Thus, the Coordination Framework's choice of al-Zaidi as prime minister was a shrewd move. Initiating an anti-corruption campaign, the "Dawn Offensive" (Sawlat al-Fajr) on June 28th, which has led to the arrest of large numbers of government officials, al-Zaidi sought to send a message to Trump that a new era in Iraqi politics was at hand. Trump views al-Zaidi as pursuing a more independent regional role for Iraq, namely an "Iraq First" policy. Nevertheless, after visiting the United States, al-Zaidi travelled to Tehran where he signed a number of economic agreements with Tehran. Although the visit was cordial, Iran demanded that Iraq pay a long overdue natural gas bill. For his part, al-Zaidi asked Iran to assure the safe passage of Iraqi oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz but received no assurances from the Iranians Exclusive: Tehran Pressed Al-Zaidi to Pay $11 Billion in Gas Debt |
Ali al-Zaidi: Myth vs. Reality Because no one party dominates the parliament, the selection of a new prime minister has always been a protracted process. The Coordination Framework, a coalition of Shi'a political parties, has fought over the position of prime minister since Ayad 'Allawi was the first to be chosen as prime minister after Iraq's post-Ba'thist 2005 elections. While 'Allawi was Sunni, all subsequent prime ministers have been Shi'a. Once the new political system was established, a confessional model (al-muhassasa) was instituted: a Shi'a would be prime minister, the president would be a Kurd and the speaker of parliament would be Sunni. |
The key decision in choosing a new prime minister is not his leadership qualities. What is most important is the extent to which he is able to satisfy all the key political parties in distributing control of specific ministries and government offices. A spoils system, rather than civic commitment, defines Iraqi politics. All parties seek access to state funds and contracts. As long as state funds derived from Iraq's lucrative oil revenues remain available to Iraq's power brokers, the political system, fragmented as it is, muddles along.
Citizen needs continue to be ignored Lost in this political shuffle are critically needed services required by Iraq's citizens. Because medicines imported by the state are often sold on the black market, public hospitals either lack necessary medicines or only have expired medications. Before the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War, Iraq had arguably the best health care system in the Middle East. Today that system has been seriously degraded.
Electricity is another commodity in short supply. The Iran-Iraq War and 1991 Gulf War devastated much of Iraq's infrastructure. As a result, between 30-50% of electric power is lost in transit due to dilapidated power lines. Also, much of the natural gas, which is a byproduct of oil extraction, is lost to flaring rather than captured and used to power electricity generation.
Instead, Iraq needs to import natural gas and electricity from neighboring Iran. Subsidized fees for electricity and the theft of electricity adds to Iraq's shortages. Despite billions of dollars of investment in improving the electricity sector since Saddam Husayn's regime was ousted, much of those funds has been lost to corruption.
Despite it being one of the five countries in the world experiencing the most negative impact of global warming, Iraq's government has done little to cope with the destructive effect of climate change. Agriculture in large parts of southern Iraq has collapsed due to the lack of water caused by a persistent drought and the desertification of arable land. Farmers are forced to leave their land and migrate to cities where jobs are few and far between.Drought in the Land of Plenty: The Impacts of Climate Change on Iraqi Security
The new prime minister's stated vision focus on institutional reform, empowering youth, and diversifying Iraq's economy from a centrally planned system dependent almost exclusively on oil revenues to a more open and sustainable economy. How realistic are these goals?
Ali al-Zaidi's platform First, al-Zaidi has given Ira'qs Popular Mobilization Units until September 30th to disarm and finally be placed under government control. However, there is no possibility that the PMUs will agree to this demand, leaving al-Zaidi looking weak and unable to control Iraq's internal security.Why disarmament will not solve Iraq’s civic space paradox
Further, al-Zaidi's "Dawn Offensive," whose goal is to clean up the massive corruption which infects the Iraqi state, is doomed to failure. Although he said "there is no red line" in attacking corruption, meaning that officials at the highest level will not be exempt from arrest and prosecution, the campaign thus far tells a very different story.
Arrests have been limited to second and third tier state ministers and their deputies. Most have been officials associated with former prime minister Muhammad Shia al-Sudani's party. While publicly supporting the anti-corruption campaign, al-Sudani's Development and Reconstruction Coaction has privately attacked al-Zaidi's tactics, together with other Shi'a parties in Iraq's parliament. The key issue here is that the anti-corruption campaign is targeting individual politicians, not the institutional structure of corruption which is the core of the problem Iraqi PM faces backlash from political parties over his bold anti-corruption drive
According to Iraqi sources, Nuri al-Maliki controls many of al-Zaidi's decision-making. The main focus of the Dawn Offensive in targeting al-Sudani's supporters would seem to substantiate this argument. If so, al-Maliki has been able to make an end run around the Trump White House and, in a de facto sense, is currently running Iraqis politics.
One of the main grievances of Iraqi youth is their inability to obtain jobs, especially those in the state bureaucracy. This was one of the causes of the October 2019 Revolution (Thawrat Tishrin). Indeed, there have been many examples of university graduates, even those with Ph.D. in science and technology, being told that employment was dependent on paying a large bribe to ministry officials. Often lacking the funds, highly educated youth have been forced to engage instead in menial work. The Killing of Qasem Suleimani and Iraq’s October Revolution: What Western Analysts Aren’t Telling You But What You Need to Know
The chickens came home to roost in Iraq long ago One of the colossal failures of US foreign policy was appointing politicians to powerful political position's in Iraq according to their confessional identity. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz argued, after Saddam Husayn's regime was toppled, that giving Iraq's Shi'a political power would assure continued American influence in Baghdad.
Wolfowitz's argument was common among neo-conservatives. Because the Shi'a they argued, like the Jewish people, had suffered historical persecution bt Sunni Muslims (who dominated Saddam's regime), they would forever thankful to the United States for giving them political power.
This argument was absurd for many reasons. First, the Shi'a politicians the Bush administration supported, such as Nuri al-Maliki appointed prime minister in 2006, were allies of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Many had lived in exile in Iran while Saddam's regime was in power.
![]() |
| George Bush meeting with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, Dec 2006 |
'Abd al-'Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Republic In Iraq SCIRI),formed in 1982 in Iran and led for its first 2 years by members of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, was a key adviser to the Bush administration prior to and after the US invasion of Iraq. All of the Shi'a exiles Bush chose, with Wolfowitz's encouragement, were authoritarian and ultimately highly corrupt. The rule of the turban
Second, Iraqis are much more committed to tribal culture than formal Islam. Virtually, all Arab tribes have both Sunni ands Shi'a clans and there has been high rates of Sunni-Shi'a marriages, especially in large cities such as Baghdad. Indeed, Iraqis who visited the White House foudn it highly insulting when Geirge Bush consistently began by asking whether they were Sunni or Shi'a. (For a critique of post-2003 US policy in Iraq, see my: From the Promise of Democracy to Sectarian Capture of the State: United States Policy and the Building of a New Political Order in Post-Ba'thist Iraq)
However, 2 days before the trip, pro-Iranian militias attacked Saudi Arabia. The attack led to joint Saudi- American attacks on militia forces which killed 20 fighters, including advisors from Iran's IRGC. The furious PMU blowback was immediate. Not only was al-Zaidi was forced to cancel his trip, but request a meeting at the United Nations to condemn the attackst. Meanwhile, he PMU demanded that the Iraqi government develop a response to what it termed the "United States-Saudi aggression." 20 PMF members killed, 32 wounded in attacks across Iraq
What these militia attacks on Saudi Arabia make clear, Iran will use its Iraqi proxies to prevent the development of further economic ties with Saudi Arabia. Because economic development is purportedly one of al-Zaidi's main calling cards, it is doubtful that Iraq will see any Saudi investments any time soon. Further, if Iraq gets dragged into the US-Iran conflict, US and other foreign investors will be reluctant to commit to new economic projects as well.
Ali al-Zaidi's future as Iraq's prime minister. Iraqis have a saying about their politicians. They call them "burnt cards" (al-awraq al-mahruqa). These are politicians who have lost their ability to influence politics. Instead, they become nothing more than pawns for other more powerful political forces to manipulate. Based al-Zaidi's track record during the short time he has been in office, he too will join the ranks of the "burnt cards.


No comments:
Post a Comment