Amateur Hour, Spectacle and Bluster: Trump's Chaotic Foreign Policy in the Middle East

As I publish this post, the United States and Israel have just attacked Iran. Donald Trump claims the goal is "regime change."  Apart from serving Benjamin Netanyahu's goal of keeping his far-right regime in power, there seems to be no strategy behind this attack. Trump has neither explained why the US has gone to war to the American people, nor obtained permission from Congress to declare war as required by the Constitution. Trump has no "day after" plan.  Nevertheless, nothing I argue below has changed as a result of the ongoing war. Another post on the war's progress and possible outcomes will follow.

Superficially, it may seem that Donald Trump has achieved a number of successes in the Middle East.  He pressured Benjamin Netanyahu to agree to a ceasefire between Israel and HAMAS. He formed a Board of Peace, which he heads, that is tasked with rebuilding Gaza.  In June 2025, he ordered US forces to bomb Iran's major nuclear facilities, claiming that the the attack destroyed the production facilities. Trump has established ties with the Ahmad Sharaa, Syria's new president, and ended US sanctions on the country.

Looking beneath the surface, however, we see that US foreign policy in the MENA region under Trump is actually a hodge-podge of half-baked initiatives which rest on shaky foundations. All of Trump's decisions have been accompanied by promises of major changes to come. Thus far, these exaggerated promises ring hollow because they haven't come to pass.

Trump Policy in the Israel-Gaza War Take the Gaza War, for example. While it's true that a formal ceasefire is in place, Israel controls half of the strip and has killed hundreds of Palestinians since it began. As of late January 2026, the number was 520 (of a total of almost 72,000, more than half women and children) Despite promises of allowing Gazans who need medical attention, some desperately, only a trickle have been allowed through the Rafah Crossing into Egypt Israeli attacks on Gaza kill 23 in one of deadliest days since ‘ceasefire’

Meanwhile, HAMAS controls the other half of Gaza. It has refused to disarm which is critical if a meaningful peace is to be established.  Its execution of Palestinians who it feels will challenge its rule and its reimposition of brutal control over Gaza isn't the type of behavior of an organization interested in concluding a peace agreement with Israel. 

As for the Board of Peace, many countries which have serious interests in the Middle East, particularly those in the EU, have refused to join it. There is no rhyme or reason to its membership which includes an odd assortment of countries. And nothing indicates that it's much more than a beauty project for Trump to project his persona onto the international stage.

Trump has thrown around all sorts of numbers which he asserts are promised investment funds for rebuilding Gaza.  Nevertheless, the populace has immediate needs of housing, food, medical care and education which aren't being met. Instead Trump has completely ignored of discussing these needs, talking of building hotels along the Mediterranean in Gaza. 

As for the technocratic Palestinian governance structure and the foreign troops who are supposed to police the Gaza Strip, nothing concrete has been implemented on this front. Indonesia has volunteered to send 8,000 troops to Gaza but only after HAMAS is no longer a threat. 

In Indonesia, the proposed employment is deeply unpopular.  many Indonesian sympathize with the Palestinian cause and fear that Trump's Board of Peace is just a vehicle for implementing the Netanyahu regime's policies in Gaza. Analysts also note that Indonesia volunteered its forces to influence Trump's tariff policies. Now that the US Supreme Court has nullified much of Trump's authority to impose tariffs, Indonesia's president may be less inclined to send his troops after all Why is Indonesia sending thousands of troops into Gaza?

Trump Policy Towards Iran At this writing, the Trump administration is negotiating with Iran to have it eliminate its right to enrich uranium.  Of course, Iran argues that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes, a claim which few take seriously. The contradictions of the negotiations underscore once again the prevarication of Trump's claims to have "obliterated" Iran's nuclear facilities. If everything was destroyed during US air attacks in June 2025, why the need for the ongoing negotiations to end Iran's nuclear program?

The Tehran regime is fully aware of the extensive warnings which the US military and American foreign policy establishment has given Trump about the possible negative consequences of am attack on Iran.  A major argument has been that such an attack on a regime which views itself as existentially vulnerable could lead it to pull out all the stops in its retaliation for an attack.  

American bases in the Gulf and Iraq, an attack on Israel by Iran and its proxies and even closing the Straits of Hormuz at the opening of the Persian Gulf through which 20% of the world's oil flows could create havoc in the Gulf region and global markets. That Trump already failed to live up to his promise to Iranian demonstrators that "help is on the way" and his threat to bomb Iran if it kept killing and executing them shows his talk has yet to be backed up by action.  

Thousands of demonstrators have been killed by paramilitary forces, often being shot at close range, and thousands more have been arrested and tortured to admit to crimes they didn't commit. While Trump condemns this regime behavior when asked by reporters, his focus for the past several weeks has been entirely on Iran's nuclear program, not the regime's war crimes against its citizens.

In the Persian Gulf, Arabian Sea and Mediterranean, Trump has amassed an armada of ships, troops and fighter aircraft which the United States hasn't seen since March 2003 when the Bush administration was  preparing to invade Iraq.  While the cost of this military buildup to American taxpayers is huge, we are now learning that Trump may only order a "symbolic" attack on Iran. For Trump, Military Strike in Iran Could Serve Symbolic Purpose

Trump has also received warnings that decapitating the current regime through a military strike could lead to a worse outcome. If Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is deposed, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) could take over the government, placing leaders even more hard line in  positions of authority. With the civilian leadership, e.g., President Masoud Pezeshkian, displaced, military action by the IRGC could produce a greater threat than the deposed clerical leadership.

Treating foreign policy like a real estate deal which is viewed as a "one off" event, combined with the spectacle of bombastic but non-actionable rhetoric, is not a recipe for a successful foreign policy, in the MENA region or elsewhere.  Trump needs to accept that toppling the Tehran regime is a long-term, concerted effort.  This would include destroying the "shadow" tanker fleet. Iran uses this unregistered fleet of tankers to offload its oil at sea and then sell it to buyers such as China. 

The despotic and genocidal "Islamic Republic" needs to be brought down, Attacks on the Tehran regime's arms factories, such as the Shahed drones it sells to Russia, using both cyber warfare and domestic strikes, would further disrupt the economy. Disabling infrastructure such as natural gas supplies would degrade Iran's manufacturing sector.  Because the economy is on life support, such a strategy - rather than the "shock and awe" Trump prefers - would require sustained attention. 

As Trump's presidency has made clear, his decision-making is fickle.  He can one decision in the morning and counteract it by evening or the next day. Aside from pursuing revenge and exacting retribution of his supposed enemies, Trump refuses to devote any detailed and sustained focus to domestic and foreign problems. Hyperbolic communication becomes a substitute for meaningful policy. Iran isn't Venezuela Trump says he’d ‘love not to’ attack Iran, ‘but sometimes you have to’

Finally, tackling the Iran crisis requires building a coalition of allies such as our EU and NATO partners. However, none of Trump's foreign policy endeavors have involved any allies except Israel. Dismissive of the EU and NATO, and International coalitions in general, Trump has charted a "go it alone" policy both in his first and present term as president.

As Thomas Friedman has convincingly argued, much of Trump's policy towards Iran has been influenced by Benjamin Netanyahu. The Israeli prime minister has manipulated Trump to keep his focus on Iran and not calling the far-right Israeli regime for its ever increasing human rights violation in the West Bank.  Here settler terrorists, with the help of the Israeli army, are expelling Palestinians from their land through a policy of ethnic cleansing Netanyahu Plays Trump and American Jews for Fools — Again

Trump policy in Syria In a matter of days after Ahmad al-Sharaa and his militia swopped down from Syria's northwest Idlib Province, Bashar al-Asad's genocidal regime was finally ousted in December 2024.  Asad fled to Russia as did many of his henchmen while others decamped in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Arab world.

It wasn't long before Trump began making overtures to Sharaa. US sanctions on Syrian were lifted and al-Sharaa was invited to met with Trump at the White House.  Because al-Sharaa is a former al-Qa'ida member, many Syrians are suspicious as to whether his commitment to democracy is genuine.

Having appointed himself president and stocked Syria's ministries with his loyalists, these suspicions have increased. An attack on the Druze minority in southeastern Suwayda Province in April and July 2025 only increased fears that al-Sharaa was no committed to a federal form of government which would respect Syria's minorities.  Only air attacks by Israel, which has a significant Druze minority, forced al-Sharaa's forces to end the attacks.

The worst result of al-Sharaa's seizing power. in Syria has been his forces' destruction of the Democratic Autonomous Administration in North and Northeast Syria (DAANES) which is also known as Rojava (the western Kurds). Its military arm, the Syrian Democratic Forces was key to defeating the Islamic State in August 2019.  Since then it has been a loyal US ally and assumed the difficult task of guarding over 70,000 Islamic State fighters and their families, primarily in the al-Hol prison in al-Hasaka Province in northeastern Syria.

During the attack on the SDF by al-Sharra's forces, the Trump administration did nothing to intervene.  Instead it withdrew 1000 US forces in East and Northeast Syria leaving the SDF to fight on its own. The result has been the capture of 80% of DAANES controlled territory and the demise of what was one of the most significant democratic experiments in the MENA region.

Under DAANES, ethnic diversity has been respected. Northeast Syria is largely dominated by the Kurds, but it also contains large numbers of Arabs and religions, including Sunni and Shi'i Muslims, Yazidis, Christians and Shabak. All of these groups have been able to live peacefully together.

Gender equality has been promoted. In DAANES, all major political bodies must have both a female and male leader.  One of DAANES 3 cantons (following the Swiss administrative model) was headed by a female physician, Dr. Heve Mustapha. In addition, so-called "honor crimes" have largely been eliminated and males have been educated as to the brutality of this practice. In short, patriarchal norms and behavior have been addressed and changed for the better.

The DAANES administration has also insisted on pursuing a policy of sustainable development and not taking funds from regional states or political forces.  This policy is designed to minimize external political and economic influence and to assure that wealth is distributed equitably among the population.

Remembering that the Asad regime refused to recognize the Rojava Kurds or give them citizenship or title to their land, and that it often seized their property, DAANES was a highly important step forward for Syrians long repressed populace.

However, now that US forces have left the region, and the SDF has been forced to focus on fighting Sharaa's forces, tens of thousands of Islamic State prisoners, fighters and their families, have been able to escape al-Hol.  Although the US repatriated some Iraqi and Turkish IS fighters to their respective countries, the 70,000 prison population has now shrunk to between two and three thousand ‘Mass escape’ occurred before IS-linked camp in Syria was closed

Not only has Trump betrayed a loyal ally, who shed much blood for American interests in fighting terrorism, but it has been complicit in allowing the Islamic State to reorganize and open new fronts in central and eastern Syria.  Having kept US forces in eastern and northern Syria would precluded the al-Hol prison escape and helped DAANES fend off the attacks by al-Sharaa's forces who would have wanted to avoid conflict with American troops From SNAFU to FUBAR in Northeast Syria

Why has Trump supported the al-Sharaa regime and deserted its Rojava Kurd allies? The answer is pressure from Saudi Arabia. Soon after al-Sharaa gained power, Saudi leader Muhammad Bin Salman (MBS) announced that the kingdom would invest significant amounts of funds in Syria. Clearly this was an effort to prevent Syrian from reverting to Alawite rule which under the Asad regime, had developed close ties to Iran.

Thus, to placate MBS, as well as protect his family business interests in Saudi Arabia, including real estate, A.I. development and World Liberty Financial, his cryptocurrency firm, Trump was willing to sacrifice a staunch ally and set in motion a new threat by the Islamic State. That some of al-Sharaa's forces are still hardened radical Islamists suggests that they may turn on their erstwhile leader in the future in favor of the Islamic State.

Trump policy towards Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates During Muhammad bin Salman's visit to the White House in November 2025, he asked Donald Trump to apply sanctions on the United Arab Emirates. Why did MBS make this request? How a Call From Trump Ignited a Bitter Feud Between Two U.S. Allies

Formally long time allies, Saudi Arabia and the U.A.E are currently at loggerheads over the course of the civil war in Sudan.  The civil war pits Sudan's army, led by General 'Abd al-Fattah Burhan, against a powerful militia, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), once part of the army, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, (known as Hemedti). While the army controls most of the east of the country, the RSF controls Darfur Province in the west.

The United Arab Emirates has backed the RSF, while Saudi Arabia supports the Sudanese Army.  The UAE has provided the RSF with heavy weapons and financial aid despite the militia having been accused of extensive human rights abuses, including the killing of thousands of residents in the city of E l Fasher in Darfur. For the UAE, the RSF represents the ability to gain access to Sudan's gold and other critical minerals. It sees the Sudanese Army infiltrated by Islamists who influence it seeks to limit in the MENA region.

Saudi Arabia views victory by the RSF as leading to creating a failed state in Sudan which would lie just across the Red Sea from its border. Because the Saudis and Emiratis increasingly view each other as competing to become the main power in the Arab Gulf region, it has led to conflict between the two countries, such as recently occurred in southern Yemen which is experiencing considerable instability, where the Saudis and Emiratis backed opposing Yemeni armed factions.

After MBS asked Trump to impose sanctions on the UAE, he called the UAE leadership which were furious to learned of MBS' request, the feud between the two Gulf state powers came out into the open. It was behind the Saudis bombiing of an Emirati shipment to southern Yemen this past December .

The open conflict threatens US interests in the Gulf and efforts to bring Saudi Arabia into the Abraham Accords with the UAE and Bahrain.  It also undermines Trump's efforts to create an A.I.hub which would Saudi Arabia and the UAR each of which want to become powerful high-tech players in the MENA region and beyond.  Clearly, Trump was naive that a simple telephone call to the UAE could resolve a complex feud between two powerful Arab states.

As these examples, and the news today that Trump unilaterally took it upon himself, to declare war on Iran shows the danger of having an amateur conduct the United States' foreign policy.  This is especially true when he has fired so many experts with deep understanding of the Middle East and other parts of the world from the State Department and other government departments and agencies. 

Trump's transactional approach, accompanied by an egotistical belief that he alone can solve the world's problems, bodes ill for the future of the United States position in the international order.

As the Arabs say, Rabbina yustur (ربنا يستر): May God protect us!

The Iraqi Election Bazaar Highlights the Machiavellian Principle!

This post was written by Guest Author, Jabbar Jaafar, who is President of Voices of Iraq, and a long time commentator on Iraqi politics.

Any observer of Iraq's political landscape might ask why there was such a rush to hold elections in November 2025 by the heads of the (ruling) political blocs and their political and non-political supporters? Why did the ruling elites resort to all manner of devious means to obtain the most votes? Why do heads of the political blocs nominate candidates who have nothing to do with politics and no skills to hold public office?

I doubt that the Machiavellian principle of the end justifies the means has been applied in any other election in the world as it is now in Iraq. Every legitimate and illegitimate means have been used, such as bribery and favoritism, intimidation and enticement, fraud, the misappropriation of religion, and lies, to win the elections and control parliament. The winner, hungry for money, can enjoy whatever he desires, because the opportunities are available to those who abandon their conscience outside the parliament building and enter it to pursue their personal and partisan interests. As for the voters who put the parties' members in office, they will reap nothing but promises. The nation is the biggest loser!

There are two categories of candidates. One category follows the proper methods stipulated in the regulations in force during the election period, promoting their electoral programs using simple methods. These candidates rely on their own resources and is far removed from the political capital employed by the ruling parties. This category is considered a minority compared to the other, which represent most candidates from political parties that have dominated the political scene since 2005. An example of this category is the civil and liberal parties that have joined the Civil Democratic Alliance.

As for the second category, most of its candidates lack clear political portfolios or visions. When you ask them about their election agenda, they begin talking about themselves and their diplomas, most of which are not accredited by reputable academic institutions. The goal of these candidates is to secure job opportunities that open doors to profiteering and quick enrichment, nothing more.

To achieve this end, the major political forces have not hesitated to resort to devious methods in seeking to achieve their goals at any cost, without regard for their constituents, the environment, their community, or the potential harm this could cause the country.

In fact, these types of candidates —and, before them, a large percentage of current representatives who belong to the ruling parties —behave according to the Machiavellian principle adopted by Niccolo Machiavelli, the sixteenth-century Italian thinker, philosopher, and politician. Machiavelli laid the foundation for the rule applied by many corrupt and tyrannical leaders who do not care about their people's interests, namely that the end justifies the means. 

According to the Oxford Dictionary, this principle means employing cunning and duplicity (deception) for political efficiency or behavior. Focusing solely on one's own goals and interests is always considered them more important than the goals and interests of others. Prioritizing success, power, status, money, and fame are valued above all else. This means manipulating or exploiting others for personal gain, without any reservations about deceiving them or lying to them.

The Cambridge Dictionary defines Machiavellianism as the use of clever, but often dishonest, methods to deceive people in order to gain or control power. Regarding religion, Machiavelli believed that religion is necessary for government not to serve virtue, but to enable the government to control the people through making their rule appear more legitimate.

In the days leading up to elections, the heads of electoral blocs begin debating and delivering bombastic speeches to deceive voters and entice them with election promises that are far from electoral platforms and have not achieved anything significant that could bring about tangible change in the lives of Iraqi citizens.  

From Iraq's first post-Ba'th Party elections in 2005 until now, the average citizen, living on a monthly salary and not implicated in corruption, dreams of obtaining suitable housing, despite the hundreds of residential complexes that suffocate Baghdad and several governorates, named euphemistically as "citizen housing." The average Iraqi citizen has received no benefit from this new housing except a look at them with a sigh of longing, because their prices are exorbitant and no one can afford the purchase price.

It is unimaginable to see a people with a cultural heritage as vast as the Iraqi people who are, unfortunately, exploited by a group of ignorant, professional thieves. In every election cycle, they bring in candidates who understand nothing about politics. If you asked one of them to give you a useful sentence, you would find them incapable of answering. 

One candidate appeared on a television program and said to a crowd of his supporters, "I entered politics for your sake." I expected him to elaborate and explain to the viewers and the audience who anticipated some additional explanation of what he had accomplished, but he added nothing beyond this phrase. The man was devoid of anything resembling general or political culture, but from his conversation, his pockets were full, like the thugs who surfaced after 2003. A candidate holding an important position in the Communications and Media Commission, speaking in an interview, was unable to even clearly define the meaning of politics.

When asked about the number of parliament members, another candidate didn't know it was 329, and offered a different number.  Yet another was asked by a reporter how many seats were allocated to the Baghdad Governorate, and she replied, "7,000 seats or something." When the reporter expressed his astonishment at her ignorance of the number of seats she was competing for —71 —she admitted she didn't know but said she had come to fight corruption. "I don't know how she'll fight corruption, when she lacks basic knowledge about the election process!

Another candidate, who wrote on his campaign banner that he was an "expert in tribal settlements," believes that parliament is a court for resolving tribal disputes. There are many examples that would require more than one article. As for why do the heads of political blocs bring in these types of candidates who understand neither politics nor anything else, and have no clear position? The answer is that they are willing to be subservient to the bloc leader. They say "yes" to everything asked of them and will not argue with or object to any draft law adopted by the bloc, even if it doesn't serve the majority or may conflict with the national interest.

According to media and social media reports, the price of a voter card ranges from 700,000 to 1 million Iraqi dinars. Some say it could even involve distributing foreign luxury cars, such as the Tahoe, Yukon, and Lexus. According to a speaker on a political program, this is intended to bribe voters, which I understand to be an attempt to manipulate the results obtained by a candidate or bloc. 

This is not just hearsay; it is a reality. The head of a major political bloc appeared to criticize those who pay to buy votes, setting the amount at between 250,000 and 300,000 Iraqi dinars. He criticized this shameful phenomenon and called on the government and the Integrity and Elections Commission to address it and hold those involved accountable!

As for the cost of obtaining a parliamentary seat, it ranges from 750 million to 1.5 billion. Iraqi dinars. Currently, according to one politician, the cost of an electoral seat has reached 5 billion Iraqi dinars, and obtaining 10 seats would cost 50 billion Iraqi dinars. The question, however, is: what will the head of the political bloc gain for this sum? 

A successful candidate will certainly gain greater benefits, power, and influence. He potentially gains control over political decisions, the power to appoint to important positions such as ministries affiliated with him, access to government contracts worth millions of dollars in those ministries, influence laws and budgets, and opportunities for personal or financial gain. He can also impose his political agenda and control the course of parliamentary legislation. 

In another position that reinforces my argument that the ruling parties apply the Machiavellian principle that the ends justify the means, in 2019, the ruling parties yielded to the demands of the October uprising protesters and amended the electoral law, adopting the multi-district formula for the Iraqi elections. Under this law, Iraq is divided into multiple electoral districts, with each district allocated a specific number of seats in the House of Representatives. 

Representatives within each district are elected using a voting system based on individual preference votes. This system allows voters to vote for a specific candidate within a specific electoral list, rather than voting for the list alone, and seats are distributed according to the results of each district. This law allowed several independent figures and some candidates from small parties to reach parliament. 

When the ruling parties realized that this law was not in their interest, as they sought absolute dominance over parliament to advance their agendas, they worked to amend the election law in March 2023. This amendment reverted to the modified Sainte-Laguë Method based on an electoral quotient of 1.9, which would return Iraq to a single electoral district system for each governorate and abolish the established multi-district formula. This law represents a return to the 2018 law, which was rejected by the massive protest movement that swept the country on October1, 2019. 

The bottom line: If elections are a large bazaar in which major parties defraud Iraqi voters through various means that contradict the concept of patriotism and are far removed from legitimate democratic practices, how can they ask citizens to go to the ballot boxes to vote for candidates who have fabricated everything in order to defraud them and win their votes?! These devious practices have encouraged capitalists, merchants, investors, company owners, and businessmen to participate in elections to benefit from parliamentary immunity and secure major contracts and investment opportunities. 

Elections are a fundamental element of democracy, enabling citizens to exercise their right to influence government decisions by electing their representatives to local and national legislatures. Only free and fair elections ensure citizen participation in political life and help elect qualified candidates to the legislative authority, which drafts laws, monitors the executive branch's actions, and approves the state's general policy and budget. Furthermore,
legislative authority, represented by parliament, plays a vital role in achieving stability, promoting political dialogue, preventing conflict, and facilitating reconciliation and peace.

After the Uprising: Whither Iran?

The massive uprisings in Iran which began on December 28the after Iran's currency collapsed have now been suppressed by the Tehran's regime forces, the Basij militia and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Estimates indicate that as many as 30,000 protestors may have been killed during the demonstrations, many shot at point blank by government forces.  Even though the protests have been quelled for the moment, what does the current unrest suggest about the future of the so-called Islamic Republic? What Happened at the Protests in Iran?

The end of the Islamic Republic The argument presented here is that the Islamic regime must be toppled. Not only it is guilty of crimes against humanity in the killing, torture and imprisonment of countless thousands of Iranians, but it has spread violence and terror thought the Eastern Middle East.  Tehran's clerics have supported HAMAS which has brutally repressed the Gaza Palestinians and which attacked Israel in October 2023 leading to the killing of 1,200 Israelis and the onset of a war in Israel has killed over 70,000 Gazans largely destroyed the Gaza Strip. The Cost of Inaction Over Iran: ‘We Are Left With Graveyards’ 

Iran also armed Hizballah which allowed the militia to take control of Lebanon's government , repress democratic forces and become a major player in international drug trade. Not only did it undermine the stability of the Lebanese political system, Hizballah, working with Russian forces, played a critical role in keeping Bashar al-Asad's genocidal regime in Syria in power.

Iran has provided Russia with its inexpensive but lethal drone, the Shahed-136. Russian forces have used the drone to kill large numbers of Ukrainian troops, to attack apartment buildings in Kyiv and other cities killing many innocent civilians, and to degrade Ukrainian infrastructure, especially its energy grid. Indeed, it has even helped the Putin regime build a factory to produce the Shahed drone inside Russia.

Based on its highly repessive rule and spread of violence and instability in the Eastern MENA region, the regime must be overthrown.  Either this regime change can occur though the Tehran elite being coerced into making meaningful democratic reforms, or it can be accomplished through econominc sanctions and military means.Iran’s Supreme Leader, Unbending Over Time

The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 To begin with some history, it should be remembered that the uprising which toppled the highly repressive regime of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi in 1978-79 was not motivated by an Islamic ideology. Rising inflation during the 1970s, which led the Shah to reduce regime funding for urban construction, on which many workers who had migrated from rural to urban areas depended, created an economic crisis.  

When demonstrations began in Iran's cities, the Shah sent the military to suppress them. When soldiers refused to fire on the demonstrators, and even in some instances joined them, the regime's future was sealed. With the loyalty of the military in doubt, the Shah fled Iran in late 1978. Already suffering from advanced cancer, he died in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1980.

The revolution which overthrew the Pahlavi regime was comprised of many forces. It included secular liberals, Marxists, oil workers, moderate clerics, e.g., Ayatollah Mohammad Kazem Shariatmadari, Islamic socialist followers of Ali Shariati, and the hard line clerics who supported Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.  Clearly, those who supported the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 didn't seek to replace a secular dictatorship with an repressive Islamic one

Consolidating a tyrannical dictatorship During the early 1980s, Ayatollah Khomeini's ability to consolidate his rule, which involved the execution and imprisonment of thousands if Iranian suspected of being disloyal to the regime, was enhanced by Iraq's invasion of Iran in September, 1980. Nationalist "rally around the flag" sentiment strengthened Khomeini's rule during the 8 year war which led to a truce in 1988. 

Iraq's use of chemical weapons, which had a devastating impact on Iranian forces, and the many youth "Islamic martyrs" who died running though mine fields in the advance of Iranian troops, kept Iranians' focus on the war, not on domestic politcis.

Khomeini's death in 1989 lay bare that the regime had failed to practice what it preached. It was not Islamic norms which informed its behavior but the concentration of power in the hands of hardline clerics and the IRGC, and the ruling elite's ability to benefit from the massive spread of corruption.  Thus, the Tehran regime's legitimacy was compromised. A new generation pf Iranian youth knew little of the Shah's rule but could clearly see that they weren't the beneficiaries of clerical rule.  Patron-client relationships, not professional expertise, determined employment opportunities for the educated middle class.

The regime loses legitimacy In 2005, corruption reached new heights. Khomeini's successor, Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, and then president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, announced a policy to liberalize the economy. Supposedly, this move would invigorate investment, strengthen markets and lead to higher economic growth.  

In reality, it was a shrewd effort to enrich the regime's elite, particularly among clerics, the IRGC high command and bazaar merchants, the traditional mainstay of Iran's economy. This decision encouraged regime members and their clients to develop private industry and commerce which benefitted from government subsidies and a variety of corrupt practices.

Because new financial ventures were considered to be part of the private sector, there was no oversight of  their formation or functioning.  As favored enterprises benefitted from large infusions of government funds, those who controlled them to become very wealthy. The political-economic elite went on to purchase homes abroad, send their children to elite foreign schools, spend vacations in Europe, and to drive around in expensive automobiles.

Meanwhile, little was done to improve the lives of the working classes and rural poor. Even though the regime used oil revenues to create foundations (bonyads) which were intended to be charitable trusts, these organizations became giant monopolies with no government oversight.  They favor members of society who supported the Islamic Republic. The bonyads have been used by regime clerics as an open-ended source of funds to use as they see fit.  

While failing the improve the living standards of the Iranian people, despite having access to considerable oil revenues, the Tehran regime has spent large amounts of money building proxy forces which it has argued will "liberate Jerusalem."  It has also used state revenues to develop its nuclear weapons program, including the latest effort to situate it under a large mountain in the Zagros range.

What should be done to protect Iranian protestors? Given the thousands of Iranian civilians killed in uprisings in 2009, 2014 and 2026, there must international action to prevent the Tehran regime from continuing to commit these crimes against humanity. Despite being led by despicable leaders who lack any respect for democratic governance, the only 2 countries which have the capability to stop the Tehran regime's repression are the United States and Israel.

What could each of these countries do?  First, the United States could set a deadline for Iran to disassemble its long-range ballistic missiles which it has partially reconstituted after the June 2025 strike by the US and Israel. The United States attacked Iran's nuclear facilities at the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant under a mountain near the holy city of Qum while Israel destroyed military assets and infrastructure and killed the top leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

Trump has already specified one condition for Iran to avoid an American attack and that is eliminating its long range ballistic missiles. He has threatened that, if this step isn't taken, then the US and Israel could strike and destroy the missile bases. Eliminating Iran's ballistic missiles would severely curtail any attack by Iran on Israel or on US bases in the region.  Thus, Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf nations' fears of an Iranian retaliatory attack were US forces to strike Iran would be reduced. 

However, the most powerful weapon at the international community's disposal in forcing the Iranian regime's to end its repressive behavior is to undermine its ability to sell its oil in the world market. The United Nations, the United States and the European Union have all placed sanctions on Iran which is one reason, together with corruption and mismanagement, that its economy is currently in free fall. 

A much more effective effort to cripple the Iranian economy would be to end its use of the so-called "Shadow Fleet."  The Shadow Fleet consists of several thousand older oil tankers which have been used by Russia, Iran and, until recently, Venezuela, to export their oil as a way to circumvent international sanctions.  These tankers are owned by shady companies, often lack insurance, and change name and country registry frequently to make it difficult to detect them.

Iran apparently has shipped oil beyond the Persian Gulf and then transferred the oil cargo on the high seas to a shadow fleet tanker.  With help from Nato allies, the US should track Iranian oil tankers and seize them, or the shadow fleet ships, which are transporting sanctioned oil in contravention of international law.  Although this would be a difficult exercise, all Iranian tankers must go through the narrow Straits of Hormuz at the southern end of the Persian Gulf which makes them easy to detect as they begin their journey to India, China and other ports of call.

Iran earns considerable revenues from Russia for providing it with ammunition, shells and military hardware, especially the Shahed-136 drone. Bloomberg reported on January 12, 2026, that Iran has sold $2.7 billion of arms to Russia. As noted above, Iran has helped Putin build a drone factory in Russia. Iran Sent Russia $2.7 Billion Worth of Missiles Alone 

To cut off these sales, the United States should use Israel's network of intelligence agents in Iran to destroy the energy supplies to the factories producing these munitions, further disrupting the Iranian economy. During the June 20205 attack, Israel destroyed several key natural gas pipelines which shut down plants producing electricity for Iran's manufacturing sector.  If the factories producing the Shahed drone and other munitions are shuttered, that results in a loos of regime revenue.

The United States and Israel should use cyber-warfare to disrupt the command and control capabilities of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Private messages should be sent to top IRGC commanders that they face assassination if they don't leave their positions. Given the ease with which almost the entire top command structure of the IRGC was eliminated during the joint US-Israel attack in June, 2025, such messages would spread fear among the newly appointed IRGC commanders.

Israel and Saudi Arabia and Arab Gulf states fear Iranian retaliation. But Iran's military is very weak and must pay attention to urban and rural unrest.  During the recent uprisings, the regime was very disturbed that it lost control of several areas of major cities.  Regime forces only reestablished control by a violent crackdown on demonstrators. 

The fears of Iran striking out beyond its borders are exaggerated.  The shutdown of the Internet during the protests has cost the Iranian economy dearly. The regime has promised to reimburse businesses which were adversely affected by the protests but lacks the funds to do so. The idea that Iran is ready to fend off military attacks and retaliate against US forces in the Gulf and Iraq belie its inability to even keep the economy operational. Iran Update, January 27

Now is the time for the International community to come together and rid the Middle East of the despotic and hated regime in Tehran.  Arab states, who don't want to see regime change in Tehran because it may bring democracy a d threaten their own rule, argue that the end of the Islamic Republic will bring chaos.  Nonsense, widespread chaos already exists, in Iran and throughout the Eastern MENA region where its spread of violence has produced massive instability. The ultimatum must be: democracy or a harsh economic and military attack. The Days of the Iranian Regime Are Numbered

The structure of corruption in Iran

“Governability” or Displacement? – Israel’s Negev Bedouins

Dr. Yoav Peled is an attorney and Professor of Political Science emeritus at Tel Aviv University.  He has published extensively on Israeli politics.  His latest study, co-authored with Horit Herman Peled, is The Religionization of Israeli Society (Routledge). This post was originally published by the Los Angeles Times.

In the summer of 1980 I accompanied my wife, Horit Herman Peled, on a research trip to Israel’s Nakab (in Hebrew Negev) region for her study of traditional Bedouin women’s weaving. In October of that year the Los Angeles Times published my op-ed article, “Bedouins: Defiance, Vows of Resistance,” based on our conversations with the region’s Bedouins. 

The concluding paragraph of that article began with: “So far the Bedouins have been remarkably calm, and have not engaged in acts of hostility against the Israeli government. But … I often heard vows of resistance and defiant statements to the effect that ‘we are not going to submit peacefully any longer’.” Now, many of the children of the Bedouins we had spoken with 45 years ago have indeed turned to violence.

That violence, however, does not take the form of armed resistance against the state but rather that of criminal activity. Reports abound about Bedouins engaged in protection rackets, possession of illegal firearms, illegal growing and smuggling of cannabis, terrorizing motorists on the highways that cross their region, and sexual harassment of women on the streets of Beersheba, the area’s major city. 

Other social ills as well plague the Bedouin communities: polygamy, practiced by about 20% of the men, which often results in large dysfunctional families; marrying off of minor girls to older, married men; violence against women; murder of women for allegedly violating “family honor.” The public discourse in Israel treats this issue as a problem of “governability,” ignoring the underlying conditions that give rise to this kind of behavior.

Using this criminal activity as pretext, the police, led by the extreme right-wing Minister of National Security, Itamar Ben-Gvir, recently placed the Bedouin community of Tirabin al-Sanaa under siege for two weeks, terrorizing the population and killing one resident who did not pose any danger to them. 

They also confiscated all of four rifles, two handguns and several hand grenades. According to police, two more Bedouin communities are up for similar treatment in the near future.

At the heart of the matter is a dispute over land between the Bedouins and the State of Israel. At the end of the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, only about 12,000 Bedouins were left in the Negev, out of 70,000 who had lived there before. The rest left, or were expelled, to the Gaza Strip (then under Egyptian rule) or to Jordan. 

Those who remained were concentrated in the eastern Nakab where they lived under military rule until 1966. When the military rule ended, the Bedouins demanded to be returned to their original lands, but because of the erratic nature of land registration in that area most of them did not possess title deeds. 

In 1984 Israel’s High Court of Justice, relying on a spurious interpretation of the Ottoman land law of 1858, determined that the entire Nakab was state land and the Bedouins, therefore, were trespassers there. Still, in recognition of the fact that many of them had lived in that area for generations, the state did not proceed to evacuate them by force, but tried to reach agreements with them.

The essence of these agreements was that the state would recognize the Bedouins’ ownership of their land, provided they agreed to move to townships established for that purpose and receive there, as compensation, much smaller parcels of land than the ones they originally claimed. Since 1966,

seven such townships have been established, which are among the poorest communities in Israel.

Of the 250,000 Bedouins in the Negev, about 70% live in the townships and in villages recognized by the state as legitimate communities, and the rest, unwilling to accept the terms offered by the state, live in forty-five “unrecognized villages,” shanty towns lacking the most essential infrastructure – water, electricity, sewage, paved roads, etc. 

All dwellings in those villages are considered to be illegal structures and are constantly under threat of demolition. Over the years the High Court of Justice mandated the establishment of a few schools and medical clinics in some of those villages, but these are far from providing adequate services to the population.

In 2018, before the outbreak of the Coronavirus pandemic and the Gaza war, the unemployment rate among the Bedouins in the officially recognized communities was more than double the national average, and the average income of a Bedouin wage-earner in the recognized communities was about two-thirds of the national average. 

During the school year 2018-2019, the rate of Bedouin twelfth grade students who gained a matriculation certificate, required for admission to higher education, was about 50%, compared with a national average of 70%. No comparable figures are available for the unrecognized villages, but the situation there is undoubtedly worse.

The Bedouins who live in the unrecognized villages are willing to settle with the state, but they demand adequate compensation, in the form of sufficient land and water allocation to establish agricultural communities, like the many Jewish agricultural communities in the area. 

So far the state has refused these demands and insists on relocating the Bedouins to the townships, while planning to establish additional Jewish settlements on land the Bedouins claim as their own. This approach, supposedly meant to enhance the state’s “governability” in the Negev, is not going to solve the problem of violence there, only to aggravate it.