Sudan and the Crisis of Failed States in the Arab World

Fighting in the Sudanese capital Khartoum

The Arab world is well known for its "democracy deficit."  This problematic state of affairs may be soon surpassed by an even more dubious distinction, namely the crisis of failed states.  Across the Arab world, Yemen, Libya, Syria, and Lebanon are all failed states.  Given the intense fighting between two rival generals in Sudan, we may soon see the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa join the list. It is not a stretch to envision Tunisia joining the list as well.

Why are so many Arab states unable to preserve their sovereignty and national security? More ominously, does the Arab experience suggest that the problems the region is facing are spreading to other regions of Africa and South Asia as well? The answer is that the problems undermining political authority in the Arab world are larger than the region. Thus, an analysis of the region helps us comprehend a larger dynamic which is affecting much of the Global South.

In explaining failed states in the Arab world, we need to focus on three stages: the collapse of secular ideology, the onset of foreign direct investment (FDI), and the development of neoliberalism accompanied by massive corruption and criminality. 

The collapse of secular ideology  The legacy of colonial rule demonstrated that the collaborative neo-colonial regimes which Great Britain, France and other European powers established after ceding independence lacked legitimacy. Despite the pretense of democratic elections, these post-WWI regimes were dominated by landowners and merchants and incipient industrialists which did little or nothing to improve the conditions of the mass publics over which they ruled.

The military and single party coups which began after WWII promised revolutionary change, especially under the banner of Pan-Arabism.  Despite high hopes, the Pan-Arab slogan of "unity, democracy and socialism" failed to materialize. As Egyptians noted, with their ingrained sense of humor, all Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (Nasser)'s revolution accomplished was to spread Egypt's poverty more evenly.

The Pan-Arab social contract offered political stability and economic security in return for political quiescence.  University education would be free and college graduates would be guaranteed a government job. Citizens would receive monthly food rations at minimal cost. Transportation would be subsidized.  To undermine Islamist movements and appear more modern to the West, gender equality was emphasized, although women remained second class citizens.*

The Pan-Arabist Social Contract was short lived.  Repression  of dissent, the institutionalization of the military in nationalized industry, the defeat in the 1967 war, and the struggle between Egypt, Syrai and Iraq for control of the Pan Arabist movement all delegitimized the ideology.  The slow growth of the state public sector prevented regimes from continuing to provide social entitlements, except through accumulating large debts.

The onset of foreign direct investment (FDI) Following the disastrous June 1967 Arab -Israeli War, Egypt found itself cut off from Suez Canal and sizable tourist revenues, while bearing the burden of residents forced to leave the Suez Canal and move west to Cairo and other urban areas.  When Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir died in September 1970, his Vice-President, Anar Sadat, replaced him.  

Sadat, as is well known, put Egypt on a very different foreign policy and domestic trajectory than that of al-Nasir.  He terminated military ties with the Soviet Union, released Nasir's arch enemies, the Muslim Brothers, from jail (so they could attack the left-wing of the Nasserite movement), and proclaimed his al-infitah - the "Open Door" policy to the US and the West.  The Open Door was an attempt to attract foreign investment to Egypt to overcome its sluggish economic growth.

At the Eighth Party Congress of Iraq's Ba'th Party in 1974, Saddam Husayn moved away from the socialism and "anti-imperialism" which characterized the party's ideology since it seized power in 1968, and began to seek foreign investment in the Iraq's economy.  When I arrived in Iraq for a two month stay in May and June of 1980, my minders at the Ministry of Information took me to a number of Western projects, such as a steel mill being built by San Francisco based Bechtel Corporation and France's Creusot-Loire engineering conglomerate.

Syria waited longer to seek Western FDI.  Between 2000 and 2010, Syria's legal system underwent significant change, offering tax holidays and other market-based incentives. During the first decade of the 20th century, there was sharp uptick of FDI which reached a peak in 2009.  The primary countries which invested in Syria were Russia and Germany.  The main areas of FDI were telecommunications, banking and electricity sectors.

The rise of the corporate-criminal state Pan-Arabism slipped from Arab collective memory during the 1970s and 1980s.  As globalization spread, Arab elites in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Libya and elsewhere became increasingly involved with foreign capital. The standard of living and general well-being of mass publics became an afterthought.  State subsidies for food and transportation, and benefits such as government employment based on a university degree, declined as Arab states sought to lower national debt to increase their attractiveness as investment targets.

Arab leaders of the 1990s lacked the experience of having participated in the anti-colonial struggle of the inter-war and post WWII eras.  In Tunisia, for example, Habib Bourguiba had ruled as an autocrat. Still, he allowed the formation of government controlled labor unions, promoted women's rights and allowed state-supervised civil society to form. After he was deposed in 1987, his successor Zine al-Din Ben Ali established an incredibly corrupt regime.  In is no coincidence that the Arab Spring began in Tunisia when a frustrated vegetable and fruit vendor, Muhammad Bouazizi, immolated himself when he no longer could afford the daily brides in the town in which he lived to conduct his business and support his extended family.

The Arab Spring uprisings quickly spread from Tunisia to Egypt, Syria, Libya and Yemen.  Only Tunisia experienced any meaningful transition to democracy with Ben Ali's ouster.  Nevertheless, the inability of successive governments to improve Tunisia's economy. combined with the spread of corruption. allowed President Qa'is Sa'id to seize power in 2020, restructure the constitution, and centralize power in his hands.  In effect, Tunisia has once again become an autocracy.

Shorn of ideology and befitting from lucrative contacts with foreign corporations, an ever widening gap has developed between political elites and the citizenry at large. During the Arab Spring, the Syrian and Egyptian regimes used the argument that the opposition was comprised of radical Islamists and therefore needed to be repressed.  The violent strife which accompanied the Arab Spring led to a large number of displaced persons. In Syria, half of the population has been affected by the ongoing civil war.

The large influx of refugees into neighboring countries has caused additional political turmoil. Over 4 million Syrians moved to Syria.  However, it was the influx of over 2 million Syrians into Lebanon which has pushed it the verge of fiscal collapse.  The storied Lebanese banking system, has run out of funds. The result has been that depositors can't accessing their bank accounts, leading to attempts to "rob" banks to obtain their funds.

Th extent of corruption in Lebanon's political elite became manifest after a huge amount of ammonium nitrate, over 2700 hundred tons, which had been illegally stored in Beirut's post for 6 years, exploded in August 2020. The explosion destroyed a large part of the city, killing 218, injuring 7000 and displacing over 300,00 residents.

Despite determined efforts of Lebanese judges, all efforts to investigate the crime and bring those who caused it to justice have failed.  The political elites from a wide variety of confessional groups - Christian and Muslim - and Hizballah, which controls the most seats in parliament and half the cabinet ministers, have stymied all attempts to move the investigation and trials forward.

Egypt -a Proto-Failed State? Egypt represents the archetypical military-corporate state.  It is a bifurcated state.  On the one hand, there is the Egyptian government appointed by General 'Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt's dictatorial ruler. This consists of the usual array of ministries with limited budgets. On the other, there is the military-financial complex in which military officers and business elites close to the al-Sisi regime enjoy all the benefits of Egypt's wealth while leaving millions of their fellow citizens in abject poverty. Egyptian Armed Forces, Inc.: the Middle East's New Janissary Corps

The great gap in wealth is combined with spatial segregation. The military-financial elite lives in upscale neighborhoods or in gated communities and socializes in exclusive clubs. There is minimal interaction between the elites and the populace at large.  Indeed, only those Egyptian's who possess al-wasta (political influence) have any hopes of entering the elite's ranks. 

Just like the Rapid Support Forces and the national army in Sudan, and the all powerful militias supported by Iran in Iraq, the Egyptian military is deeply compromised by its control of Egypt's economy.  This control is symbolically codified in an Egyptian  law which makes publishing the military's budget a crime.  Estimates are that the military controls at least 1/3 of Egypt's economy.  Egypt’s Military Now Controls Much of Its Economy. Is This Wise?

Meanwhile, the Sisi regime has done little to generate the jobs needed for a rapidly growing population, now almost 108 million. University graduates are frustrated and angry because they can't find employment based on their merits.  Instead, they see youth who have wasta receiving the premium positions.  

Poverty is a major problem in Egypt with almost 30% of the population suffering from low incomes, access to food and shelter and healthcare.  The war in Ukraine has raised the cost of living because Egypt imports most grains which it needs to feed its population.  Thus, current statistics surely underestimate the current rate of poverty.

Despite building one of the largest solar farms in the south near the border with Sudan, Egypt has done little to address another serious problem, that of global warming.  The rising sea level of the Mediterranean is beginning to push its waters up the two tributaries of the Nile River.  The resulting salinization of the water and soil is adversely affecting agricultural production in these regions.  Ironically, Egypt was given the presidency of the United Nations' COP27 Meeting which was an international embarrassment in light if its having ignored to date its domestic environmental problems.

Egypt is also facing a dangerous threat to the south where Ethiopia has built the Grand Renaissance Dam on the Nile River which will hamper the flow of critically needed water resources downstream.  Egypt has declared the dam to be a national security threat and warned of possible military action to attack it if Ethiopia begins to fill the lake behind it.  

However, Egypt is doing little to modernize its agrarian sector and teach farmers how to better allocate water used for irrigation. It could make better use of the model developed by the Egyptian firm, Karam Solar, which provides solar panels to farmers which enables them to avoid use polluting and expensive diesel fuel and allows them to access and pump water from deeper in the ground to use for irrigating their crops.

Like most MENA region autocracies, the Sisi regime lacks an ideology and hence any meaningful legitimizing mechanism. The military-financial elite demonstrates no civic consciousness. Its only goal is increasing its profits and wealth.  This state of affairs has engendered considerable dissent among the educated classes.  Unable to tolerate any criticism, the Sisi regime has arrested large numbers of Egyptians, resulting in an estimated 60,000 prisoners held under horrific conditions in its infamous prisons. COP27 shines spotlight on Egypt's political prisoners

One reason the Egyptian political class has been able to weather a number of storms, including the ignominious defeat in the June 1967 six day war, Anwar al-Sadat's assassination in 1981 of threats from radical Islamism and the 2012 Arab Spring uprisings has been the cohesion derived from its social base. 

As Leonard Binder documented years ago in his study, In a Moment of Enthusiasm: Political Power and the Second Stratum in Egypt, the Free Officers movement which led the July 1952 coup which overthrew the monarchy under King Faruq was rooted in a rural middle class of notables and middle level landowners. This social stratum has provided the social base of the al-Nasir (Nasser) and subsequent regimes.

Will the military-financial elite be able to rely upon oppression to maintain its current grip on power and prevent Egypt from becoming a failed state?  While Egypt's elite did successfully negotiate the Arab Spring uprisings, the toppling of President Husni Mubarak notwithstanding, it is doubtful that it can sustain its rule if it continues to ignore the serious challenges facing Egypt.

Sudan had its own uprisings in 2019. However, its military-financial elite was not about to allow power to flow into the hands of democratic leaders who might expose and break up its corrupt hold on the country's economy. Even though the military-financial elite in Egypt is still largely unified politically, it too could experience schisms developing within it if pressures from below emerge, such as large scale protests demanding a change in the authoritarian status quo. Meet Sudan's web of warlords, foreign backers and their tangled alignments

Foreign powers, whether from Russia or China, or from the West, will continue to pressure MENA region states which possess critical economic resources, whether oil, natural gas, gold, other precious metals, or agricultural products. Any hope for a move towards democratization of MENA region nation-states seems unlikely indeed.

____________

 *Although it should be noted that, when I visited Baghdad in May and June of 1980, the majority of physicians in the capital were female.