Prime Minister Hayder al-Abadi arrives in Mosul to declare its liberation-July 9, 2017 |
Damage to Mosul during November 2016-June 2017 battle |
Should the post-Mosul reconstruction process really be
viewed in such negative terms? Should
analysts limit themselves to viewing Iraqi politics as a “spectator sport”? Or should analysts become more proactive and begin
to think of ways to address Iraq’s problems rather than simply focus on a supposed bleak
future?
I would argue that the key variable in addressing both the successful
rebuilding of Mosul and reintegrating Iraq’s Sunni Arab provinces culturally, politically
and economically is national
reconciliation. National
reconciliation (al-masaliha al-wataniya/المصالحة الوطنية)
involves first and foremost creating a sense of trust among Iraqis. Here the manner in which the Iraqi Army – the
Counter-Terrorism Forces and Federal Police – defeated the Dacish
provides an excellent starting point.
Tent city for displaced Mosul residents |
Based on the Mosul experience, where can the Iraqi
government go from here? If Prime Minister al-Abadi would follow up his tour of
Mosul with some innovative policies, such actions could well serve to promote
national reconciliation. For example, the
Iraqi government could make an effort to interview groups of Iraqi military and
Mosul citizens together and broadcast these joint interviews on television and
radio as well as on social media platforms such as Vimeo.
The UK distributes food to residents displaced from Mosul |
Another proactive measure that Prime Minister al-Abadi could
take would be to invite Sunni clerics from the provinces most adversely
affected by Dacish terrorism – Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, al-Anbar and
al-Diyala – together with Shica clerics to participate in panels
where they both condemn extremist attitudes and behavior. Of course, Iraqi clerics would run circles
around the Dacish showing how their so-called “fatwas,” or religious
decrees, are either bogus or “cherry picked” interpretations of Islamic doctrine
designed to validate terrorist behavior.
An important tradition - both religious and political - is for Shica and Sunnis to pray together as a sign of national unity and solidarity when Iraq faces sectarian violence. This tradition finds its origins in the June through October 1920 Revolution against colonial rule when the British treid to pit the two sects against one another in an effort at "divide and conquer." In July 2016, after the Dacish killed 250 Iraqis in a car bombing, Shica and Sunni Baghdadis came once more to pray together (https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/world/iraqi-sunnis-and-shiites-pray-together-in-a-show-of-unity/2016/07/06/671d9186-436f-11e6-a76d-3550dba926ac_video.html).
An important tradition - both religious and political - is for Shica and Sunnis to pray together as a sign of national unity and solidarity when Iraq faces sectarian violence. This tradition finds its origins in the June through October 1920 Revolution against colonial rule when the British treid to pit the two sects against one another in an effort at "divide and conquer." In July 2016, after the Dacish killed 250 Iraqis in a car bombing, Shica and Sunni Baghdadis came once more to pray together (https://www.washingtonpost.com/video/world/iraqi-sunnis-and-shiites-pray-together-in-a-show-of-unity/2016/07/06/671d9186-436f-11e6-a76d-3550dba926ac_video.html).
Iraqi troops assist an elderly women in Mosul |
As former Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Lukman
Faily, has correctly observed, the most trusted person in Iraq is Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Iraqi government would be well served by appointing
a trusted member of al-Sayyid Sistani’s Office as an Ombudsman to oversee
Iraq’s reconstruction process.
Mosul children free of the Dacish |
The role of Iran and affiliated Shica militias in
the battle against the Dacish is also an issue that must be
addressed as part of the process of national reconciliation. The expansion of
Iranian influence in Iraq’s domestic politics was given a boost - “shot in the
arm” - after Mosul’s fall. When the
Iraqi Army collapsed in June 2014, after its betrayal by then Prime Minister
Nuri al-Maliki and the local army high command, al-Sayyid Sistani called on the
Iraqi people to arm themselves to protect again the Dacish which
began to move south towards Baghdad after seizing Mosul.
The subsequent formation of militias in Baghdad and the
south were primarily composed of Shica fighters. Iran quickly sought
to dominate the militia movement by providing funds, arms and training to those militias which supported its
interests in Iraq, namely the three most powerful groups controlled by Hadi
al-Amiri, Abu Mahdi Muhandis and Qais Khazzali respectively.
There is little doubt that the militias played an important
supporting role in defeating the Dacish, even if the bulk of the
fighting in Mosul was done by the Iraqi Army, especially the Counter-Terrorism
Forces and the Federal Police. However,
the 3 militias supportive of Iran have sought to politically exploit the
struggle against the Dacish by seeking to be officially recognized
as part of Iraq’s armed forces. Clearly,
they serve as a “Trojan Horse” for Iranian political interests in Iraq.
Efforts to prevent Iran from using the struggle against the
Dacish to expand its political interests in Iraq requires a subtle
response on the part of Prime Minister al-Abadi, and those cabinet ministers and
politicians who are supportive of efforts to curtail Iranian interference in
Iraq’s internal affairs.
The Iraqi government has been effusive in thanking Iran for
its military assistance in fighting the Dacish and should continue
to do so. At the same time, the Iraqi
government should begin a campaign in parliament and the media which emphasizes
that, having expunged the influence of foreign fighters from Mosul and other
Iraqi cities and towns, it now wants to prevent any future incursions by external
political forces.
This message should remain an on-going mantra without explicit mention of Iran. The implicit message here would not be lost
on Iraqis – Iraq want to pursue its political future without the interference
of Iran.
The Iraqi government should try and integrate a portion of
the Shica militiamen who have excellent combat skills into the Iraqi
Army. They should be offered positions
in separate units, rather than being allowed to form a unit of their own. Thus the Iraqi Army would benefit from
skilled fighters who are battel tested, and provide employment for them, a key
incentive for many men who joined the irregular militias.
Beyond these efforts, the Iraqi government should continue
to work with the US and its coalition partners from the EU and the MENA region
to train Iraq’s armed forces. The
strongest bulwark against politicization of the military is one which promotes
a vision of itself as a professional
institution designed to defend the nation but not to interfere in politics.
Iraq’s conscript army, which the US very foolishly disbanded
in 2003, was comprised of an ethnically integrated office corps. I have conducted numerous interviews with Shica, Sunni and Kurdish officers who all stressed the good relations which existed
among all three ethnoconfessional groups in the conscript army. To develop once again an officer corps and military
units which contain troops from all Iraq’s ethnic groups will serve Iraq well
in the future, not just to prevent attempts at a coup d’état, but to resist
foreign interference in Iraq’s military and domestic politics.
Finally, there is the problem of the Kurds. The KRG referendum on declaring an independent
state will occur on September 25, 2017.
Undoubtedly, it will be approved by a majority vote. Whether the referendum will mean the
separation of Iraq’s three majority Kurdish provinces from Iraq and the
formation of a new nation-state is another question all together.
A serious effort in Baghdad to use the military victory over
the Dacish to sustain some form of political relationship between
Baghdad and the KRG might work to prevent separation. It should be remembered that the Pesh Merga,
like the Iraqi Army, suffered many casualties protecting the KRG from the Dacish
following the fall of Mosul in 2014.
The Pesh also fought with the Iraqi Army against the Dacish
in the north suffering many casualties.
At present the KRG is providing refuge for a large number of Moslawis
and other DPIs from north central Iraq as a result of Dacish
terrorism which drove them from their homes. The number of DPIs in the KRG and elsewhere has dramatically
increased following the 9 month battle for Mosul.
While a topic for another post, an effort to create a truly
federal Iraq, which would benefit both Arabs, Kurds and other minorities, such
as Turkmen, Christians and Yazidis, is a precondition for creating a durable political
system acceptable to all ethnoconfessional groups. For those who argue that federalism is alien
to the MENA region, the UAE belies that argument, given its 45 year history as
a successful federal nation-state.
As I have argued before, Iraqis should examine the Canadian
model where Quebec was convinced not to succeed from Canada once it felt a
meaningful federalism had been established by the central government. Language
and cultural rights were established which placed French speaking Canada on par
with English speaking Canada. For
example, a Canadian university student of French heritage can submit
examinations and research papers in French anywhere in Canada and the
educational institution which that student attends must accommodate her or him.
At the end of the day, Iraq’s national reconciliation and reconstruction
– in its cultural-political as well as material dimensions – must come from
Iraqis themselves. Iraqi youth – 70% of
the population under the age of 30 – have already begun the post-Mosul reconstruction
process. They are in the forefront of
organizing meetings between Moslawis and other Sunni Arab residents in the north
with Shica in the south. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ggPYla9IRqE)
Mosul Library destroyed by Da'ish |
Iraq is a resilient country with a remarkable people who
represent a rich and diverse cultural heritage.
Over the past half century, Iraq suffered a military coup d’état in
1958, a vicious Bacthist putsch in February 1963, 35 years of brutal
rule under Saddam Husayn and the Bacth Party, a highly destructive war
with Iran from 1980-1988, the Gulf War of 1991, followed the March 1991
uprising (al-Intifada), the US
invasion of 2003 followed by 5 years of civil strife, and then 3 years of control
of Mosul and other towns in the Sunni majority provinces of the north by Dacish
terrorists.
In the final analysis, does Iraq have the political will –
both on the part of its citizenry and politicians – to seize the moment and
finally realize its potential as a nation-state?
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