The US fiddles as Rome burns: the need for radical action in Egypt

As the number of Egyptians killed by the military has risen to over 800 dead and 4000 wounded, the international community's need to respond to the massacre of largely unarmed civilians is obvious.  The United States does not have the means to end the killing or solve the Egypt's deeply polarized political situation  which pits secularists against Islamists.  However, should it merely stand by and exhort Egypt's military leaders through telephone calls to stop the violence?  Or should the US take a more active role to end the crisis?

US policy makers need to realize that the Middle East is at a crossroads, much like 1978-79 when the Shah's regime was overthrown and replaced by the despotic Islamic Republic of Iran.  Sectarianism is spreading throughout the region, fueled by an increasingly bitter cold war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.  Qatar is using its vast financial resources to fund radical forces in Syria while the Turkish government looks the other way as radical Islamists cross its borders daily to join the struggle against Bashar al-Asad's Ba'thist regime.

Yemen, one of the poorest states in the Middle East, is facing a resurgence of al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Penisula (AQAP).  In Libya, the central government is that in name only as a myriad of militias refuse to submit to its authority.  In neighboring Tunisia, secularists and leftists are the targets of assassinations by radical Salafis who are unwilling to share power with the country's large secular populace.  Across North Africa, al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) lies in wait, fed by a continuous flow of weapons from Libya and ready to exploit whatever discontent it can.  In Iraq and Lebanon, the spillover from the Syrian civil war threatens to pull both countries more deeply into that conflict while intensifying domestic sectarian divisions as well.  The dispatch of more Hizballah forces and Iraqi Shiite militiamen to Syria is on the increase.

Turkey, supposedly the model of a new democratic Islamism, just completed a highly flawed trial of ex-generals, journalists and academics  designed to intimidate and suppress secular dissent of the ruling Justice and Development Party's (AKP) increasingly authoritarian policies.  Turkey's prime minister, Recep Tayyip Ergogan, is now showing his true colors as he attempts to Islamicize Turkey against the wishes of its largely secular citizenry, restrict press freedoms (Turkey has one of the highest number of imprisoned journalists awaiting trial of any country in the world), and jails opponents without due process.

In this context, the lack of action by the Obama administration to what is taking place in Egypt constitutes a recipe for a foreign policy disaster.  What occurred in Egypt on June 30th should be called what it was -  a coup d'etat - and military aid should be cut off immediately.  That Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will make up the loss of $1.3 billion in aid should not become an excuse for the US to tacitly support the bloodshed in Egypt, especially when the violence that is being perpetrated is with the use of American weapons.  While we may jeopardize in the short term our close ties with Egypt's military which provides the US with important intelligence and overflight rights through Egyptian airspace, Egypt needs the US far more than the US needs Egypt.

One reason that the Obama administration doesn't want to end the $1.3 billion in military aid is because most of the funds provided to Egypt end up in the pockets of  American arms manufacturers.  Given the present circumstances, the US should eschew short term profits from the Egyptian arms market and give greater consideration to Egypt's domestic crisis and the broader regional picture.  If the US does provide aid to Egypt, it should be only civilian aid with strict conditions attached to its use, e.g., paying for medical care for those injured in the ongoing violence.  The last thing the Egyptian military needs at this point is more fighter aircraft and tanks.

Cutting off US military aid to Egypt will not push Egypt into the hands of the Russians as some analysts have suggested.  The Egyptian army's weaponry is almost totally of American origin and thus Egypt is dependent on the US for spare parts and training.  The Sadat regime expelled 20,000 Soviet military advisers in 1972 and the military junta is not about to reestablish military relations with a country whose weaponry is inferior to that of the United States.  Further, the Egyptian economy is closely intertwined with US, not Russian commercial and financial interests.

The US should not pressure Egypt on its own but rather through a multifaceted and internationally based strategy.  First, it should push back against Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states' support for the military's violence (reminding the Saudis and the Arab Gulf monarchies that, as The Economist pointed out in its Aug 3rd article, "Yesterday's Fuel," the global oil market has reached its peak and soon will enter a decline, signaling the decline of Arab oil states' influence as well).  Numerous reports indicate that the Saudis and their Gulf allies have encouraged the military to use force against the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than seek a peaceful resolution to the current political crisis.

Second, US should inform Israel that advocating support for Egypt's military is not in its long-term interests. An unstable Egypt on Israel's  borders - a definite result if the brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood continues - will increase instability in the eastern Mediterranean basin  And the Egyptian military will continue its pursuit of radical elements in the Sinai whether the US cuts off military aid or not.

Third, the US should introduce a resolution in the UN Security Council condemning the killing of unarmed civilians by the Egyptian security forces and military.  As part of that resolution, it should also demand that Egypt allow UN observers to enter the country to monitor a reduction in government-sponsored violence.

Fourth, the US,UN, and EU should demand that the military junta set a timetable for writing a new constitution that will include all of Egypt's political forces, including the Muslim Brotherhood.  This constitution should not be written hastily (as was the last interim constitution) but over a period of a year so that the document provides a solid foundation for new, free and fair elections.  Completing the constitution and holding elections should be organized according to a very specific time table so there is no doubt that Egypt's process towards democratization will continue.

Fifth, the US should notify Gen. Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi and his military junta that the US will work to block US investments in Egypt and refuse to support any loan requests that Egypt submits to international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund.  The Obama administration should also notify Egypt that, if the military regime continues its massive human rights violations, the US will freeze Egypt's assets in American banks.

Sixth, the US should indicate that it is gathering information on the attacks on unarmed civilians with an aim to turning this information over to the International Criminal Court.  If the Egyptian military persists in its violent policies, the US will then press the international community to bring a case of massive human rights violations against the generals in the ICC.

Seventh, President Obama should make a high profile speech to the Congress outlining the rationale for these actions in an effort to gain Republican as well as Democratic support.  He should point to the destructive civil war in Algeria  between 1991 and 2000 in which as many as 200,000 Algerians may have been killed as the result of military intervention in 1991 to prevent an Islamist victory in then scheduled municipal elections.

President Obama should make clear that, by supporting the military's brutal crackdown on Egypt's civilian population, the US is encouraging Islamists within the Muslim Brotherhood to turn away from the democratic process and take up arms instead against the government.  This development would threaten Egypt's stability, provide new openings for al-Qa'ida, and perhaps even lead to attacks on shipping in the Suez Canal, a vital international waterway.  Further, military action will increase resentment against Egypt's Coptic Christian minority, which has already seen dozens of its churches burned throughout the country, as radical Islamists try to exploit the crisis by associating the Christian community with support for the military's brutality.

Worst of all, the many Egyptian youth who yearn for democracy - whether secular or Islamist - will now feel that democratic processes are no longer viable in Egypt.  They will either withdraw from politics, seek to leave the country (accelerating Egypt's brain drain) or turn to violence.  The spread of extensive urban violence throughout the country would be impossible for Egypt's security forces to contain.

Let me be very clear.  I make no brief for the Muslim Brotherhood.  Muhammad Morsi may have been an excellent professor of materials sciences when he taught at California State University at Northridge.  However, he was not qualified to rule Egypt given his lack of political experience.  His heavy handed attempts to Islamicize the country, his exclusion of all those who opposed his policies, and his failure to address Egypt's pressing economic policies can be described in one word - disastrous.  Nevertheless, Morsi's policies do not provide justification for the killings of Egyptian civilians.

Between 20 and 25% of the Egyptian electorate supports the Muslim Brotherhood.  Many young members of the organization are much more open to democratic processes than the Western press would allow.  Egypt's military cannot "kill its way" out of the current political state of affairs.  Only good faith negotiations can lead to a resolution of the current crisis.

The so-called "Realists" in US foreign policy circles who argue for unconditional support for Gen. Sisi and his junta need to realize that the time for supporting brutal dictatorships in the Middle East not only has come to an end but undermines US foreign policy in the Middle East. The time for President Obama to show decisive presidential leadership is here.  Continued inaction of the type we have seen this past week will have negative consequences that will haunt the US and the international community for decades to come.

Rebellion movements inspired by Egypt splinter in Tunisia

Tamarod poster: "The Tunisian Constitution doesn't represent me."

An interview with Dr. Alaya Allani, professor of Professor of Contemporary History at Manouba University, Tunisia, conducted by Tunisialive, July 24, 2013.

In the wake of the ouster of former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, multiple groups in Tunisia have organized with the aim of “correcting the path of the revolution” by overthrowing the ruling Ennahdha government. There are important differences, however, between these activists and their counterparts in Egypt.

On Monday, the Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh condemned the most prominent of these groups, Tamarod. In a radio interview, he described the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement as a “copy cat group,” referring to the Egyptian movement by the same name which mobilized millions against Morsi, and a “danger to the democratic process,” according to AFP.  Tunisia’s Tamarod, however, denies the claim, saying that the similarities with their Egyptian counterparts stops at the name, which means “rebellion” in Arabic.

Mahdi Said, a spokesperson for Tamarod, outright rejected the possibility of military intervention, as seen in Egypt, saying “there is no way for military interference to achieve the goals of the movement.”

Said further distanced Tamarod from the events seen in Egypt, where political parties came to the support of the grassroots Egyptian Tamarod movement, claiming that his group is completely independent.

Commenting on Tamarod’s support base, Said claimed that as of July 14, the group had collected 878,000 signatures, adding that they are prepared to give the names to “an independent, neutral committee” for verification but not to any political party, for fear of government retribution. The group’s Facebook page shows over 14,000 likes.

The Tunisian Tamarod also differs from its Egyptian counterpart in that its leadership was not well-known in the country prior to establishing the group. In Egypt, the movement was led by activists with experience from previous campaigns including the 2004 Kefaya campaign, according to the BBC.

Tamarod is not the only group seeking to remove the government. Another group, Khaneqtuna, has also called for the “correction of the revolution.” Despite efforts to coordinate, disagreements have splintered the groups.

In distinguishing Tamarod from Khaneqtuna, Said cited the former’s commitment to political independence and dedication to maintaining Tunisian government institutions, calling Khaneqtuna’s approach “anarchy.”

Ayoubi Jaouadi, a member of Khaneqtuna, stated that the two groups share similar goals, but different planned means.

In published statements, Tamarod and Khaneqtuna state that the government and National Constituent Assembly have lost legitimacy as their October 23, 2012 mandate has expired. Both groups have made contradictory statements on their preferred outcomes should they succeed in removing the government and NCA.

Alaya Allani, a professor at Manouba University and a historian of Islamism in the Maghreb, doubts Tunisia will follow Egypt’s example and played down Tamarod’s aims.

“In my opinion there aren’t groups seeking to overthrow the government, rather there are groups seeking to pressure the government and the NCA to hasten the setting of a final date for elections and the [ratification of the] constitution. For this, they are demanding the dissolution of the government and the NCA through peaceful political pressure.”

Allani listed Tamarod but also political parties Nidaa Tounes and the Popular Front as examples of groups pressuring the government, whose legitimacy and that of the NCA has been questioned by many since its electoral mandate expired on October 23, 2012.

“The Tamarod is an expression of desperation, directed not only at the government but at the opposition as well.” He is confident, though, that the process will remain peaceful.

“We have not heard so far of someone calling for change through violence,” he said. Allani denied that the military intervention seen in Egypt is possible in Tunisia, saying that the military is “committed to neutrality.” Still, he said that the government would be wise to respond.

“It would be in the interest of Tamarod and the government to negotiate for a date for elections.”

“Ennahdha needs to show that it is not like the Muslim Brotherhood, and that it is a civil democratic party in substance and not only appearance.”

Asma Smadhi contributed reporting.

- See more at: http://www.tunisia-live.net/2013/07/23/rebellion-movements-inspired-by-egypt-splinter-in-tunisia/#sthash.f

Will sectarianism destroy Iraq? Part 1: the counterattack by Iraqi youth

 (I want to thank my Iraqi colleague, Dr. Asmaa Abed, for providing the images in this post and sharing with me her extensive knowledge of efforts to counter sectarian ism in Iraq)

Will sectarianism cause Iraq's political system to collapse and perhaps even lead to the country's fragmentation ? Recent violence in Iraq underscores the increase in political instability.  The creation of a so-called "Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham" reflects the impact of the Syrian civil war on Iraq's "Sunni Arab Triangle."  Young Shi'i fighters traveling to Syria to protect Shi'i shrines from radical Sunni extremists demonstrates the fear many Iraqi Shi'a have of extremist Sunni elements coming to power in Iraq's neighbor.  Recently, over 500 hardened terrorists escaped from Abu Ghrayb prison in a well coordinated attack, posing serious questions about the effectiveness of Iraq's security forces.

These events are disturbing, especially when combined with less visible manifestations of sectarianism, such as the fear of Mosul residents to wear their traditional ethnic garb in public for fear of attracting a violent attack (see Niqash,, July 25, 2013).  Sunni Arab perceptions that Iran and the Maliki government are trying to ethnically cleanse al-Diyala Province through which runs Iraq's most important highway to Iran add more oil to sectarian flames

While these examples of sectarianism identities attract the Western media's reporting, little attention
has been paid to efforts to combat this social disease.  Recently, during a discussion of the problems facing Iraq, my State Department colleague, Charles Wise, who has spent considerable time in Iraq training the post-2003 judiciary, opined that, despite all the violence, "the embers of democracy in Iraq are still burning."  I could not have expressed my own thoughts any better.  Charles was right to point out that, violence notwithstanding, Iraqis are a tough lot and still pressing ahead with efforts to create a more tolerant, pluralist and ultimately democratic society.

There are at least three areas where Iraqis are fighting against sectarianism and the authoritarian rule that lurks right behind it.   First, there is an active campaign, largely driven by youth, to raise public awareness about the political and social destructiveness of Iraqis subscribing to sectarian identities.  Secondly, there are efforts in the national parliament and the Kurdish Regional parliament to thwart sectarianism as well.  In this post, I focus on the efforts of youth.  In a forthcoming post, I will talk about efforts of the respective parliaments to reign in the activities of Iraq's sectarian elites, both Arab and Kurdish.

In the image above, we find a number of Iraqi youth standing in Firdaws (Firdos) Square in Baghdad holding signs identifying their respective confession or ethnicity which say, "I am a Sunni/Shi'i/ Christian/Yazidi/Sabean/ student and I am against sectarianism."  Another sign states, "Our life depends on our unity."

To appear in such a photograph, which presents a direct challenge to sectarian militias and crime syndicates, is very dangerous.  It demonstrates the sentiment of a very large segment of Iraqi youth, especially those who are educated. This accords with the findings of my own research with Arab and Kurdish youth between the ages of 12 and 30 who see sectarianism as destructive of their ability to have a career, family and to live in a politically stable society.

The above sign is one that expresses the concerns of Shi'i youth in the southern city of al-Diwaniya for the death of Sunni youth who were killed by a suicide bomber while playing pool  in a pool hall in the Sunni district of al-Amiriya in Baghdad this past April 18th.  It states that the youth of al-Diwaniyta "send their condolences to the beloved district of al-Amiriya."  Their message is summed up in the main statement across their banner, "Iraqi blood is all the same" (al-damm al-'Iraqi wahidun).  Once again, this photograph demonstrates significant courage because it exposed these youth to sectarian militias in the south, many supported by Iran, such as the League of the Righteous People (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq).

Obviously, the anti-sectarian activity by Iraq's youth rerpesents an important statement by Iraq's  "generation in waiting.".  A wide variety of other sectarian posters likewise demonstrate the thinking of large numbers of Iraqi youth.

This poster celebrates Iraq's ethnic and confessional solidarity, showing a Shi'i cleric, a Sunni tribal shaykh, a Kurdish man and what is probably an urban middle class man.  The poem to the right enjoins Iraqis:
"I ask you in the name of everything
that is sacred to Iraq
to share it among each other despite the efforts of the sectarians.
Don't neglect to share that which is holy to Iraq because it may reach people who only have heard the voices of the sectarians.
Let every Iraqi be non-sectarian."

This poster proclaims: "Sunni, Shi'i, Kurdi, Arabi, Muslim, Christian, what's the most important is their heart is Iraqi."

"One day history will note...
That a people who disagreed about what they shared together...
Destroyed their country..."
 
This caricature, which shows 2 men standing on a pyramid with the word, "Iraq," at the bottom, states, "If you open fire, we will both die together."

Another popular sign, shows two men pierced with a sword.  Signs next to them identify them respectively as Sunni and Shi'i.  The Arabic and English sign in the upper right hand corner, in reads" "Terrorism has no religion." This sign, drawn from an older government campaign called, "Terrorism has no religion!," shows that, with government leadership - sadly lacking under the current administration of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki and Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Arbil - Iraqis could benefit from strong cues from the state not to be taken in by sectarianism as well as use its huge powers of publicity to educate the Iraqi population s to the destructive nature of sectarian identities.

As noted to me by my colleague, Iraqi scholar, Dr. Asmaa Abed, in the effort to combat sectarianism, a number of other images have become very popular in Iraq, especially those that draw upon the wisdom of philosophers and clerics who have warned of the dangers of those who manipulate religion for personal and socially destructive ends.

The posters that are the most popular are those that emphasize sayings of important philosophers and clerics that promote tolerance and ecumenical approaches to religion.  Ibn Rushd (Averroes) noted that, "The trade in religions thrives in societies in which ignorance is widespread."

The above saying comes from  Shaykh al-Hasan al-Basri, who was born in 642 CE of Persian parents.  He warns believers: "Beware of the ignorant worshiper and the immoral scholar, who both promote dissension and civil strife among those they seduce"

No effort to combat sectarianism would be complete without reference to the wisdom of the great Arab sociologist, Ibn Khaldun.  Here he conserves that, "Sedition that hides behind the mask of religion is very popular in societies that are in an era of decline."

There is much more that could be added about the effort, particularly among Iraqi youth, to fight against the spread by sectarian entrepreneurs of socially destructive ideas that seek to set Iraqis confessional sect and ethnic groups one against the other.

As Dr. Abed also noted, Iraqi youth and civil society activists generally have used social media, including Face Book, to mount a campaign to end the law that gives all parliamentarians a pension of $80,000 per month for life once they end their parliamentary membership.  In a society where poverty is still widespread, many Iraqis consider this benefit that the national parliament voted to itself to be  obscene.

Recently, public pressure to change the law has mounted.  Ammar al-Hakim, the head of the Supreme Iraqi Islamic Coubncil has now come out and indicated that members of his party will no longer accept this right to a perpetual pension.  Whether this pledge will hold remains to be seen.  Nevertheless , what the activities of Iraqi democrats show is that indeed, '"the embers of democracy in Iraq are still burning."

Without external financial support and mediation, Islamist parties are discovering their true electoral strength

Guest contributor, Dr. Alaya Alani, is is Professor of Contemporary History at Manouba University in Tunisia.  This interview below was conducted by La Presse on July 22, 2013.

Entretien avec Alaya Allani, spécialiste de l’islamisme au Maghreb

«Sans l’appui financier et médiatique extérieur, les partis islamistes retrouveront leur poids électoral réel...»

Alors que les islamistes continuent de dénoncer un coup d’Etat militaire en Egypte, vous annoncez, comme beaucoup d’autres spécialistes, que la destitution de Morsi et l’enlisement du régime d’Ennahdha en Tunisie marquent historiquement le début de la fin de l’islam politique... Comment en être si sûr ?

Il faut préciser que l’on parle de la fin de l’islam politique comme expérience hégémonique de partis majoritaires au pouvoir et non pas de l’islamisme comme idéologie, encore moins de l’islam comme religion. La raison est que l’expérience menée notamment en Egypte et en Tunisie se trouve devant trois impasses. La première est que la position des partis islamistes au pouvoir reste floue sur le rapport entre l’islam et la démocratie, entre l’islam et la modernité et entre l’islam et le caractère civil de l’Etat. 

Leur stratégie repose sur une philosophie de l’interdépendance entre le politique et le religieux qui entre en contradiction avec les systèmes modernes et les institutions. La deuxième impasse est qu’ils ne présentent pas un programme politique et économique fiable. La troisième impasse est le décalage entre le discours politique et le discours idéologique de ces partis. Alors que le discours politique tend à s’inscrire dans la modernité et dans la démocratie, le discours idéologique reste proche de celui des salafistes et autres courants radicaux. Ils ont commis des erreurs dont certaines sont fatales, tel l’islamisation du mode de vie et l’islamisation des institutions de l’Etat.

En Tunisie, plus de 2.000 nominations de proches d’Ennahdha ont été faites dans l’administration. Ce qui fait dire à certains que des élections dans ces conditions seraient controversées. L’islam politique en tant que parti gouvernant a échoué à convaincre car il est incapable de créer un modèle économique et social capable de concilier le développement et les libertés fondamentales. Le libéralisme économique qu’ils pratiquent ne s’accompagne pas du libéralisme politique et institutionnel corollaire du libéralisme économique : liberté d’expression, respect des droits de l’Homme, égalité hommes-femmes... Il en découle un système curieux et incohérent qui n’a pas son équivalent dans les systèmes universels.   

Ne croyez-vous pas que des facteurs extérieurs comme le changement de position et de stratégie des Etats-Unis et des pays du Golfe aient fortement déterminé sur le cours des évènements ?
Probablement. Il existe des données consignées dans des études stratégiques européennes et occidentales qui proposent de tester ce que donne l’islam politique s’il accède au pouvoir : sera-t-il compatible avec la démocratie ? Les partis islamistes serviront-ils les intérêts des alliés occidentaux ? Seront-ils capables d’encadrer l’islam radical ?... 

Outre l’objectif de contrecarrer la menace d’Al Qaïda, il y avait aussi, du côté de l’Occident, la volonté de réduire l’exil des islamistes en Europe et aux Etats-Unis et l’émigration clandestine. Pour l’Occident, l’islam politique pouvait servir de modèle politico économique  idéal. Le mot d’ordre, après le printemps arabe était alors de le soumettre à un test. Résultat : deux ans après, les pays occidentaux concluent que les islamistes au pouvoir n’arrivent ni à encadrer les radicaux, ni à donner un rendement socioéconomique convaincant, ni même à résoudre le problème de la sécurité qui entrave les possibilités de démocratisation. 

D’un autre côté, le changement de l’Emir du Qatar en synchronisation avec les évènements en Egypte signifie la levée progressive de la mainmise de ce pays sur les Frères musulmans. A moyen terme, le régime qatari ne soutiendrait plus les Frères musulmans. Sur l’échiquier moyen-oriental, cela marque le retour du rôle de l’Arabie Saoudite qui, on le sait bien, soutient plutôt le wahhabisme et l’islam radical. Quoi qu’il en soit, je pense que la baisse de popularité des Frères sur le terrain due à leur faible rendement socioéconomique et conjuguée au retrait du soutien financier et médiatique du Qatar sont des facteurs déterminants.

Vous précisez qu’il s’agit de la fin d’une expérience et non de la mort d’une idéologie. Comment évolueront désormais les partis islamistes face au pouvoir,  d’autant qu’ils sont loin de convenir d’un échec et encore moins d’une  fin ? Quels scénarios peut-on imaginer ?
 
En Tunisie, l’idée d’un gouvernement de coalition à parts égales entre les islamistes et les forces démocratiques est envisageable.  L’Islam politique en tant qu’expérience de partis majoritaires au pouvoir est fini. Du coup, l’islamisme en tant que courant idéologique dans l’opposition sera forcément amené à réviser ses ambitions. Les derniers sondages montrent que les islamistes ne dépassent pas les 20% de voix en Tunisie et 30% en Egypte. Ils se positionneront comme des partis participatifs et non hégémoniques. La démocratisation des partis islamistes les poussera à renoncer à la référence religieuse étant donnée que celle-ci est le point commun de toutes les composantes politiques et sociales et ne peut pas être indéfiniment instrumentalisée exclusivement par l’un et pas l’autre. 

L’Islam politique restera dans l’opposition comme force de pression nécessaire. Les partis doctrinaires ne disparaissent pas facilement d’autant que dans un pays musulman, la religion est une idéologie séduisante qui exploite le sentiment religieux chez les catégories populaires et quelques franges du bazar qui consentent de construire leurs richesses avec les salafistes dont la devise commerciale est le bénéfice absolu et les islamistes qui prônent le libéralisme.
Il sera difficile aux Frères musulmans de reprendre le pouvoir en Egypte dans l’immédiat. Ils ne seront plus majoritaires. 

En Tunisie, c’est vers ce scénario que les choses s’orientent, car lors des prochaines élections, le parti Ennahdha — sans appui politique extérieur, sans le soutien médiatique d’Al-Jazira, sans les mannes d’argent qatari — retrouvera son poids électoral réel. Celui-ci ne doit pas dépasser 15 à 20% en situation normale; et si l’on n’a pas recours à la stratégie de la tension, de la peur et du vide... Tous les sondages prévoient qu’Ennahdha perdrait, aux prochaines élections, près de la moitié de son électorat du 23 octobre 2011 quand ses scores étaient ce qu’ils étaient en raison de la faiblesse et de l’éparpillement de l’opposition, le soutien financier et médiatique du Qatar et le préjugé favorable d’une bonne partie de l’opinion. 

En Tunisie comme en Egypte ou ailleurs, l’islam politique sera capable d’exercer une pression dans la moralisation de la vie politique, la lutte contre la corruption et la création de richesses, dans le respect de la neutralité de l’administration et de la règle démocratique. La participation même limitée des partis islamistes aux affaires de l’Etat réduirait leur dogmatisme et profiterait aux démocraties naissantes.

Comment se présente concrètement l’idée d’un gouvernement de coalition où islamistes et libéraux occuperaient des parts égales, comme vous dites ?
 
On parle d’une probable alliance entre les nahdhaouis et les destouriens sahéliens regroupés autour de Hamed Karoui. Dans ce cas, il y aura des destouriens dans les deux camps. Du côté des démocrates réunis autour de Caïd Essebsi et du côté des islamistes libéraux comme Hamadi Jebali, Samir Dilou, Abdelfattah Mourou... Ce qui ouvre la voie à une éventuelle division au sein du mouvement Ennahdha, composé à majorité de conservateurs qui occupent les postes stratégiques au sein du parti. Cette division est surtout envisageable après les prochaines élections.

Sur le plan géostratégique, quel serait le rôle des grandes puissances dans ces scénarios ?
Les occidentaux et les Etats-Unis en tête traitent toujours avec les équilibres et les rapports de forces qui sont en action. Pour eux, la crédibilité des partis islamistes vient d’être entamée par l’épreuve du pouvoir et la baisse de popularité intérieure. Ils  sont en train de revoir leurs stratégies envers les islamistes. La nouvelle stratégie américaine notamment cherche à composer avec des régimes démocratiques et non théocratiques. Elle aiderait les partis islamistes qui acceptent de faire leur autocritique et leur propre révision interne, à s’impliquer dans la vie politique à parts égales avec les autres forces en présence, et dans le respect du jeu démocratique. Ennahdha peut être un exemple illustre dans ce scénario, tandis qu’en Egypte, ce modèle serait applicable dans un futur moins proche,  puisque les islamistes boycotteraient probablement les prochaines élections.

Croyez-vous que la fin de l’expérience politique actuelle des islamistes s’accompagnera facilement d’une sécularisation sociale ? Est-on sûr que les populations qui se rebellent contre les régimes islamistes sont constituées de forces laïques et démocrates ? Pourquoi les spécialistes font-ils curieusement le silence sur le sentiment religieux des populations, notamment des jeunes, sachant que ce sentiment constitue le moteur de l’islam politique ? 
 
La crise de la jeunesse dans le monde arabe est une crise due à l’absence de modèle. Elle se trouve déchirée entre le modèle occidental et, à l’antipode, celui qui se construit sur les valeurs religieuses. Avec la crise, les jeunes cherchent les modèles et les courants où ils peuvent exprimer colère et rébellion. Dans ce cadre, l’islam politique a essayé d’encadrer ces jeunes avec des moules, des dogmes et un endoctrinement fondé sur des méthodes populistes qui les conduisent directement à l’extrémisme. 

Ce qu’on voyait uniquement au Pakistan et en Afghanistan est en train de s’importer et de séduire les jeunesses arabes, africaines et maghrébines. C’est une manifestation liée à une situation socioéconomique fragile marquée par l’absence d’une éducation. La religiosité devient un signe de mécontentement et de protestation et non un facteur d’apaisement et de construction. C’est plus une forme de revanche qu’une forme de spiritualité. 

Pour illustration, tous les délinquants qui deviennent des jihadistes en six semaines. L’écrasante majorité de la jeunesse radicalisée considère que la religion est un moteur de révolte et de revanche contre des régimes incapables de réaliser son rêve. L’islam politique trouve parmi ces couches une base de recrutement et de mobilisation. D’où la nécessité pour les futurs dirigeants d’articuler leurs programmes autour des aspirations sociales et culturelles des jeunes. 

Est-il envisageable pour les pays arabes de se libérer un jour de ce que l’occident appelle «la fatalité musulmane» alternance entre dictature et théocratie ? 
 
Une révolution culturelle est nécessaire où partis — y compris les plus dogmatiques — et citoyens se mettent d’accord sur un modèle sociétal qui garantit la démocratie pluraliste, l’identité moderniste et s’inscrit totalement dans la catégorie des droits de l’Hommes y compris les droits de la femme. Cette révolution culturelle nécessite un climat politique apaisé. A terme, les partis islamistes se classeront un peu comme les partis d’extrême droite en Europe. Ils seront des partis minoritaires agissant comme des forces de pression. Cela demande beaucoup de temps et requiert une pensée nouvelle qui n’existe pas encore chez l’élite islamiste actuelle.

Entre le mouvement «Tamarrod» et ceux qui prônent le retour aux urnes, comment imaginer la fin de la transition en Tunisie, à la lumière de ce qui s’est passé en Egypte ?
 
Je crois que la pression populaire pacifique sur l’actuel gouvernement et sur l’ANC est un élément très positif et constructif. Les islamistes ne font des concessions que sous la forte pression de la rue. Mais je ne partage pas l’idée de ceux qui appellent à la dissolution du gouvernement et de l’assemblée. Le vide profitera au totalitarisme. Je pense que le changement en Tunisie se fera plus efficacement sans les manifestations des millions comme en Egypte.

Mais l’existence d’un mouvement «Tamarrod» est en soi très positive et doit poursuivre son activité pacifique. Le mouvement doit obliger le gouvernement et l’ANC à conclure la Constitution dans la norme constitutionnelle, fixer une date définitive pour les élections, renoncer à toute instrumentalisation de la religion dans la politique, dans l’administration, dans les mosquées et lors de la prochaine campagne électorale, confier le ministère des Affaires religieuses à un ministre indépendant, réviser les milliers de nominations partisanes dans l’administration, renoncer à la loi d’exclusion, dissoudre les ligues de protection de la révolution... Il ne faut pas moins que cela pour résorber la colère des jeunes qui se rebellent.

Auteur : Entretien conduit par Hedia BARAKET

La Presse 22juillet 2013

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http://www.lapresse.tn/22072013/70228/sans-lappui-financier-et-mediatique-exterieur-les-partis-islamistes-retrouveront-leur-poids-electoral-reel.html