The following is the Arabic translation of my post, "Charlie Hebdo and the murders in France: Is there a problem with Islam?," which was published by al-Mada newspaper in Iraq on Jan. 21, 2015.  I would like to thank my colleague, Dr. Faris Kamal Nadhmi, and the Editor-in-Chief of al-Mada, Fakhri Karim, for translating and publishing my post

 

جرائم شارلي إيبدو : هل هناك مشكلة مع الإسلام ؟

أريك دافيس/ترجمة المدى

تأتي جرائم القتل المروعة التي تم تنفيذها على كادر مجلة شارلي إيبدو الفرنسية الساخرة وفي مركز كوشر للتسوق في باريس، بعد تنفيذ عدد من الهجمات باسم الإسلام، تتمة لهجمات سابقة نفذّها  أفراد كالهجوم على مقهى في سيدني بأستراليا و البرلمان الكندي في أوتاوا، كما أنها تتضمن هجمات من قبل منظمات كالهجوم على مول ويست غيت في نيروبي، وفي كينيا على يد الشباب ، و خطف 200 طالبة مدرسة والقتل الجماعي شمال شرق نيجيريا من قبل بوكو حرام ، و قطع رؤوس الصحفيين الغربيين و عمّال الإغاثة  إضافة إلى قتل القوات العراقية و رجال العشائر على يد تنظيم داعش في سوريا و العراق . 

 

كيف ينبغي لنا ان ننظر إلى هذا العنف الذي يتّسم بالوحشية و العشوائية ؟

لنبدأ بالسؤال : ما هي الفئات التي تستخدمها وسائل الإعلام و المحللون في وصف ما حدث في باريس و غيرها؟ الفئة الأبرز استخداما لوصف أعمال العنف أعلاه هي فئة الجهاد. الإرباك الذي سبّبه التركيز على هذا المصطلح – بدلا من المفاهيم الأساسية الأخرى – يحتاج إلى معالجة.

 

أولا، ان مفهوم الجهاد حدّده المتطرفون المتشددون، و قد استخدم تفسيرهم لتبرير الهجمات على مجموعة واسعة من الأهداف. ثانيا، هؤلاء المتطرفون يزعمون ان الجهاد هو محور الإسلام، لكي يبينوا لغير المسلمين ان الإسلام هو دين قائم على العنف . إذا اعتبرنا ان هناك محلّلين في الغرب يعادون الإسلام لعدة أسباب، فسوف ننتهي في نهاية المطاف إلى توافق مصالح ضار بين المتطرفين الذين يعملون باسم إسلام مشوّه اخترعوه، من جهة، و بين غير المسلمين المعادين للإسلام من جهة أخرى . ان المغالطة في تصنيف جرائم القتل التي وقعت في باريس، و غيرها من العنف والجرائم التي قام بها المتطرفون المتشددون، تحت مفهوم الجهاد هي ان الجهاد لا علاقة له بالعنف في معناه الأساسي. 

 

كما يعرف الكثيرون فإن الكلمات في اللغات السامية ( مثل الآرامية و العبرية و العربية ) مبنية على جذر من ثلاثة أصوات صحيحة، و في هذه الحالة فان الفعل (جهد) يعني ببساطة بذلَ جهدا . لقد ميّز الإسلام بين الجهاد الأكبر و الجهاد الأصغر؛ الأول يتطلب من المؤمن ان يبذل جهده للتقرّب إلى الله، إنها عملية روحانية لا علاقة لها باستخدام القوة. أما الجهاد الأصغر فانه يدعو المسلم للدفاع عن الأمة الإسلامية عند تعرّضها لتهديد أو هجوم . لغرض توضيح البعد بين مفهوم الجهاد و مفهوم العنف، علينا ان نلاحظ مفهوم الاجتهاد – أي استخدام العقل البشري في تفسير و تطبيق تعاليم الإسلام- و هو مشتق من الفعل جاهدَ. علاوة على ذلك، 

 

فان رجل الدين في المذهب الشيعي يعرف بالمجاهد – و هو الشخص الذي يمتلك فهما و خبرة دينية صحيحة لتطبيق فكرة الجهاد . 

مع ذلك، فان مغالطة الإشارة إلى العنف الذي يمارس باسم الجهاد تذهب إلى أبعد من تعريفها المنصوص عليه في الإسلام. أولا، من بين مسلمي العالم الذين يبلغ عددهم 1.6 مليار، ترفض الأغلبية الساحقة تطبيق مصطلح الجهاد على الفظائع التي ارتكبها الأخوان كواتشي في باريس و غيرها من الممارسات التي ذكرت أعلاه. ثانيا، هناك قلة فقط من الذين يعتبرون أنفسهم مسلمين ينخرطون في العنف الوحشي العشوائي الذي شهده العالم على مدى العام الماضي. ان استخدام مصطلح الجهاد كما يعرّفه المتطرفون يشابه تعريف المسيحية من قبل محاكم التفتيش الإسبانية و الإيطالية ، و أعمال قتل الأميركان من أصول أفريقية على يد منظمة كوكلوكس كلان - التي تتخذ من الصليب المحروق رمزا لها - و أعمال منظمات التفوق المسيحي الأبيض في الولايات المتحدة مثل الأمة الآرية و بوسيه كوميتاتوس ، أو اعتصام الجنازات العسكرية من قبل كنيسة ويستبورو المعمدانية المعادية للسامية .

 

 ثالثا، ان الأغلبية العظمى من المتطرفين المشاركين في الأعمال الوحشية كالتي وقعت في باريس، لا يعرفون شيئا عن الإسلام الحقيقي. في الواقع، و في أغلب مناطق الغرب، غالبا ما يكون الذين يرتكبون أعمال العنف ضد مدنيين أبرياء، من الشباب الذين يعرفون عن الثقافة الغربية أكثر مما يعرفون عن الثقافة الإسلامية . أمضى محمد عطا – الذي قاد هجمات الحادي عشر من أيلول – مساء يوم الثامن من أيلول 2001 يحتسي الشراب في أحد البارات في هوليوود و يمارس ألعابا على الفيديو، حيث بلغ هو و رمزي بن الشهب و رفيق آخر غير معروف درجة الثمالة – و هو أمر لا يتوقعه أحد من مسلم متديّن. بنفس الشكل، كان الأخوان كواتشي – سعيد و شريف –يتيمين و من صغار المجرمين و معروف عنهما تدخين الماريجوانا وعشقهما لرقص الراب قبل أن يقعا تحت تأثير رجل دين متطرف – فريد بنيتو – و مسجد الدعوة في منطقة ستالين غراد في باريس. شجّعهما بنيتو – الذي لديه علاقة بتنظيم القاعدة في الجزيرة العربية – على الذهاب إلى اليمن للتدريب العسكري (ديلي ميل ، 11 ك2 ، 2015 ) . مرة أخرى، لم تكن هناك علاقة بين الدوافع الاجتماعية والسياسية وراء هجمات الأخوين كواتشي و بين الدين، وإنما كانت لها علاقة قوية بوعود بينيتو في جعلهما من كبار الرجال.

 

هنا نبدأ التطرّق إلى شرح أكثر إقناعاً للإرهاب الذي نراه يمارس باسم الإسلام. شباب لا يمتلكون الكثير من الثقافة، مع انعدام فرص العمل، لا أمل لهم في المستقبل يقعون تحت تأثير المتطرفين المتشددين ثم تبدأ تغذيتهم بمجموعة من الأفكار المشوهة و إفهامهم بأن أعمال العنف " تحمي المسلمين " و تقود إلى " الشهادة ". 

 

بعيدا عن الجهاد و التطرّف الإسلامي ، فان أحد المفاهيم الرئيسية التي غابت عن معظم التحليلات في وسائل الإعلام هو الطبقة الاجتماعية. كان العنف الذي مارسه الأخوان كواتشي هو عنف اثنين من الشباب المسلمين المهمّشين اللذين كانا إما عاطلين عن العمل أو يعملان بشكل متقطع. كانا يعيشان في منطقة من باريس معزولة إلى حد كبير عن المجتمع الفرنسي التقليدي . المجموعة الأخرى من المتغيرات التي غابت عن مناقشة العنف الإرهابي هي انهيار الأيديولوجيات العلمانية. ترتبط الليبرالية الغربية على نحو متصاعد مع ارتفاع مستويات عدم المساواة و تراجع الخدمات الاجتماعية و انعدام الحساسية بالفروق الثقافية. بنفس الشكل، تبدو الاشتراكية وانها ستراتيجية قضت تاريخيا، حيث ينظر إليها على أنها نتاج حكم استبدادي و فساد دولة واسع النطاق وانعدام التنمية الاقتصادية . مع المعدلات العالية للهجرة بين البلدان، الناتجة عن انعدام الفرص الاقتصادية و التعليمية ، 

 

فقد تقوض الشعور بالوطنية أيضا. عند مقارنة داعش وجبهة النصرة في سوريا مع الحركات المبكرة مثل حركة ماو ماو و حزب العمال الكردستاني و القوات الثورية الكولومبية أو الجبهة الشعبية – التي سعت كل منها إما إلى السيطرة على دولة سيادية موجودة أو تأسيس دولة جديدة – نرى ان المنظمات الإرهابية الحالية ترفض نموذج الدولة القومية ذات السيادة التي تقدّس الغرب بكل أبعادها . بالنسبة إلى مجموعة داعش، فان " خلافتها " هي الشكل الوحيد المقبول لمنظمة سياسية، و مثل الرايخ الثالث، المقصود منها ان تضم العالم بأسره في نهاية المطاف. 

 

الأخوان كواتشي هما مجندان مثاليان لمنظمات مثل داعش، فكلاهما يتيمان هاجر والداهما من الجزائر لكنهما توفيا عندما كان الأخوان صغيرين . بما أنهما غير مقبولين من كلا المجتمعين، الجزائري و الفرنسي، فلم تكن لهما علاقات عاطفية قوية تربطهما بأي من الدولتين. و لكونهما يعملان بشكل متقطع و مهمشين ثقافيا في فرنسا، فانهما يمثلان جيلا جديدا من الشباب العابر للحدود الذي لا دولة له والذي يعتبر نموذجا ممتازا للتجنيد في الحركات الإرهابية . 

 

زعم بعض المراقبين ان هناك حاجة للتعليم كوسيلة للتغلّب على التهميش الذي تعانيه أعداد كبيرة من شباب العوائل المهاجرة خاصة من الجزائر – المستعمرة الفرنسية القديمة. لكن مع هذا، فان التعليم بلا توظيف يعتبر شرطا ضروريا لكنه ليس كافيا لمواجهة الإرهاب. ما لم يحصل سكان فرنسا المسلمون على فرصة للارتقاء والتخلص من الطبقات الدنيا، فانهم سيظلون أرضا خصبة يمكن ان يستغلها المتطرفون المتشددون لترويج العنف. 

 

يجب ان يقر الاتحاد الأوروبي بأن مشكلة المجتمعات المهاجرة – سواء في فرنسا أو الدنمارك أو المملكة المتحدة أو السويد و غيرها من بلدان أوروبا التي تتواجد فيها مشكلة الاندماج الاجتماعي الثقافي – هي مشكلة أوروبية وليست مقصورة على بعض بلدان الاتحاد. تمويل الاتحاد الأوروبي لمنظمات المجتمع المدني، التي توفر فرصاً للشباب من مختلف الديانات و الخلفيات العرقية ، يمكن ان يبدأ عملية تجعل كافة المجتمعات تشعر بأنها جزء من الاتحاد الأوروبي . في إسبانيا ، شكّل الشباب الإسباني المسيحي و العلماني منظمات تحاول التواصل مع مهاجري شمال أفريقيا الذين جاءوا لإسبانيا للانخراط في الأعمال الزراعية، لكنهم يعيشون في أحياء حضرية تقل فيها فرص الاندماج بالمجتمع الإسباني الأكبر. استخدم هؤلاء الشباب الذاكرة التاريخية لأندلس المسلمين التي شهدت تركيبة غير اعتيادية من التعاليم الإسلامية و المسيحية و اليهودية قبل استرجاعها في ظل حكم الملكة أيزابيلا التي طردت السكّان المسلمين و اليهود بعد عام 1492. 

 

بالعودة إلى السؤال: هل هناك مشكلة مع الإسلام ؟ أولا، عندما نشير إلى المتطرفين المتشددين، فان مصطلح " الإسلام المتطرف" هو مصطلح خاطئ كخطأ استخدام مصطلح " اليهودية المتطرفة" أو " المسيحية المتطرفة". ما نتحدث عنه حقيقةً هو تسييس الدين. المصطلح المناسب هنا هو الإسلاموية وليس الإسلام. كما هي الحال مع اليهودية و المسيحية، ففي الإسلام أيضا ليست هناك متطلبات سياسية كي تصبح منتسبا لدين ما. و كما هي الحال مع الدين المسيّس، فان السياسة تأتي في المقدمة – بمعنى السعي للسلطة و النفوذ الاقتصادي – و بعد ذلك تأتي التعبئة الدينية، بطريقة مشوهة ، للمساعدة في تسهيل تحقيق الأهداف السياسية و الاقتصادية ، كما فعلت منظمة كوكلوكس كلان . في نفس الوقت، فان رجال الدين المسلمين المعتدلين بحاجة إلى المزيد من المساعدة في محاربة العنف و الدعاوى الفوضوية لرجال الدين المتطرفين الذين يعرضون دينا مخترعا. المسجد هو دار للعبادة و ليس مكانا لتجنيد الشباب من الذكور و الإناث لقتل أولئك الذين يشعر رجال الدين المصطنعون بوجوب قتلهم. 

 

على فرنسا و الاتحاد الأوروبي و كافة بلدان العالم إما تعزيز أو تمرير القوانين التي تعاقب بشدة الذين يستخدمون الدين كملاذ لتعزيز الكراهية و العنف، كما قمعت الحكومة الفيدرالية للولايات المتحدة منظمة كوكلوكس كلان في سنوات الستينات و أنهت عهدها الإرهابي ضد الأميركيين الأفارقة . حاليا، يعتبر إيقاف أولئك الذين يقتلون الآخرين على أساس العرق أو الدين أمرا مهما للغاية. مع ذلك، فان معالجة العوامل الكامنة التي تدفع الشباب المسلم إلى الانخراط في هذا النوع من الأعمال المروعة، كالتي شهدناها قبل أيام في فرنسا، تعتبر أمرا بالغ الأهمية من أجل إيقاف ومنع انتشار العنف الإرهابي الذي يمارس في ظل الفهم الخاطئ للإسلام .

عن: وورلد تريبيون

Charlie Hebdo and the murders in France: Is there a problem with Islam?

The Kouachi brothers - Said and Cherif

Is there a problem with Islam?  The horrific murders carried out this week against  the staff of the French satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, and at a Kosher supermarket in Paris, follow a number of attacks carried out in the name of Islam.  These include attacks by individuals, such as the attack on a cafe in Sydney Australia, and the Canadian parliament in Ottawa.

They also include attacks by organizations such as that on the Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya by al-Shabab, the kidnapping of 200 school girls and the mass killings in northeast Nigeria by Boko Haram, and the beheadings of Western journalists and aid workers, as well as the slaughter of Iraqi troops and tribesmen, by the so-called Islamic State in Syria and north central Iraq.

How should we view this violence which is especially vicious in its indiscriminate nature?  Is this violence rooted in Islam, or do we need recourse to a larger narrative to understand what is taking place?

The Kouachis  kill a policeman protecting Charlie Hebdo

Let's begin by asking: what are the categories that the media and analysts use in explaining what took place in Paris and elsewhere?  The most prominent category used to describe the violence above is that of Jihad (al-jihad).  The confusion created by the focus on this term, rather than other more fundamental concepts, needs to be addressed.

First, the concept of jihad has been appropriated by radical extremists whose interpretation is used to justify attacks on a wide variety of targets.  Second, these extremists argue that (their definition of) jihad is central to Islam, ergo signifying to many non-Muslims that Islam is a religion based on violence.

If we consider that there are analysts in the West and elsewhere who are hostile to Islam for a wide variety of reasons, then we end up with a perverse correspondence of interests between extremists who act in the name of an invented and distorted Islam, on the one hand, and those non-Muslims who are hostile to Islam, on the other.

The fallacy of subsuming the murders that occurred in Paris, as well other murders and violence conducted by radical extremists, under the concept of jihad is that jihad has nothing to do with violence in its most fundamental meaning.  As many know, words in Semitic languages (e.g., Aramaic, Hebrew, and Arabic) are built on a tri-consonent root, in this case ja ha da, which simply means to exert effort.

Islam makes the distinction between the "Greater Jihad," and the "Lesser Jihad."  The former entails the effort of the Believer to engage in activities that will bring her/him closer to God (Allah).  It is a spiritual process and has no relationship to the use of force.  The "Lesser Jihad" calls upon Muslim to defend the Islamic community (al-umma al-Islamiya) when it is threatened or attacked.

To show how far the notion of jihad is from that of violence, we should note that the concept of al-ijtihad,  the use of human reason to interpret and apply the teachings of Islam, is based on the root ja ha da.  Further, a cleric in Shiism is known as al-mujtahid, one who has the proper religious training to apply the notion of al-ijtihad.

However, the fallacy of referring to the violence conducted under the aegis of "jihad" goes far beyond its textual definition in Islam.  First, of the world's 1.6  billion Muslims, the overwhelming majority reject the application of the term al-jihad to the type of atrocities conducted by the Kouachi brothers in Paris or the other acts referenced above.

9/11 mastermind Muhammad Atta

Second, only a minute fraction of those who consider themselves Muslims engage in the type of brutal and indiscriminate violence that the world has witnessed over the past year.  Using the term "jihad" as defined by radical extremists, is equivalent to defining Christianity by the Spanish and Italian inquisitions, the lynchings of African-Americans by the Ku Klux Klan - whose symbol is the burning cross - the actions of white Christian supremacist groups in the United States such as the Aryan Nation, Posse Comitatus, United Klans of America, or by the picketing of military funerals by the the anti-Semitic and homophobic Westboro Baptist Church.

Members of the Westboro Baptist Church

Third, the overwhelming majority of radical extremists who engage in the atrocities such as those carried out in Paris this week know little of nothing of formal Islam.  Indeed, in much of the West, those who have perpetrated violent acts against innocent civilians are often youth who are more acquainted with Western that Islamic culture.  Muhammad Atta, the leader of the 9/11 attackers, spent the evening of September 8, 2001 in a bar, Shuckum's Oyster Bar and Grill, in Hollywood, Florida, playing video-games and pool, where he, Ramzi bin al-Shihb, and an unidentified companion, became highly intoxicated - not the behavior one would expect of a devout Muslim.

Father says 2 youth radicalized by "Call of Duty" video game

Often, members of terrorist cells and organizations not only know little of formal Islam but show little interest in religion.  Numerous reports on the Islamic State in its defacto capital, al-Raqqa, in Syria, and elsewhere, describe its fighters wiling the day away playing video-games when they are not on the  battlefield.  As the late Troy Kastigar, a 28 year old Minneapolis resident, Muslim convert and al-Shibab recruit, put it in a famous YouTube video, the Somali terrorist organization  represents "the true Disneyland."

Troy Kastigar in al-Shabab video

Cherif Kouachi as rapper

The two Kouachi brothers, Said and Cherif, were orphans and petty criminals, known to smoke marihuana and love rap before coming under the influence of a radical cleric, Farid Benyettou, at the Adda’wa mosque in the Stalingrad district of Paris. Benyettou, who had ties to al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) encouraged them to go to Yemen for military training (The Daily Mail, Jan. 11, 2015).


Again, the social and political dynamics behind the Kouachi brothers attacks had little to with religion and much to do with Benyettou's promise to make them "big men."  Here we begin to touch upon a more cogent explanation for the terrorism that we see carried out in the name of Islam. Young men, who have little education, few employment opportunities, and no hope in the future, are brought under the influence of radical extremists.  They are then fed a group of distorted ideas and told that carrying out violent acts will "protect Muslims" and lead to "martyrdom."

Radical "cleric" Farid Benyettou

It is important to note that, in the United States, where Muslims are more integrated into American society than in European states, we do not see the type of violence that we find in Europe.  For one, the US does not have the colonial past of Great Britain and France which has resulted in significant migration of citizens of their former colonies to their respective countries.  In France, Muslims constituted 5-6 million of a population of 52 million Frenchmen and many have been born in France.

Moving beyond jihad and radical Islam One key concept that is missing in almost all of the analysis in the media is that of social class.  The violence carried by the Kouachi brothers was that of two marginalized Muslim youth who were either unemployed or semi-employed.  They lived in a section of Paris largely divorced from traditional French society.

Photograph of bullets from Said Kouachi's Facebook page

Another set of variables missing from the discussion of terrorist violence is the collapse of secular ideologies.  Increasingly Western liberalism is associated with rising levels of inequality, declining social services and lack of sensitivity to cultural difference.  Socialism is likewise seen as a historically spent ideology.  It is viewed as producing authoritarian rule, extensive state corruption,  and lack of economic growth.

With higher levels of trans-national migration, caused by lack of economic and educational opportunity, nationalism has also been undermined.  Comparing the Islamic State and the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria to earlier movements such as the Mau Mau movement, the PKK, the FARC, or the PFLP - each of which either sought to take control of an existing nation-state or create a new one, we see that current terrorist organizations reject the Westphalian state model of sovereign nation-states in all its dimensions.

For the IS, its "caliphate" is the only acceptable form of political organization and, like the Third Reich, is meant to eventually encompass the entire world.  The Kouachi brothers are quintessential recruits for terrorist organizations like the IS.  Both were orphans whose parents had immigrated from Algeria but died when the brothers were very young.

Neither Algerian, nor accepted by mainstream French society, the Kouachis did not have strong affective ties to any specific nation-state.  Intermittently employed, and culturally marginalized in France, they represent a new déclassé transnational demographic of "state-less" youth - prospects par excellence for being recruited to terrorist movements.


Some observers have argued for the need for education as a means of overcoming  the marginalization experienced by large numbers of youth of immigrant families, mostly from France's former colony, Algeria.  However, education without employment is a necessary but not sufficient condition for confronting terrorism.  Unless France's Muslim population has the chance of upward mobility and escape the lower classes, there will continue to be fertile soil that radical extremists can exploit to promote terrorist violence.

Policy prescriptions The European Union needs to recognize that the problem of immigrant communities, whether in France, Denmark, the UK or Sweden - just to name a few EU countries where this problem of sociocultural integration exists - is a European problem, and not just one experienced by certain member states.  EU funding of civil society organizations that provide opportunities for youth from multiple religions and ethnic backgrounds to interact - Muslims, Christian and Jews, for example - can begin a process that makes all communities feel more a part of the EU.

In Spain, Christian and secular Spanish youth have formed organizations that attempt to reach out to North African immigrants who come to Spain to engage in agricultural work, but live in urban ghettos with little opportunity to engage with the larger Spanish society.  These Spanish youth have used the historical memory of Muslim Andalusia, which witnessed an extraordinary synthesis of Muslim-Christian-Jewish learning, before being subjected to the Reconquista under the reign of Queen Isabella who ousted the Muslim and Jewish populations after 1492.

And what of the question that I posed at the beginning of this post - is there a problem with Islam?  First, when we refer to radical extremists, the term "radical Islam" is as erroneous as using the terms "radical Judaism" or "radical Christianity."

What we are really talking about is the politicization of religion.  Here the proper term is Islamism, not Islam.  Just as in Judaism and Christianity, so too in Islam there are no political requirements for becoming a member of the faith.  As is the case with most politicized religion, politics comes first - meaning seeking power and economic influence - with religion being mobilized after the fact, and in a distorted fashion, to help facilitate achieving political and economic goals, e.g., as done by the KKK.

At the same time, moderate Muslim clerics need more help in fighting the violent and anarchist messages of radical clerics who offer an "invented religion."  The mosque is a house of worship, not a venue for recruiting young males and females to murder those who radical ersatz clerics feel should be killed.

France, the EU, and all countries of the world should either strengthen or pass laws that severely punish those who would use religion as a haven for promoting hatred and violence, just as the federal government in the United States finally suppressed the Ku Klux Klan in the 1960s and ended its reign of terror against African-Americans.

Stopping those who would murder others on the basis of ethnicity or religion is key in the immediate term.  However, addressing the underlying factors that lead Muslim youth to engage in the kind of horrific acts that we witnessed this week in France is critical to preventing the spread of and ultimately ending terrorist violence conducted in the name of a perverted understanding of Islam.

Iraq, the Gift of the Magi and the Islamic State

The Christmas celebration calls to mind the Gift of the Magi - the visit of the Three Kings ("We Three Kings of Orient Are"), or Wise Men, who came to Bethlehem bearing gifts for the newborn Christ child.

While the Three Kings brought precious offerings - gold, frankincense and myrrh - the reason for their trip was spiritual, not material.  For them, the birth of Jesus offered the possibility of a better world, one in which love, tolerance and respect for cultural diversity would become humankind's dominant values.

IS crucifixion in Raqqa, Syria

Like the Three Kings, the Islamic State (IS) has also come bearing three gifts.  However, the gifts it has given Iraq are not those that will lead to the betterment of mankind.  Instead, the IS has been responsible for indescribable violence and destruction, the displacement of thousands of law-abiding and peace loving people solely on the basis of their confession or ethnicity, and the enslavement of hundreds of women for the sexual satisfaction of its male members.   The three gifts of the Magi - juxtaposed to the three gifts IS has given to Iraq - could not be more stark.  What relevance does the parable of the Magi have for the contemporary Iraq?

IS crucifixions near Aleppo, Syria

Despite their hopes for a better future, the Three Kings lived in a violent world and had to use caution during their visit.  When Herod, the puppet Roman King of Judea, learned that the baby who had been born was purportedly the "king of the Jews," he became frightened and ordered all male children in Bethlehem and the surrounding area to be killed, a brutal act known in the Bible as the "Massacre of the Innocents."

Having killed his wife and two sons, as well as many of his subjects, Herod was viewed by many as an unstable and violence-prone psychopath.  It is said that the Three Kings had a dream in which they saw themselves threatened by Herod and, fearing for their safety, quickly and surreptitiously left Judea to return to their home countries.

The tension between the hopes of mankind for a better world, and nefarious political elites who seek to crush these aspirations to enhance their personal gain of power and wealth, existed at the birth of Christ and has continued down through the centuries.

In Iraq, this tension exists among the estimated 400,00 Christians still remaining in Iraq who yearn for a past when Muslims helped Christians celebrate Christmas, setting off fireworks and visiting their homes to partake of celebratory feasts.  Instead, due to the actions of terrorist organizations, over a million Christians have been forced to leave Iraq and, among those who remain, many have been displaced from their homes. (The New York Times, Dec. 25, 2014)

This depressing situation would not seem to augur well for Iraq's ability to establish a tolerant, stable and ultimately prosperous and democratic society.  Nevertheless, tyrannical despots such as Hitler, Saddam Husayn, Pol Pot and many others - the list is all too long - invariably meet an end that they did not plan for themselves or the people that they rule.   Either these despots die a violent death or the tyrannies they establish collapse after they die or are forced from office.  This will be the fate of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi - the so-called "Caliph Ibrahim" - who rules the "Islamic State."

Tyrannical rule is inherently unstable and, in the modern era, has always played a central role in its own destruction.  So too the IS - which originally possessed the aura of an unstoppable juggernaut - is already beginning to decay, not so much as a result of the actions of its enemies, but by the unintended consequences of its own self-defeating policies.  What, then, are IS's gifts to Iraq?

Gift Number One  The IS' first gift to Iraq is the gift of leadership.  No one would disagree with the argument that, had it not been for the IS seizure of Mosul and large areas of northern Iraq in June 2014, Nuri al-Maliki would still be Iraq's prime minister today. He would thus be in a position to continue his political and economic policies that, during his 8 years in power, were leading to the destruction of Iraq.

Maliki promoted sectarian tensions, massively increased government corruption, curtailed the personal freedoms of Iraq's citizenry, laid the foundations for a new "security state" along the same lines as the former Ba'thist regime, and undermined the Iraqi military through appointing his cronies and relatives, who possessed little or no military qualifications, to high positions in the armed forces.

Not only did the IS give the Iraqi political elite the rationale and the backbone - with strong backing from the US and the international community (including even Iran) - to force Maliki from office, but it led to the election of a prime minister who represents the first truly democratic leader in the long history of modern Iraqi politics that began with the founding of the state in 1921.

Haydar al-Abadi is the first leader to take democracy seriously in Iraq.  A Ph.D. in economics from Manchester University, he spent many years in the financial sector in the United Kingdom where he learned the "ins and outs" of a modern advanced industrialized economy.  Unlike Maliki, who spent much of his youth and adult life engrossed in political intrigue, Abadi has been a problem-solver for many years as required by his career in the private sector.

Abadi and Maliki's personal qualities and style of rule could not be more different.  Whereas Maliki is brusque and authoritarian, and saw a conspiracy and threat to his power in every political act, Abadi has reached out to his potential opponents in an effort to  avoid Maliki's "zero-sum" game approach to politics that alienated so many members of the Iraq's political elite, including many within his own Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da'wa al-Islamiya). 

When Maliki was asked while in office why he didn't pursue national reconciliation (al-musaliha al-wataniya; asht boonawiy nishtimani), Maliki always dismissed such questions. Iraq needed the "rule of law," he replied, not national reconciliation.

Haydar al-Abadi disagrees.  He is actively pursuing national reconciliation - the key prerequisite for transcending the authoritarian legacy of Ba'thist (and Maliki) rule. Recently he gave the portfolio for this task to a former (and secular) prime  minister, Ayad Allawi, another example of reaching out to the political opposition.

Whereas Maliki promoted corruption by placing loyalists in positions in the Iraqi cabinet, and throughout  the bureaucracy, military and security services, Abadi has removed over 40 incompetent officers - many of who were responsible for the ignominious defeat of the Iraqi army in Mosul and northern Iraq last June.  He has fired 50,000 "ghost soldiers" who received salaries but did not serve in the Iraqi army. He has reduced his own salary and those of his cabinet ministers, sending an important symbolic message to Iraq's citizenry that the government serves the people, not the other way around.

Prime Minister Abadi's statement that he will continue to fight corruption even if it results in his assassination would have been unheard of coming from the mouth of Nuri al-Maliki.  The very fact that Abadi makes such statements sends a new and different message to Iraq's citizens, one that has  begun to create a very different and more positive view of the central government.

Unlike Maliki who continually insulted the Kurdish leadership while pursuing spurious criminal charges against Sunni Arab political leaders who he saw as threatening his goal of building a new dictatorial regime, Abadi has reached out to the Kurdish and Sunni Arab communities.  One of his first acts was to order the Iraqi army to cease indiscriminate shelling of Sunni Arab towns and villages that were suspected of harboring IS forces and to suggest the creation of provincial national guard units that would give local communities a "buy-in" to insuring their own security.

Gift Number Two  IS's second gift to Iraq was to promote reconciliation between the Arab political elite in Baghdad and the Kurdish political elite in Arbil.  The most concrete manifestation of this reconciliation has been the conclusion of an interim oil agreement between Baghdad and Arbil, a dispute that has been ongoing since the fall of Saddam Husayn in 2003.

The oil deal has opened the way for the Kurds to address a major fiscal crisis.  The crisis' origins stem from the Kurdish Regional Government's inability to sell its oil on the world market (due to potential buyers' fears of being sued in international courts by the Iraqi government), and Maliki's retaliation for the attempt to sell oil by terminating funds used to pay the KRG's employees' salaries.  It was exacerbated after last June by the IS having disrupted the KRG's ability to export its oil through Turkey.

Inadvertently, the IS has strengthened Iraqi federalism. While the Kurds were threatening to declare independence when it appeared that Maliki would win a third term after the March 2014 parliamentary elections, those declarations have now disappeared as relations between the central government in Baghdad and the KRG have taken on a completely new quality. (al-Monitor - Iraq Pulse, December 2014)

Difficult to quantify, but perhaps most significant of all, is the symbolism of an Arab government in Baghdad beginning to respect Iraq's Kurdish population, listen to its demands, and work to reconcile Arab and Kurdish interests.  If Abadi continues moving in this positive direction, a lasting federalism could develop in Iraq that would, as it has in Canada through reconciling the Quebecois with the English speaking populace, place the country on a sound political footing.

Gift Number Three  The IS' third gift to Iraq is to have demonstrated the complete bankruptcy of its rule and to have destroyed any pretense that its so-called "Caliphate" has anything to do with Islam.  Its unparalleled brutality is so extreme as to even been criticized by other terrorist organizations including al-Qa'ida Central and the Nusra Front (Jabhat al-Nusra) in Syria.

The IS's brutality is on par with its gender politics which reduces women to slaves and sexual objects used for the pleasure of the organization's male members.  The IS executed 150 women alone in al-Anbar Province, some of whom were pregnant, for refusing to marry IS fighters (The Daily Mail, Dec 18, 2014).  The IS has sold hundreds of Christian and Yazidi women and girls into sexual slavery at "slave markets," underscoring its brutal policies yet again.

As foreign fighters have come to join the IS, many have discovered that, far from fighting to overthrow the authoritarian regime of Bashar al-Asad, they are fighting other terrorist organizations.  Coalition air strikes, which have killed over a 1000 IS members alone in the fight for the Kurdish majority town of Kobani along the Turkish-Syrian border, have further undermined morale, leading many foreign fighters to try and desert their posts.

In response, the IS has established a military police and begun executing fighters caught trying to flee the battlefield. (Financial Times, December 19, 2014).  With conditions worsening by the day in Mosul, large numbers of IS fighters have left the city, especially after the recent defeat of the IS on Mount Sinjar by Kurdish peshmerga forces. (Niqash , Dec 24, 2014)

Whereas the Wise Men brought the Christ child three gifts in the hope that his birth signaled a new world based on love, caring and mutual respect among all peoples, so too has the IS come bearing three gifts.  However, in the latter instance, the gifts it has given Iraq are the unintended consequences of its brutal and destructive policies.

No one would ever wish the IS on Iraq, Syria on any other country.  Still, if the IS attack against Iraq leads to a stronger political system, one based on a true federalism and a more rational administrative system in which corruption is seriously tackled and the government begins delivering badly needed social services to the Iraqi populace, then the events of the past 6 months may ultimately have a positive outcome.

Leadership, a strengthened federalism, and the delegitimization of its rule and claims to Islam are the three gifts that the IS has bestowed on Iraq.  One day the IS will be nothing more than a horrible memory, much like that of the so-called Third Reich that was supposed to last for a 1000 years.  Iraq, however, will persevere and be all the stronger for its defeat of the Islamic State.

(For my views on the future of Iraq's political unity, see the post, 24 Views on the Unity of Iraq, on the excellent blog, Musings on Iraq).

 

Is a political paradigm shift possible in Pakistan? Think again!

Guest contributor, Farah Jan, a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA, specializes in South Asian security affairs.

The massacre of almost 145 people, out of which 132 were children, at Army Public School Peshawar has plunged the Pakistan into a state of mourning. The attack that initiated at the start of the school day lasted for many hours and left scores of school children all under the age of 16 dead. The barbaric attack by the Pakistani Taliban was in retaliation to the army’s operation in the tribal areas.

The date is indeed ironic, on December 16^th 1971, 43 years ago Pakistan lost its eastern half that later became Bangladesh. The question is, did Pakistan learn any lesson from losing its eastern wing years ago? For one, the decision makers in Pakistan fall behind on learning by past mistakes. The atrocities that took place four decades ago were forgotten and never realized. 

There was neither a national dialogue to try to understand what went wrong nor how to prevent another catastrophe. Instead, a religious-oriented policy was adopted as the best option for national cohesion and the state continued focusing on external security rather than looking within for a comprehensive assessment. 

Currently, Pakistan is experiencing the boomerang effect of the jihadist policies that were adopted then, which in turn has further propelled it to the verge of another tragedy. Once again, the decision depends on the guardians of Pakistan to either continue with business as usual by strengthening their own myopic interests or acknowledging the problem and getting rid of this decomposing appendage conclusively.

Funeral of a student killed during the Dec 16th attack

I am not very optimistic that anything will change. Most probably, the politicians and military will make grand (albeit useless) proclamations of bravery and unity in fighting this war against the terrorists for another week/  However, by the end of the month they would have forgotten and it would be business as usual, until another soft target is hit.

If the guardians of Pakistan truly want to shift gears, then the following prescription would address the ailment that Pakistan is afflicted with for many years. This is similar to a person being diagnosed with cancer and the oncologist recommends surgical removal of the tumor followed by an aggressive dose of chemotherapy. Similarly, in Pakistan’s case a total Talibanectomy, along with other Islamic-militant-ectomy is a critically needed. 

With further combination of Rx: education + professional training + fixing the judicial system, and if affordable improving the economy and curtailing corruption, Pakistan could begin the process of serious political and social reform.  For the patient (in this case Pakistan) to pull through, the first steps must to be taken, while the latter would increase the chances of survival and decrease recurrence of the disease.

The Greek word ektomē stands for ‘excision,’ further breaking the term ek meaning ‘out’ + temnein ‘to cut.’ This is precisely what Pakistan needs to do with ALL the proxy elements, those that are kept for its India policy like the LeT (Lashkar-e-Taiba); JeM (Jaish-e-Mohammed); HuA (Harkat-ul-Ansar); the ones for Afghanistan like the Afghan Taliban, and of course the groups like the LeJ (Lashkar-e-Jhangvi); SSP (Sipah-e-Sahaba-Pakistan) that target the domestic minorities. A war on these groups is imperative and a shift in policy is indispensible for Pakistan’s guardians. 

The question of the hour is will the ruling elite change course? Is it going to wake up before the political crisis reaches the point of no return? As mentioned earlier, the chance of any major policy shift is very slim. This pessimistic assumption is grounded in the fact that a Pakistan court on Thursday (the two days after the Peshawar massacre) granted bail to Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, a militant commander of LeT accused of the 2008 Mumbai attacks that resulted in over 160 deaths.  Not unexpectedly, India has sharply condemned the court's decision.

Furthermore, the Pakistan political elite's "good and bad militant" line needs to be rejected once and for all. For the last few years we have heard the claptrap of the good and bad Taliban.  However, it is time to call a spade a spade. History has proven there never were good or bad Nazi soldiers, neither have there been good or bad Al Qaeda militants. 

How can this distinction be made for the Taliban or militants groups in Pakistan? The crux of the matter is that what makes them bad is when the attacks are on Pakistani cities, but these militant groups are considered good when the same incidents take place in Afghan or Indian cities. It’s high time the realization kicks in that these groups are like Hydra, the serpent with multiple heads each capable of a poisonous bite, and who was only defeated when all the heads were decapitated and cauterized.

Pakistan has entered a period where all efforts of salvaging domestic security have failed and war against the Taliban/Islamic militants is unavoidable. The civilian government and the people of Pakistan should pay attention to George Orwell’s advice, "he that is not with me is against me." And in this case the adversary is obvious - the TTP, LeT, JeM (a list much too long) militants, their supporters, their defenders and, of course, their apologists. 

For once, let us not draw the line of distinction between the good Afghan and the bad Pakistani Taliban. Let us not defend one group because they promote our national interest in our neighboring country, Afghanistan, and scorn the other because they attack our school kids and innocent civilians in Pakistan. 

More importantly, let us not support and provide sanctuaries to militant groups to fight an unavailing war against India. For Pakistan, the best course of action is to take steps of handing over terrorists to its neighbors. This would send a signal both to the militants and the international community that the Pakistani authorities are finally learning from past mistakes and are resolute in the war on terrorist movements.

Only through this policy can Pakistan prevent tragedies of the sort that were witnessed in Peshawar this week. Unfortunately, a paradigm shift is an unlikely scenario and one that does not suit the strategic interests of Pakistan's Guardians.  It is sad to say, but this tragedy will wither like the previous ones. I agree with Christine Fair that "tens of thousands of Pakistanis will die before the army gives up its jihad habits."

Israeli academics call upon members of the Knesset: Oppose the Jewish Nation Law

Israelis protest against the Jewish Nation Law

Guest contributor, Dr. Yoav Peled, of Tel Aviv University's Department of Political Science, is one of the world's leading experts on democracy in ethnically divided nation-states, a topic on which he has published extensively.  Dr. Peled is part of a large group of Israeli academics who oppose the proposed Jewish Nation Law as undermining equal rights for all of Israel's citizens.  Following his contribution, I enclose a Nov. 25, 2014, editorial from Haaretz, Israel's most prominent newspaper, that calls from the proposed law to be rejected by the Israeli Knesset (parliament)

Basic Law: Israel – the Nation-State of the Jewish People (the "Jewish Nation Law"), if legislated, will seriously violate the principle of equality, a fundamental constitutional principle in any democratic state, and will contradict Israel's Declaration of Independence.

The bills currently on the agenda (including those described as "moderate") seek to ground in a basic law the discrimination and inequality that currently afflict national and religious minorities in Israel and will legitimate further discriminatory legislation. Such a law does not exist in any democratic country in the world.

We, faculty members in Israel's universities and colleges, support the President of the State of Israel in opposing this proposed basic law and call on the citizens of Israel and on our representatives in the Knesset not to lend their hand to turning inequality into a fundamental value and a basic law in Israel.

Organizing Committee:

Prof. Dani Filc, Ben-Gurion University

Dr. Snait Gissis, Tel Aviv University

Prof. Aeyal Gross, Tel Aviv University

Prof. Yoav Peled, Tel Aviv University

Signed by more than 700 faculty members in Israeli universities and colleges (15% of the total number), including 9 Israel Prize laureates.

The Jewish nation-state bill only weakens Israel's democratic foundations

The State of Israel’s identity is liable to be held hostage to the desire of ministers and their parties to favor their political ambitions over democratic principles.

Haaretz Editorial, November 25, 2014 

After heavy political pressure exerted by coalition leaders, it was decided on Monday to postpone by a week a vote on the proposed basic law on the Jewish nation-state. But despite this delay, one cannot avoid stating that if these proposals in their current wording pass into law, they will remove the State of Israel from the community of democratic nations, and give it a place of honor instead beside those dark regimes in which minorities are persecuted.

The bill stipulates, among other things, that Arabic – the language of 20 percent of the country’s population – will lose its historic status as an official language; that the equal rights of minorities to live anywhere in the country will be compromised; that Jewish law, which is assimilated into Israeli law, will be given preferred status; and, most of all, that Israel’s definition as a Jewish state will prevail over its definition as a democracy.

The explanatory notes accompanying the bill state that it is required, “At a time when there are those who seek to do away with the right of the Jewish people to a national home in its land, and with the recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.” But this bill will not strengthen recognition of Israel as the Jewish people’s nation-state. It will only weaken its democratic foundations.

Beyond the dispute over whether such a law is necessary – let alone how it should be worded – it appears that Israel’s future identity has become part of a political game, in which settling personal accounts between the prime minister and some of his ministers is much more important than the threat to the status of Israel, its citizens and, particularly, its minorities.

The much-needed debate on the dangerous ramifications of this law has been replaced by speculation on whether the government can survive after it is voted on. The question of whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu means to use the law as a way of catapulting his partners/rivals out of the ring so he can establish a new coalition, or to force a new election, is overshadowing any discussion of its foolish clauses.

Thus, the State of Israel’s identity – which was never subject to dispute since its founding – is liable to be held hostage to the desire of ministers and their parties to favor their political ambitions over the principles on which a democracy should rest.

In this context, the positions of Finance Minister Yair Lapid and Justice Minister Tzipi Livni are particularly important, because their votes will determine the future of this bill and this government. Lapid and Livni made clear that they do not plan to support any versions of the bill drawn up by Zeev Elkin and Ayelet Shaked. They must be encouraged to stick to this position, even if it means dissolving the government, going to an election, and losing their places in the next cabinet. [Since this editorial was published, both Finance Minster Lapid and Justice Minster Livni were dismissed by PM Netanyahu from his government - ED]