990s and after when at least some moderate leaders occupied the office of the presidency, namely Mohammad Khatami and Hassan Rouhani.
Does the rise of the hardliners reflect an actual weakening of the regime? While sanctions won't bring down the regime, they have clearly taken a toll on Iran's economy and promoted popular discontent with the regime. This is especially true because the populace is aware of the extensive corruption which pervades the regime and its praetorian guard, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
It is striking that, for Dr. Sadjadpour, history begins in 1979 with the victory of Iran's revolution which toppled the regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. However, the largest American blunder, and example of US misunderstanding of Iran par excellence, was the CIA's overthrow of Mohammed Mossadegh, the democratically elected prime minister of Iran, in 1953.
Mossadegh was guilty of the sin of wanting to help the citizens he represented enjoy a higher standard of living. To do this, he demanded the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company pay higher royalties per barrel beyond the pittance Iran received for the oil extracted from its wells. In the political instability which followed, the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, fled the country.
For its part, Great Britain organized an international boycott of Iranian oil. Ultimately the CIA, and its agent, Kermit Roosevelt, Jr., mobilized Iran's army and religious clergy to support a coup d'etat which reinstated the young Shah to the Peacock Throne. After regaining power, the Shah enacted brutally repressive policies which marginalized much of Iran's population apart from a small, wealthy Westernized elite.
One possibility for the US to open a powerful initiative would be to admit the mistake that it made in 1953 in overthrowing Mossadegh and restoring the Shah to power. In conjunction with this declaration, the US could call on Iran to release its large number of political prisoners, including the many dual nationals in its prisons.
There would be no expectation that Tehran would agree to release political prisoners. Nevertheless, an apology for the events of the early 1950s when the US interfered in Iran's internal affairs would undercut the anti-American rhetoric which Dr. Sadjadpour shows is so central to the regime's legitimacy.
Another initiative which the author mentions but doesn't elaborate on is the possibility of the US developing economic ties with Iran. While excellent in the abstract, this policy would have no traction among Democrats and Republicans in the US unless Iran changes its behavior in at least two respects. First, it would need to commit to ending its uranium enriching program to assure that it does not acquire nuclear weapons, and, second, it would need to rein in its regional interference in Yemen, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Conspicuously absent from Dr. Sadjadpour's analysis is the current negotiations of the US and the European Union with Iran to reinstate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) . After Donald Trump unilaterally abrogated the agreement in 2018, Iran increased its uranium enrichment program and has continued to develop ballistic missiles.
The prospects for the current JCPOA negotiations to be successful are dim at best. Iran has engaged in significant behavior beyond its borders intended to intimidate expatriate dissidents or even assassinate them. Its gloating over the stabbing of Salman Rushdie, and blaming the author and his supporters for the attack, was both despicable and certainly will not improve its standing in the international community. Will Anyone Punish Iran for Its Murderous Behavior?
The proof of the pudding is the eating. Iran's behavior points to an increasingly rogue state. The question at the end of the day is not, "Does the United States Misunderstand Iran," but rather, "Does Iran Misunderstand What It Means to Be a Responsible Member of the Global Order?" As long as Iran refuses to change its behavior, the US and the West should continue their policy of isolating it.
