The New Middle East

Monday, March 5, 2012

Curtailing freedom of expression in Iraq

While Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's advisers insist that the political disputes which continue to rage in Iraq are simply "the normal growing pains" of a nascent democracy, actions speak louder than words, as the memo by the National Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq below attests.

Maliki is trying to centralize power in his hands, creating what Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way call in their recent volume of the same name "competitive authoritarianism." Levitsky and Way define competitive authoritarian regimes as "civilian regimes in which formal democratic institutions exist and are widely viewed as the primary means of gaining power, but in which incumbents' abuse of the state places them at a significant advantage vis-a-vis their opponents." The core characteristics of such regimes are that "competition is real but unfair." In other words, democracy exists in name only.

Levitsky and Way fail to include any Middle Eastern states in their analysis. However, in Iraq, Maliki's State of Law Coalition is working hard to establish a political system that accords with the notion of "competitive authoritarianism." Maliki has successfully excluded the Sunni dominated al-'Iraqiya Coalition from power and is attempting to marginalize the 2 parties - the Kurdish Democratic Party and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan - which control the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) which are themselves highly authoritarian. Patronage, corruption and nepotism are the core characteristics of Iraqi politics today. The Maliki government increasingly manipulates these processes to its advantage. The result is a consistent underpinning of the ability of competing parties to wield any meaningful political influence.

Iraq's National Association for the Defense of Human Rights has published a series of directives issued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service which are designed to curb freedom of expression in Iraq. Despite knowledge of these directives, no other agency in the Maliki government has condemned them, including the Ministry of Human Rights. The memo by the Association below is yet another indicator of the ongoing efforts to curtail what citizens in any democracy have come to assume is a basic constitutional right, namely freedom of expression.

الجمعية الوطنية للدفاع عن حقوق الانسان في العراق

National Association for the Defense

of Human Rights in Iraq

Freedom of Expression is Indispensable

for Building Democracy
A number of news agencies, websites and Iraqi newspapers have published a document issued by the Iraqi Intelligence Service (Directive No. 3061, dated 20 February 2012) that requested pursuing activities organized by youths to commemorate the first anniversary of protest demonstrations that took place in Baghdad on 25^th February 2011.

The Intelligence Service directives issued the following orders:

1 – To follow-up movements.

2 – To inform officials about these movements.
3 – To record names.

4 – The purpose is to pursue these people by the relevant authorities.
5 – To take intensified security measures and provide precautionary arrangements in accordance with the law.

These directives have caused deep concern among all those who uphold democracy and the right to exercise the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, including the freedom of expression in accordance with Article 38 of the Constitution which stipulates that “the state guarantees, without prejudice to public order and morality, 1- the freedom of expression of opinion by all means .. 2 - (....) 3 - Freedom of assembly and peaceful demonstration.”

These directives, issued by a government body, are therefore not only an administrative violation but rather constitute several irregularities. First; it is a blatant violation of the Constitution. Second; it is a harmful measure directed against democracy which is the basis of the political process. Third; it is a violation of human rights that guarantee the freedom of expression in accordance with the law.

Our Association has been following up this issue since the publication of these Intelligence Service directives. It has come to the conclusion that the relevant authorities that issued these directives have not denied it. We have also checked the website of the Ministry of Human Rights but could not find any comment, statement or clarification about this blatant violation. The Ministry should have condemned this violation and demanded that the relevant authorities rescind it and abide by the principles of human rights and the section on freedoms in the Constitution.

While considering these directives of the Intelligence Service to be a grave violation of the Constitution and the right to demonstrate, we note that the demands to be raised by youth belonging to the Iraqi Communist Party in the demonstration, as referred to in these directives, do not violate the laws or the Constitution. As a matter of fact, many officials have publicly given support to these demands, such as: 1 - Providing job opportunities, 2 – Putting an end to political differences. Our Association, which defends the rights enshrined in the Constitution and the UN Charter, is therefore astonished that these rights are made a pretext for security measures which are actually of political nature. Those who are in charge of the executive bodies were presumably themselves victims of human rights violations, and if this is so, how can they relish the practice of violations that are prohibited constitutionally after the fall of the dictatorial regime?!

Our Association calls upon those who issued the above-mentioned directives to announce publicly that they are abolished, as well as apologizing for issuing them. We also call upon all the authorities that implement laws to undertake a systematic study of the Constitution and abide professionally by the rights of Iraqi citizens as stipulated by the Constitution and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

National Association for the Defense of Human Rights in Iraq

Baghdad - 28 February 2012

العنوان: شارع السعدون ــ عمارة مكية ــ ط3 ــ قرب المسرح الوطني

Email: iraqhumanrights@yahoo.de

Monday, February 13, 2012

What can Iraqi merchants tell us about the impact of sanctions on Iran?

Will Israel attack Iran? Will the US give Israel the “green light” to conduct such an attack? Might the US even join Israel in attacking Iran? The rhetoric surrounding Iran’s development of a nuclear energy program has increased dramatically during the past month, particularly after Defense Secretary, Leon Panetta, suggested that an Israeli might attack Iran might as soon as this coming May or June.

Clearly, Iran’s nuclear program is not limited to increasing its energy production. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has stated that the program is not limited to energy, but intended instead to lay the basis for developing nuclear weapons. Israel is concerned that if it waits, Iran will have time to bury its nuclear program in underground bunkers after which it will immune to air attacks.

The behavior of Iraqi merchants may suggest reasons why Israel and the US should think twice about mounting an attack on Iran. Merchants in the Shiite shrine cities of al-Najaf, Karbala’, and the Baghdad quarter of al-Kadhimiya, site of the splendid al-Kadhimayn Mosque which celebrates Twelver Shiism's 7th Imam, Musa al-Kadhim (a mosque I once had the great fortune to visit), and elsewhere in Iraq, are increasingly refusing to accept the Iranian toman (rial).

Iraqi merchants who serve the thousands of Iranian pilgrims who travel to Iraq to visit Shiite holy sites, and who trade with Iran, state that, if the toman continues to lose its value, they will no longer accept Iranian currency. While many merchants express sympathy for Iranian pilgrims who, they point out, are often of very modest means, they cannot afford to continue to lose money. As one money changer noted, a month and a half ago he exchanged $10,000 daily in tomans while now that figure has dropped to only a $1000 per day.

Hotel owners in al-Najaf and elsewhere likewise complain about the decline in value of the toman. An owner of a large hotel in al-Najaf, Khalid Abu al-Jeej, notes that many hotel owners have been experiencing a sharp drop in profits. As a result, many are only accepting payments from Iranian guests in US dollars. Of course, as the Iranian toman buys less Iraqi dinars, fewer pilgrims are visiting Iraq, further cutting into the profits of both Iraqi and Iranian businessmen.

The drop in the value of Iran's currency is not only significant because it is hurting Iranian pilgrims and Iraqi and Iranian merchants. The economic narrative is much broader and more complex than that. The Iranian middle classes are scrambling to convert their tomans into dollars. Many Iraqis have been hired by Iranians to convert tomans into US dollars at Iraqi banks. This behavior has led the Iraqi Central Bank to begin to impose restrictions on who can change tomans into dollars, putting further pressure on the Iranian currency. Iranians hire Iraqis to convert tomans into dollars as a hedge against further losses as the toman continues to lose value.

What do these developments have to do with the current Iranian nuclear weapons crisis? The rapid loss of value of the Iranian toman suggests that the international sanctions imposed on Iran are having serious negative consequences for its economy. President Obama has shown excellent leadership skills in refusing to succumb to the rhetoric of a nuclear armed Iran, which is being used to mobilize an attack on Iran. Instead, President Obama has chosen to pursue a steady ratcheting up of the international sanctions regime which is now having a serious impact on Iran.

Already there are signs that the Iranian regime is very nervous at the international opposition to its nuclear program. It realizes that its position domestically is not particularly strong. On the one hand, there is intense infighting currently underway within the political elite that sets the supporters of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad against those of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei. On the other hand, the regime faces declining popularity among the populace at large. Both of these considerations mean that challenging the US, Israel, the European Union, and other major powers such as India is not necessarily the most sensible policy to be pursuing at the present time.

In an earlier post, I discussed the possible consequences of an attack on Iran and argued that it would be a lose-lose situation for all parties concerned. If Israel attacks Iran, international sympathy will swing towards the Islamic Republic and further isolate Israel in the Middle East and the larger international community. For Iran, such an attack could set in motion processes that lead to the collapse of the regime. For the US and the West, an attack on Iran would result in huge increases in the price of oil, dealing a serious blow to the global economy and sending many countries into an even deeper recession.

For Iraq, the continued economic travails faced by Iran - problems that will only increase in the short term - are having a negative impact on its own economy. These problems are raising questions inside Iraq about the Maliki government’s close ties to the current Iranian regime. Questions include: why should Iraq be so closely allied with a regime that is becoming an international pariah?

Steady as she goes - to invoke a tried and true saying - is the best antidote for Iran’s effort to become a nuclear power. Tightening the existing sanctions regime and persuading Iran’s trading partners not to purchase its oil will bring Iran to the bargaining table. This can be accomplished in time to prevent Iran from achieving an end that no one, aside from its few allies, wants to become a reality, namely the development of nuclear weapons which would further destabilize the Middle East, an outcome that the region can ill afford.

(For more information on Iraqi responses to Iran's economic woes, see al-Hayat, February. 6, 2012)

Friday, February 10, 2012

Opposition Groups in Syria: Myths and Realities

Guest author - Andrew Spath

Revolutionary periods have a way of compressing history. Events unfold so quickly, and the flow of information is so dense, that our ability to comprehend them is diminished. This condition pervades the present political situation in Syria, fostering numerous popular fictions that contribute to miscalculating strategies of action. Two related popular fictions stand out in assessing the prospects of prolonged civil conflict or outright civil war. The first fiction insinuates a clear bifurcation between regime supporters and regime opponents. The second fiction, related to the first, suggests that sectarian divisions define clear lines of support and opposition to the Ba‘athist regime.

Fears abound among analysts and onlookers, including the Arab League Secretary General Nabil al-Arabi, that Syria is moving closer to a civil war that would include drastic consequences for its neighbors. [1] The protocol between the Arab League and the Syrian government to send observers to Syria[2] has thus far failed to stem the violent repression of on-the-ground activists. Opposition groups in and out of Syria[3] and some of the Arab League observers themselves[4] have little faith in the mission as currently constituted. Amid intense debate in and out of Syria over the internationalization of the crisis and outside intervention, there is consensus among opposition groups on the desire for a change in governance. However, there is little programmatic unity over how to change it and what will follow it.

Much of the commentary on the situation in Syria – as was the case in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain, and elsewhere – pits the government and its supporters against “the opposition.” United in the desire to see traditional Ba‘ath Party dictatorship give way to some form of pluralism in “the Syria of tomorrow,” [5] opposition groups otherwise diverge on crucial issues pertaining to both the short-term strategies of resistance and long-term political and ideological commitments. [6] Identifying and discussing “the opposition” in monolithic terms reifies the notion that there is a single voice to which opposition positions and statements can be attributed, [7] ignoring clear and consequential differences among its diffuse parts.

The Arab League and international community have made clear the importance of a cohesive opposition with diverse representation. In a meeting with representatives of the Syrian National Council (SNC), the most visible coalition of opposition groups outside the country, Hillary Clinton stated directly that “the future and legitimacy of the opposition depends on its… ability to organize and unify its ranks,” prompting efforts to work toward consolidation. [8] Yet the ability to coalesce around shared interest in ending autocratic rule in Syria remains elusive.

The challenge is most apparent among the two most prominent and internally diverse umbrella organizations – the SNC and the National Coordinating Body (NCB). While disagreements within the SNC have been apparent since its genesis, [9] in-fighting flared recently over a draft agreement between the two organizations, signed by SNC leader Burhan Ghalioun and NCB representative Haytham al-Manna, that was summarily rejected by the SNC executive council. [10] The most contentious points of disagreement are support of foreign intervention, dialogue with Assad’s government, and relations with the Free Syrian Army. [11]

Fissures within the opposition in general, and within the SNC itself, are exacerbated by a lack of coordination and clarity in public statements. Contradictions between personal views of the Council’s members and its stated positions on international intervention plagued the effort to bring together the SNC and NCB in December. [12]

The divisions among regime challengers do not end there. There are, of course, significant differences between secularists and Islamists. [13] But even among the Islamists, as seen recently in Egypt, different views persist about the direction of the revolution and visions of a post-Assad Syria. Only recently have leading Muslim scholars from various Islamic trends come together in search of a formula to unite in support of the revolution. [14]

Moreover, growing feelings of frustration toward the larger opposition organizations persist among many protesters on the ground. With a growing power vacuum on the ground, divisions are sharpening between the activists on the ground and the opposition in exile. [15] Bearing the immediate threats of the government’s violent tactics to suppress the uprising, it is not surprising that some protesters feel the dissident parties in exile are “in one valley and the [domestic] revolutionaries in another valley.” [16]

The oversimplification of a singular “opposition” suggests that there is a coherent and coordinated government waiting in the wings that will facilitate a smooth transition upon Assad’s downfall. The model reflects the Libyan experience of creating an internationally recognized transitional council as the legitimate representative of the opposition, a designation sought by the SNC since October and one that may facilitate international intervention. [17] While the Libyan opposition became decidedly militarized, the Syrian National Council is treading a fine line between advocating military intervention and its commitment to “safeguarding the non-violent character of the Syrian revolution” that bolsters its domestic and international legitimacy. [18]

Recently, the SNC began direct coordination with the Free Syrian Army, though the body has been careful to convey that the FSA is not its “armed wing.” [19] Unlike the Libyan Transitional Council, however, the Syrian National Council has yet to gain international recognition as the sole representative of the Syrian people partly because of the challenges to coordinate and unite the various opposition factions.

Identifying these lines of difference within the Syrian opposition is not to suggest that integrating these disparate groups is unlikely or imprudent. It instead requires that observers confront realistically the complexities of unifying a wide array of political organizations, warns against actions that may exacerbate divisions, and questions the relevance of the Libyan model in the Syrian context.

The challenges of coordination and unification generate a justified fear of extended civil war and increased sectarian violence. But contrary to some analysis, the distinction between Syrians who support the government and those who oppose it does not follow a strict dichotomy between the Sunni majority and Syria’s minority communities. Nor does it follow a dichotomy between Alawi (the minority Shi’a sect of the Assads that dominates the government’s security apparatus) and non-Alawi Syrians. Prominent Alawi member of the SNC Munther Majos emphasizes that many in the Alawi community have been “vulnerable to the injustice of the Syrian regime,” especially in the last two decades as the regime has become more personalized and family-centered. [20]

Across the board, opposition organizations have worked to dispel the fears of minorities and challenge the framing of the crisis in sectarian terms. [21] They have charged the government with provoking sectarian conflict and have made it a point to highlight the significant involvement of Alawis, Druze, Kurds, and Christians in their ranks and on the street, particularly in highly heterogeneous cities like Tartous and Banias. [22]

Since the beginning of the revolution, concerted displays explicitly against sectarian discord demonstrate the alternative narrative of national and confessional tolerance and the shared plight of life under autocracy. [23] Protest chants, official stances of opposition groups, and online Facebook pages[24] explicitly reject the politicization of Syria’s diverse ethnic and religious identities. Prominent Druze leader Walid Jumblatt called on the Druze forces in the Syrian military not to participate in the suppression of the opposition. [25] Prominent Christians like Michael Kilo and Fayez Sara are notable members of the opposition, and some Christian leaders have recently stated that they “stand with the demands of the Syrian people.” [26]

At the same time, should a power vacuum, military intervention, or other sources of violence escalation add to fears of anarchy and chaos – an image Bashar al-Assad refers to frequently[27] – a convergence of people into their respective ethno-confessional social groups is very possible. Recent months have not been absent of explicitly sectarian attacks and rhetoric, particularly in areas of Homs. [28]

A nuanced view of the situation displays that sectarianism is “not merely a scarecrow wielded by despots to resist change… but is also not an undying and eternal fact.” [29] Across the board, opposition groups have maintained strong nationalist and anti-sectarian language in their founding documents and public statements. Comparisons with Syria’s neighbors in Iraq and Lebanon, and the vast sectarian violence that were part of civil wars in each country, provide little leverage for anticipating what will unfold in Syria. Iraq’s sectarian crisis was exacerbated by foreign military intervention, and Lebanon’s ethno-confessional composition is more balanced than the Sunni-majority Syrian society.

Despite representation of the various minority communities in both the active support and active opposition to the government, many Syrian minorities are taking a more passive “wait and see” approach to the crisis. The challenge is that the longer people wait and the more they see, the more likely it is that fears of violence will increase and sectarian divisions will harden. Simply, sectarian violence is an open question rather than a foregone conclusion.

The declared anti-sectarian nature of the revolutionaries across organizations provide a better model for post-Assad governance than the prospect of smaller insurgent groups that may seek to exploit sectarian identities for political or material purposes. A turn to violent opposition of any kind plays directly into the hands of the government as it attempts to divide, and thereby weaken, the opposition by exploiting fears of “leaping into the unknown.” [30]

More careful assessments of the situation in Syria will consider the complexities of both opposition politics and dynamics of sectarianism. Questions remain as to whether the leading opposition organizations can allay sectarian anxieties. Their best chances of doing so are through further inclusion of the many segments of Syrian society, sustained inclusive rhetoric, and coordination among the opposition bodies in the absence of unification.

Notes

Andrew Spath is a Ph.D. candidate at Rutgers University’s Department of Political Science, where he studies on comparative politics and international affairs. His research interests focus on Arab states of the Middle East, specifically dealing with leadership succession, political mobilization, regime transformations, and the rule of law. He can be contacted at: andrew.spath@rutgers.edu

This article was originally published by the Foreign Policy Research Institute in its Middle East Media Monitor E-Note series, January 2012.

Wednesday, February 8, 2012

Envisioning a Post-Asad Syria: The Future of Past Relations

Ghaidaa Hetou, guest author

“al-Asad’s Syria,” a slogan adorning countless government and private buildings in Syria for over forty years, is symbolic of the political transformation this country is currently experiencing. For ten consecutive months, Syria's citizens have braved capture, humiliation, and torture in order to speak and be heard. The process of disentangling Syria from the private fiefdom that al-Asad dynasty has created must proceed down a long and winding road.

The political awakening that has engulfed the Arab world took on a peculiar meaning in this famously stable country. This particular uprising is a testament to the possibility of change in the most unlikely of places, and to the uncertainty shrouding the political unknown which presents a security risk of the highest order.

The Syrian regime has shown that it is not capable of containing the growing protests with means other than increasing military and security operations, which is an inherently self-defeating tactic. In turn, the protests have not reached the critical mass seen in Tunisia or Egypt, nor have anti-regime armed groups been able to establish a military stronghold in any of Syria’s main cities that would then allow for a regime change, resembling what occurred in Libya. The Syrian situation is similar to that of Yemen, with the uprising taking a long, slow and winding path, often violent, yet tempered by proposals for resolving the conflict offered by neighboring and friendly countries.

The Syrian unrest started in March of last year when demonstrations broke out in Dar’a, a town to the south of Damascus, which subsequently spread to other towns. Over time, the protests have become increasingly marred by violence involving armed groups and army defectors. The military and security operations, and sieges that have befallen a number of Syrian cities, such as Dar’a, Homs, Hama, Idlib, Dayr al-Zor, and Banias, have fueled a type of uprising that is unrelentingly, with the level of demands being raised whenever the regime proposes a new set of reforms. Christians and Kurds have been reluctant, up until recently, to join the demonstrations. Bashar al-Asad used to enjoy wide and genuine popularity due to his anti-imperialist foreign policy, but this support quickly eroded due to over 6,000 casualties since the beginning of the protests.

As of now, both government and the opposition are experiencing an exaggerated sense of unease in entering direct negotiations that would facilitate a transition of political power. Declaring an end of the Arab League’s failed observatory mission in Syria, which was designed to bring an end to government violence, paved the way for enforcement of the Arab League’s proposal to end the Syrian crisis to be transferred to the UN Security Council. However, Russia and China vetoed the western backed Arab plan, and Russia proceeded to negotiate a transition of power in Syria directly with the al-Asad regime.

What do these developments this mean for Syria’s traditional allies: Iran, Russia and Hezbollah? What are the strategic options available to Syria’s neighboring countries? How will the United States integrate a post-Asad Syria into its overall policy in the Middle East? When and for what political price will al-Asad’s allies give up on his regime?

A Strategic Hub in Perpetual Transition

Geopolitically speaking, Syria is a strategic hub for the following reasons: Syria is Turkey’s open door into the Arab Middle East, Lebanon’s economic lifeline, Iraq’s security and trading partner, China’s hope of reviving a modern Silk Road, Iran’s ally, Israel’s border guard since 1974, and provides Russia’s its only port in the Mediterranean. Syria is, along with Iran, a regional counter weight to pro-western Arab countries, primarily the Gulf States.

The Syrian uprising is evolving along a slow and painful path precisely because of the high stakes involved in its outcome. All regional and international parties at least agree that the transition in Syria needs to be peaceful, and occur without foreign military intervention. Syria’s political awakening is crucial precisely because it carries profound implications for the entire Middle East. For neighboring and regional countries: Lebanon, Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Jordon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, to countries that have interest in maintaining or re-establishing their strategic depth in the Middle East such as Turkey, Russia and China, the final outcome of the Syrian crisis will have profound consequences for their internal politics and foreign policy.

Most importantly, the political awakening in Syria has important implications for America’s standing in the Middle East. Can the United States regain some of its standing in the region, especially after the military withdrawal from Iraq, by supporting a peaceful political transition in Syria? We will offer some answers to the questions posed by analyzing the implications of a post-Asad Syria on some of the stakeholders.

Iran

Since the success of the Islamic revolution in ousting Shah Reza Pahlavi in 1979, Iran established close ties with Syria. The close ties were not based on ideological preferences, given the Islamic nature of the Iranian government and the secular nature of the Syrian government. Rather, the close ties were the product of the system at the time: the threat to Syria posed by Saddam Husayn’s Ba’thist regime in Iraq, Egypt’s peace deal with Israel, and Iran’s isolation in the Arab world. This bilateral relation evolved to become a strategic pact, with multiple security, military, educational and trade agreements to boost. Iran’s current ties to Syria are not of the disposable type.

What kind of assurances does Iran need to withdraw its support of the al-Asad regime? Iran faces its own domestic struggles, not to speak of its controversial nuclear program. Another external concern is Iran’s relations with the Arab Gulf States and Lebanon, given that Iraq is now largely in Iran’s sphere of influence.

To complicate matters (or simplify them), the Arab Gulf States dare not threaten Iran at this time. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries are contending with political challenges in their respective countries as their populations increasingly question the political status quo. Any military pressure on Iran will result in exacerbating the delicate internal political conditions in the GCC countries.

What might lead Iran to change its Syria policy? First, assurances with regards to reasonable nuclear inspections and resumption of nuclear talks, with Turkish and Brazilian consultation. Second, a gradual rapprochement with the GCC countries. Third, assurances that the Syrian opposition will not threaten Iran’s strategic access to the Mediterranean. Fourth, reinforcing the idea that the oil pipeline stretching from Iran to Syria, through Iraq, should be viewed as supporting Syrian national interests, rather than viewing it as a project in ideological terms. Finally, as a key power broker in Lebanese politics, Hizballah needs to remain an integral part of the Lebanon’s political, social, and economic structure. Because Hezbollah receives support from Iran, a post-Asad Syria will need to deal with this reality by accommodating Hizballah’s concerns in its relations with Lebanon, Israel and Iran.

Turkey

Prior to 2004, Turkey turned a blind eye to the Arab world, until signing a free trade agreement with Syria. Among the tensions between the two countries prior to 2004 were Kurdish freedom fighters who maintained guerilla bases in northern Syria, water resources given the construction of the Anatolia project which dammed the Euphrates River, and the annexation of the Hatay region in 1939. The strained relationship between the two countries began to ease when Syria expelled Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) leader, Abdullah Ocalan, in 1998, and signed the Adana agreement in 1999 in which Syria agreed to refrain from harboring Kurdish fighters. Syrian-Turkish relations have improved tremendously in the last ten years, to the extent that Turkey invested considerable political capital in the Syrian regime under Bashar al-Asad. At the beginning of the 2011 uprising, it tried to mediate and encourage the regime to implement significant democratic reforms, early and swiftly, advice that was not heeded.

What are Turkey’s main interests in a post-Asad Syria? First, Turkey was able to make a seamless transition from support for the al-Asad regime to becoming a supporter of the Syrian opposition as evident by its early hosting of opposition conferences in Turkey. In addition, Turkey was able to establish good working relations with Mohammad Tyfour the head of the banned Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which provides a cue to Turkey’s sympathies towards the predominantly Sunni uprising in Syria.

Second, Turkey is certain to resume its economic interests in post-Asad Syria, an option that was not available to Turkey in post-Qaddafi Libya. Turkey’s inconsistent diplomacy towards the Libyan uprising jeopardized its economic and financial interests in Libya. The lesson learned by Turkey will not to be repeated in the Syrian case. Third, Turkey maintains a strategic relationship with Iran. Hence both countries have an interest in reestablishing stability in Syria. The Syrian unrest has necessitated and deepened Turkey’s bilateral relations with Iran, which is part of Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmad Davoud Oglo’s Strategic Depth policy in the Middle East.

Fourth, looking to the east, current developments in the international system will naturally lead Turkey to extend its diplomacy, military and trade relations beyond Iran to China. Finally, it is imperative for Turkey to diversify its relations with the countries of the Middle East. To be identified as a Gulf State ally is not in Turkey’s best interest, especially given the current political awakening in the Middle East. The logical conclusion of this consideration will be for Turkey to align itself with post-authoritarian governments while preserving its economic interests with all the regions’ states.

Russia

Russia’s relations with Syria, which is also known as “Russia’s Israel,” are a product of the Cold War as much as a product of ideological cohesion. This relationship is fundamentally built on military, training and security considerations sense. Russia’s treaty for its naval base in Tartus on the Mediterranean, which president Putin renewed in 2008, is another reminder of the importance of Russian-Syrian relations. The Syrian opposition, in this sense, has not struck the right tone during its negotiations with the Russians during the past few months, which explains in large measure Russia’s reluctance to support regime change in Syria.

What are Russia’s interests post-Asad Syria? First and foremost, both Russia and Iran seek a continuity of Syria’s foreign policy in the post-Asad era that will insure Russia’s and Iran’s strategic objectives.Second, due to Russia’s mediation role in the Syrian crisis, it faces the dilemma of having to deal with a Syrian opposition that represents the antithesis of Ba’thist ideology, making it naturally sympathetic to pro-western interests. For Russia, the Syrian crisis is a race against time to preserve its foothold in Syria while institutionalizing a post-Asad government which fits its ideological desiderata.

Third, during the post-Asad era, Russia will need Syria much more than Syria needing Russia. This is probably the most difficult hurdle, in addition to the tremendous amount of good will Russia needs to show to a post-Asad government in order to overcome the negative effect of Russia’s recent veto in the UN Security Council of the Arab League proposal for a transfer of power in Syria. Nevertheless, preserving good relations with Russia in the post-Asad era will be in Syria’s national interests. In terms of Syria’s foreign policy to the East, it will not be able to ignore Russia.

China

China is becoming an increasingly powerful player in the Middle East. The political awakening in the Middle East has presented unprecedented opportunities for China. The economic clout which China is capable of exercising through support of development projects in the Middle East is without parallel. Still calculating its interests in the Middle East, China is still reticent to assume a leading role in political initiatives in the region.

China joined Russia in vetoing the UN resolution against Syria, but it quietly faded into the background, leaving Russia to absorb the international outrage that followed the Security Council vote. Not surprisingly, China supports a peaceful transition in Syria, but is adamantly opposed to foreign military intervention in Syria, a position supported by Russia and many Arab countries.

Conclusion

In bringing the Syrian crisis to an end, Iran, Turkey, Russia and China converge in their support for non-military intervention and a peaceful transition of political power. All four countries face the task of repairing their image as past supporters of nit only the al-Asad regime but authoritarian regimes throughout the Middle East. The potential for establishing amicable relations with a post-Asad government, as well as engendering the good will of the Syrian opposition, will be increased if they make more of a concerted effort to devise a plan that would facilitate a political transition in Syria.

A peaceful transition of power in Syria would preserve the quiet border between Israel and Syria. It would also undercut the increasing calls for a Jihad in Syria against Bashar al-Asad’s “infidel government,” a development that might get out of control and spill over into neighboring Jordon, Saudi Arabia and Lebanon if the crisis continues and violence escalates. The United States has an interest in supporting a peaceful resolution to the Syrian crisis in a matter that would preserve its good standing with the Syrian people. How the US will balance its own interests with those of all the parties concerned remains a daunting task.

Ghaidaa Hetou is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey. She can be contacted at ghaidaa.hetou@gmail.com

Sunday, January 29, 2012

Are we headed for a war with Iran?

The following Op-Ed article was published in the Newark, NJ, Star-Ledger and the Newhouse Papers on January 29, 2012. It can be found at: http://blog.nj.com/njv_editorial_page/2012/01/are_we_headed_for_war_with_ira.html

As Iran defies the world and works toward building nuclear arms, Washington is turning up the heat in an effort to get the Iranians to back off. President Obama last week convinced Europe to impose economic sanctions on Iran — which some have called an act of war.

The United States doesn’t buy oil from Iran, but Europe is its No. 2 market. Europe’s embargo, with a push from America, could be crippling. And Obama is trying to convince Iran’s customers in Asia — China, India, Japan, South Korea — to join in.

The attack on Iran’s already wounded economy could push its leaders to retaliate: Iran is threatening to use military force to close the Strait of Hormuz, the entrance to the Persian Gulf, and cut off the flow of oil to the United States and its allies.

Obama has moved more U.S. warships into the gulf — just in case — while he tries to find a diplomatic solution.

Tensions with Tehran are getting worse: Did Israel assassinate an Iranian nuclear scientist? Did the United States know about it? Will Japan and South Korea join the oil embargo? Will Iran execute a U.S. spy?

In the background, meanwhile, Obama’s Republican challengers are talking tough and pushing for a show of U.S. force.

Where’s it all heading? Star-Ledger editorial writer Jim Namiotka last week spoke with Eric Davis, a political science professor at Rutgers University and an expert on Middle Eastern affairs.

Q: Let’s start here: What are the odds of a U.S. war with Iran in 2012? 2013?

A: I would say that the odds are relatively small because neither side would benefit.
Iran would find itself isolated even more internationally. A war would increase support for Iran’s isolation by increasing the number of countries willing to impose sanctions.

For the U.S., war would have a very damaging impact on foreign relations in the Middle East, where it already has a poor image and is viewed as a bully and imperialist power.

Domestically, a war would lead to a drastic increase in gas prices. There are warnings that oil prices would go up to $300 or $400 a barrel or even higher. It would undermine the already tepid economic recovery we’re seeing here now in the U.S.

Q: Iran has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz. Is that a real possibility?

A: Closing the Strait of Hormuz would be a violation of international law, which might justify action by the United Nations — paralleling the kind of action that was taken against Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War over violations of international law. The Iranian regime couldn’t predict what the outcome of closing the strait would be, but it certainly knows that the U.S. wouldn’t allow that to happen.

Q: Europe has now said it will boycott Iranian oil if Iran’s leaders don’t halt their nuclear production. How can we expect Iran to react?

A: International sanctions have already wreaked havoc on Iran’s currency and forced the government to dramatically increase interest rates. The more significant effect is that the deteriorating economic situation is going to affect the parliamentary elections this coming March. It was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad who has rejected calls to raise interest rates, which is necessary to protect the value of the Iranian rial.

As a result, his parliamentary candidates could suffer in the March elections.
So the sanctions are having both an economic impact and a political impact, as well.

One of the few options available to the Iranians is to try and increase their rhetoric on closing the Strait of Hormuz to force an increase in oil prices. This would have the effect of at least temporarily increasing the price of oil.

Even if Iran sold less oil, what it did sell would bring a higher price.

Iran can saber-rattle and it can threaten certain actions. But the Iranians can only go so far — they’re not about to start attacking tankers and laying mines because that would be considered an international act of war.

Q: What if other countries, such as Japan and South Korea, join in?

A: You might see perhaps — not a collapse of the Iran economy; that would be too extreme a prediction — but severe economic problems.

Q: Will sanctions convince Iran to stop developing nukes?

A: The Iranian regime might get serious about allowing international inspections, and then start playing games with the inspections while they keep working on their uranium enrichment program at underground facilities. But the regime can’t have it both ways and Iran’s leadership is going to have some real decisions to make in the very near future.

If Iran backs down in the face of U.S. and international pressure, that would constitute a real loss of status and prestige for Ahmadinejad and Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

If Iran doesn’t respond to international demands for inspections of what it says is only a nuclear energy program, it’s going to continue to suffer economically.

Q: Is Iran a worrisome power? Compared with, for instance, Saddam’s Iraq?

A: No, Iran is not a major military power. But, as we saw in the Iran-Iraq war, Iranian forces have units ... such as their Revolutionary Guards that can inflict great harm if there was a land war as a result of an invasion by an international coalition, such as occurred in Kuwait in January 1991. Iran doesn’t have a powerful air force or navy. While Iran does have missiles that could reach parts of Europe, these aren’t serious military threats because Iran would not dare attack Europe.

Iran’s military power would only manifest itself if there were a land invasion of Iran, which I don’t see happening.

Iran’s greatest threat is using its rockets to attack Israel, which would result in an overwhelming Israeli response. Iran realizes such an attack would have serious consequences for the regime.

Q: Republican presidential candidates are talking tough about Iran. What are the practical results of such rhetoric?

A: Certainly, they are providing Iran’s regime tremendous grist for their propaganda mill. I don’t think any of the candidates are doing the U.S. any favors by threatening to attack Iran.

Q: Is Iran’s nuclear program a real threat?

A: I think they really want to develop nuclear weapons as part of their vision of becoming one of the main powers of the Middle East, primarily to compete with Israel and Turkey, even though they have a good relationship with Turkey. The Turks and the Persians have, historically, been enemies.

Q: What are the worldwide impacts of U.S.-Iran tensions?

A: The Saudis are threatening to start development of a nuclear program, perhaps to preclude Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.

Q: Describe the changing face of the Middle East with a nuclear Iran.

A: It would be incredibly unstable. There would always be the threat of a pre-emptive attack by Israel.

Turkey sees itself as the emerging model — it’s an Islamist government, but it’s democratic and politically moderate. ... I think the Turks would have to think twice about becoming a nuclear power if Iran became a nuclear power.

It would not be very easy for Turkey to try to do that. Turkey is part of NATO, and a signatory to the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. But treaties can be broken.

Q: Is there any way for the U.S. to prevent Iran from becoming a nuclear power?

A: There are only two ways: Either to make the cost of sanctions so high that Iran decides to allow for meaningful international inspections, which will prevent them from doing anything apart from what they say they want to do, namely use nuclear materials for power and civilian purposes … or to attack Iran and destroy its nuclear program. That would involve a ground war because a lot of their facilities are underground. You’d run into a lot of casualties by any invading army.

You could not eliminate Iran’s nuclear program simply through the use of air power.

Q: What don’t we know about Iran that we should?

A: The impression that readers will take away from this article is that Iran is kind of a radical country on the model of North Korea. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Iranian public is very much in support of democratization. For evidence of that, see the election of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in 2009, when thousands of Iranians demonstrated against his stealing of the presidential election. Public opinion polls and the opinions of scholars are that Iranians are very supportive of democracy. They also see a nuclear program as part of their sovereignty as a nation, but there’s no support for starting a nuclear war by attacking Israel.

One thing that doesn’t come across in the press is that there’s a lot of competition within the political elite: between Mahmoud Ahmadinejad — the secular wing — and their spiritual leader, the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who represents the clerical wing. The rhetoric we see is part of each far wing’s attempt to mobilize its base — much like the current political process we’re seeing in the U.S.

So there’s an intense political struggle going on inside Iran, which is why no one can really predict what the outcome will be in the effort to curtail Iran’s nuclear weapons program.

Friday, January 27, 2012

The Many Moving Parts of Iraq's Current Political Crisis

What are the key components of the current Iraqi political crisis and what does it tell us about the future of Iraqi politics?

The most important dynamic is Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki's effort to marginalize his political opponents and centralize power in his own hands. This effort was discussed in an earlier post (Dec. 23, 2011) and is described in great detail in a recent report by Human Rights Watch that has received a high profile in the Arab Press (see al-Hayat, Jan.23).

Maliki’s efforts to impose a new form of authoritarian rule has been incorrectly analyzed in purely sectarian terms. The processes in motion are much more complex and go well beyond sectarian politics. Maliki’s arch enemy, Ayad Allawi, is a fellow Shi’i as is his other nemesis, Muqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadrist Trend (al-Tayyar al-Sadri).

Maliki is trying to eliminate Allawi’s al-Iraqiya Coalition (which received many Shi’i and Kurdish votes in the March 2010 parliamentary elections) through a campaign of arrests in which those detained are accused of having engaged in terrorist attacks. Many of those arrested are former members of the Ba’th Party as well as members of the al-Iraqiya Coalition.

The core dynamic is the ongoing struggle over Iraq’s political identity. Will Iraq become a state dominated by Shi’i Islamists such as those in Maliki’s Islamic Call Party (Hizb al-Da’wa al-Islamiya) which controls the broader State of Law Coalition (I’tilaf Dawlat al-Qanun)? Or will Iraq return to the legacy of the Iraqi nationalist movement which was dominated by secular politics?

Secular politics was the norm from Iraq's independence in 1921 and through at least the first decade of Ba’th Party rule between 1968 and Saddam Husayn’s seizure of power in 1979. Fearing the Iranian Revolution of 1978-79 might spread to Iraq, Saddam began to promote sectarianism after invading Iran in September 1980.

While all Iraqi regimes (except that of Abd al-Karim Qasim between 1958 and 1963) favored Sunni Arabs for cabinet positions and positions in the state bureaucracy, Maliki seeks to impose the obverse of that system which now privileges Iraq's Shi’a. The difference with former regimes is that Maliki’s model is Islamist and anti-secular and thus precludes the type of cross-ethnic coalitions - such as represented by al-Iraqiya - that rose to prominence in the Arab Provincial Legislature elections of 2009 and the March 2010 parliamentary elections.

The most high profile case of those accused of terrorism is Iraqi Vice-President Tariq al-Hashimi who currently remains under the protection of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG). Most Iraqis feel that Maliki’s attempt to arrest al-Hashimi is political since the charges against him have been known since 2006. The KRG government is loathe to turn over al-Hashimi because that would both increase Maliki’s power and implicitly recognize Baghdad’s judicial authority within the KRG.

An important complicating factor is Iraqi President Jalal al-Talabani’s declining health since he is al-Hashimi’s most important patron in the KRG. Talabani is increasingly worried about the sectarian policies that Maliki is pursuing. If Maliki is able to eliminate the secularists’ power, both Sunni and Shi’i Arab, Talabani and the KRG leadership realize that the Kurds will be the next target on Maliki’s list of political opponents.

Second, the struggle with his political opponents is not limited to Maliki’s dispute with secularists and al-Iraqiya. The Iraqi prime minister has been under constant attack by the Sadrists who have castigated him for his unwillingness to bring government corruption under control and to improve the quality of government services. Since the Sadrists represent poor Shi’a in Sadr (Revolution) City in Baghdad and throughout Iraq’s southern provinces, social services are the core factor in attracting support for their movement.

Maliki is also trying to undermine the power of the Sadrists by giving support to its arch-enemy, the League of the Righteous (‘Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq). Now that US forces have left Iraq, the Iraqi government is negotiating to have the League put down its arms and enter the political process. This was a brilliant move by Maliki because it increases the League's power and visibility and power and has forced the Sadrists to shift their attention from attacking his government to fending off the League’s new found strength.

The League of the Righteous developed within the ranks of the now disbanded Mahdi Army (Jaysh al-Mahdi) beginning in 2004. That year the JAM challenged US forces by mounting an assault in the holiest Shi’i shrine city, al-Najaf. The Najaf uprising led to its defeat but created resentment among fighters that the JAM failed to mount further major offensives against American forces.

JAM units in a number of provinces and cities were gradually transformed into units loyal to the newly created League. These units included the "Abu-l-Fadl al-'Abbas" brigade in Amara Priovince, the "Musa al-Kadhim" brigade in Baghdad, the "Imam al-'Askari" brigade in Samarra, and the "Imam Ali" brigade in al-Najaf. The League has also received assistance from Iran where its fighters have received training (al-Hayat, Jan 4)

Under the leadership of Shaykh Qays al-Khaz’ali, the League grew to the position of influence it now holds. al-Khaz'ali studied under Sadr's father, Ayatollah Muhammad Muhammad Sadiq alp-Sadr (assassinated by Saddam's regime in 1999) which enhances his legitimacy among poor Shi'a. With Iranian help, and given added legitimacy by the Maliki government, the ranks of what we may call “populist Shiism” are divided between those who support the Sadrists and those who support the League (or a number of smaller militias that have formed in the south).

Over the past few months, Muqtada al-Sadr’s attacks on the League have escalated. The underlying theme of al-Sadr’s attacks have been that the League is a criminal organization which has nothing to do with religion (qutla la din la hum). Sadr has called for making the organization illegal. In a recent interview, Qays al-Khaz’ali indicated that he does not see the League reconciling with the Sadrist Trend. He also rejected assertions that his return from Iran indicates that he seeks to become the “Nasrallah of Iraq.”

The struggle between the Sadrists and the League of the Righteous not only enhances Maliki’s power but also that of Iran, which has given training and military support to both organizations. As their conflict intensifies, Iran always maintains the option of serving as an important mediator between these organizations as well as among competing Shi’i factions in Baghdad and throughout southern Iraq.

A third level of struggle reflects the impact of “neighborhood effects” on Iraq's domestic politics. Recently a scandal ensued in response to remarks supposedly made the Ali Solimani, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, before a large gathering of youth in Tehran, including those from several Arab countries. According to those at the gathering, Solimani indicated the Iran maintains decisive influence over the politics of Iraq and southern Lebanon (al-Hayat, Jan. 22).

The response in Iraq to Solimani's remarks was immediate. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs called in Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad for an explanation. Iraqi politicians were quick to attack Iran for interfering in Iraq’s internal affairs and for its failure to respect Iraq’s sovereignty.
At the same time, Turkey has criticized the Maliki regime for its sectarian policies and the possibility that they could lead to new instability. These remarks infuriated Maliki leading him to to protest to the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad. The Turkish Foreign Ministry responded by saying that nations which are friends are allowed to comment on theri respective politics and that Turkey’s criticism of Maliki’s policies were entirely appropriate (al-Hayat, Jan 21).

A fourth “moving part” is Maliki’s efforts to circumscribe the power of the Hawza, particularly that of Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, Shiism's most prominent religious figure. Maliki despises al-Sistani for his continued criticism of the rampant corruption in the state bureaucracy and the prime mister’s unwillingness to prosecute corrupt elements in his government. Maliki is also angry that al-Sistani has consistently refused to meet with him or any of his representatives (al-Sharq al-Awsat, Nov. 26, 2011)

It is no surprise that Maliki welcomed the Iranian government's decision to send Iraqi born Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi to al-Najaf to become Guardian of the Jurists (Wali al-Faqih) for Iraq, ostensibly to oversee the thousands of Iranian pilgrims who visit Shiite shrines in south central Iraq, especially in al-Najaf and Karbala’.

By appointing Shahroudi, a prominent cleric who once headed Iran’s judiciary, Wali al-Faqih for Iraq, the Iranian regime has mounted a direct challenge to the Najafi Hawza and its efforts to keep Shiism out of Iraq's daily politics. It also indicates that there will be intense competition over the successor to al-Sistani, who is in poor health.

The struggle for control of Iraqi Shiism pits the "quietist" clerics, who seek to keep power politics out of religion, and those who adhere to Iran's politicized form of Shiism, evident in the concept of State of the Jurisprudent (Wilayat al-Faqih). Maliki hopes that the Najafi Hawza will be forced to spend more time trying to contain Iranian influence being spread through Shahroudi’s office and thus have less time to criticize his government.

Maliki’s political decision-making is “penny wise, and pound foolish,” to use an old adage. He has put his opponents on the defensive and ingratiated himself with Iran. His political calculation is that he can ignore Turkish and American protests against his recent actions. Turkey will not go beyond criticism of his government because the Erdogan government does not want to jeopardize the Nabucco Pipeline project which will carry Iraqi natural gas through Turkey to Europe. For its part, the US does not want to loose lucrative arms contracts as Iraq rebuilds its air force and navy.

The longer term scenario is not as promising for Maliki. Marginalizing al-Iraqiya and continuing arrests of Sunni Arabs could easily lead to a renewal of violence, especially as the Sunni community sees Maliki working to create a sectarian based army in which Sunni Arabs (and Kurds) have little influence. A renewed insurgence in the so-called Sunni Arab triangle of north-central Iraq would have severe consequences for Iraq’s political stability.

The attempt to reduce the power of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and the Najafi Hawza is likewise poorly conceived. Certainly, it will alienate many pious Shi’a who consider al-Sistani much more than just their spiritual leader. al-Sistani’s efforts to promote social justice and democracy has made his beloved among large segments of Iraq’s Shi’i population (and Shi'a outside Iraq as well).

The Turks may decide to place more of their political eggs in the KRG basket and back off from investments in the Arab south, especially if political unrest and violence increase. If the Kurds feel Turkey is a solid ally, they may be encouraged to declare independence, especially if they see no change in Maliki’s unwillingness to make more concessions to the KRG. The current Iraqi budget, for example, has come under criticism from the Kurds (and local provincial legislatures) for not devolving government revenues to the KRG (al-Hayat, Jan. 23)

As Maliki attempts to consolidate power, he is becoming ever more dependent on the Iranian regime. The sensitivity of this issue is evident from Iraqi responses to Ali Solimani’s comments mentioned above. If attacks from the Sunni Arab community, the Sadrists and the Kurds increase, Maliki may find himself isolated and even more dependent on Iran. If he does become largely an Iranian puppet, his regime will face constant instability.

Democratic politics is not just a normative desideratum. It is ultimately the most stable and effective form of governance. If Maliki had decided after the March 2010 parliamentary elections to share power with al-Iraqiya, and to negotiate seriously with the KRG, he could have retained the prime ministership and put Iraq on the road to meaningful political and economic development. Maliki certainly has not learned the lesson that has led to the ouster of multiple autocrats in the Middle East. The processes he has set in motion can only lead to disastrous outcomes, both or Maliki and for Iraq.

Friday, January 20, 2012

Pakistan’s Current Crisis: Institutional Maturation or Manipulation?

Guest author - Farah Jan

Over the past few weeks, Pakistan’s army has been faced with the quandary of whether to take over through a coup or not, while the rest of us are left wondering if this fragile democracy will survive, or once again be defeated by its formidable challenger – the army.

Since the start of the year, civil-military relations have taken a nosedive, with no recovery in sight, and with each side threatening serious consequences. The initiation of this cat and mouse chase between the military establishment and the democratically elected government began back in May 2011, when Osama bin Laden was killed by the American forces in Abbotabad. The government’s initial response was to condemn the blatant violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty, but the rupture between the army and the civilian government was already set in place.

The recent "Memogate" scandal/affair is a testament to the army’s mistrust of the civilian regime, along with the Supreme Court’s order of reopening the corruption cases that were suspended in the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO). Pakistan’s ambassador to the U.S., Hussain Haqqani, seems to be the first victim of the memogate scandal, who is accused of being the author of the so-called memorandum. This scandal is based on a confidential memorandum addressed to Admiral Mike Mullen after the bin Laden raid seeking American help to avert a military coup in return for nuclear transparency. The memorandum was delivered to Admiral Mullen by a Pakistani-American businessman, Mansoor Ijaz, on behest of Hussain Haqqani.

The analysis here is based on two issues; first, a post-U.S. scenario in the region, and, secondly, on the rising influence of the red dragon, China. Both are crucial for the Pakistan army and its future choices and options. In a post-U.S. region, along with the decline in American supremacy globally, the patron client relationship that Pakistan has maintained with the U.S. is also dwindling. Thus any party, person or group connected with it is also out of the game. The army from the very beginning has perceived the Zardari-Gillani enterprise as an American client regime, albeit the army would like to play that role itself and traditionally it had done so. The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) is conventionally associated with the West (particularly the U.S.) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz Sharif’s (PML-N) link seems to be more with the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia). Yet both have maintained and respected Pakistan’s ties with China.

The emerging player in Pakistani politics is cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan, the chairman of the Pakistan Threek-i-Insaaf (PTI), who has maintained an anti-American stand, in addition to an anti-foreign aid stance. Nevertheless, Khan has been astute enough not to air anti-China sentiment, and instead he insists on strengthening the already strong Sino-Pak ties. In recent months, Imran Khan also received an unprecedented invitation by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to visit Beijing. Up until now, only elected prime ministers have been granted such honors, and this shows Beijing’s commitment to Pakistan’s future, as well as affirming its own regional position vis-à-vis India. Hence, for the army establishment it would be bearable to accept someone like Imran Khan, to keep the public content and the army in the barracks and not on the streets. The question is, would Imran Khan be able to keep his promises and contain this army-cum-leviathan that is immersed in every aspect of the Pakistani society.

Pakistan is clearly linking itself exclusively with China, and Sino-Pakistan relations have remained strong since 1962. Both sides claim that this all-weather friendship has endured political and economic shifts, but their partnership has remained strong. This brings us back to our earlier question: would the army once again enter the political arena or not? Historically, the army allows democracy to come into play only to please its Western clients, and with the power balance shifting towards the Chinese side, the army is not concerned with Western appeasement.

At this point, it is pivotal to keep in mind that the current political institutions in Pakistan are very different from the previous times when martial law was declared. The rules of the game have changed, with the judiciary and the media both playing a robust role in the political system. Albeit, the army might not care to placate the West, but to play it safe and not face a threat of mass revolt, it would not commit a coup for two reasons. Firstly, it is not prepared for a repeat of anything similar to the Long March of 2008-09. More importantly, if it can easily get its way by exploiting institutions like the judiciary and the media, why bother with instating martial law. In addition, General Kayani seems to be comfortable in being only the Chief of Army Staff, and not interested in being the president or the chief executive.

Pakistan has grappled with three and half (Yahya khan’s regime being the half) military regimes lasting for almost four decades. The military has exploited the India security threat for most of Pakistan’s existence in order to gain full access to all institutions. Thus, over the years it has strengthened its reach, and is used to getting rid of any civilian leader by conveniently declaring martial law. But with the recent events in the Middle East, it will play it safe and would not like to start a new wave, or the South Asian version of winter revolution/uprising.

Thus the army this time is more calculated, by playing one branch of the government against another. The judiciary seems to be in a head on collision with the executive branch with the army establishment in the control position. The reopening of NRO cases (corruption cases) is an attempt to purge the society of the old guard and pursuing the memogate scandal has already left the government weak and discredited.

Predictions are often embarrassing, yet as political scientists, we attempt to make enlightened guesses, and the present situation in Islamabad is filled with ambiguity and uncertainty. The aim here is not to predict, but to contend that the army has always claimed to be the defenders of Pakistan’s borders and the protectors of their motherland, yet their record shows that they have not been the guardians of Pakistan’s constitution or the preservers of democratic institutions. As it was famously joked about, ‘every country has an army, and in Pakistan’s case the army has a country.’ If the army establishment is interested in the future of Pakistan as an economic success story, it needs to back off and let the political process take place. The army needs to heed from Henry Kissinger advice, ‘that Pakistan needs to think long term and needs to find a national identity that is not based on the fear of India.’

fjan@polisci.rutgers.edu

Farah Jan is a Ph.D. Candidate in Political Science at Rutgers University – New Brunswick, NJ.